Opinion

McManus

Court
District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed
Dec 3, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 37.9%

finding only qualified immunity for a prosecutor who allegedly made false statements in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant

How later courts described this case

  • finding only qualified immunity for a prosecutor who allegedly made false statements in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant
  • “Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.”
  • “18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 do not provide a basis for civil liability.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JOSEPH MCMANUS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-1859

REGINALD J LAURENT ET AL. SECTION “J” (3)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pro se Plaintiff Joseph McManus filed this lawsuit against City Prosecutor

Reginald J. Laurent and the Honorable Bryan D. Haggerty (“Defendants”).1

Plaintiff’s lawsuit arises from an arrest warrant issued while his late father

(“Mr. McManus”) was in the hospital. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Laurent is liable for

pursuing charges against his father and for playing some role in the issuance of a

warrant for his arrest. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Haggerty is liable for declining to

dismiss the charges against his father. Plaintiff also alleges that Judge Haggerty did

not allow Plaintiff to have his phone, which Plaintiff characterizes as a medical

device, in court or at the courthouse.2

Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claims that these

events were a violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and

Americans with Disabilities Act.3 The Court has permitted Plaintiff to proceed in

forma pauperis in the instant proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Summons has

1 R. Doc. 1 at 1.

2 Id.

3 Id. at 3.

1

not issued, however, to allow the Court to review Plaintiff’s Complaint to determine

whether it satisfies the requirements of the federal in forma pauperis statute. The

Court ordered that Plaintiff show cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed

for failure to state a claim.4 Plaintiff did not respond to that order.

I. Standard of Law

“There is no absolute right to be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in civil

matters; rather it is a privilege extended to those unable to pay filing fees when the

action is not frivolous or malicious.” Startti v. United States, 415 F.2d 1115, 1116

(5th Cir. 1969). “It is left to the discretion of the court to which the application is

made to determine whether the petition on its face is frivolous or lacking in merit.”

Id.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires summary dismissal sua sponte should the

Court determine that a case is frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief may

be granted. It provides, in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have

been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that--

(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief.

4 R. Doc. 5.

2

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or

fact.” Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999). A complaint fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted when it does not contain “sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Rogers

v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009)).

II. Analysis

A. Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of his own personal

rights under § 1983.

To claim a violation of her constitutional rights under § 1983, a plaintiff is

required to “to prove some violation of his personal rights.” Coon v. Ledbetter, 780

F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Resendez v. Texas, 440 F. App'x 305, 306

(5th Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiff’s claims are based on the alleged violation of his

father’s constitutional rights rather than his own rights. As he has not alleged any

violation of his own personal constitutional rights, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983

claim on which relief may be granted.5

B. Plaintiff’s allegations do not set forth a cognizable ADA claim.

Plaintiff alleges that Judge Haggerty did not allow Plaintiff to have his phone,

5Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ conduct constitutes a conspiracy against rights

under 18 U.S.C. § 241, and deprivation of rights under color of law under 18 U.S.C.

§ 242. These statutes, however, do not provide Plaintiff with a civil cause of action.

See Gill v. State of Texas, 153 F. App'x 261, 262 (5th Cir. 2005) (“18 U.S.C. §§ 241

and 242 do not provide a basis for civil liability.”).

3

which Plaintiff characterizes as a medical device, in court or at the courthouse.6 “To

establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must

demonstrate: (1) that he is a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA; (2)

that he is being excluded from participation in, or being denied benefits of, services,

programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise

being discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial

of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of his disability.” Melton v. Dallas Area

Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671–72 (5th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s allegations fall far

short of this standard. Moreover, and as set forth below, Defendants are entitled to

immunity relative to the claims against them.

C. Judicial immunity bars the claims against Judge Haggerty.

“It is well established that judges enjoy absolute immunity for judicial acts

performed in judicial proceedings.” Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1996)

(citation omitted). “Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on

occasion, it is a general principle that a judicial officers shall be free to act upon his

own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Mireles

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 10 (1991) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Judicial

immunity can be overcome in two sets of circumstances: (1) when a judge acts outside

their judicial capacity; and (2) when the judge acts in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction. Id. at 11–12.

6 Id.

4

The Fifth Circuit has set out a four-factor test to determine whether a judge’s

actions were judicial in nature: (1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal

judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate

adjunct spaces such as the judge's chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered

around a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of

a visit to the judge in his official capacity. Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124

(5th Cir. 1993). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Haggerty erred in declining to

dismiss the charges against Mr. McManus and that Judge Haggerty did not allow

Plaintiff to have his phone in court or at the courthouse. Judge Haggerty’s actions

meet the Fifth Circuit factors: his actions are within the normal judicial function,

occurred in the court, centered around a case involving Mr. McManus, and arose out

of a visit to court. Nor does Plaintiff allege that Judge Haggerty acted without

jurisdiction. Thus, judicial immunity requires the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims

against Judge Haggerty. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“Like other forms

of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from

ultimate assessment of damages.”).

D. Prosecutorial immunity bars the claims against City Prosecutor

Reginald J. Laurent.

A state prosecutor whose “activities [are] intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process” is absolutely immune from a civil lawsuit

under § 1983. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). A prosecutor is absolutely

immune for initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution, for actions taken in their

5

role as advocate for the state in the courts, or when their conduct is intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Loupe v. O'Bannon, 824

F.3d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). A prosecutor is afforded only

qualified immunity for acts performed in the course of administrative duties and

those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the

initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings. Id.

Here, Mr. Laurent is immune from liability for pursuing charges against

Plaintiff’s late father. See Loupe, 824 F.3d at 539. Plaintiff also appears to allege (or

at least question whether) Mr. Laurent misrepresented to Judge Haggerty that a

summons had been served on Plaintiff’s late father.7 Construed generously, Plaintiff

seems to allege that by signing his name on a court document Mr. Laurent

misrepresented that the summons had been served. Any such action would be

subject to prosecutorial immunity. See id. To the extent that Mr. Laurent allegedly

misrepresented facts in an affidavit supporting a warrant, however, absolute

immunity would not apply. “Testifying about facts is the function of the witness, not

of the lawyer.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 130 (1997) (finding only qualified

immunity for a prosecutor who allegedly made false statements in an affidavit

supporting an application for an arrest warrant). Even then, however, Plaintiff does

not have a right of action under § 1983 relative to an alleged violation of his father’s

constitutional rights. Thus, any such claim would be futile.

7 R. Doc. 1 at 5.

6

RECOMMENDATION

It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,

and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within 14

days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain

error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal

conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served

with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996)

(en banc) superseded by statute on other grounds.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 3° day of December, 2025.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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