Xie

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISON

Qin Xie, et al., ) CASE NO. 5:23 CV 2288

)

Plaintiffs, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

)

vs. )

)

Jackson Local School District )

Board of Education, et al., ) Memorandum of Opinion and Order

)

Defendants. )

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46).

This is a Section 1983 action. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This case concerns the 2020-2021 school year (the “School Year”) at Jackson Memorial

Middle School (the “Middle School”). During that time, plaintiff Qin Xie’s (“Ms. Xie”) daughter

S.G. was in seventh grade at the Middle School. Because of the on-going COVID-19 pandemic,

defendant Jackson Local School District, Board of Education (“Jackson LSD”) offered students,

including S.G., the option of either in-person or online education. Students utilizing online

education did so using a school-issued Chromebook. During the School Year, S.G. attended classes

both in person and online.

While the parties dispute the accuracy of the records, it is undisputed that Jackson LSD’s

records from the School Year indicate that S.G. frequently failed to attend virtual classes or

complete assignments. Several of S.G.’s teachers attested to her absences and missing assignments.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs maintain that S.G. did attend her virtual classes and did submit her

assignments electronically, but her school-issued Chromebook failed to record her attendance

and/or submissions.

The parties also dispute the extent of the Defendants’ attempts to address Plaintiffs’

insistence that the school-issued Chromebook was the problem. The record is clear however that

Defendants were in frequent communication with Ms. Xie about the issues with S.G.’s attendance

and assignment and they offered several work-around options to address the allegedly faulty

Chromebook, including giving S.G. the option to provide screenshots of her attendance and

complete make-up work during academic detentions. S.G. also took her Chromebook to the Middle

School’s technology help desk. Unfortunately, S.G. continued having issues attending class and

submitting assignments. Plaintiffs maintained that the problem was a faulty Chromebook.

Ultimately, however, S.G. was referred to a truancy prevention mediation conference with the Stark

Country Family Court and received a failing grade in several of her classes.

Ms. Xie filed suit against Defendants1 on behalf of herself and S.G., premised on her belief

that S.G. was attending her virtual classes and submitting her assignments, but the school-issued

Chromebook failed to record either one. In an essence, Ms. Xie faults Defendants for failing to fix

S.G.’s Chromebook and instead issuing her daughter failing grades and referring her to truancy

1 Along with the Jackson LSD, Plaintiffs name several individual Jackson LSD employees as

defendants. The Complaint names each employee-defendant in their official capacity only.

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mediation, which Ms. Xie alleges was done in retaliation for Ms. Xie insisting that Defendants were

incorrectly blaming S.G. for her attendance and assignment issues.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint identifies five causes of action: (1) “Due Process; 42 U.S.C. §1983;

R.C. §Section[sic] 3313.64,” (2) “Equal Protection; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; R.C. §3313.64,” (3) “Due

Process; Ohio Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 16; R.C. §3313.64,” (4) “Equal Protection; Ohio

Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 2; R.C. §3313.64,” and (5) “Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of

Severe Emotional Distress.” (Doc. 1.) Defendants have now moved for summary judgment in their

favor as to all five causes of action. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also LaPointe v. UAW, Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.

1993). The burden of showing the absence of any such genuine dispute of material fact rests with

the moving party:

[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions

of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with affidavits,” if any, which it believes demonstrates the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A fact is

“material” only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in

support of the [moving party’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the

jury could reasonably find for the [moving party].” Id. at 252.

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The evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may permissibly be drawn from the facts

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The nonmoving party must present “significant

probative evidence” to demonstrate that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993). In doing so, the

nonmoving party may not simply rely on its pleading, but must “produce evidence that results in a

conflict of material fact to be resolved by a jury.” Cox v. Ky. Dep’t. of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150

(6th Cir. 1995).

“The nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court’s attention to those

specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.”

Fulson v. Columbus, 801 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D. Ohio 1992). “The trial court no longer has the duty to

search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C.

Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479–80 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Frito–Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863

F.2d 1029, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Moreover, if the evidence is “merely colorable” and not

“significantly probative,” the court may decide the legal issue and grant summary judgment.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

Defendants contend that all of Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law. The Court will

address each in turn.

A. Ms. Xie’s Individual Claims

As an initial matter, Defendants contend that several individual claims asserted by Ms. Xie

fail as a matter of law because they are time barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

Defendants are correct.

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The applicable statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims arising in Ohio is two years.

LRL Props. v. Portage Metro Housing Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995); Nadra v. Mbah,

119 Ohio St. 3d 305, 312 (2008). Likewise, the applicable statute of limitations for claims of

negligent infliction of emotional distress under Ohio is also two years. Lawyer Coop. Publ’g Co. v.

Muething, 603 N.E.2d 969, 974–75 (Ohio 1992).2

Here, Plaintiffs do not dispute that their claims had accrued by, at the latest, August 17,

2021. Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until November 28, 2023. Accordingly, to the extent

Ms. Xie has asserted any individual Section 1983 and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress

claims, any such claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and, thus, fail as a matter

of law.

B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Under Section 1983

Plaintiffs assert their First and Second Causes of Action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging violations of Plaintiffs’ rights guaranteed by the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses

of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs bring these claims

against Jackson LSD and several individual employees in their official capacities.3

2 Plaintiffs’ contention that both claims are instead subject to Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.09(D)’s four-

year statute of limitations completely ignores the above-cited, controlling precedent. LRL Props., 55

F.3d at 1105 (“[This Court has] definitively held that ‘the appropriate statute of limitations for 42

U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio . . . requires that actions . . . be filed within two

years after their accrual.’” (quoting Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1989) (en

banc))); Muething., 603 N.E.2d at 975 (“[W]e hold that claims of negligently inflicted humiliation

or loss of reputation must be asserted within two years of their discovery, pursuant to R.C.

2305.10.”).

3 In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs acknowledge that their Complaint names the employee-

defendants in their official capacities only. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs claim that the explicit language

of their own pleadings is not dispositive, and this Court should instead read in claims against the

employee-defendants in their individual capacities. In support of this request, Plaintiffs cite one

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Section 1983 claims brought against individuals in their “official capacities” are treated as

being brought against the government entity itself—a Monell claim. Leach v. Shelby Cty. Sheriff,

891 F.2d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1989). It is well established that a government entity may not be

sued for injuries inflicted solely by its employees or agents under Section 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also, e.g., Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 620 (6th Cir.

2015); D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 2014). Rather, a plaintiff may only hold

a government entity liable under Section 1983 for the entity’s own wrongdoing. Gregory v. City of

Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 752 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to sue a

local government entity on the theory of respondeat superior.” (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692–

94)). Or, as the Sixth Circuit explained, “a municipality is liable under § 1983 only where, ‘through

its deliberate conduct,’ it was ‘the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.’” D’Ambrosio, 747

F.3d at 388–89 (quoting Alman v. Reed, 703 F.3d 887, 903 (6th Cir. 2013)).

To properly allege an institutional liability claim, a plaintiff must adequately allege “(1) the

existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision

making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or

case: Sollenberger v. Sollenberger, 173 F. Supp. 3d 608, 630 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2026). In

Sollenberger, the plaintiff failed to designate any capacity in the complaint, which left the Court no

choice but to rely on the pleadings to determine the scope of the claim. That is not the case here.

Here, Plaintiffs’ Complaint explicitly names the employee-defendants in their official capacities

only. Plaintiffs have neither sought nor been granted leave to amend their complaint and Plaintiffs

cannot do so through their summary judgment briefing. Howard v. Tennessee, 740 F. App’x 837,

843 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[P]laintiffs cannot raise new claims in their summary judgment briefing and

should instead request leave to amend their complaint.”); see also Davis v. Echo Valley Condo.

Ass’n, 945 F.3d 483, 496 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Parties who seek to raise new claims at the summary-

judgment stage must first move to amend their pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(a) before asserting the claims in summary-judgment briefing.”).

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supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance [of] or acquiescence [to] federal rights

violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013); see also D'Ambrosio, 747 F.3d

at 386. Further, there can be no liability under Monell without an underlying constitutional

violation. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). See also North v. Cuyahoga

Cty., 754 F. App'x 380, 389 (6th Cir. 2018) (“There must be a constitutional violation for a § 1983

claim against a municipality to succeed—if the plaintiff has suffered no constitutional injury, his

Monell claim fails.”).

1. Due Process Claims

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . .

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” There are two types of

due process claims—“procedural” and “substantive.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746,

(1987) (distinguishing the two concepts). It is not clear which type of claim Plaintiffs advance here

and, thus, the Court addresses each in turn.

a. Procedural Due Process

A procedural due process claim turns on whether there exists a liberty or property interest

which has been interfered with by the State, and whether the procedures attendant upon that

deprivation were constitutionally sufficient. To establish a procedural due process claim, plaintiffs

“must first identify a protected liberty or property interest of which [they were] deprived.” Jordan v.

Stroughter, 2022 WL 620119, at *4 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 570–71 (1972)). Only then will courts “examine whether the procedures attendant

upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Id. (citing Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11

F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir. 1993)).

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Without citing any case law, Plaintiffs contend that “Plaintiffs had a property interest in a

public education. That interest necessarily includes the grades S.G. received, without which would

undermine her academic position and abilities.” (Doc. 51, at 19.) While Plaintiffs do have a

property interest in access to a public education, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975), other

courts have consistently held that that right does not extend to grading.4 E.g., James v. Cleveland

Sch. Dist., 45 F.4th 860, 866 (5th Cir. 2022). Rather, due process is triggered only by a student’s

“total exclusion from the educational process.” See Dickens by Dickens v. Johnson Cty. Bd. of

Educ., 61 F. Supp. 155, 157–58 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (quoting Goss, 419 U.S. at 576).

It is undisputed that S.G. was never expelled or suspended for any period of time. Nor have

Plaintiffs pointed this Court to any evidence that Defendants otherwise prevented S.G. from

attending classes—either virtually or in person.5 Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot establish that their

due process rights to public education were violated.

4 To be sure, the specific grades assessed to individual students and disciplinary procedures

espoused in Jackson LSD’s student handbook are wholly discretionary. “[A] party cannot possess a

property interest in the receipt of a benefit when the state’s decision to award or withhold the

benefit is wholly discretionary.” Med. Corp., Inc. v. City of Lima, 296 F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir.

2002); see McClain v. N.W. Cmty. Corr. Ctr. Judicial Corr. Bd., 440 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2006)

(“No constitutional entitlement to procedural due process can logically arise when the decision-

maker’s power is wholly discretionary.”).

5 Plaintiffs briefly mention in their opposition brief that “S.G., as well as other students,

encountered repeated problems with their Chromebook . . . include[ing] repeated inability to login,

computer crashes, substantial delay in computer processing, and blank screens.” (Doc. 51, at 15.)

Plaintiffs, however, include zero citations to the record for these claims. In any event, Plaintiffs do

not contend these issues rose to a constitutional deprivation of her right to access public education

and, in fact, Plaintiffs maintain that Ms. Xie witnessed her daughter successfully attending virtual

classes and submitting assignments.

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Plaintiffs do not identify any other alleged protected liberty or property interest of which

they were deprived and, thus, cannot establish a violation of their procedural due process rights.

b. Substantive Due Process Rights

Claims for violations of a plaintiff’s substantive due process rights involve the deprivation

or infringement of a protected liberty interest. See Mares v. Mia. Valley Hosp., 96 F.4th 945, 955

(6th Cir. 2024). “[T]he interests protected by substantive due process are . . . much narrower than

those protected by procedural due process.” Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 249–50 (6th

Cir. 2003). The “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

includes “two categories of substantive rights[:]” (1) “rights guaranteed by the first eight

Amendments” and (2) “a select list of fundamental rights that are not mentioned anywhere in the

Constitution.” Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2246 (2022). Under either

category, a right must be “deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition” and must be “essential to our

Nation’s ‘scheme of ordered liberty.’” Id.

Here, the only “right” Plaintiffs discuss is S.G.’s property right to access public education in

Ohio. S.G.’s right to public education, however, is neither a right guaranteed by the first eight

Amendments, nor a fundamental right. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he

Supreme Court has held explicitly that the right to attend public school is not a fundamental right

for the purposes of due process analysis.” (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411

U.S. 1, 33–37 (1973)); Wayne v. Shadowen, 15 F. App’x 271, 282–83 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[N]o child

in America, irrespective of any particular status or condition, possesses any affirmative federal

constitutional entitlement to a publicly-funded, tuition-free education.” (emphasis omitted); see also

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986) (remarking that public education “is not among the

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rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.” (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at

35)); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“Public education is not a ‘right’ granted to

individuals by the Constitution.” (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35)).6

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to establish any substantive due process violation.

For all these reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Defendants violated their rights

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Defendants are entitled to

judgment entered in their favor as to Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action.7

2. Equal Protection Claims

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from denying to

“any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The Equal Protection Clause

embodies the principle that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

“The threshold element of an equal protection claim is disparate treatment. Scarbrough v.

Morgan Cty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006). “[O]nce disparate treatment is shown,

the equal protection analysis to be applied is determined by the classification used by government

6 A parent’s right to direct their child’s education is recognized as fundamental, however, that right

does not encompass the ability to direct how a school district provides an education. Blau v. Fort

Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The critical point is this: While parents

may have a fundamental right to decide whether to send their child to a public school, they do not

have a fundamental right generally to direct how a public school teaches their child.”). Further, as

discussed above, Ms. Xie’s individual Section 1983 claims are time barred.

7 Even if Plaintiffs had established a cognizable due process violation, they wholly fail to tie that

violation to any policy or custom within the Jackson LSD. See Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925

F.3d 793, 828 (6th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a Section 1983 claims against a political subdivision

are established by “showing that the [political subdivision] had a ‘policy or custom’ that caused the

violation of [the plaintiff’s] right”).

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decision-makers.” Id. In making an equal protection challenge, the plaintiff bears the initial burden

of demonstrating that some discrimination has occurred against him or her, which has not occurred

against other individuals who were similarly situated. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439; Clements

v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 967 (1982).

In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that other students at the Middle School also missed

classes and assignments like S.G., but white and/or Caucasian students were not referred to truancy

mediation or required to submit to detention like S.G.8 In their opposition brief, however, Plaintiffs

do not proffer any evidence of this alleged disparate treatment. In fact, Plaintiffs do not even

discuss this basis of their equal protection claim at all. At most, Plaintiffs say that “[i]n June 2021,

S.G.’s email and Chromebook access were revoked while other students retained theirs.” (Doc. 51,

at 20.) Simply, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that any Defendant discriminated against S.G.

because of her membership in any protected class.9

8 Plaintiffs also allege in their Complaint that Defendants retaliated against Ms. Xie. According to

Plaintiffs, “the more Ms. Xie expressed her position that Defendants were incorrect in their

assessments about S.G. being absent and not submitting her work, the more Defendants resisted and

ignored Ms. Xie’s plea, including accusing her of manipulating documents, such as screenshots

showing S.G.’s attendance and other communications between S.G. and her teachers, including her

communications with Ms. Billing and Ms. Johnson. Such conduct was tantamount to retaliation

against Plaintiffs for exercising their rights under the constitution[.]” (Doc. 1 ¶ 89.)

As discussed, Ms. Xie’s individual Section 1983 claims are barred by the statute of limitations. But

even if this claim was not time barred, or it somehow alleged retaliation against S.G., it would still

fail because, among other shortcomings, Plaintiffs have not pointed this Court to any evidence that

even remotely ties the alleged retaliation to a policy or custom within the Jackson LSD. See

Jackson, 925 F.3d at 828. At most, Plaintiffs have alleged isolated incidents taken by unnamed

individual Defendants. (Doc. 51, at 20.) But Jackson LSD “may not be held liable under § 1983 on

a respondeat superior theory[.]” Id.

9 To be sure, Defendants presented evidence that of six total students referred to truancy mediation

during the School Year, four were white and/or Caucasian. Further, white and/or Caucasian

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Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to establish their claim that Defendants violated their

Equal Protection Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Defendants are entitled to judgment

entered in their favor as to Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action.

C. Plaintiffs’ Third and Fourth Causes of Action: Claims Under the Ohio Constitution

Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth Causes of Action purport to allege claims under Article I,

Section 16 (“Section 16”) and Article I, Section 2 (“Section 2”) of the Ohio Constitution. The

problem, however, is that neither Section 16 nor Section 2 creates a private cause of action.

Autumn Care Ctr., Inc. v. Todd, 22 N.E.3d 1105, 1110 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v.

Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 523 (2000)).

Plaintiffs concede that neither Section 16 nor Section 2 is self-executing but contend—

without citing any authority—that Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.48 is an enabling statute.10 Ohio Rev.

Code § 3313.48 is not an enabling statute. Its language provides no explicit private cause of action.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Third and Fourth Causes of Action fail to state any cognizable

claim and Defendants are entitled to judgment entered in their favor.

students were referred for detention during the School Year. Plaintiffs have not cited any evidence

that refutes these numbers.

10 Plaintiffs also mention Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.64 in their complaint and opposition brief, but

they never claim it is an enabling statute. To be sure, it is not. See Forest Hills Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ., v. Huegal, 2003 WL 21496835 (2003).

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D. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Cause of Action: Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of

Emotional Distress

Plaintiffs’ Fifth Cause of Action names a claim for intentional and/or negligent infliction of

emotional distress under Ohio law. Whichever type of claim, Defendants are entitled to statutory

immunity.

When applying Ohio law, courts must employ a three-tier analysis to determine whether a

political subdivision is entitled to immunity from civil liability under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02.

Cater v. Cleveland, 697 N.E.2d 610, 614 (Ohio 1998). First, Section 2744.02(A)(1) sets out a

general rule that political subdivision is not liable in damages. Greene Cty. Agric. Soc. v. Liming,

733 N.E.2d 1141, 1146 (Ohio 2000). In setting out this rule, Section 2744.02(A)(1) classifies the

functions of political subdivision into governmental and proprietary functions, and states that the

general rule of immunity is not absolute but is limited by the exceptions found in Section

2744.02(B). Id. Under the second tier of the analysis, it must be determined whether any of the

exceptions in Section 2744.02(B) apply. Id. If any of the exceptions are found to apply, the third

tier of analysis is a consideration of the defenses found in Section 2744.03. Id.

Here, Jackson LSD is a political subdivision.11 None of the exceptions enumerated in

Section 2744.02(B) apply.12 As such, Defendants are immune from liability for Plaintiffs’ negligent

11 Because the Jackson LSD employee-defendants were sued only in their official capacity, the

claims against them are treated as against Jackson LSD itself. Chesher v. Neyer, 477 F.3d 784, 797

(6th Cir. 2007) (“The Ohio Court of Appeals has held that an action against an officer in his

‘official capacity’ is simply another way of pleading an action against the governmental entity

itself.” (citing Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, N.E.2d 1223, 1232 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999))).

12 Confusingly, Plaintiffs do not contend that any of the exceptions enumerated in Section

2744.02(B) apply, but they argue that Defendants are not entitled to immunity because they acted

with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. (Doc. 51, at 22–24.) This

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and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress claims and entitled to judgment entered in their

favor on the same.13

CONCLUSION

For all the aforementioned reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46)

is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

United States District Judge

inquiry is irrelevant, however, where, as here, none of the exceptions enumerated in Section

2744.02(B) apply.

13 Even if Defendants were not entitled to statutory immunity, Plaintiffs’ claims fail. Plaintiffs

cannot establish any claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because they have not

provided any evidence suggesting they witnessed an accident or otherwise were within a sphere of

danger causing them to fear bodily harm, as required for a traditional negligent infliction of

emotional distress claim. Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 76 Ohio St. 3d 34, 40 (1996) (“Ohio

courts have limited recovery for claims alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress to

situations such as where the plaintiff was a bystander to an accident or was in fear of physical

consequences to his own person.”).

Nor can Plaintiffs establish any claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because they

have not pointed this Court to any sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct. See Phung v. Waste

Mgmt., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ohio 1994). At most, Plaintiffs contend they experienced

“humiliation, dishonor, disgrace, indignity, shame, embarrassment[,] and severe stress” because

S.G. was referred to truancy mediation, assigned academic detention, and received failing grades in

several classes. (Doc. 51, at 28.) This falls short of the types of conduct found to be extreme and

outrageous under Ohio law. Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &

Helpers of Am., 453 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ohio 1983) (“Liability has been found only where the

conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible

bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of

the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,

‘Outrageous!’” (citation omitted)).

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