White

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

JAMES PATRICK WHITE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:25-cv-161-KCD-DNF

WARDEN PAYNE

Defendant.

/

ORDER

Defendant Warden Payne moves to dismiss Plaintiff James Patrick

White’s Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 29.) White responded (Doc. 30), and

the motion is ripe for review. For the reasons stated below, the motion is

granted in part and denied in part. Payne is directed to answer the second

amended complaint within twenty-one days.

I. Procedural History and Second Amended Complaint

White—a prisoner at Charlotte Correctional Institution (CCI)—initiated

this action with a pro se civil rights complaint against six CCI employees. (Doc.

1.) After initial screening, the Court dismissed the complaint with leave to

amend. (Doc. 4.) White then filed an amended complaint against the same

defendants. (Doc. 6.) The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint

(Doc. 20), and the Court granted the motion on the grounds that White had

filed a shotgun pleading. (Doc. 26 at 7-8.) The Court also determined that

White had not set out plausible First, Fourth, Eighth, or Fourteenth

Amendment claims. (Id. at 7-13.) Once again, the Court granted White leave

to amend. (Id. at 13.)

White has filed a second amended complaint against Payne, raising only

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. (Doc. 28.) He alleges that on the

morning of September 20, 2024:

The Plaintiff went back to sleep. The Plaintiff takes a

variety of psychiatric medication, one being Zaprexa,

which causes drowsiness. However, routine inspection

was being conducted, and Warden Payne—because

Plaintiff was asleep: (1) didn’t give Plaintiff a verbal or

written reprimand; (2) or directive; (3) Instructions; (4)

no report was written or anything. But Warden Payne

had Plaintiff placed on Stage 3 personal property

restriction without bedding or linen or basic life

necessities [such as] [a] toothbrush, toothpaste, or

toilet paper, which was cruel and unusual punishment

for a bed not being made and for not being

documented. And there was no running water for the

period of 72 hours (said to prevent flooding). No

showers either.

(Id. at 3.)1 White claims that—due to a lack of toilet paper—he was unable to

adequately clean himself, leading to a genital fungus that was treated by a

nurse, but took four weeks to heal. (Id.) The cream used to treat the fungus

caused skin discoloration. (Id.) He also asserts that he has neck and back pain

caused by “skin and body contact with direct steel” for which he takes

1 For clarity, the Court has corrected minor spelling and grammar errors in the operative

complaint.

naproxen. (Id.) White seeks monetary and declaratory relief. (Id. at 4.)

Payne moves to dismiss White’s second amended complaint and argues

that: (1) White failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted; (2) Payne

is shielded by Eleventh Amendment Immunity; (3) Payne is entitled to

qualified immunity; (4) White does not state a claim for declaratory relief; and

(5) White’s request for punitive damages must be dismissed. (Doc. 29.)2

White responded to the motion with 29 pages of argument and

attachments. (Doc. 23.) But the Court will not consider additional facts or

claims that White offers in his response because its review of a motion to

dismiss is limited to the four corners of the complaint. St. George v. Pinellas

Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).

II. Legal Standards

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all

allegations in the complaint and construes them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th

Cir. 2004). This includes all reasonable inferences from the allegations.

2 White sues Payne in his individual capacity only. (See Doc. 28 at 2.) Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity applies to state officials acting in their official capacity, but it does not

apply to officials sued in their individual capacities under Section 1983. See Hafer v. Melo,

502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). Moreover, at this stage of litigation, the Court will not decide

Plaintiff’s entitlement to declaratory relief or punitive damages. Resolution of those issues is

not dispositive of this case and will not change the course of proceedings on Plaintiff's

remaining claims. Payne may raise these issues again if this case proceeds to summary

judgment or trial. Thus, the Court now considers only whether Payne is entitled to dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(6) or qualified immunity.

Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir.

1990). But factual allegations must be more than speculative:

While a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).3 Likewise, courts are not

“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

“To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient

facts, accepted as true, to state a facially plausible claim for relief.” Galette v.

Goodell, No. 23-10896, 2023 WL 7391697, at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2023). “A

claim is facially plausible if it pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. A motion to dismiss fails where the complaint provides facts that

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.

III. Discussion

White purports to seek relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Doc. 28 at 2.) Liberally construing the complaint, the Court

3 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations have

been omitted in this and subsequent citations.

concludes that White raises two discrete claims. First, he argues that being

placed on property restriction without access to toilet paper and running water

led to a fungal infection and violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on

cruel and unusual punishment. Next, he argues that his placement in a strip

cell without notice and a hearing violated his procedural due process rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment.

A. White has stated an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-

confinement claim.

A plaintiff seeking to show unconstitutional conditions of confinement

must clear a “high bar” by demonstrating “extreme deprivations.” Chandler v.

Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004). Although “the Constitution does

not mandate comfortable prisons,” prison officials must “provide humane

conditions of confinement.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). When

considering conditions-of-confinement claims, courts apply a two-part analysis

containing objective and subjective components. Under the objective

component, the plaintiff must show “that extreme conditions created an

unreasonable risk—one that society chooses not to tolerate—of serious damage

to the detainee’s future health or safety.” Ellis v. Pierce Cnty., Ga., 415 F. App’x

215, 217 (11th Cir. 2011). Under the subjective component, the plaintiff must

show that the defendants acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).

White asserts that his 72-hour placement on strip-cell status without

adequate hygiene supplies amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Courts

in the Eleventh Circuit routinely reject claims that strip-cell status and

management meals, standing alone, violate the Eighth Amendment. See

Woodson v. Whitehead, 673 F. App’x 931, 932 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Confinement

without clothing (other than boxers), bedding, or hygienic materials for 72

hours during the months of April and August in Florida is not the type of

extreme prison conditions that create a substantial risk of serious harm.”);

Alfred v. Bryant, 378 F. App’x 977, 980 (11th Cir. 2010)(concluding that the

lack of a mattress and a malfunctioning toilet were not sufficiently serious to

violate the Eighth Amendment).

But these cases are not necessarily dispositive of this action because the

Eleventh Circuit has also recognized a “well established” Eighth Amendment

right “not to be confined . . . in conditions lacking basic sanitation.” Chandler

v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057, 1065–66 (11th Cir. 1991). In Baird, the plaintiff

alleged that he was deprived of toilet paper for three days, running water for

two days, and was not provided with soap, a toothbrush, toothpaste, or bed

linens. The court found that these conditions—combined with inadequate

heating in the plaintiff’s cell—were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment

violation. Id. at 1063.

While it is unclear from White’s sparse allegations that the conditions in

his cell were as grim as those described in Baird, at this stage of litigation, the

Court must take the facts (and all inferences) in White’s favor. Under that

standard, Payne is not entitled to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal or to qualified

immunity on White’s conditions-of-confinement claim.

B. White has not stated a Fourteenth Amendment procedural

due process claim.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against

deprivations of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S.

Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To state a due process claim, a prisoner must show: (1)

a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest; (2)

state action; and (3) constitutionally inadequate process. Catron v. City of St.

Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011).

In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the United States Supreme

Court identified two situations in which a prisoner—already deprived of liberty

in the traditional sense—can be further deprived of liberty such that

procedural due process protections are required. Id. at 483-84. “For an inmate

to state a claim that prison officials have deprived him of a liberty interest in

violation of due process, he must establish either that the deprivation imposes

[an] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life or that a change in [his] conditions of confinement is so

severe that it essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by the court.” Fuller v.

Gates, 656 F. App'x 944, 946 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484).

And unless White has been deprived of a liberty interest, no due process

protection is triggered.

White complains that he was placed on strip-status property restriction

“without bedding, linen, and basic life necessities such as toilet paper, tooth

brush, tooth paste, etc.” (Doc. 28 at 2.) But White’s short placement in a strip

cell simply does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. A relatively short

term of segregation rarely implicates a liberty interest protected by the Due

Process Clause. See Smith v. Deemer, 641 F. App’x 865, 868 (11th Cir. 2016)

(“Generally, atypical and significant hardships must exist for a significant

period of time.”). And the conditions alleged by White only continued for

approximately 72 hours.

Second, to the extent White rests his procedural due process claim on the

fact that he was immediately confined to strip status after committing a rule

infraction (an unmade bed) instead of first receiving notice and a hearing, he

essentially attacks Payne’s right to determine where White should be housed.

But courts have consistently “rejected the notion that every state action

carrying adverse consequences for prison inmates automatically activates a

due process right.” Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976); see, e.g.,

Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1295 n.17 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing

that the due process clause does not create a liberty interest in being confined

in general population rather than administrative segregation); Meachum v.

Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (finding no due process protections required when

prisoners were transferred to a substantially less agreeable prison—even when

the transfer visited a “grievous loss” upon the inmate).

Finally, to the extent White argues that the absence of sufficient hygiene

supplies in the strip cell caused his fungal infection, the claim actually attacks

the conditions of his confinement—not the pre-confinement process afforded—

and is subsumed by White’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement

claim.

Because placement in a strip cell did not deprive White of a liberty

interest, he was not entitled to any form of due process prior to being placed in

the cell, and Defendant Payne is entitled to dismissal of White’s Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process claim.

II. Conclusion

White’s allegation that he was confined on strip cell status without a

verbal or written warning or other process does not state a Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process claim. However, White will be allowed to

develop his Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Defendant Payne’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 29) is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. The motion is granted as to White’s Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process claim and otherwise denied.

2. Defendant Payne shall file an answer to the second amended

complaint within TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS from the date of this Order.

ENTERED in Fort Myers, Florida on January 5, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek

United States District Judge

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