Jones

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION

)

DEWAYNE JONES, )

a/k/a ABDUL HASEEB IBU JONES BEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:24-cv-01104-JDB-tmp

)

ARTHUR HEUN, )

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER DISMISSING PRO SE CIVIL COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE,

DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND,

CERTIFYING THAT APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH,

DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL,

NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF STRIKE RECOMMENDATION,

AND

CLOSING CASE

On May 7, 2024, the Plaintiff, Dewayne Jones, a/k/a Abdul Haseeb Ibu Jones Bey,

Tennessee Department of Correction prisoner number 556285, an inmate incarcerated at the

Northwest Correctional Complex (“NWCX”) in Tiptonville, Tennessee, filed a pro se civil

complaint. (Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 1.) The Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) and assessed the $350 civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915, et seq. (the “PLRA”). (D.E. 6.)

For the reasons that follow, the complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Leave to amend is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that, on July 25, 2023, he entered into a “written agreement” with the

Defendant, Arthur Heun, who is also an inmate at NWCX, “to pay back money” that Plaintiff had

loaned to him. (D.E. 1 at PageID 1-2.) Jones avers that the due date has passed, and Heun has

not paid the $650.00 owed him. Plaintiff has made several attempts to contact Defendant

regarding the outstanding loan amount, but the latter “is ignoring him.” (Id. at PageID 2.)

Because of Defendant’s “breach of law,” Plaintiff claims, he has suffered physical and mental

stress. (Id. at PageID 3.) He seeks monetary damages of $650.00 as well as “unknown” damages

for “mental anguish,” “permanent disability,” and “pain and suffering.” (Id.)

II. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT

The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of

it, if the complaint—

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court

applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007).

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Applying those standards, the Court accepts

the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the

allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383

(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that conclusory

allegations are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a complaint “must

be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint must contain “a short

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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). It also requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’

rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Id. at n.3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). However, pro se litigants are not exempt

from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591,

594 (6th Cir. 1989); see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612-13 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming

dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and

stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”).

III. ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] pleading that states

a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s

jurisdiction[.]” Jones’s pro se complaint contains no jurisdictional allegations.

The Court has attempted to discern whether any basis for federal jurisdiction is apparent

on the face of the complaint. Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases “arising

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff cites

no federal laws or constitutional principles in his complaint and, even if the Court reads his

allegations generously, it cannot discern a federal claim.

This Court has diversity jurisdiction if the parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount

in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

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Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he and Heun are both inmates at NWCX, but the complaint

contains no allegations about the citizenship of either party.

Jones has also failed to sufficiently allege that the amount in controversy exceeds

$75,000.00. He seeks “unknown” amounts for “mental anguish,” “permanent disability,” and

“pain and suffering,” but has not made any factual allegations that, if proven, would entitle him to

such damages. (D.E. 1 at PageID 3.) His request for damages of $650.00—the alleged amount

of the unpaid loan—falls far below the statutory requirement. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege

that there is diversity jurisdiction over this matter.

Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Jones’s pro se civil complaint is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IV. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th

Cir. 2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013)). Leave to amend

should not be granted where a plaintiff cannot cure the deficiency in his complaint. See Gonzalez-

Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“If it is crystal clear that . . . amending

the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); see also Curley v. Perry,

246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal

of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and

does not infringe the right of access to the courts”).

The Court DENIES leave to amend. Plaintiff cannot remedy the deficiencies in his

complaint.

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V. NOTICE OF STRIKE RECOMMENDATION

The “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prevents a court from granting IFP

status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court recommends that the dismissal of this case be treated as a strike

pursuant to § 1915(g). See Simons v. Washington, 996 F.3d 350, 352-54 (6th Cir. 2021).

VI. APPELLATE ISSUES

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) and § 1915(a)(3), it is CERTIFIED

that any appeal in this matter by Plaintiff would not be taken in good faith. If Jones nevertheless

chooses to file a notice of appeal, he must either: (1) pay the entire $605.00 appellate filing fee

or, if he is confined at that time, (2) submit a new IFP affidavit and a current, certified copy of his

inmate trust account statement for the last six months, in compliance with § 1915(a)-(b).

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above:

a. Plaintiff’s pro se civil complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1).

b. Leave to amend is DENIED.

c. The Court CERTIFIES that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and

DENIES leave to proceed IFP on appeal.

d. This case is DISMISSED in its entirety.

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IT IS SO ORDERED this 5th day of January 2026.

s/ J. DANIEL BREEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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