The opinion
USCA11 Case: 25-11592 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/02/2026 Page: 1 of 11
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-11592
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
KENNETH R. PARSON, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ANN COFFIN,
in her individual capacity,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:25-cv-00268-LSG
____________________
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth Parsons, Jr. appeals pro se from the magistrate
judge’s grant of a motion to dismiss without leave to amend his
USCA11 Case: 25-11592 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/02/2026 Page: 2 of 11
2 Opinion of the Court 25-11592
amended complaint alleging violations of his due process rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 On appeal, Parsons argues that the
magistrate judge erred in dismissing his claims because his
complaint alleged that his driver’s license is a property right which
Ann Coffin, the Director of the Florida Department of Revenue
Child Support Program, took without notice or a hearing in
violation of clearly established law. Parsons further argues that
Coffin was not entitled to qualified immunity. Parsons also argues
that the magistrate judge abused her discretion in denying him
leave to amend because he was entitled to an opportunity to
amend in response to Coffin’s motion to dismiss. After careful
review, we affirm the dismissal without leave to amend.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 19, 2024, the Florida Department of Revenue
(“DOR”) Child Support Program sent Kenneth Parsons a “Notice
of Intent to Suspend Driver License and Motor Vehicle Registra-
tions for Failure to Submit to Genetic Testing.”2 The notice stated
1 The parties below consented to the magistrate judge’s authority.
2 Florida law authorizes the DOR to initiate administrative paternity
proceedings. Fla. Stat. § 409.256(2). To begin a paternity proceeding, the
DOR must send notice to the respondent which may include an order for
genetic testing. Id. §§ 409.256(4)(a)(11), 409.256(4)(c)(9). If the respondent
does not submit to genetic testing, the DOR may start proceedings to suspend
his license, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 61.13016. Id. § 409.256(7)(a). Section
61.13016, in turn, authorizes the DOR to enforce a genetic testing order by
“provid[ing] notice to the obligor of the delinquency or failure to comply”
which must describe the person’s right “to file a petition in circuit court to
contest the delinquency action.” Id. § 61.13016(1)(c). When the Department
USCA11 Case: 25-11592 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/02/2026 Page: 3 of 11
25-11592 Opinion of the Court 3
that “The Child Support Program may ask the Department of
Highway and Safety and Motor Vehicles” to suspend Parson’s
driver’s license and registration because he failed to “compl[y] with
the Order to Appear for Genetic Testing” served on June 13, 2024.
The notice gave Parsons twenty days to either contact the Child
Support Program to schedule a genetic test appointment or to
“[c]ontest this action by filing a petition in circuit court.” The ge-
netic testing order occurred as part of an administrative action
against Parsons to establish paternity in a pending child support
case. Parsons contested that action.
On January 27, 2025, the Florida Department of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles (“FLHSVM”) notified Parsons that his
driver’s license and vehicle registration would be suspended as of
February 17, 2025, “for failure to comply with an order for child
support, alimony or genetic testing per section 322.058 and
322.245, Florida Statues.” The notice explained to Parsons how to
“clear” the issue and avoid suspension. The notice also explained
that, if Parsons believes he had “any basis to show why [the suspen-
sion] is incorrect,” he could request a hearing “to present evidence
per section 322.271, Florida Statutes.”
of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles receives notice that a person has a
delinquent obligation, it must suspend his driver’s license and car registration.
Id. § 322.058. Florida law requires certain procedures for different types of
administrative proceedings. See Fla. Stat. §§ 120.57, 120.569.
USCA11 Case: 25-11592 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/02/2026 Page: 4 of 11
4 Opinion of the Court 25-11592
Parsons filed his first pro se complaint on February 3, 2025.
One month later, Parsons filed an amended pro se complaint—the
operative complaint here—alleging that Coffin violated his due
process rights by suspending his driver’s license and car registration
without notice, a hearing, legal justification, or judicial authoriza-
tion and that suspension was outside of her jurisdiction as an exec-
utive official. Although none of the notices Parsons received indi-
cated they were from Coffin or bore her signature, Parsons alleged
that Coffin is responsible for his license suspension because, as Di-
rector, she initiated the process to suspend his license. This action,
he says, is an ultra vires act because Florida law requires compli-
ance with judicial due-process protections before a license may be
suspended. Parsons next alleged that Coffin could not rely on
vague statutory interpretations to justify enforcement actions that
violate constitutional rights, and Coffin’s actions were First
Amendment retaliation because Parsons’s license was suspended
after he contested her jurisdiction over him. Parsons requested
damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.
Coffin filed a motion to dismiss Parson’s amended com-
plaint, arguing that she was entitled to qualified immunity and that
he failed to state a claim because he did not provide factual or legal
support that Coffin violated his rights.
On March 31, 2025, Parsons opposed, arguing that Coffin
was not entitled to qualified immunity and that his claim was well-
pleaded because he alleged Coffin violated his due process rights
and he was entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief because a
USCA11 Case: 25-11592 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/02/2026 Page: 5 of 11
25-11592 Opinion of the Court 5
threat of fraudulent claims against him remained. A week later, in
a second motion in opposition, Parsons argued that he plausibly
alleged First Amendment retaliation because Coffin opened a child
support case after Parsons filed his complaint and Coffin lacked per-
sonal and subject matter jurisdiction.
The magistrate judge found Parsons’s amended complaint
made frivolous allegations because Florida law authorizes Coffin
to suspend a license without a court order and to initiate an admin-
istrative paternity proceeding by serving the respondent with a no-
tice that explains the choice to file an action in circuit court, to or-
der genetic testing in the paternity proceeding notice, and to en-
force the order for genetic testing by suspending the respondent’s
license and registration. Applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), the magistrate judge determined that Parsons failed to al-
lege a due process violation because he had pre-suspension notice
that explained how he could obtain a hearing or contest DOR’s ac-
tion. Even if Parsons stated a claim, the magistrate judge con-
cluded that Coffin was entitled to qualified immunity because she
acted within her discretionary authority and Florida law did not es-
tablish a right to a court order before license suspension. Parsons
timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “accepting the allegations in
the complaint as true and construing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Hunt v. Aimco Properties, L.P., 814 F.3d
USCA11 Case: 25-11592 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/02/2026 Page: 6 of 11
6 Opinion of the Court 25-11592
1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016). We review de novo dismissal for failure
to state a claim based on qualified immunity. Cottone v. Jenne,
326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003).
We review denials of leave to amend a complaint for an
abuse of discretion, although we review de novo the underlying
legal conclusion of whether a particular amendment to the
complaint would be futile. Chang v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 845
F.3d 1087, 1093–94 (11th Cir. 2017).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Parsons raises two issues. First Parsons
challenges the dismissal of his section 1983 claim for failure to state
a claim. Second, Parsons maintains that the district court, upon
dismissing that claim, abused its discretion by denying him leave to
amend his complaint. We address each issue in turn.
A. Failure to State a Claim
We consider whether the magistrate judge erred in
concluding that Parson’s amended complaint failed to plausibly
allege a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment and section 1983 and that Coffin is entitled to qualified
immunity.
i. Due Process Claim
To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead
enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
Hunt, 814 F.3d at 1221. A claim is facially plausible when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
USCA11 Case: 25-11592 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/02/2026 Page: 7 of 11
25-11592 Opinion of the Court 7
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Id. “A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a
pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 10(c). “[W]hen the exhibits contradict the general and
conclusory allegations of the pleading, the exhibits govern.” Griffin
Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1206 (11th Cir. 2007).
To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that a person acting under color of state law committed an act that
deprived him of some right protected by the Constitution or laws
of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The elements of a section
1983 claim alleging denial of procedural due process are
(1) deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property
interest, (2) state action, and (3) constitutionally inadequate
process. Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003).
Here, the alleged Constitutional violation was Parsons’s
procedural due process rights. “[A]t a minimum, the Due Process
Clause requires notice and the opportunity to be heard incident to
the deprivation of life, liberty, or property at the hands of the
government.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.
2003).
To determine if the procedures used to deprive a liberty or
property interest are constitutionally adequate, we must apply the
balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge. Specifically, courts
look at (1) the private property or liberty interest that will be
affected by the official action, (2) the risk that the procedures used
will cause an erroneous deprivation of such interest, and the
USCA11 Case: 25-11592 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/02/2026 Page: 8 of 11
8 Opinion of the Court 25-11592
probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the
government’s interest, including the administrative burdens that
any additional procedural safeguards would entail. See Mathews,
424 U.S. at 335.
The deprivation of a driver’s license by the state implicates
the Due Process Clause. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977).
In Dixon, the Court first applied the Mathews test to determine
whether an Illinois law that permitted the state to revoke drivers’
licenses without a preliminary hearing was constitutionally
adequate. Dixon, 431 U.S. at 112–15. In analyzing the private
interest involved, the Court noted that while citizens have a
property interest in their licenses, such an interest was not “vital
and essential,” nor was it “so great as to require us to depart from
the ordinary principle . . . that something less than an evidentiary
hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” Id. at
113. Second, the Court held that the risk of erroneous deprivation
in the absence of a preliminary hearing was not great, because
suspension decisions were “automatic” and involved little
discretion, and that additional procedural safeguards were
unnecessary. Id. at 113–14. Finally, the Court held that the
government interest in administrative efficiency would be
obstructed by requiring preliminary hearings in every case, and
that there was a significant public interest in keeping the roads safe
and free of those “unable or unwilling to respect traffic rules.” Id.
at 114–15.
USCA11 Case: 25-11592 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/02/2026 Page: 9 of 11
25-11592 Opinion of the Court 9
On that background, Parsons has not plead sufficient facts to
draw the reasonable inference that Coffin denied him
constitutionally adequate process.
First, Parsons did not plausibly allege that Coffin took any
action to suspend his license, nor do his exhibits demonstrate that
she signed off on his suspension. See Griffin Indus., Inc., 496 F.3d at
1206. Second, even if Coffin did act, Parsons did not allege that
Coffin failed to provide him with pre-deprivation notice and
hearing. The exhibits attached to his complaint demonstrate that
the DOR sent him a notice of its intent to suspend his license and
registration, that he could have filed a petition in circuit court to
contest the child support order before his license was suspended,
and that he could have requested a hearing to contest his
suspension. Such opportunities to be heard satisfy the minimum
due process required because they provide more than the post-
deprivation hearing the Supreme Court determined was adequate
for license suspension. See Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1232; Dixon, 431
U.S. at 113. Nor is there a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation
because suspension came only after Parsons failed to comply with
the DOR’s order and the DOR provided an opportunity to contest
suspension. Dixon, 431 U.S. at 113-14. Finally, ensuring individuals
comply with their legal obligations to participate in paternity
proceedings is a significant interest for the government to protect.
Id. at 114.
USCA11 Case: 25-11592 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/02/2026 Page: 10 of 11
10 Opinion of the Court 25-11592
ii. Qualified Immunity
Even if Parsons could state a claim under section 1983, such
a claim is barred because Coffin is entitled to qualified immunity.
A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when
its allegations, on their face, show that an affirmative defense bars
recovery. Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1357. Once the affirmative defense
of qualified immunity has been advanced, the defendant is entitled
to dismissal unless the plaintiff alleged a violation of clearly estab-
lished law. Id. Qualified immunity protects government officials
performing discretionary functions from suit in their individual ca-
pacities unless their conduct violated clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. Id. To receive qualified immunity, the official must show
that he was acting within his discretionary authority. Id. Once that
showing is made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 1358.
Coffin, as director of the DOR Child Support Program,
would have been acting within her discretion by initiating Parton’s
license and registration suspension. See Fla. Stat. §§ 409.256(2),
409.256(4)(a)(11), 409.256(4)(c)(9), 409.256(7)(a), 61.13016(1)(c).
Moreover, Coffin would not have violated Parson’s due process or
statutory rights because he received notice and the opportunity for
a hearing before the suspension. Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1232; Fla.
Stat. §§ 409.256(7)(a), 61.13016(1)(c).
USCA11 Case: 25-11592 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/02/2026 Page: 11 of 11
25-11592 Opinion of the Court 11
We thus conclude that the magistrate judge did not err in
dismissing Parsons’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
B. Dismissal Without Leave to Amend
Having determined that the magistrate judge properly
dismissed Parson’s section 1983 claim, we next consider whether
the court abused its discretion by denying Parsons leave to amend
his complaint. Generally, before the district court dismisses an
action with prejudice, a pro se plaintiff must be given at least one
chance to amend the complaint where a more carefully drafted
complaint might state a claim. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d
1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2017), abrogated on other grounds by Bostock v.
Clayton Cnty., Ga., 590 U.S. 644 (2020). But a district court need not
allow amendment where amendment would be futile. Id. An
amendment would be futile if the amended complaint would still
be properly dismissed. Id.
Here, the magistrate judge’s dismissal of Parsons’s
complaint without leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion
because any amendment would be futile, as Coffin was entitled to
qualified immunity. Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate judge’s
dismissal of Parsons’s claim without leave to amend.
AFFIRMED.