Stills

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

GUS STILLS CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-cv-1428

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

BEST CHICKEN IN SHREVEPORT LLC ET MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

AL

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Introduction

Gus Stills (“Plaintiff”), who is self-represented, filed this civil action against his

former employer for alleged wrongful termination and retaliation. The employer, Best

Chicken of Shreveport, LLC, has filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) that is now before the

court. The motion was noticed for briefing, but Plaintiff did not file any response. For the

reasons that follow, it is recommended that the motion be granted and that this civil action

be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

The Complaint

“[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all

of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197,

2200 (2007). Plaintiff’s complaint is titled Petition for Wrongful Termination. It asserts

that the court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the action

arises under federal law, including violations of his “rights to fair employment

protections.” Plaintiff does not, however, invoke any particular federal employment

statutes.

Plaintiff alleges that he was employed by Defendant as a cook at a Church’s Chicken

location in Shreveport. He was the only cook on duty one day when the manager

“experienced a medical episode, passed out, and displayed hostility toward Plaintiff.”

Afterward, “the manager threatened Plaintiff with termination and sent Plaintiff home.”

Plaintiff, concerned for workplace safety, contacted law enforcement. Police officers

arrived, took statements, and generated a report. The supervisor did not come to the

workplace.

Later that day, a supervisor contacted Plaintiff by phone and told him that he was

“not permitted to return to work under any circumstances.” Plaintiff asserts that his

employer “effectively terminated Plaintiff without cause, investigation, due process, or

lawful justification.” He contends that he was subjected to “wrongful termination in

violation of public policy, as retaliation for raising legitimate safety concerns and

requesting assistance from law enforcement.”

Rule 12(b)(6) Requirements

Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint based on Fed. R. Civ. Pro 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff’s

complaint must plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S.Ct. 1955 (2007)). The factual allegations must “raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. “[P]ro se complaints are held to less

stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers,” but even in a pro se complaint

“conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not

suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378

(5th Cir. 2002).

Analysis

Plaintiff’s primary allegation is that he was wrongfully terminated in violation of

public policy. He appears to believe that his termination was unfair or without good reason,

and that such circumstances give rise to a legal claim. But neither federal nor Louisiana

law provide a cause of action for wrongful termination or mere unfair treatment in the

workplace. When an employee is employed for an indefinite term, Louisiana law allows

the employment relationship to be terminated at will by either party. “Reasons for

terminations need not be accurate, fair or reasonable.” Stephenson v. Lavalco, Inc., 669

So.2d 608, 610 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1996). See also Gilbert v. Tulane University, 909 F.2d

124, 125 (5th Cir. 1990).

There are state and federal statutes that prohibit termination of employment for

certain, specified reasons, but Plaintiff has not invoked any such laws or alleged that his

termination was based on one of the unlawful reasons listed in those statutes. Mere

termination for unfair or incorrect reasons does not give rise to a federal (or state) cause of

action. McCoy v. Wade, 2007 WL 1098738, *2 (W.D. La. 2007); Godfrey v. AAB

Amusement Co., 2005 WL 2467773, *10 (W.D. La. 2005) (“wrongful termination in

violation of public policy is not a cause of action recognized under Louisiana law in the

absence of a statutory exception”); and Thomas v. United Rentals, Inc., 2022 WL

17834073, *7 (M.D. La. 2022) (rejecting claim of wrongful termination based on public

policy).

Plaintiff also complains that his employer retaliated against him for raising safety

concerns and requesting assistance from law enforcement. There is no general “retaliation”

cause of action. Brown v. Texas State Univ. Sys. Bd. of Regents, 2013 WL 6532025, *7

(W.D. Tex. 2013). There are several federal and state statutes that contain anti-retaliation

provisions in specific situations, but Plaintiff does not invoke any of them or allege facts

that appear to state a claim under any of them.

Title VII is perhaps the most well-known employment discrimination law, and it

makes it unlawful to discriminate or take an adverse employment action (retaliate) against

an employee who has opposed an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII. The

employee must show that he engaged in activity protected under the statute. Lewis v. Bd.

of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 134 F.4th 286, 295 (5th

Cir. 2025). “Protected activity is defined as opposition to any practice rendered unlawful

by Title VII, including making a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII.” Ackel v. Nat’l Commc'ns, Inc., 339,

385 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that suggest he may have engaged in protected

activity for which he would be protected against retaliation. To the extent Plaintiff may

contend that he was retaliated against for reporting a potential OSHA violation, that claim

should also be dismissed. Reporting an employer to authorities for violating OSHA does

not qualify as protected activity under Title VII. Washington v. M. Hanna Const. Inc., 299

Fed. Appx. 399 (5th Cir. 2008). Even if Plaintiff intended to bring a claim for retaliation

under OSHA, and not Title VII, there is no indication that he has complied with the

procedural prerequisites or alleged facts that would state a claim under the applicable law.

See Licona v. Pro. Distribution Ctr., Inc., 2025 WL 2723139, *5 (S.D. Tex. 2025).

There are multiple potential flaws in Plaintiff’s complaint, and Defendant has raised

others in its motion. It is sufficient, however, to say that the allegations do not state a claim

on which relief may be granted. Plaintiff’s general assertions of wrongful termination and

retaliation simply do not state an actionable claim under federal or Louisiana law.

Accordingly,

It is recommended that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) be granted and that

all of Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim on which

relief may be granted.

Objections

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties

aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and

recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an

extension of time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.

Counsel are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the

District Judge at the time of filing.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and

recommendation set forth above, within 14 days after being served with a copy, shall bar

that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to

proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See

Douglass v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d 1415 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc).

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 4 day of December,

2025.

“Mark L. Hornsby

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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