Asante-Chioke

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MALIKAH ASANTE-CHIOKE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 22-4587

NICHOLAS DOWDLE ET AL. SECTION: “J”(3)

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Thomas Martin (Rec.

Doc. 205) filed by Plaintiff Malikah Asante-Chioke. Defendants Officers Jonathon

Downing, Gerard Duplessis, and Terry Durnin (“EJLD Defendants”) filed an

opposition to the motion. (Rec. Doc. 213). Defendants Col. Lamar A. Davis and

Nicholas Dowdle (“LSP Defendants”) also filed an opposition. (Rec. Doc. 218). Plaintiff

filed a reply. (Rec. Doc. 232). Having considered the motion, the legal memoranda,

the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion should be

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a witness who is qualified as

an expert may testify if: (1) the expert's “specialized knowledge will help the trier of

fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”; (2)

the expert's testimony “is based on sufficient facts or data”; (3)

the expert's testimony “is the product of reliable principles and methods”; and (4) the

principles and methods employed by the expert have been reliably applied to the facts

of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert

v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), provides the analytical

framework for determining whether expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702.

Both scientific and nonscientific expert testimony are subject to

the Daubert framework, which requires trial courts to make a preliminary

assessment of “whether the expert testimony is both reliable and relevant.” Burleson

v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 584 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Kumho

Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).

When expert testimony is challenged under Daubert, the party offering

the expert's testimony bears the burden of proving its reliability and relevance by a

preponderance of the evidence. Moore v. Ashland Chem. Co., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th

Cir. 1998).

To be reliable, expert testimony must be based on “scientific knowledge,”

meaning it must be “ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of science” and based

on “more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at

589-90. However, this rule does not require the testimony to be based on a scientific

study, but allows testimony based on “personal experience” if, in the trial court's

view, there is a sufficient level of “intellectual rigor” underlying

the testimony. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152. Indeed, “reliance upon extensive

personal experience or specialized knowledge is an acceptable ground for the

admission of expert testimony.” Derouen v. Hercules Liftboat Co., LLC, No. CV 13-

4805, 2015 WL 13528499, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2015).

A number of nonexclusive factors may be relevant to the reliability analysis,

including: (1) whether the technique at issue has been tested; (2) whether the

technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the potential error

rate; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's

operation; and (5) whether the technique is generally accepted in the relevant

scientific community. Burleson, 393 F.3d at 584. The reliability inquiry must remain

flexible, however, as “not every Daubert factor will be applicable in every situation;

and a court has discretion to consider other factors it deems relevant.” Guy v. Crown

Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Runnels v. Tex. Children's

Hosp. Select Plan, 167 F. App'x 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[A] trial judge has

considerable leeway in determining how to test an expert's reliability.”).

With respect to the relevancy prong, the proposed expert testimony must be

relevant “not simply in the way all testimony must be relevant [pursuant to Rule

402], but also in the sense that the expert's proposed opinion would assist the trier of

fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” Bocanegra v. Vicmar Servs., Inc., 320

F.3d 581, 584 (5th Cir. 2003). Ultimately, a court should not allow its “gatekeeper”

role to supersede the traditional adversary system, or the jury's place within that

system. Scordill v. Louisville Ladder Grp., LLC, No. 02-2565, 2003 WL 22427981 at

*3 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2003). As the Supreme Court noted, “vigorous cross-examination,

presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are

the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible

evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. Generally, questions relating to the basis and

sources of an expert's opinion rather than its admissibility should be left for the jury's

consideration. United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1077 (5th Cir.

1996) (citing Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987)).

PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

In his report, Mr. Martin offers the following conclusions and opinions:

1. There is a difference between what an officer can actually see during

a real time event and what is captured on the officer’s body worn

camera recording.

2. Each officer had a different visual perspective of Mr. Asante-Chioke

as they fired at him.

3. It is not possible to identify the gun that fired bullet #15 using

trajectory analysis, nor is it possible to determine exactly where in

the sequence of the thirty-six shots that bullet #15 was fired.

4. Mr. Asante-Chioke's position of bending forward as he was falling

forward is consistent with the back to front and upward trajectory of

gunshot wound #15.

5. Given the wound path of bullet #15, and the position of Trooper

Dowdle at the 3.67 frame . . . the trajectory of bullet #15 is not

consistent with have [sic] been fired by Tpr. Dowdle at this frame.

6. The origination point (firearm) and sequence of each shot can not be

determined with any scientific certainty using trajectory analysis.

(Rec. Doc. 205-7, at 35).

Plaintiff urges the Court to exclude Mr. Martin’s first two conclusions because

they are factual statements that are unhelpful to the factfinder. (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at

5). Plaintiff then argues that the rest of Mr. Martin’s opinions are inadmissible

because (1) Mr. Martin is unqualified, (2) his opinions lack factual support, (3) his

methodology is unreliable, and (4) his opinions are unhelpful to the factfinder. Id.

I. Mr. Martin’s First Two Conclusions

Plaintiff seeks to exclude the first two conclusions and opinions from Mr.

Martin’s report where he states, “There is a difference between what an officer can

actually see during a real time event and what is captured on the officer’s body worn

camera recording.” (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at 3). And “[e]ach officer had a different visual

perspective of Mr. Asante-Chioke as they fired at him.” Id. Plaintiff argues that such

conclusions and opinions will not assist the factfinder. Id. at 3,5. LSP Defendants do

not contest Plaintiff’s argument.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Expert testimony will not assist the factfinder

if it “provide[s] information that is a matter of common knowledge.” United States v.

McGinnis, 201 F. App’x 246, 248 (5th Cir. 2006). It is common knowledge that what

an officer can see during an event is different from what an officer’s body cam footage

captures. It is also common knowledge that each shooting officer had their own visual

perspective of Mr. Asante-Chioke during the shooting. Accordingly, the Court will

exclude these opinions.

II. Mr. Martin’s Trajectory Analysis

Plaintiff next seeks to exclude Mr. Martin’s trajectory analysis and any

opinions derived therefrom. (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at 5). Plaintiff argues that Mr. Martin’s

trajectory analysis should be excluded because (1) he is unqualified, (2) his opinions

lack factual support, and (3) his methodology is unreliable. Id. at 7–15.

Plaintiff argues that Mr. Martin is unqualified to conduct a shooting

reconstruction because he lacks specialized training in bullet trajectory analysis. Id.

at 7–8. Plaintiff also asserts that Mr. Martin is unqualified to review the video

evidence to reconstruct the scene because he lacks specialized training in video

analysis. Id. at 8.

LSP Defendants argue that Mr. Martin has the requisite specialized training

in shooting reconstruction to testify here (Rec. Doc. 218, at 7–9), and the Court agrees.

Mr. Martin testified that he practiced shooting reconstructions regularly during his

22-year career with the New York State Police. (Rec. Doc. 218-1, at 14). Mr. Martin

also testified that he continues practicing shooting reconstruction, and to stay up to

date in the field, he attends conferences, reads newsletters and periodicals, goes to

the shooting range and runs test fires, and is “actively involved in [shooting

reconstructions] on a day-to-day basis.” Id. at 14–15. Mr. Martin claims to have

participated in approximately 1,000 autopsies concerning shootings where he took

pictures, retrieved bullets, and assisted in tracking bullets through the body. Id. at

41–42. Mr. Martin further claims that he is “Force Science” certified, which he

explains involves training in human factors, including the anatomy and physiology

of shootings. Id. at 15.

Plaintiff fails to offer any case where Mr. Martin was deemed unqualified to

opine on shooting scene reconstruction. Further, at least two courts have recognized

Mr. Martin’s expertise in the relevant subject matter. In Marks v. Bauer, The United

States District Court for the District of Minnesota explained that “Martin is a

shooting reconstructionist with over 30 years of training and experience.” 2023 WL

1478015, No. 20-cv-1913, at *16 (D. Mn. Feb. 2, 2023). The United States District

Court for the District of Colorado also recognized Martin’s qualifications. “Martin is

a crime scene reconstruction expert. The Court need not delve into his credentials,

and the Court has no doubt of Mr. Martin’s expertise in these matters.” Valdez v.

Motyka, No. 15-cv-0109, 2019 WL 4686605, at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2019) (excluding

Mr. Martin for reasons independent of his expertise). Plaintiff offers no authority

which requires a shooting reconstruction expert to have specialized training in either

video analysis or bullet trajectory analysis. Accordingly, the Court finds Mr. Martin

qualified to opine here.

A. Evidentiary Support

Plaintiff argues that Mr. Martin’s trajectory analysis is unsupported by the

evidence in the record. (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at 8–11). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that

no evidence supports Mr. Martin’s opinion that the “wound path of bullet #15 could

be consistent with any” of Mr. Asante-Chioke’s body positions at 1.13, 1.23, or 1.27

seconds after the start of the shooting. Id. at 9. Stills from Mr. Martin’s report taken

during each of these times show that Mr. Asante-Chioke was parallel to a concrete

wall to his left and fell forward as he was being fired upon. (Rec. Doc. 205-7, at 27,

28, 29). Plaintiff argues that no evidence supports this opinion because the wound

path of bullet #15 had a left-to-right path through Mr. Asante-Chioke’s body, but the

shooting officers were positioned to Mr. Asante-Chioke’s right as they fired upon him

during that time. (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at 9–10).

LSP Defendants argue that evidence in the record does support Mr. Martin’s

opinion because stills in his report show some leftward rotation of Mr. Asante-Chioke

as he fell, which could have altered a bullet’s trajectory as it traveled through his

body. (Rec. Doc. 218, at 10). LSP Defendants also point out that the exact locations of

each shooting officer are unknown, and that images in the report show that Officer

Duplessis was positioned farther to the left than the other shooting officers such that

he could have fired a shot which produced a left-to-right wound path. Id.

This Court agrees with LSP Defendants. In his report, Mr. Martin provides

that “[a] small twist of the body . . . as each bullet is fired . . . can alter the direction

of the bullet through the anatomy.” (Rec. Doc. 205-7, at 32). Stills in Mr. Martin’s

report show that Mr. Asante-Chioke rotated slightly to the left as he fell. (Rec. Doc.

205-7, at 27, 28, 29). Further, the exact locations of the shooting officers are unknown,

and stills in the report show that Officer Duplessis was nearly directly behind Mr.

Asante-Chioke as the last shot was fired. Id. at 14. Thus, the Court is unwilling to

say that no evidence supports Mr. Martin’s opinion. To the extent that Plaintiff

disagrees with Mr. Martin’s opinions, she is free to challenge them at trial. As the

United States Supreme Court has explained, “[v]igorous cross-examination,

presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are

the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). Accordingly,

the Court will not exclude Mr. Martin’s testimony based on this challenge.

B. Reliability

Plaintiff next argues that Mr. Martin uses unreliable principles and methods

to create the shooting reconstruction. (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at 11). Specifically,

Plaintiff argues that Mr. Martin did not use a reliable methodology to determine the

positions and angles of the shooting officers relative to Mr. Asante-Chioke when he

opines that “(1) the bullet that caused Wound #15 could have been fired at 1.13,

1.23, and 1.27 seconds, and (2) the trajectory of Wound #15 is not consistent

with Shooting Defendant Dowdle’s position at 3.67 seconds.” Id. at 12. For similar

reasons, Plaintiff also seeks to exclude Mr. Martin’s diagram on page 31 of his report,

where he depicts the entry and termination point of Wound #15 on Mr. Asante

Chioke 3.67 seconds into the shooting. (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at 14). Plaintiff

contends that Mr. Martin’s methodology is unreliable because he did not calculate

the shooting angles of the officers nor provide the potential error rate of his method

for determining the shooting officers’ locations. Id. at 12. Plaintiff suggests that Mr.

Martin merely guessed the shooting angles, the officers’ locations, and the entry and

exit points on the diagram. Id. at 15.

LSP Defendants argue that Mr. Martin did not calculate the shooting angles

or the precise positions of the shooting officers because such information “cannot be

determined with any scientific certainty due to the multifactorial aspect of this

shooting, including the number of shooters, lack of specific location of two of the

shooters, and the dynamic and continued movement of the shooters and Chioke.”

(Rec. Doc. 218, at 9). Still, LSP Defendants contend that Mr. Martin did not merely

guess the relevant information and that his opinions are “reliably based on his review

of the video, wound paths, and positioning” of the shooting officers. Id. at 11.

The Court agrees with LSP Defendants. Mr. Martin, a shooting scene

reconstruction expert, conducted a bullet trajectory analysis by reviewing Dr. Dana

Troxclair’s autopsy report to determine the path of Wound #15. (Rec. Doc. 205-7, at

24–25). Mr. Martin analyzed that wound path and used a commercially available

computer program to illustrate it on a computer-generated skeleton in the anatomical

position. Id. at 25–26. Mr. Martin then superimposed that wound path onto three

body-worn camera images of Mr. Asante-Chioke during the first 1.13, 1.23, and 1.27

seconds of the shooting. Id. at 27–29. Mr. Martin relied on video evidence, an

orthophoto, geometrical calculations, and landmarks to determine the general area

of the shooting and approximate the location of the officers at the start of the shooting.

(Rec. Doc. 205-7, at 16; Rec. Doc. 218-1, at 171).

Mr. Martin then conducted a similar analysis to depict the entry and terminal

locations of Wound #15 on Mr. Asante-Chioke 3.67 seconds after the start of the

shooting. (Rec. Doc. 205-7, at 31). Plaintiff presents no authority which requires a

shooting scene reconstruction expert to calculate the shooting angles of the officers

nor provide an error rate for determining the shooting officers’ locations. Accordingly,

the Court will not exclude Mr. Martin’s opinions for lack of a reliable methodology,

nor will it exclude the diagram on page 31 of his report.

III. Human Perception-Reaction Time

Next, Plaintiff seeks to exclude Mr. Martin’s opinions on perception-reaction

time by arguing that (1) Mr. Martin is unqualified to render such opinions; (2) such

opinions are unhelpful to the factfinder; and (3) he bases his opinions on inapplicable

and unreliable studies. (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at 16).

A. Qualifications

Plaintiff argues that Mr. Martin is unqualified to opine on human perception-

reaction time because he “lacks any recent training on human perception.” (Rec. Doc.

205-1, at 16). EJLD Defendants argue that Mr. Martin does have recent training on

human perception-reaction time, and all Defendants note his certifications and years

of experience in the field. (Rec. Doc. 213, at 15; Rec. Doc. 218, at 14).

The Court agrees with Defendants. Plaintiff offers no authority which requires

an expert to have recent training on human perception-reaction time. Mr. Martin

testified that he took a “Force Science” course as recently as 2021, in which he

received a certification covering multiple areas, including perception-reaction times.

(Rec. Doc. 218-1, at 15–16). Mr. Martin also testified that he took classes on human

response time and perception in college and during his career with the state police.

Id. at 20. As Mr. Martin explained, he has “been learning and studying perception-

reaction times for decades.” Id. at 115. Accordingly, the Court finds Mr. Martin

qualified to opine on perception-reaction time.

B. Helpfulness

Plaintiff next argues that Mr. Martin’s opinion on perception-reaction time will

not help the factfinder because they are common sense. (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at 17). The

Court rejected a similar argument in its November 21, 2025 Order and Reasons and

will do the same here. While a lay person may have a general understanding of

perception-reaction times, “[a] lay person typically would not have experience or

knowledge about the time it takes an officer to react to a perceived threat or the

absence of a perceived threat.” Estate of Smart v. Chaffee, No. 14-2111, 2020 WL

7643505, at *14 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 2020). By opining that a shooting officer takes time

to react to a stimulus to stop shooting, Mr. Martin may help the factfinder determine

whether the Defendant Officers’ actions were reasonable when they continued to

shoot Mr. Asante-Chioke. Consequently, the Court will not exclude Mr. Martin’s

testimony as unhelpful.

C. Reliability

Plaintiff next argues that this Court should exclude Mr. Martin’s opinions on

perception-reaction time because they are based on unreliable scientific studies and

“junk science.” (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at 18). Defendants argue that Mr. Martin bases his

opinions on his training and experience and expert studies. (Rec. Doc. 213, at 15; Rec.

Doc. 218, at 14). However, Defendants do not discuss the scientific validity of these

studies.

At the end of Mr. Martin’s opinions on perception-reaction time he

opines as follows:

Studies have shown that when officers are guided by an audio signal

(stimulus) to stop shooting, the final shot fired occurred an average of

.261 seconds after the audio signal/stimulus was recognized by the

officer. Most officers fired one or two shots after the end signal/stimulus

was given.

Studies have shown that when officers are guided by a visual signal

(stimulus) to stop shooting the average time for an officer to recognize

the signal/stimulus and stop pulling the trigger was between .35 seconds

and .5 seconds. The more complex the scenario, the longer it takes for

an officer to recognize the stimulus and stop pulling the trigger. (Rec.

Doc. 205-7, at 33).

In connection with these opinions, Mr. Martin cites two sources: the first, an

article entitled Officer Reaction-Response Time Delay at the End of a Shot Series; the

second, an article entitled Reaction Times in Lethal Force Encounters, Time to Start

Shooting? Time to Stop Shooting? (Rec. Doc. 205-7, at 33 nn. 1, 2). Both articles

allegedly discuss studies which support Mr. Martin’s opinions.

An expert’s sources must be based on “scientific knowledge.” Wells v.

SmithKline Beecham Corp., 601 F. 3d. 375, 379–81 (5th Cir. 2010). Defendants fail to

address any of Plaintiff’s arguments which question the scientific validity of Mr.

Martin’s sources. Specifically, Defendants do not argue that “these articles were peer

reviewed, used control groups, reported statistically significant results, or are

generalizable to the New Orleans police context.” (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at 18). Therefore,

the Court is unable to find that Mr. Martin’s sources meet the reliability standards

under Rule 702. Brandner v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., No. 18-cv-982, 2019 WL

636423, at *6 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2019) (excluding experts because they did not

document whether their referenced studies “were peer reviewed” or whether the

results of the studies were “generally accepted by the scientific community”).

Accordingly, the Court will exclude Mr. Martin’s statements which rely on these two

sources.

IV. Human Vision and Body-Worn Cameras

Plaintiff next seeks to exclude Mr. Martin’s additional opinions on the

difference between human vision and what is captured on a body-worn camera. (Rec.

Doc. 205-1, at 19). Plaintiff argues that Mr. Martin cannot opine on this issue because

he is unqualified, his opinions would not help the factfinder, and his opinions lack a

reliable methodology. (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at 19–20).

A. Qualifications

Plaintiff argues that Mr. Martin is unqualified to opine on the difference

between what is captured by human vision versus a body-worn camera because he

lacks any specific training in video analysis. Id. at 19. Defendants argue that Mr.

Martin does not need special training in video analysis and can instead rely on his

years of experience and training as a police officer investigating crime scenes and

shooting incidents. (Rec. Doc. 213, at 15; Rec. Doc. 218, at 15).

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Defendants fail to explain how Mr. Martin’s

years of training and experience as an officer qualify him as an expert on the

difference between human perception and what body cam footage captures. Mr.

Martin lacks any special education in human vision or video field of view. Further,

Mr. Martin retired from the police force in 2010 (Rec. Doc. 205-7, at 3), well before

the implementation of body cam footage programs across the United States. Logan

Seacrest & Jillian Snider, The Past, Present, and Future of Police Body Cameras, R

Street Inst. (July 1, 2025), https://www.rstreet.org/research/the-past-present-and-

future-of-police-body-cameras/. Accordingly, the Court finds Mr. Martin unqualified

to opine on the difference between human perception and body cam footage.

IV. Officer Training and Focus

Plaintiff next seeks to exclude Mr. Martin’s opinions concerning how officers

are trained to focus when firing their weapons. (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at 20). Plaintiff

argues that Mr. Martin is unqualified because he admittedly is not a police practices

expert. Id. (citing (Rec. Doc. 205-5, at 12)). LSP Defendants argue that Mr. Martin is

qualified to opine on these issues, again noting his experience as an officer and

investigator of crime scenes and shooting incidents. (Rec. Doc. 218, at 15).

In his report, Mr. Martin opines as follows:

Police are trained to focus on the front sight (or holographic red dot) of

their pistol when firing. When using iron sights, the rear sight is used

to orient the front sight, which is then placed over the intended target,

or “center mass.” The human eye can not focus on these three points

(rear sight, front sight, target) simultaneously, so proper shooting

technique requires the shooter to focus on the front sight, which causes

the rear sight and the target to become out of focus, or to appear blurry.

This concentrated focus on the front sight further restricts vision to a

specific area and eliminates nearly all peripheral vision. (Rec. Doc. 205-

7, at 33).

LSP Defendants fail to convince this Court that Mr. Martin is qualified to offer

expert opinions on how officers are trained to shoot and how this training affects their

field of vision. Mr. Martin is admittedly not an expert on police use of force policies

and procedures. (Rec. Doc. 205-5, at 12). Further, Mr. Martin’s opinion on what the

human eye can focus on and perceive while shooting is beyond his education and

experience. Accordingly, the Court will exclude such opinions.

V. Threat Characterizations

Plaintiff next seeks to exclude Mr. Martin’s characterization of Mr. Asante-

Chioke as a “threat” or “imminent threat.” (Rec. Doc. 205-1, at 21). Plaintiff argues

that such characterizations are impermissible legal conclusions. Id. EJLD

Defendants argue that such terms are common expressions “of the danger that Mr.

Asante-Chioke posed to the officers present.” (Rec. Doc. 213, at 16). LSP Defendants

agree, and they also argue that such a characterization is an established fact. (Rec.

Doc. 218, at 16).

The Court recognizes that experts may not render legal conclusions. Renfroe v.

Parker, 974 F. 3d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 2020). In the qualified immunity context, whether

Mr. Asante-Chioke was a threat is relevant to the objective reasonableness of the

force used by the shooting officers. An officer’s use of deadly force is considered

excessive and unreasonable “unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the

suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer[s] or to others.”

Roque v. Harvel, 993 F. 3d 325, 333 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal citation omitted). By

opining that Mr. Asante-Chioke is a “threat,” “imminent threat,” or “imminent deadly

threat,” Mr. Martin is impermissibly answering a legal question for the jury.

Furthermore, such testimony “would risk inappropriate bolstering and undue

prejudice.” Joseph v. Doe, No. 17-cv-5051, 2021 WL 2313475, *5 (E.D. La. June 7,

2021). Accordingly, the Court will exclude all references to Mr. Asante-Chioke being

a “threat.”

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Exclude the Testimony

of Thomas Martin (Rec. Doc. 205) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as

follows.

Mr. Martin may testify as an expert in this case with the following limitations:

Mr. Martin may not render any opinions concerning officer field of vision, each

officer's different visual perspective, or the difference between what an officer sees

and what body cam footage captures; Mr. Martin may not opine on how officers are

trained to focus when firing their weapons and how this affects their field of vision;

Mr. Martin may not opine on studies concerning perception-reaction time; lastly, Mr.

Martin may not opine on whether Mr. Asante-Chioke was a threat to the shooting

officers.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 5th day of January, 2026.

UK faibe

AYA. :

CARL J. BA i RV

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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