Cordell Sanders v. Deanna Brookhart and J. Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CORDELL SANDERS, #R41346, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-00517-MAB

)

DEANNA BROOKHART )

and J. BROWN, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Cordell Sanders, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of

Corrections and currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, filed this civil

rights action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff brings

a claim for denial of access to programs that allowed him to “earn program sentence

credit” (EPSC) at Lawrence Correctional Center. Id.

The Complaint is before the Court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 Any

portion that is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests

money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed. Id. The factual

allegations are liberally construed at this stage. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577

F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint in light of Plaintiff’s consent to the full jurisdiction of

a Magistrate Judge, and the limited consent by the Illinois Department of Corrections to the exercise of

Magistrate Judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between this Court and

the Illinois Department of Corrections.

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff sets forth the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1, pp. 1-3):

While he was incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, Plaintiff was housed in the

infirmary (September 2022 to July 2023), 5 House (September 2023 to November 14, 2023),

and 7 House (November 14, 2023 to April 2024). Id. at 2-3. He was considered part of the

general inmate population for some, or all, of this time. Id. at 3.

Warden Deanna Brookhart and Assistant Warden J. Brown allowed general

population inmates housed in 1 House, 2 House, 3 House, or 4 House to participate in a

range of programs that enabled them to “earn program sentence credit” (EPSC). These

programs included, but were not limited to, substance abuse education, vocational

training, behavioral modification, GED, life skills, re-entry planning, and anger

management. Successful completion of an EPSC program entitled an inmate to sentence

credit that directly reduced the length of the inmate’s prison sentence. Plaintiff claims

that he was denied participation in the EPSC programs while housed in all three

locations, for no rational penological reason. As a result, he was ineligible to earn sentence

credit that might have reduced his prison sentence by up to two years. Id.

Plaintiff filed a grievance to challenge the EPSC policy as discriminatory on

November 14, 2023. Plaintiff complained that he was denied access to EPSC programs

and rendered ineligible for sentence credit as a general population inmate in the

infirmary, 5 House, and/or 7 House when general population inmates housed elsewhere

could participate. He seeks money damages against Warden Brookhart and Assistant

Warden Brown under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Id.

DISCUSSION

The Court designates the following count in the pro se Complaint:

Count 1: Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection

Clause when they denied Plaintiff participation in the EPSC

programs as a general population inmate housed in the infirmary,

5 House, and 7 House, while allowing general population inmates

housed in 1-4 House to participate in EPSC programs.

Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed here is

considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly.2

The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states to “deny any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. XIV. The Equal Protection

Clause guards against state action that treats a person poorly because of a suspect

classification, such as sex, national origin, race, or religion, or because the person

exercised a fundamental right. Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2010). Here,

Plaintiff does not allege that he was a member of a protected class. Moreover, there is no

fundamental constitutional right to education or rehabilitation. San Antonio Indep. Sch.

Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of course, is not one of the rights

afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for

saying it is implicitly protected.”); Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 429 (7th Cir. 1997) (The

“right to an education [is] not guaranteed, either explicitly or implicitly, by the

Constitution and therefore could not constitute a fundamental right.”). This does not

2 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (action fails to state a claim if it does not plead

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).

mean that Plaintiff is without recourse for the allegedly discriminatory access to

education and rehabilitation programs at Lawrence.

Absent a fundamental right or membership in a suspect class, equal protection

requires that a classification resulting in unequal treatment bear some rational

relationship to a legitimate state purpose. French v. Heyne, 547 F.2d 994, 997 (1976) (citing

Wojick v. Levitt, 513 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1975)). The requirements of equal protection “apply

to administrative as well as legislative classifications.” French, 547 F.2d at 997. These

requirements extend into the prison context. Fletcher v. Thatcher, 819 F.3d 990, 991 (7th

Cir. 2016). Prison officials may treat inmates differently if the treatment is rationally

related to a legitimate penological interest. Id. (collecting cases). “Prison classifications

are presumed to be rational and will be upheld if any justification for them can be

conceived.” Id.

At the time his claim arose, Plaintiff was a general population inmate who was

housed in the infirmary, 5 House, and 7 House and was denied access to EPSC programs,

while general population inmates housed elsewhere had access to the EPSC programs.

Plaintiff alleges that this policy changed when Warden Brookhart left the facility in May

2024. See Doc. 1, p. 3. After that time, general population inmates in 5 House and 7 House

were also allowed to participate in EPSC programs. Id. It is not clear why general

population inmates in 1-4 House had access to EPSC programs at all times, while those

in other housing units did not. At this stage of the case, the Court cannot conceive of any

reason. The allegations, taken as true, suggest that there was no rational basis for

distinguishing between the two groups of general population inmates. At this stage, the

Complaint articulates a plausible claim of discrimination against Defendants under the

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, Count 1 shall proceed

against Defendants Brookhart and Brown.

DISPOSITION

The Complaint (Doc. 1) survives screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and

COUNT 1 will proceed against DEANNA BROOKHART and J. BROWN.

With regard to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for DEANNA

BROOKHART and J. BROWN: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive

Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is

DIRECTED to mail these forms, the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and

Order to Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails

to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days

from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal

service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs

of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending

the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the

address shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file

or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint (Doc. 1) and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244 and SDIL-Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need

only respond to the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.

Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and the opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 5, 2026

/s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify Defendants of your lawsuit and

serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved, Defendants

will enter an appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least

60 days from the date of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely

possible that it will take 90 days or more. When Defendants have filed Answers, the Court

will enter a Scheduling Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery,

and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants

before filing any motions, to give the Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond

to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will

generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at

this time, unless specifically directed to do so.