Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Blue Train, Inc., ) CASE NO. 1:25 CV 1950

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

)

vs. )

) Memorandum of Opinion and Order

City of Cleveland, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

Introduction

This matter is before the Court upon City Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings. (Doc. 11). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

Facts

On September 10, 2025, plaintiff Blue Train, Inc. dba Play Bar and Grill filed a Verified

Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas

Court against defendants City of Cleveland, Mayor Justin Bibb, Chief of Police Dorothy A.

Todd, and Chief Director of Public Safety Dornat A. Drummond (collectively hereafter, the City

defendants). Plaintiff filed an Amended Verified Complaint and Motion for Temporary

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Restraining Order on September 12, 2025, in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court against

the City defendants, George Kimson, and Flats East Phase 1 Retail, LLC (collectively hereafter,

the Flats defendants). The City defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal

question jurisdiction as plaintiff had alleged a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. By prior

Order, this Court denied the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.

The Amended Complaint alleges the following. Plaintiff is the owner/operator of the

premises located at 1051 West 10th Street in Cleveland, Ohio. The Flats defendants are the

owner landlord and/or property management company in control of the lease at 1051 W. 10th

Street. In the early evening of September 7, 2025, a shooting occurred in the area of West 10th

and West 11th Streets. Plaintiff was not involved in or responsible for the shooting. Shortly

thereafter, agents of the City of Cleveland notified plaintiff “that business located near the scene

of the incident was to be boarded and closed.” A couple hours later, without providing plaintiff

notice or an opportunity to be heard, the City agents boarded the premises located at 1051 West

10th Street. Plaintiff has been unable to access the business premises since the boarding, causing

ongoing financial losses and reputational harm. On September 11, 2025, plaintiff learned of

crews removing the boarding, but it has received no communication regarding these actions.

Plaintiff’s counsel contacted the City of Cleveland Law Department and was informed that

the boarding was being removed because the City had been informed by Flats East Phase 1

Retail, LLC that it would “lockout” or “evict” plaintiff. Plaintiff has not received notification of

such. (Am.Compl.). The Amended Complaint sets forth two claims: a violation of due process

rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment (Count One) and wrongful interference with

business operations (Count Two).

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The Answer to the Amended Complaint filed by the City defendants asserts that “Play

Bar and Grill has a long history of criminal incidents occurring at, inside, or in the immediate

vicinity of, the Premises.” Attached are the police reports and/or 911 call chronologies of

relevant incidents. (Doc. 10 ¶ 7, Exs. 2-7).

An attachment to the Answer shows that on September 10, 2025, defendant Drummond,

the City’s Director of Public Safety, sent plaintiff a declaration of nuisance based on the

September 7 shooting and other incidents. The notice outlined a procedure for a post-deprivation

hearing as well as a hearing on the nuisance declaration. (Doc. 10 Ex. B).

This matter is now before the Court upon City Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings.

Standard of Review

A “motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is generally reviewed under

the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”Mellentine v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 2013 WL

560515 (6th Cir. February 14, 2013) (citing EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851

(6th Cir.2001)). “For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded

allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be

granted only if the moving party is nevertheless entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank,

N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir.2007).

Thus, “[w]e assume the factual allegations in the complaint are true and construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Comtide Holdings, LLC v. Booth Creek

Management Corp., 2009 WL 1884445 (6th Cir. July 2, 2009) (citing Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate

Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.2008) ). In construing the complaint in the light most

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favorable to the non-moving party, “the court does not accept the bare assertion of legal

conclusions as enough, nor does it accept as true unwarranted factual inferences.” Gritton v.

Disponett, 2009 WL 1505256 (6th Cir. May 27, 2009) (citing In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.,

123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir.1997). As outlined by the Sixth Circuit:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the

statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.”Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). However, “[f]actual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and to “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. A plaintiff must “plead[ ]

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir.2012). Thus, Twombly and Iqbal require that

the complaint contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face based on factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570;

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Discussion

(1) Count One

Count One asserts in full:

Count I – Violation of Due Process Rights

By closing and boarding up Plaintiff’s business without notice or hearing, Defendants

deprived Plaintiff of property without due process of law, in violation of the Ohio

Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

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Initially, the City defendants maintain that the federal due process claim fails because

there is no direct cause of action for such. This Court agrees. “42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the exclusive

remedy for constitutional violations by state and local officials- no direct action under the

Constitution is available.” Desmond v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation, 2006 WL 462431

(S.D.Ohio February 23, 2006)(citing Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496 (6th Cir.1987); vacated on

other grounds, 872 F.2d 772 (6th Cir.1989)). See also Reo v. Lindstedt, 2020 WL 92558392

(N.D.Ohio August 20, 2020) (Ҥ 1983 is the exclusive means for a party to recover for

constitutional violations allegedly committed by government personnel”); and Steele v. Hall,

2013 WL 4012769 (N.D.Ohio August 6, 2013) (citations omitted) (“[N]o private right of action

arises directly under the United States Constitution, rather a plaintiff complaining of a

constitutional violation must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).

Nor is there a direct cause of action for an Ohio constitutional violation. Moore v. City of

Cleveland, 388 F.Supp3d 908 (N.D.Ohio May 21, 2019) (citations omitted) (“Ohio law does not

authorize private suits for violations of the Ohio Constitution.”)

Rather than seek leave to amend the pleadings to assert a claim under § 1983, plaintiff

contends that it may sufficiently state a cause of action under § 1983 despite its failure to invoke

the statute. This Court disagrees given the Amended Complaint’s allegations set forth above.

Regardless, even if the Court construes Count One as being brought under § 1983, the claim fails

to state a claim.

“To prove a civil rights claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he was

deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) he was

subjected to or caused to be subjected to this deprivation by a person acting under color of state

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law.” Steele, supra (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978)).

The Amended Complaint fails to state an individual capacity claim against any City

defendant. “The Sixth Circuit has consistently held that damage claims against government

officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity,

facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Webb

v. Board of Judicial Conduct, Tn., 2025 WL 3218683 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2025) (citing

Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psych.

Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). “Where a person is named as a defendant without an

allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal...” Id. (citing Frazier v.

Michigan, 41 F. App'x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff's claims where the

complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were

personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights) and Griffin v.

Montgomery, 2000 WL 1800569 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal

involvement against each defendant).

The Amended Complaint alleges only that “agents of the City of Cleveland notified the

plaintiff that business located near the scene of the incident was to be boarded and

closed,” “agents of the City of Cleveland under the direction of the City of Cleveland Division of

Police boarded the premises,” and the “City acted without providing plaintiff notice or an

opportunity to be heard.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 8, 9, 10).There is no reference to, or specific allegation

against, defendants Bibb, Todd, or Drummond. Furthermore, Count One refers only to

“defendants” and does not distinguish between the City defendants or the Flats defendants.

Plaintiff argues merely that government officials may be sued individually when, as here, a

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plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief. However, plaintiff’s Amended Complaint makes no attempt

to name these officials in their individual capacity. Accordingly, these defendants are dismissed

as to any individual liability claim.

The Court assumes, although not expressly stated in the Amended Complaint, that

defendants Bibb, Todd, and Drummond are sued in their official capacity as they are named in

their official roles of Mayor, Chief of Police, and Chief Director of Public Safety, respectively. It

is well established that a “suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to

a suit against the governmental entity.” Poole v. Jensen, 2025 WL 3085035, at *3 (W.D. Mich.

Nov. 5, 2025) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) and Matthews v.

Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994)). As the City is also named, and these defendants are

lumped together as one entity, the individual defendants maintain that the claims against them

must be dismissed as redundant to the claims against the City. Plaintiff only asserts that the

individual defendants committed acts which render the municipality liable. The Court agrees

with defendants that dismissal of the defendants in their official capacity is warranted. “When a §

1983 complaint asserts a claim against a government entity and a government official in his

official capacity, federal courts will dismiss the official-capacity claim.” Kouider on behalf of

Y.C. v. Parma City School District Board of Education, 480 F.Supp3d 772 (N.D.Ohio August 19,

2020) (citing Brooks v. Skinner, 139 F. Supp. 3d 869, 890 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (citing Doe v.

Claiborne Cty., Tenn. By & Through Claiborne Cty. Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir.

1996)); accord Agema v. City of Allegan, 2015 WL 1022084, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2015)

(collecting cases)). Accordingly, these defendants are dismissed as to any official capacity claim.

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Finally, while the Amended Complaint does not include a § 1983 claim, to survive on

such a claim against a municipality, a Monell claim must be asserted. “[A] local government may

not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is

when execution of a government's policy or custom...inflicts the injury that the government as an

entity is responsible under § 1983.” Baker v. City of Columbus, 2025 WL 3250912 (S.D. Ohio

Nov. 21, 2025)(quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Nichols v.

Wayne Cty. Mich., 822 F. App'x 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2020) (“To state a municipal-liability claim

under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the deprivation (1) of a right secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States, (2) that was directly caused by a municipal policy or

custom.”)(other citations omitted).

Thus, to prevail on a § 1983 Monell claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must show

that: (1) he or she suffered a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest; and (2) the

deprivation was caused by an official policy, custom, or usage of the municipality. Hunt v. City

of Toledo L. Dep't, 881 F. Supp. 2d 854, 878 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (citing Monell v. New York Dep't

of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978)).

Plaintiff argues that it has sufficiently pled a Monell claim based on a single decision by

municipal policymakers. However, not only did the Amended Complaint fail to allege such a

claim, but the factual allegations do not sufficiently plead such a basis of liability.

The Sixth Circuit has recently reiterated,

[M]unicipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers

under appropriate circumstances”—for example, a single decision by a city council.

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452

(1986). But the policymaker must have “final authority to establish municipal policy with

respect to the action ordered,” which is a question of state law. Id. at 482–83, 106 S.Ct.

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1292. A municipality can also be held liable for a subordinate's decision if the final

policymaker ratifies a subordinate's decision, making it final. Feliciano v. City of

Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 656 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485

U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion)). But “on a

single-act theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a ‘deliberate choice to follow a course

of action is made from among various alternatives by the official ... responsible for

establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.’ ” Burgess v.

Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 479 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483, 106 S.Ct.

1292). The policymaker's “action must be shown to be the moving force behind or cause

of the plaintiff's harm.” Id.

Guptill v. City of Chattanooga,--- F.4th ----2025 WL 3295395 (6th Cir. November 26, 2025).

Plaintiff alleges only that “agents of the City of Cleveland notified the

plaintiff that business located near the scene of the incident was to be boarded and

closed,” “agents of the City of Cleveland under the direction of the City of Cleveland Division of

Police boarded the premises,” and the “City acted without providing plaintiff notice or an

opportunity to be heard.” Although plaintiff argues in its brief that Mayor Bibb is the chief

executive officer of the City with final authority including ultimate authority over Director

Drummond and Chief Todd, the Amended Complaint did not allege a decision made by a

specific City official.

Even if the Amended Complaint had alleged such, there can be no liability under Monell

without an underlying constitutional violation. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799

(1986). See also North v. Cuyahoga Cty., 754 F. App'x 380, 389 (6th Cir. 2018) (“There must be

a constitutional violation for a § 1983 claim against a municipality to succeed—if the plaintiff

has suffered no constitutional injury, his Monell claim fails.”).

The Court agrees with defendants that plaintiff’s due process rights were not violated

because an adequate postdeprivation process was provided by the City’s notice of nuisance to

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plaintiff which set forth the opportunities for hearing as to the emergency decision to shut down

and board up the premises.

“When the situation necessitates ‘quick action’ by the state or makes efforts to provide a

meaningful predeprivation process impracticable, the persons acting under state authority may

proceed without violating the property owner's rights so long as the state provides an adequate

postdeprivation procedure.” Harris v. City of Akron, 20 F.3d 1396 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Parratt

v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)). “Such a procedure satisfies the fundamental requirement of due

process—an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id.

Here, the Amended Complaint alleges that a shooting occurred on the evening of

September 7, 2025, in the area of plaintiff’s business and that agents of the City boarded up

plaintiff’s business that day. Attached to the defendants’ Answer is the City’s September 10,

2025 notice of nuisance to plaintiff. (Doc. 10 Ex. B). The notice gave plaintiff 14 days to respond

with a written safety plan to prevent a recurrence of the nuisance activities. Additionally, plaintiff

was notified of the right to appeal, within 10 days, the “emergency decision to shut down and

board up” plaintiff’s premises. Further, if plaintiff disagreed with the decision on appeal, plaintiff

would have 15 days to appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals. (Id.). According to the Amended

Complaint, the boards were removed the day after this notice. Thus, the pleadings establish that

an adequate postdeprivation procedure was in place.

For the foregoing reasons, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim on Count One.

(2) Count Two

As to the wrongful interference with business operations claim, the Court assumes

plaintiff intended a tortious interference with a business relationship claim which exists under

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Ohio law. To prevail on this claim, plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence or the prospect of a

business relationship; (2) that defendants knew of the relationship; (3) that defendants

intentionally and materially interfered with the prospective relationship; (4) the interference was

without justification; and (5) the interference caused plaintiff to suffer damages. Plastics NYC,

LLC v. Plastics Boutique, LLC, 2025 WL 2696305, at *19 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2025) (citations

omitted).

This claim states in full:

19. Defendants’ actions unlawfully interfered with Plaintiff’s lawful business operations,

causing immediate and irreparable harm.

20. Defendant’s actions are directly in breach of the lease that Plaintiff entered with

Defendants Flats East Phase 1 Retail, LLC and George Kimson, Jr.

Initially, it must be noted that the Amended Complaint fails to distinguish which “defendant’s”

actions were unlawful. Consequently, the Court is unable to construe this claim against the City

defendants. Additionally, plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed defendants Flats East Phase 1 Retail,

LLC and George Kimson, Jr. Thus, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against the City

defendants as to Count Two on this basis. Furthermore, as the City defendants point out, no facts

are alleged regarding the elements of this claim which are set forth above.

For these reasons, Count Two fails to state a claim.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the City Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is

granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

United States District Court

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