Boykin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

MARSHAUN BOYKIN, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-1309-SEM

)

LIEINGER et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Marshaun Boykin, an inmate at Pontiac Correctional

Center (“Pontiac”), has filed a Complaint (Doc. 1), a Motion for Leave

to Amend (Doc. 14), and Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 17, 23).

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s pleading states an Eighth

Amendment excessive force claim. However, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Leave to Amend is denied, and his Motions to Dismiss are moot.

I. COMPLAINT

A. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court

accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing

them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649

(7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721

F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Alleged Facts

Plaintiff’s pleading alleges constitutional violations at Pontiac

Correctional Center (“Pontiac”) that he asserts were committed by

the following Defendants: former Warden Mindi Nurse, Major

Lieinger, Lieutenant Miller, Correctional Officers Bolte and

Martinez, Medical Director Dr. Rodney Alford, and Nursing

Supervisor Nikki Rambo.

Plaintiff alleges that on October 25, 2024, he was placed in a

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cell with dried feces on the walls and without a mattress and his

property. (Pl. Compl., Doc. 1 at 6.) When Plaintiff attempted to

return to the area where he had previously been, he was hog-tied,

picked up in the air, and thrown on his head. (Id.) Plaintiff also

claims that Defendant Bolte smashed his jaw into the ground. (Pl.

Compl., Doc. 1 at 6-7.)

Sometime later, Plaintiff saw a dentist regarding jaw pain.

Plaintiff was referred to an oral surgeon, who removed a cyst under

Plaintiff’s wisdom tooth and ordered a biopsy of the removed tissue,

which was determined to be malignant. Plaintiff asserts he was

diagnosed with lymphoma and is “fighting for his life, battling

cancer as a result of [the] excessive force” earlier applied. (Id. at 8.)

C. Analysis

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint need

only contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This

requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in

sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is

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and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that

the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level.” Bravo v.

Midland Credit Mgmt., 812 F.3d 599, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2016); see

also Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769,

772 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Instead, a plausible claim must include

‘factual content’ sufficient to allow the court ‘to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

Despite naming Defendants Alford, Lieinger, Martinez, Miller

Nurse, and Rambo, Plaintiff does not provide specific facts to infer

that each identified individual committed a constitutional violation

against Plaintiff. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir.

1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant by

including the defendant’s name in the caption.”).

Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials may not use

excessive physical force against prisoners. Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 7 (1992). “The use of force qualifies as excessive for the

purpose of Eighth Amendment . . . when it entails the ‘unnecessary

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and wanton infliction of pain.’” Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs.,

675 F.3d 650, 667 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).

Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment

excessive force claim for the alleged use of force by Defendant Bolte

on October 25, 2024.

II. AMENDMENT

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 14) seeks to add an

oncologist employed by UI Health in Chicago as a Defendant.

However, “[t]o establish [a] § 1983 claim, [the plaintiff] must

demonstrate that the individual defendants: (1) acted under the color

of state law; and (2) deprived him of a constitutional right.” Estate of

Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439, 452 (7th Cir. 2017).

The Seventh Circuit has held that “medical providers who have

‘only an incidental or transitory relationship’ with the penal system

generally are not considered state actors.” Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of

Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 797–98 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 827 (7th Cir. 2009))

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(holding that state university physicians who examined inmate were

not acting under color of state law where physicians “had only an

incidental and transitory relationship with the penal system” and

where no evidence existed that physicians “had a contract with

Wexford or the prison, that their practices focused on treating

inmates, or even that they regularly treated inmates as part of their

practices”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 14) is

denied.

III. DISMISSAL

Plaintiff’s separate filings seek to dismiss former Warden Mindi

Nurse and Nursing Supervisor Nikki Rambo as parties. However, for

the reasons stated in the Court Merit Review Order, Nurse and

Rambo are not parties to Plaintiff’s suit. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motions to

Dismiss (Docs. 17, 23) are moot.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 14) is DENIED.

2) Plaintiff’s Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 17, 23) are MOOT.

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3) According to the Court’s merit review of Plaintiff’s

complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff has

alleged enough facts to proceed with an Eighth

Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant

Bolte. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant proceeds in his

individual capacity only. Additional claims shall not be

included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on

motion by a party for good cause shown or under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

4) The Court directs the Clerk of the Court (“Clerk”) to

dismiss Dr. Rodney Alford, Lieinger, Martinez, Miller,

Mindi Nurse, and Nikki Rambo as parties.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court

advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for

Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions.

Motions filed before Defendant’s counsel has filed an

appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff

need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time

unless otherwise directed by the Court.

6) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing

Defendant a waiver of service. Defendant has sixty days

from service to file an Answer. If Defendant has not filed

Answers or appeared through counsel within ninety days

of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion

requesting the status of service. After Defendant has been

served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and

dispositive motion deadlines.

7) If Defendant no longer works at the address provided by

Plaintiff, the entity for whom Defendant worked while at

that address shall submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s

current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant’s

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forwarding address. This information shall be used only for

effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding

addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not

be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the

Clerk.

8) Defendant shall file an Answer within sixty days of the

date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to dismiss is

not an answer. The answer should include all defenses

appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and

subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims

stated in this order. In general, an answer sets forth

Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the

merits of those positions unless and until Defendant files

a motion. Therefore, no response to the answer is

necessary or will be considered.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after

Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance, Defendant’s

counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any

motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendant’s counsel

copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has

filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to

discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and

responses are not filed with the Clerk of the Court.

Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses

directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or

responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless

they are attached to and the subject of a motion to

compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s

counsel has filed an appearance, and the Court has

entered a scheduling order, which will explain the

discovery process in more detail.

10) The Court grants Defendant’s counsel leave to depose

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Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Defendant’s counsel

shall arrange the time for the deposition.

11) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of

any change in his mailing address and telephone number.

Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in

mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal

of this lawsuit, with prejudice.

12) If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to

the Clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the

Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service

through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and

will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal

service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

13) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified

protective order under the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act.

14) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on

Defendant under the standard procedures.

ENTERED January 5, 2026.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

____________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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