The opinion
Jones v City of New York
2025 NY Slip Op 34753(U)
December 8, 2025
Supreme Court, New York County
Docket Number: Index No. 154355/2024
Judge: Hasa A. Kingo
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York
State and local government sources, including the New
York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.
This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
publication.
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 12/09/2025 09:09 AM INDEX NO. 154355/2024
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 48 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 12/08/2025
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
PRESENT: HON. HASA A. KINGO PART 05M
Justice
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 154355/2024
DARYL JONES,
MOTION DATE 12/08/2025
Plaintiff,
MOTION SEQ. NO. 002
-v-
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE NEW YORK CITY
SANITATION DEPARTMENT, CHRISTINA PEDUTO, DECISION + ORDER ON
KOSHAEV AZAMAT, BAKHODUR TADJIEV, MOTION
Defendant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 37, 38, 39, 40, 41,
42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47
were read on this motion for SUMMARY JUDGMENT .
Defendants Koshaev Azamat and Bakhodur Tadjiev (collectively, “Defendants”) move for
summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212, seeking an order dismissing the complaint and all
cross-claims against them in this action. Defendants contend that they bear no liability for the
subject motor vehicle accident, having been free of negligence, and that the sole proximate cause
of the collision was the conduct of their co-defendants, The City of New York, the New York City
Department of Sanitation, and sanitation truck driver Christina Peduto (the “City Defendants”).
The City Defendants oppose the motion, while plaintiff Daryl Jones takes no position on the
motion. Defendants’ motion on the issue of liability is timely, as no note of issue has been filed.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action arises from a multi-vehicle collision that occurred on October 3, 2023, at
approximately 12:57 P.M., near the intersection of Lexington Avenue and East 103rd Street in
Manhattan. At that time, Defendant Tadjiev was driving a vehicle owned by Defendant Azamat
southbound on Lexington Avenue, proceeding lawfully through a green light up a one-way hill.
Suddenly and without warning, a New York City Department of Sanitation street sweeper truck,
driven by co-defendant Peduto, began barreling down the hill in reverse against traffic. The
sanitation vehicle careened backwards into multiple vehicles: it first struck the rear of a white van
traveling just ahead of Defendants’ car, then continued downhill and collided head-on with
Defendants’ stopped vehicle. The force of the impact propelled Defendants’ vehicle down the hill
and to the side of the street, where it ultimately struck the plaintiff’s vehicle (designated as Vehicle
#4 in the police report). Defendant Tadjiev was rendered unconscious by the crash and was
transported to a hospital.
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Plaintiff Daryl Jones commenced this personal injury action on or about May 9, 2024,
alleging negligence against the City of New York, the Department of Sanitation, Ms. Peduto (the
sanitation truck driver), and against Mr. Azamat and Mr. Tadjiev as owner and operator of the car
that struck plaintiff’s vehicle. Defendants Azamat and Tadjiev joined issue by serving an answer
on July 12, 2024. It appears that multiple related actions arising from this incident (involving other
injured parties) have been consolidated with the instant case for joint discovery by court order.
Indeed, in one such related case, a Supreme Court Justice has already granted summary judgment
on liability against the City, noting that the City “concede[d] that the [sanitation truck] driver failed
to operate the sanitation vehicle with reasonable care” and that the City offered no non-negligent
explanation for the runaway truck. Settlement conferences have been held, but as of this motion
no depositions have taken place and no Note of Issue has been filed.
Defendants Azamat and Tadjiev now move for summary judgment dismissing all claims
and cross-claims, contending that the undisputed evidence – particularly a dashcam video
recording of the accident – establishes that they were not at fault for the happening of the accident.
The City Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that a jury should determine whether Mr. Tadjiev
was negligent in failing to avoid the collision. Defendants submitted reply papers responding to
the City’s arguments.1
ARGUMENTS
Defendants Azamat and Tadjiev assert that they are innocent victims of an unforeseeable
incident caused entirely by the City’s runaway vehicle. In support of their motion, they submit Mr.
Tadjiev’s sworn affidavit and the dashboard camera video from his vehicle, which together provide
an objective, moment-by-moment account of the crash. According to Defendants, the dashcam
footage “portrays the incident clearly and objectively” and eliminates any question of fact
regarding their lack of culpability. The video shows Defendant Tadjiev driving prudently with the
right-of-way, proceeding uphill on Lexington Avenue, when the City’s street sweeper suddenly
comes hurtling down in reverse and strikes first a van and then Defendants’ car. Defendant Tadjiev
affirms that he brought his vehicle to a stop as soon as he perceived the imminent collision, but
the out-of-control sanitation truck nevertheless plowed into him. Given these facts, Defendants
argue that they were “not at fault in the happening of the accident”, and that the City’s vehicle was
the sole proximate cause of the collision, with “no negligence” attributable to Defendants. They
contend that, as a matter of law, a driver in Mr. Tadjiev’s position cannot be held liable when a
third-party vehicle unexpectedly careens into his path. Defendants cite multiple on-point appellate
cases in which summary judgment was granted to a driver who was struck by another vehicle’s
sudden, unlawful maneuver. For example, in Aponte v. Uber Techs., Inc., 230 AD3d 1053 (1st
Dept 2024), a dashcam video conclusively established that a nonparty driver’s illegal left turn was
the only cause of the accident, and the court found no fault on the part of the defendant driver who
was struck.
Similarly, in Calderon v. Calise, 214 AD3d 446 (1st Dept 2023), video evidence
demonstrated that one driver’s actions were the sole proximate cause of a multi-vehicle collision,
1
The court notes as a preliminary matter that the City’s opposition was served after the deadline set by CPLR §
2214(b). In the interest of justice and given the absence of prejudice, however, the court has considered the City’s
untimely opposition rather than disregarding it.
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showing “no negligence” by the defendant who was hit. Defendants argue the same is true here:
the sanitation truck’s egregious malfunction or operator error was wholly responsible for this
crash, and Mr. Tadjiev — who had been driving normally and obeying all traffic laws — did
nothing to contribute to the accident.
Defendants further invoke the emergency doctrine. They maintain that Mr. Tadjiev was
confronted with a sudden emergency not of his own making when the City’s large street sweeper
came rushing toward him “suddenly without any warning.” By all accounts, he had only a split-
second to react and “virtually no opportunity to avoid a collision”. Under such circumstances,
Defendants contend, the law does not demand perfection or second-guess a driver’s instantaneous
reaction. Defendant Tadjiev’s response — braking his vehicle to a stop — was, in their view, a
reasonable and blameless reaction to an unforeseen hazard. Any suggestion that he might have
avoided the impact by swerving or taking some other maneuver, they argue, is pure hindsight
speculation and legally insufficient to create a triable issue. Defendants point out that they had no
duty to anticipate that a municipal vehicle would suddenly come barreling the wrong way down a
one-way street. It is undisputed that the sanitation truck’s brakes failed (according to the City’s
own records) and that it rolled downhill out of control. Defendants assert they cannot be charged
with foreseeing or preventing another vehicle’s mechanical failure or gross negligence. In support,
they cite cases such as Kirby v. Lett, 208 AD3d 1174 (2d Dept 2022) and Wade v. Knight Transp.,
Inc., 151 AD3d 1107 (2d Dept 2017), which hold that a driver is not required to anticipate
extraordinary scenarios like a vehicle suddenly crossing into oncoming traffic or losing control.
Finally, Defendants note that the City itself has effectively acknowledged its sole
responsibility for this accident in related litigation. They reference a companion case arising from
the same incident in which the City Defendant purportedly conceded that its street sweeper driver
failed to operate the vehicle with due care, resulting in an order granting summary judgment
against the City on liability. Given all the above, Defendants Azamat and Tadjiev argue that no
reasonable fact-finder could assign them any fault for this accident. They seek dismissal of the
complaint and all cross-claims, thereby excusing them entirely from the case.
The City of New York and its co-defendants oppose the motion, arguing that material
questions of fact exist as to whether Mr. Tadjiev was truly blameless or whether he failed to act
reasonably to avoid the collision. The City does not dispute the basic sequence of events shown
on the dashcam video – namely, that the sanitation street sweeper rolled downhill in reverse and
struck multiple vehicles. However, the City focuses on the actions (or inaction) of Mr. Tadjiev in
the moments before impact. They contend that the dashcam footage reveals a potential lapse by
Mr. Tadjiev that a jury must evaluate. In particular, the City notes that a white van traveling directly
in front of Defendants’ car managed to perceive the danger and swerve to the side out of the street
sweeper’s path. As the sweeper came hurtling down Lexington Avenue, the van is seen pulling
toward the left curb to escape being hit. By contrast, Mr. Tadjiev’s vehicle continued moving
straight and came to a stop in the middle of the lane, where it was struck head-on. The City argues
that while the van’s driver took evasive action, Mr. Tadjiev “took no action” to get out of the way,
despite having had a brief window of opportunity while he was still in the intersection of E. 103rd
Street. According to the City, Mr. Tadjiev could have turned his vehicle either left or right at that
intersection to clear Lexington Avenue and potentially avoid the collision. In the City’s view, the
fact that “another driver was able to observe the conditions and react” (i.e., the white van)
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demonstrates that avoidance was at least possible under the circumstances. They insist this is “not
mere hypothetical” conjecture, but evidence that a prudent driver in Mr. Tadjiev’s position might
have evaded the oncoming truck. Thus, the reasonableness of Mr. Tadjiev’s response to the
emergency is said to be a classic factual question for the jury, not resolvable as a matter of law.
The City cites Caparitia v. Johnson, 216 AD3d 529 (1st Dept 2023), in support of its
argument. In Caparitia, a plaintiff driver sought summary judgment after a truck ahead of her
made a sudden improper turn, but the Appellate Division, First Department, found an issue of fact
as to whether the plaintiff had more than a few seconds to react and could have avoided the crash.
By analogy, the City contends that the dashcam video here could lead a jury to conclude that Mr.
Tadjiev had enough time to attempt an evasive maneuver, rather than merely stopping in the truck’s
path. The City emphasizes that the video begins when Defendants’ car was about a block away
from the eventual collision point, and the street sweeper is visible up the hill at least 14 seconds
before impact, initially stationary at the top of Lexington Avenue. As Defendants’ car approached
the 103rd Street intersection, the sweeper began rolling backward and the white van reacted, yet
Mr. Tadjiev continued through the intersection and did not turn off or pull aside. From these facts,
the City argues that a juror could find Mr. Tadjiev was negligent in failing to take reasonable
precautions when confronted with the runaway vehicle. The reasonableness of his conduct in that
emergency—whether he truly had “only seconds” or perhaps a bit more time to respond—is,
according to the City, debatable in a manner that precludes summary judgment.
In addition, the City contends that Defendants’ motion is premature. No depositions of the
drivers (neither Mr. Tadjiev nor Ms. Peduto) have yet been conducted. The City asserts that it
should be permitted to explore the details of Mr. Tadjiev’s observations and decision-making
through testimony before the court conclusively determines liability. They urge that further
discovery might shed light on whether Mr. Tadjiev saw or heard the truck earlier than he claims,
whether evasive action was feasible, and other facts bearing on comparative fault. The City notes
that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, especially in negligence cases, and it invokes the
principle that questions of proximate cause and the reasonableness of a driver’s response are
typically matters for the fact-finder. The City’s opposition quotes at length from Gerard v. Inglese,
11 AD2d 381 (2d Dept 1960), an older appellate decision cautioning that even where the basic
physical facts of an accident are undisputed, the issue of whether a defendant acted as a reasonably
prudent person in an emergency is “essentially one of fact” that ordinarily must be left to the jury.
In sum, the City Defendants maintain that this case is not so clear-cut that liability can be decided
as a matter of law. They ask the court to deny summary judgment so that a jury can ultimately
determine whether any failure by Mr. Tadjiev to avoid the crash contributed to the accident.
In reply, Defendants Azamat and Tadjiev vigorously refute the City’s contentions and
underscore the absence of any concrete evidence contradicting their account. As a threshold matter,
Defendants point out that the City’s opposition is supported only by an attorney’s affirmation, not
by any affidavit from a witness with personal knowledge of the accident. The sanitation truck
driver, Ms. Peduto, has offered no testimony or affidavit to suggest that Mr. Tadjiev had a realistic
chance to avoid the collision. Nor has the City proffered an expert affidavit or other evidence to
substantiate its theory of an avoidable accident. Defendants argue that an attorney’s unsworn
assertions and interpretations of the video cannot create a triable issue of fact. To defeat summary
judgment, the City was required to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form, not mere
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conjecture or speculation. Here, the City “submitted no evidence of a nonnegligent explanation for
the accident,” and its arguments about what Mr. Tadjiev might have done differently are purely
speculative and “insufficient to raise an issue of fact.” In support of this point, Defendants cite
McDaniel v. Codi Transp., Ltd., 149 AD3d 595 (1st Dept 2017), where the Appellate Division,
First Department, held that speculative arguments about how a plaintiff driver could have avoided
an accident, in the absence of any evidentiary showing, could not defeat summary judgment.
Defendants also directly address the white van scenario that the City emphasizes. They
argue that the conduct of a third-party driver (the van) does not establish a legal standard of care
for Mr. Tadjiev. In other words, just because the van’s driver attempted an evasive maneuver does
not mean Mr. Tadjiev was negligent for not attempting the exact same maneuver. No authority is
cited by the City (because none exists) for the proposition that one driver’s split-second reaction
defines what a reasonably prudent driver must do in that moment. On the contrary, Defendants
argue, the law recognizes that different individuals may react differently in an emergency, and a
person who hesitates or chooses one form of evasive action over another is not necessarily
negligent — especially when only seconds are available. Defendants reiterate that Mr. Tadjiev did
react to the emergency by braking to a stop, which is an intuitively reasonable response when a
vehicle is hurtling towards you head-on. They contend there is no evidence that turning left or right
(as the City suggests) would have been safer or even feasible in the scant time available. Indeed,
the van’s successful swerve does not guarantee that Mr. Tadjiev’s larger SUV could have cleared
the sweeper’s path in time, or that turning wouldn’t have led to a different collision (for example,
with cross-traffic or a parked car). All arguments that Defendants “could have moved their vehicle
in one direction or another” to avoid being hit are, in Defendants’ words, nothing but “pure
speculation”.
Defendants buttress this point with recent appellate authority squarely rejecting speculation
about evasive measures in similar contexts. They highlight the Appellate Division, First
Department’s, statement in Aponte v. Uber Techs., supra, that while under some limited
circumstances a driver with sufficient time might have a duty to attempt an evasive action, “this
duty does not arise when the driver only has a few seconds to react to another driver’s violation of
traffic laws” (230 AD3d at 1054).
Here, by the City’s own timeline, Mr. Tadjiev had at most a handful of seconds from the
moment the sweeper began rolling to the moment of impact. In such a rapid emergency,
Defendants argue, no duty to execute an ideal evasive maneuver can be imposed on the driver.
Defendants cite Rooney v. Madison, 134 AD3d 634, 634-635 (1st Dept 2015), for the proposition
that “[s]peculation regarding evasive action that a defendant driver should have taken to avoid a
collision, especially when the driver had, at most, a few seconds to react, does not raise a triable
issue of fact.” In Rooney, as in this case, the Appellate Division, First Department, refused to
entertain conjecture that the defendant might have averted the crash, because the emergency
unfolded too quickly to expect more of the driver. Defendants maintain that the City’s position is
exactly the sort of hindsight speculation that these cases forbid.
With respect to the emergency doctrine, Defendants note that the City’s opposition
conspicuously failed to rebut or even address their emergency-doctrine defense. By not countering
this point, the City effectively concedes that Mr. Tadjiev was indeed faced with a sudden
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emergency beyond his control. Defendants reiterate that, under long-established law, when a driver
“is confronted with an emergency not of [his] own making” and has only seconds to react, he
cannot be held negligent if his response is reasonable under the circumstances. They argue that
nothing about Mr. Tadjiev’s conduct was unreasonable in the context of the emergency that
confronted him; he was a cautious driver caught in a nightmare scenario. Defendants also clarify
that the cases cited by the City are distinguishable on their facts. Caparitia, supra, for instance,
involved a different scenario (a truck making a turn across the plaintiff’s lane) and the appellate
court found evidence that the plaintiff might have had more time to react than she claimed. Here,
in contrast, we have a vehicle mechanically careening the wrong way down a hill, which is far
more abrupt and uncontrollable than a truck executing a turn. Defendants also distinguish Zeman
v. Dewes, 35 AD2d 940 (1st Dept 1970), which the City cited. In Zeman, the defendant driver’s
own vehicle malfunctioned (going forward when he meant to reverse) and the driver might have
mishandled his pedals, raising a factual question about whether his response was reasonable. By
comparison, Mr. Tadjiev’s vehicle did not malfunction at all; he was simply struck by another
malfunctioning vehicle. Thus, Defendants contend, Zeman is inapposite: there is no question here
of Mr. Tadjiev’s own equipment or actions precipitating the event. Lastly, Defendants address
Gerard v. Inglese, supra, the 1960 case the City quoted. They point out that in Gerard the appellate
court, despite musing about the general rule of jury determinations in negligence cases, actually
affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff because the facts of that case were “inescapable” and
left no triable issue of the defendant’s negligence. Defendants argue that the same is true here: the
evidence of their lack of negligence is so clear that, just as in Gerard, summary judgment is
warranted notwithstanding the general caution that many negligence cases go to the jury.
Finally, Defendants reject the City’s plea for further discovery as a basis to delay judgment.
They emphasize that the City has offered only the hope that depositions might turn up something
– but “mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment
may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion.” Defendants
cite Yonghong Xia v Zhao Xian Zeng, 219 AD3d 914 (2d Dept 2023) on this point, noting that the
City has not identified any specific facts that are likely to emerge from depositions which would
alter the analysis. Given the highly peculiar circumstances of the accident and the existence of an
objective video, Defendants argue that additional testimony would be cumulative at best. In their
view, the essential facts are already before the court, and those facts establish their entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law. Defendants also note that even if issues of comparative fault exist
between the City and some other party, that would not preclude granting summary judgment to
Defendants. Relying on the Court of Appeals’ decision in Rodriguez v. City of New York, 31 NY3d
312 (2018), they observe that a party can obtain summary judgment on liability without disproving
all other potential contributing fault. In Rodriguez, the Court held that a plaintiff may be granted
partial summary judgment on a defendant’s liability despite open questions about the plaintiff’s
own comparative negligence. Here, by analogy, the mere fact that the City posits multiple causes
of the accident does not bar this court from ruling as a matter of law that these Defendants were
not one of those causes. Defendants reiterate that they have demonstrated 0% liability on their part;
thus, any comparative fault issue is solely between the City and others, and does not involve
Defendants. In sum, Defendants urge that the City’s opposition has failed to raise a genuine issue
of material fact, and they ask the court to grant the motion in its entirety.
DISCUSSION
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CPLR § 3212 provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the moving party
establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The movant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing
of entitlement to judgment by demonstrating the absence of any material factual issues. If that
showing is made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to “produce evidentiary proof in
admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial”
(Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d
557, 562 [1980]). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, the court must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor. However, the opponent of summary judgment cannot rely on mere suspicions, conclusory
allegations, or speculation in place of concrete evidence. As the Court of Appeals put it in
Zuckerman, the non-movant must lay bare its proof and cannot defeat summary judgment with
“mere speculation or conjecture as to what might be uncovered later.” Thus, where the movant’s
evidence is sufficient to eliminate all triable issues, bald assertions or ipse dixit arguments by the
opponent will not suffice to avoid summary judgment (id.; see also Perez v. Brux Cab Corp., 251
AD2d 157 [1st Dept 1998][attorney’s affirmation without personal knowledge or factual support
is inadequate to raise an issue]).
Here, Defendants Azamat and Tadjiev have met their prima facie burden of demonstrating
that they were not negligent and that no act or omission on their part caused or contributed to the
accident. The evidence submitted on the motion includes a dashcam video of the collision and a
sworn affidavit from the driver, Mr. Tadjiev, both of which are uncontradicted in the record. This
evidence compellingly shows that Mr. Tadjiev was operating his vehicle in a lawful, cautious
manner when an extraordinary hazard presented itself. The dashcam footage (the accuracy of
which is not disputed) depicts Defendants’ car proceeding with the right-of-way on Lexington
Avenue moments before the crash. There is no indication that Mr. Tadjiev was speeding,
distracted, or violating any traffic rules – in fact, the light was green in his direction and he was
traveling below the speed limit up a hill. Then, in a shocking turn of events, the City’s large street
sweeper appears ahead, moving backwards down the hill against traffic at a high rate of speed. Mr.
Tadjiev reacted by bringing his car to a stop as quickly as one could reasonably expect, but the
runaway sweeper slammed into him head-on. There is no evidence that Mr. Tadjiev had any prior
notice of the sweeper’s approach in time to avoid being in its path; it quite literally came from the
opposite direction of travel, a scenario virtually no driver would anticipate. The police accident
report corroborates that the sanitation vehicle’s brakes malfunctioned, causing it to roll
uncontrollably. In short, Defendants’ submissions establish a classic case of a blameless driver
struck by another vehicle’s unexpected loss of control.
Under New York law, a driver who is struck by a vehicle that crosses into his lane or
otherwise violates the traffic laws generally will be found free of fault as a matter of law, provided
the driver himself did nothing unreasonable to contribute to the happening of the accident. This
principle has been applied in numerous similar cases. For example, in Calderon v. Calise, 214
AD3d 446 (1st Dept 2023), a video demonstrated that one vehicle’s driver was solely responsible
for a collision, “and [it] showed no negligence” on the part of the defendant driver who was
impacted. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed summary judgment exonerating the
defendant in that case. Likewise, in Aponte v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 230 AD3d 1053 (1st Dept
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2024), the Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed summary judgment for a
defendant driver whose dashcam proved that a third-party’s sudden illegal turn was the sole cause
of the crash; the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant driver should have somehow avoided the
collision was deemed entirely speculative.
The dashcam evidence at bar is every bit as conclusive. It objectively establishes that the
City’s street sweeper, due to either mechanical failure or operator negligence, careened backwards
into Defendants’ stopped car. There is not a shred of evidence that Mr. Tadjiev operated his vehicle
improperly. To the contrary, the video shows he was in his proper lane, obeying traffic signals,
and in the final seconds had halted his car in an attempt to avoid impact. There is no suggestion
that anything Mr. Tadjiev did triggered or exacerbated the collision – he was simply there when
the City’s truck barreled into him. Thus, Defendants have affirmatively demonstrated that fault
lies entirely with the co-defendants, not with Mr. Tadjiev or Mr. Azamat. This showing satisfies
Defendants’ prima facie burden on summary judgment.
The burden accordingly shifts to the City Defendants (as the opponents of the motion) to
produce evidence of a material factual dispute. The City has failed to meet that burden. Crucially,
the City has offered no contrary evidence to rebut the scenario depicted in the video or to suggest
that Mr. Tadjiev was in any way negligent. The City did not submit any affidavit from Ms. Peduto
(the sanitation truck driver) or from any eyewitness to the accident. There is no expert testimony
opining that Mr. Tadjiev had time to take additional action. In fact, there is not even an affidavit
from the white van’s driver indicating what exactly transpired from that driver’s perspective. The
entirety of the City’s opposition rests on an attorney’s speculation that, because one vehicle (the
van) managed to move slightly to the side, perhaps Mr. Tadjiev also should have been able to do
so. But an attorney’s hypothesis is not evidence. As the Appellate Division, First Department, has
admonished, “speculation regarding evasive action that a defendant driver should have taken to
avoid a collision, especially when the driver had, at most, a few seconds to react, does not raise a
triable issue of fact” (Rooney v. Madison, 134 AD3d 634, 634-635 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 27
NY3d 911 [2016]]). This principle directly applies here. The City’s theory that Mr. Tadjiev “could
have” turned left or right in the intersection is pure conjecture, unsupported by any concrete facts
such as measurements, timing, or expert analysis. The dashcam video, if anything, undermines the
notion that a safe evasive turn was feasible: Mr. Tadjiev had only an instant to decide, and his
immediate reaction was to hit the brakes (an instinctively reasonable response). The video shows
that the street sweeper was moving at a high speed and striking other vehicles along the way,
giving Mr. Tadjiev precious little time or space to maneuver. By the time he even reached the
intersection at 103rd Street, the sweeper was almost upon him. A split-second judgment not to
swerve is hardly evidence of negligence; on the contrary, swerving might have placed him in the
path of the very van that was also scrambling to escape, or into the path of pedestrians on the
sidewalk. The City’s hindsight assertion that Mr. Tadjiev “could have turned onto 103rd Street”
or ducked behind a double-parked car is speculative on its face – it presumes facts not in evidence
(e.g., that the cross street was clear, that Mr. Tadjiev had control and awareness to execute such a
turn in a heartbeat, etc.).
New York courts consistently reject this sort of conjecture as insufficient to defeat
summary judgment. In McDaniel v. Codi Transp., Ltd., 149 AD3d 595 (1st Dept 2017), for
example, the Appellate Division, First Department, held that a defendant’s arguments about how
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the plaintiff driver might have avoided the accident were “speculative, and therefore insufficient
to raise an issue of fact” in the absence of any evidentiary support. Similarly, in Hidalgo v.
Vasquez, 187 AD3d 683 (1st Dept 2020)(cited in Aponte), the Appellate Division, First
Department, found no triable issue where the only allegation of negligence was that a driver failed
to somehow dodge an incoming collision – an allegation deemed too speculative to carry weight.
Here, the City’s contentions boil down to the same impermissible hindsight second-
guessing. The court cannot let this case proceed to a jury on the mere hope that jurors might engage
in conjecture about alternative scenarios, when the actual evidence (the video) so clearly depicts
an unavoidable crash. As our Court of Appeals has instructed, “[m]ere conclusions, expressions of
hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient” to raise a question of fact
(Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562). The City’s opposition, lacking any affidavit from a person with
knowledge or any tangible contradictory proof, amounts to precisely the kind of unsubstantiated
assertion that cannot overcome a prima facie case.
It bears emphasizing that the City’s focus on what the white van’s driver did does not create
a triable issue regarding Mr. Tadjiev’s conduct. One driver’s ability to take a particular evasive
action does not establish that another driver in a similar emergency must or could successfully do
the same. Human reactions to emergencies are not uniform, and the law does not impose liability
on a blameless driver merely because a bystander managed a heroic avoidance maneuver. The City
cites no authority for using a third party’s split-second reaction as the benchmark for negligence,
and this court is aware of none. On the contrary, the cases hold that each driver’s circumstances
must be judged on their own facts, and speculation that “if Driver A could do it, Driver B should
have too” is insufficient. Indeed, the white van’s successful escape only underscores how
extraordinary this situation was – the van driver was very fortunate to find an opening and avoid
catastrophe. That fact does not convert Mr. Tadjiev’s misfortune (being unable to get out of the
way in time) into negligence. To rule otherwise would in effect punish a driver for not performing
a near-miracle under deadly pressure. The law does not countenance such an approach. As the
Appellate Division, First Department stated, in Aponte, even though “under some limited
circumstances a party who has time to act may have a duty to take evasive actions,” no such duty
arises when events are unfolding in a matter of seconds (230 AD3d at 1054).
Here, the window between the onset of the emergency and the impact was so brief that Mr.
Tadjiev cannot be faulted for failing to accomplish what the City, with 20/20 hindsight, imagines
he might have done.
The emergency doctrine squarely applies to this case and further compels the conclusion
that Mr. Tadjiev was not negligent. Under the emergency doctrine, “when an actor is faced with a
sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for deliberation, the actor may
not be held negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context”
(Rivera v. New York City Transit Authority, 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]).
This doctrine recognizes that a person confronted with a sudden peril cannot be expected
to exercise the cool judgment of someone with time to reflect, and it gives legal latitude to those
who, through no fault of their own, must react in the moment to avoid harm. Both the existence of
an emergency and the reasonableness of the response are typically fact-specific inquiries; however,
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when the material facts are undisputed and only one conclusion can be drawn, the court may
determine the issue as a matter of law (Caristo v. Sanzone, 96 NY2d 172, 174 [2001]; Vitale v.
Levine, 44 AD3d 935, 936 [2d Dept 2007]).
In the case at bar, the evidence conclusively establishes a classic sudden emergency. It is
hard to imagine a more unexpected roadway hazard than a 25-ton garbage sweeper flying
backwards down a city street. Defendant Tadjiev was driving normally when, “suddenly and
without warning,” a large sanitation truck came at him in the wrong direction. He had virtually no
time to react – the video suggests mere seconds at best – and no safe avenue of escape that can be
identified in hindsight. Courts have held that events of this nature constitute a textbook emergency
situation. Notably, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Wade v. Knight Transp., Inc.,
151 AD3d 1107 (2d Dept 2017) observed that a driver facing an oncoming vehicle traveling the
wrong way was confronted with “a classic emergency” implicating the emergency doctrine.
Likewise, in Bernot v. Reid, 227 AD3d 1043, 1045 (2d Dept 2024), a case with analogous
facts, the defendant driver was not held liable when another car’s sudden movement gave him only
seconds to react; the appellate court emphasized that the driver was confronted with “an emergency
not of [his] own making,” had “only seconds to react, and had virtually no opportunity to avoid a
collision.” Mr. Tadjiev’s predicament was the epitome of a no-win emergency: in a matter of
moments, a truck came hurtling into his lane, and there was essentially nothing he could do to stop
it from hitting him. Under these circumstances, the emergency doctrine protects Mr. Tadjiev from
liability. His response – immediately braking to a stop – was, on its face, a reasonable and
instinctual reaction to an imminent collision. There is no evidence that he did anything reckless or
improper during those critical seconds. Even if one could hypothesize that a perfect driver might
have tried a different maneuver, the emergency doctrine does not demand perfection. It asks only
whether the driver’s choices were reasonable when judged against the urgent pressure of the
moment. Here, stopping one’s car when a vehicle is coming at you out of nowhere is a reasonable
action. There is certainly no indication that any alternative action would have been more effective.
Thus, as a matter of law, Mr. Tadjiev’s conduct was consistent with that of a reasonably prudent
driver in an emergency situation. The City’s arguments, which second-guess Mr. Tadjiev’s split-
second decision-making, ignore the forgiving lens through which the law views those confronted
with sudden danger. Because Mr. Tadjiev did not create the emergency and responded to it in a
manner that cannot be deemed irrational or careless, the emergency doctrine exonerates him from
negligence (Bello v. Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2d Dept 2004][“a driver
confronted with a sudden, unexpected circumstance not of his own making… who reacts
reasonably under the circumstances may not be held negligent, even if another course of action
would have been safer”]). Notably, the City’s opposition did not offer any argument to refute the
emergency doctrine’s applicability, effectively conceding that this was indeed an unforeseen
emergency. The court finds, based on the undisputed facts, that Mr. Tadjiev was confronted with
a sudden emergency and that his response was reasonable as a matter of law. This is an independent
ground for granting Defendants summary judgment on liability (Vitale, 44 AD3d at 936).
The City’s plea that the motion is premature due to pending discovery is unavailing. CPLR
§ 3212(f) permits a party to oppose summary judgment on the ground that facts essential to justify
opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated. However, the opposing party must make an
evidentiary showing that such facts are within the exclusive knowledge of the movant or that
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further discovery would yield material evidence (Voluto Ventures, LLC v. Jenkens & Gilchrist
Parker Chapin LLP, 44 AD3d 557, 557 [1st Dept 2007]). Here, the City has not identified any
specific information that it expects to obtain from depositions which would raise a triable issue.
The circumstances of the accident have been captured on video, and Mr. Tadjiev has already
described the event in an affidavit. The City does not suggest that Mr. Tadjiev is withholding some
crucial detail that only his deposition would reveal; nor does it claim that the sanitation driver
would provide an affidavit supportive of the City’s position (tellingly, she has provided none).
Simply put, there is no indication that further discovery would yield anything beyond what is
already known from the video and the physical facts. In this posture, courts routinely reject
requests to delay summary judgment. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is
insufficient” to deny the motion (Yonghong Xia v Zhao Xian Zeng, 219 AD3d 914, 916 [2d Dept
2023]; see also Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 324). The City’s opposition essentially asks for a fishing
expedition on the chance that something might turn up. That is not a proper basis to postpone
judgment, especially where, as here, the crucial facts have been captured objectively on video. The
court is satisfied that it has a complete and clear record upon which to decide this motion, and no
amount of additional questioning is likely to change the incontrovertible reality shown in the
dashcam footage.
The City’s arguments at times suggest that multiple causes were at play in this accident,
implying that even if the City’s truck was one cause, Mr. Tadjiev’s actions could be another. The
court notes, however, that establishing one party’s freedom from negligence is not negated merely
because another party’s negligence also existed. New York’s comparative negligence regime
permits the apportionment of fault among multiple tortfeasors, but it also allows the court to
determine as a matter of law that a particular party bears no fault. In Rodriguez v. City of New
York, 31 NY3d 312 (2018), the Court of Appeals made clear that a plaintiff may obtain partial
summary judgment on a defendant’s liability without having to disprove the plaintiff’s own
comparative fault. By the same token, a defendant who demonstrates that it was not negligent in
any degree is entitled to summary judgment even if other parties were negligent. The presence of
other culpable conduct does not immunize a non-negligent party from being dismissed. Here,
Defendants have demonstrated that they were not negligent at all. There is, therefore, no
“comparative” fault to consider on their part. To the extent the City contends that liability should
be apportioned between its driver and Mr. Tadjiev, that contention has no factual support in this
record. But even assuming arguendo that comparative fault were an issue, it “does not preclude [a
party’s] ability to obtain summary judgment on liability” (Rodriguez, 31 NY3d at 324). In practical
terms, this means that the court can grant summary judgment to Defendants Azamat and Tadjiev
on the issue of liability, thereby removing them from the case, and leave any remaining liability
issues (such as the percentage of fault as between the City and perhaps the sanitation vehicle’s
maintenance contractors, if any) to be resolved later. There is no procedural or legal bar to doing
so, and indeed it promotes judicial efficiency and fairness to excise an obviously fault-free
defendant from a lawsuit.
Having carefully reviewed the evidence and the applicable law, the court finds that there
is no triable issue of fact as to Defendants Azamat and Tadjiev’s liability. The material facts are
essentially undisputed and, importantly, are corroborated by unimpeachable video evidence. Those
facts lead to the inescapable conclusion that Mr. Tadjiev was in no way responsible for this
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accident. All of the competent evidence indicates that the sole proximate cause of the collision was
the negligence of the City’s sanitation truck driver and/or a mechanical failure of the City’s vehicle.
There is no evidence of any negligence by Mr. Tadjiev (or by Mr. Azamat, whose liability would
be purely vicarious as owner) that contributed to the happening of the crash. In such circumstances,
summary judgment is not only appropriate but warranted to prevent an innocent party from being
unduly dragged into further litigation. This outcome is entirely consistent with Appellate Division,
First Department, precedent. As noted, the Appellate Division, First Department, in Aponte,
Calderon, Rooney, and other cases has affirmed the dismissal of claims against drivers who, like
Mr. Tadjiev, were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time and were struck by another
vehicle’s unforeseeable misconduct. The court is confident that a similar result is compelled here.
Accordingly, Defendants Azamat and Tadjiev have established their entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law, and the City Defendants have failed to raise any genuine issue
requiring a trial. The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that moving Defendants were free
from fault, and the opposing arguments amount to speculation unsupported by proof. There is no
legal or factual impediment to granting summary judgment in favor of these Defendants on the
issue of liability.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Koshaev Azamat and Bakhodur Tadjiev’s motion
for summary judgment is granted. It is hereby
ORDERED that the complaint and all cross-claims against Defendants Azamat and Tadjiev
are dismissed in their entirety; and it is further
ORDEDED that counsel for Defendants Azamat and Tadjiev is directed to serve a copy of
this decision and order on all parties, and shall file the same with the Clerk of the Court with notice
of entry; and it is further
ORDERED that upon said service, the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in
favor of Defendants Azamat and Tadjiev accordingly; and it is further
ORDEDED that this dismissal is on the issue of liability only, and has no effect on
plaintiff’s continuing claims against the remaining defendants. The balance of the action shall
continue as against the City of New York, the Department of Sanitation, and Christina Peduto. The
court finds, pursuant to CPLR § 3212(b), that no triable issues of fact exist with respect to moving
Defendants’ liability.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court. The parties shall proceed to the next
stages of litigation in a manner consistent with this decision and order, and are invited to contact
the court, with all sides copied, at sfc-part5@nycourts.gov to schedule a settlement conference.
12/8/2025
DATE HASA A. KINGO, J.S.C.
CHECK ONE:
B X
CASE DISPOSED
GRANTED
□
DENIED
B
X NON-FINAL DISPOSITION
GRANTED IN PART
□
OTHER
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