Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-0808

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

COUNCIL FOR THE ADVANCEMENT MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

OF SOCIAL SERVICES AND EDUCATION

D/B/A CASSE COMMUNITY HEALTH

INSTITUTE

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”)

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Record Document 36), seeking judgment on

liability as to certain Title VII claims asserted on behalf of Destiny Johnson (“Johnson”).

The defendant, Council for the Advancement of Social Services & Education d/b/a

CASSE Community Health Institute (“CASSE”), opposes the Motion. See Record

Document 43. The EEOC replied. See Record Document 45. For the reasons stated

below, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Johnson, who is black, was employed by CASSE as a dental assistant at its

Shreveport clinic from July 2019 until June 2020. See Record Document 36-2 at 1. During

Johnson’s employment, Dr. Edward Gray Chumley (“Dr. Chumley”) served as the clinic’s

dental director. See id. Dr. Chumley’s wife, Mary Elizabeth Chumley (“Ms. Chumley”),

served as CASSE’s Chief Executive Officer during all relevant times. See id. at 4.

In early June 2020, during a period of widespread racial justice protests, Dr.

Chumley asked Johnson whether she had attended a Black Lives Matter protest. See

Record Documents 36-6 at 2, 36-7 at 1, 36-8 at 7, 36-10 at 1. Johnson was the only black

employee present at the time the question was asked. See Record Document 36-2 at 3.

Johnson testified that she was upset and humiliated by the comment because she found

it racially charged. See Record Document 36-6 at 2. Johnson complained about the

comment to Victoria Poe (“Poe”) expressing that she felt uncomfortable and believed the

comment was inappropriate. See Record Document 36-2 at 3. Poe relayed the

information to Karen Weber (“Weber”), who then relayed Johnson’s complaint to Ms.

Chumley. See id. at 3–4.

Ms. Chumley immediately sent a text message to Johnson placing her on unpaid

administrative leave pending an investigation into the incident that occurred between

Johnson and Dr. Chumley. See Record Document 36-9. Johnson was never asked to

return to work. See Record Document 36-8 at 1. During the EEOC investigation, CASSE

stated that Johnson’s removal stemmed from her “introduction of race” into the workplace.

See id. at 4. However, CASSE asserts that Johnson was terminated, at least in part, for

performance related reasons. See id. at 1–2.

The parties dispute whether Dr. Chumley made additional racially offensive

remarks, including comments referencing blackface and looting. See id. at 3–4; see also

Record Document 36-6 at 1. No evidence has sufficiently established those disputed

statements for purposes of summary judgment.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Summary Judgment Standard

A court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the pleadings “show

that there is no dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323-24 (1986). In applying this standard, the court should construe “all facts and

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Deshotel v. Wal-Mart Louisiana, L.L.C., 850

F.3d 742, 745 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that

there is no genuine issue of material fact as to issues critical to trial that would result in

the movant's entitlement to judgment in its favor, including identifying the relevant portions

of pleadings and discovery. See Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir.

1995). Courts must deny the moving party's motion for summary judgment if the movant

fails to meet this burden. See id. If the movant satisfies its burden, however, the

nonmoving party must “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). In evaluating motions for summary judgment,

courts must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There is no

genuine issue for trial, and thus a grant of summary judgment is warranted, when the

record as a whole “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party

....” Id.

“A partial summary judgment order is not a final judgment but is merely a pre-trial

adjudication that certain issues are established for trial of the case.” Looney Ricks Kiss

Architects, Inc. v. Bryan, 2014 WL 1092403, at *2 (W.D. La. 2014). Partial summary

judgment is for narrowing and focusing the issues for trial. See Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall

Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1415 (5th Cir. 1993).

II. Retaliation

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee

because she has opposed an unlawful employment practice or participated in protected

activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In analyzing a Title VII retaliation claim at the

summary judgment stage, the Court must first determine whether the EEOC’s claim is

supported by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence, because that determination

dictates the analytical framework the Court must apply. See Cooper v. Dallas Police Ass'n,

278 Fed. Appx. 318, 320 (5th Cir. 2008).

Where a plaintiff relies solely on circumstantial evidence of retaliation, courts apply

the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. See 411

U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under that framework, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case

for retaliation, showing three elements: “(1) the employee engaged in [an] activity

protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took [an] adverse employment action against the

employee; and (3) a causal connection exists between that protected activity and the

adverse employment action.” See Cooper, 278 Fed. Appx. at 320. Once the employee

proves the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to “articulate some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action. See McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Then, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the

reason offered by the employer is a pretext for retaliation. See id. at 804.

By contrast, where the record contains direct evidence of retaliatory motive, the

burden-shifting framework does not apply. Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed,

proves the fact of retaliatory intent without inference or presumption. See Brown v. E.

Mississippi Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993). When direct evidence

exists, “the burden of proof shifts to the employer to establish by a preponderance of the

evidence that the same decision would have been made regardless of the forbidden

factor.” Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 778 F.3d 473, 475 (5th Cir.

2015).

As explained below, there is direct evidence of retaliatory intent, so the Court will

use the appropriate framework. First, the EEOC has shown that Johnson engaged in

protected activity under Title VII. A protected activity includes an opposition to any

unlawful employment practice under Title VII. See § 2000e-3(a). An unlawful employment

practice includes discriminating against an individual based on race. See § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Here, it is questionable whether Dr. Chumley asking Johnson if she had attended a Black

Lives Matter protest, standing alone, is sufficient to form the basis of a discrimination

claim. However, for the first element of a retaliation claim, “protected activity” only requires

an opposition to an unlawful employment practice. A plaintiff is not required to show that

an unlawful employment practice actually existed, but only that the plaintiff had a

“reasonable belief” that such practices existed. De Anda v. St. Joseph Hosp., 671 F.2d

850, 853 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982). Thus, the question becomes whether Johnson opposed a

practice that she reasonably believed to be unlawful.

The record shows that Johnson subjectively believed that Dr. Chumley had

“singled [her] out” and was “targeting [her] because of [her] race.” Record Document 36-

6 at 2. Further, the context of Dr. Chumley’s question, asked in front of a group of white

coworkers, reinforces the possible reasonableness of Johnson’s belief that the comment

was racially charged and discriminatory. Johnson’s belief that Dr. Chumley was unlawfully

discriminating against her based on her race was not unreasonable.

The next question is whether Johnson opposed this conduct. The record reflects

that Johnson complained about Dr. Chumley’s conduct to Poe. See Record Document

36-8 at 13. Poe then relayed the information to Weber, who then told Ms. Chumley about

Johnson’s complaints. See id. at 12. An opposition under Title VII means resisting or

contending against the discrimination. See Crawford v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville and

Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 277–78 (2009). Johnson’s reporting of Dr.

Chumley’s conduct meets the requirement of an opposition. Because Johnson opposed

an activity that she believed to be unlawful, she was engaged in a protected activity,

satisfying the first element for a retaliation claim. See Cooper, 278 Fed. Appx. at 320.

Next, the Court must determine whether CASSE took an adverse employment

action against Johnson. See id. An adverse action is any act which may dissuade “a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Price v.

Wheeler, 834 F. App’x 849, 858 (5th Cir. 2020). Here, Johnson was placed on unpaid

administrative leave, which is clearly an adverse employment action. See Record

Document 36-9. Thus, the second prong for a retaliation claim is met.

Lastly, the Court must ask whether there is a causal connection between the

protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Cooper, 278 Fed. Appx. at

320. Here, there is direct evidence that Johnson was placed on unpaid leave because

she complained about Dr. Chumley’s conduct. Ms. Chumley texted Johnson and stated

that she was being placed on unpaid leave until she could complete her assessment

concerning the incident between Dr. Chumley and Johnson. See Record Document 36-

9. Additionally, Ms. Chumley stated that Johnson was terminated for her “introduction of

race” into the workplace. See Record Document 36-8 at 3–4. Considering CASSE has

admitted that Johnson was placed on unpaid leave for complaining about Dr. Chumley’s

comment, the third element of the retaliation claim is clearly met. Therefore, the EEOC

has established a prima facie case for the retaliation claim.

Because the Court has found direct evidence of retaliation, CASSE must prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that it would have placed Johnson on unpaid leave even

if it had not taken her complaints about Dr. Chumley into account. See Etienne, 778 F.3d

at 475. CASSE attempts to blame Johnson’s termination on performance deficiencies.

See Record Document 36-8 at 3–4. However, Ms. Chumley’s text to Johnson directly

stated that Johnson was being placed on unpaid leave until Ms. Chumley completes her

assessment surrounding the incident between Johnson and Dr. Chumley. See Record

Document 36-9. This is clear statement that Johnson was placed on unpaid leave pending

an investigation into the possible race discrimination. See id. Because the evidence is

clear that Johnson would not have been placed on leave if it weren’t for her complaints

about Dr. Chumley, CASSE has not met its burden. See Etienne, 778 F.3d at 475.

The Court notes that even if there were no direct evidence, and the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework applied, the EEOC would still prevail. See 411 U.S.

at 802–04. Although CASSE has presented an alternative, nondiscriminatory reason for

Johnson’s placement on unpaid leave (i.e., performance deficiencies), the EEOC has

shown this is a pretext. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–04. “A plaintiff may

establish pretext either through evidence of disparate treatment or by showing that the

employer's proffered explanation is false or ‘unworthy of credence.’” Thompson v. Houma

Terrebonne Hous., 2019 WL 2524591, at *3 (E.D. La. 2019) (citing Thomas v. Johnson,

788 F.3d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 2015). Here, the EEOC has presented the text message from

Ms. Chumley to Johnson which clearly states that the reason for her being placed on

unpaid leave is to investigate the incident. See Record Document 36-9. Therefore, the

EEOC’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Record Document 36) is GRANTED on

the issue of liability as to the retaliation claim.

III. Discrimination

To successfully establish a prima facie case for racial discrimination in violation of

Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following: “(1) [she] is a member of a protected

group; (2) [she] was qualified for the position at issue; (3) [she] was subject to an adverse

employment action; and (4) [she] was treated less favorably than a similarly situated

employee outside of [her] protected group under nearly identical circumstances.”

Thompson, 2019 WL 2524591, at *3 (citing Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F. 3d 253,

259 (5th Cir. 2009)). Once the plaintiff proves the prima facie case, the burden shifts to

the employer to provide an “alternative non-discriminatory explanation for the adverse

employment action.” Lee, 574 F. 3d at 259. If the employer can provide such an

explanation, then the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the explanation is

“merely a pretext for racial bias.” Id. Here, it is undisputed that Johnson is black, which

means she is a member of a protected class. Additionally, as stated above, Johnson faced

the adverse employment action of being placed on unpaid leave.

To determine whether an employee was qualified for the position at issue, courts

considers objective qualifications. See Berquist v. Washington Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344,

350 (5th Cir. 2007). Generally, an employee can show he is qualified by “showing that he

continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse

action ….” Id. Here, Johnson had sufficient qualifications to be hired for the job, and there

is no evidence she lost those qualifications during her employment. Although CASSE

maintains that Johnson was fired, at least in part, because of performance deficiencies,

this evidence does not prove a lack of qualifications at the prima facie stage. See id. at

351; see also Record Document 36-8 at 3–4. Therefore, the EEOC has established that

Johnson was qualified.

Next, the Court must consider whether the EEOC has proven that Johnson was

treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside of her protected group

under nearly identical circumstances. See Thompson, 2019 WL 2524591, at *3. For this

element, the plaintiff must offer a fellow employee as a comparator and “demonstrate that

the employment actions at issue were taken ‘under nearly identical circumstances.’” Lee,

574 F. 3d at 260. Here, the only available information for the Court to consider is that

Johnson claims she was replaced by two white dental assistants. See Record Document

36-3 at 17. The EEOC has not presented evidence proving that CASSE hired two white

dental assistants as replacements. Further, the EEOC has presented no evidence of how

these alleged new hires were similarly situated to Johnson. Thus, the Motion for Summary

Judgment (Record Document 36) is DENIED as to the discrimination claim because a

genuine issue of material fact remains regarding treatment of similarly situated

employees.

IV. Hostile Work Environment

To prevail on a race-based hostile work environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff

must demonstrate:

(1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome

harassment; (3) such harassment was based on race; (4) the harassment

complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; [and]

(5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question

and failed to take prompt remedial action.

Parker v. State of Louisiana Dept. of Educ. Spec. Sch. Dist., 323 Fed. Appx. 321, 325 (5th

Cir. 2009). “To affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment, the harassing conduct

‘must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's]

employment and create an abusive working environment.’” E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const.

Co., L.L.C., 731 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Aryain v. Wal–Mart Stores of Tex.,

L.P., 534 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir.2008)). A plaintiff “must subjectively perceive the

harassment as sufficiently severe or pervasive, and this subjective perception must be

objectively reasonable.” Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 138 (5th Cir. 2003). Courts

use a “totality-of-the-circumstances test that focuses on ‘the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating ...

and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.’” Id. (citing

Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 347 (5th Cir. 2007)).

Here, the only race-based conduct in the summary judgment record that

indisputably took place is Dr. Chumley’s question about whether Johnson had attended a

Black Lives Matter protest. Although the EEOC alleges that Dr. Chumley made various

other racial comments at the workplace, the Court cannot consider those comments at

this stage because they are disputed. Thus, the question is whether this one comment

about Johnson’s attendance at the protests is sufficient to establish a hostile work

environment.

The Court finds that this one comment, standing alone, is insufficient to establish

a hostile work environment. Using the framework explained above, this comment does

not show frequent discrimination, and it is not so severe or pervasive to create an abusive

work environment. Therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment (Record Document 36)

is DENIED as to the hostile work environment claim.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the EEOC’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Record Document

36) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED on the issue

of liability as to the retaliation claim. The motion is DENIED as to the discrimination and

hostile work environment claims.

An order consistent with this Ruling shall issue herewith.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, on this 5th day of January,

2026.

KPpeticccs [ober

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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