LINTON

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ROCMOINE LINTON,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No.: 24-09702

v.

OPINION

NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al., December 31, 2025

Defendants.

SEMPER, District Judge.

The current matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ New Jersey Office of the

Attorney General (“NJOAG”) and Patricia Shaw (“Shaw”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to

Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Rocmoine Linton’s (“Linton” or “Plaintiff”) Complaint (ECF 1,

“Compl.”). (ECF 13, “Def. Mot.”) Plaintiff did not file any papers in opposition of Defendants’

Motion. The Court has decided this Motion upon the submission of Defendants, without oral

argument, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the

reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is

dismissed without prejudice.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRODUCURAL HISTORY1

1 The facts and procedural history are drawn from the Complaint and documents integral to or

relied upon by the Complaint. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426

(3d Cir. 1997). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the facts drawn from the Complaint are

accepted as true. See Fowler v. UMPC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).

This suit arises from the denial of Plaintiff’s request to be provided transcripts at public

expense by the New Jersey Appellate Division. (Compl., ECF 1-1 at 1.) On February 17, 2021,

Plaintiff was arrested for a domestic violence-related disorderly persons offense. (Id.) Plaintiff was

ordered detained pending trial. (Id.) An attorney from the New Jersey Public Defender’s Office,

Lorane Posner (“Posner”), was appointed to represent Plaintiff in his criminal case. (Id.) On

August 11, 2023, Plaintiff initiated a civil action against Posner for alleged malpractice (the

“Malpractice Suit”) arising from his pre-trial detention proceedings. (Id.) The NJOAG represented

Posner in the Malpractice Suit. (Id.) On May 24, 2024, the Malpractice Suit was dismissed. (Id.)

Following the dismissal of the Malpractice Suit, Plaintiff filed an appeal with the New

Jersey Appellate Division (the “Appellate Division”). Upon the commencement of his appeal,

Plaintiff filed requests for a fee waiver and transcripts at public expense with the Appellate

Division. (Id.) On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff’s fee waiver request was granted, but his request for

transcripts at public expense was denied. (Id.) On August 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for

leave to appeal the Appellate Division’s denial of his request for transcripts at public expense. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that Shaw, the Appellate Division case manager for his appeal, “impeded the

appeal by diverting it from its intended path, which should have involved a review by the relevant

judges.” (Id.) On September 16, 2024, Plaintiff received an email from Shaw, notifying him that

his motion for leave to appeal was denied. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges that his motion for leave to

appeal was not submitted to the Appellate Division judges “for their evaluation,” which he argues

puts his “appeal at risk of dismissal due to a lack of timely response.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff also

alleges that he notified Shaw’s manager about his concerns regarding Shaw’s alleged misconduct,

and unsuccessfully attempted to reach out to other court clerks regarding his appeal. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action on October 9, 2024. (Compl.) In the Complaint,

Plaintiff alleges that “[t]here is a pattern of unconstitutional practices involving government

officials, and entities that discriminate based on race and gender, resulting in unfair treatment and

equal protection under the law.” (Compl., ECF 1-1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct

violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and amounts

to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 for depravation of rights under the color of law. (Compl. at 3.)

Plaintiff also sought a temporary injunction against Defendants to require them to “properly carry

out [and execute] their duties.” (Id. at 5.) On November 25, 2024, this Court denied Plaintiff’s

request for a temporary injunction. (ECF 7, ECF 8.) On March 24, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Def. Mot.,

ECF 13-1 at 8.) On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a letter requesting an extension of time to

file an answer to the Motion to Dismiss, explaining that he did not respond to the Motion to

Dismiss because he mistakenly thought that this Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for a

temporary restraining order constituted a dismissal of the entire case. (ECF 19.) The Court granted

Plaintiff’s request (ECF 20), and in lieu of an answer or responsive pleading to the Motion to

Dismiss, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint.2

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move

to dismiss for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Where a defendant

files a motion to dismiss invoking the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense, such a

2 As set forth herein, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, and as

such, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint is denied as moot.

motion is analyzed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77

F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (Since “the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which

deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction[,]” a motion invoking such a defense “may

properly be considered a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)”); see also Saint-Jean v. Cnty. of Bergen, 509 F. Supp. 3d 87, 97

(D.N.J. 2020).

Ordinarily, even where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, “once a 12(b)(1) challenge is raised, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.” See

Towaki Komatsu v. NYP Holdings, Inc., No. 12-07088, 2013 WL 504602, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 7,

2013); see also Lancaster v. New Jersey Transit Corp., No. 20-1995, 2021 WL 4473114, at *2

(D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2021). “However, because ‘Eleventh Amendment immunity can be expressly

waived by a party, or forfeited through non-assertion, it does not implicate federal subject matter

jurisdiction in the ordinary sense,’ and therefore, a party asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity

bears the burden of proving its applicability.” Saint-Jean, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 97 (quoting Garcia

v. Knapp, No. 19-17946, 2020 WL 2786930, at *3 (D.N.J. May 29, 2020)); see also Christy v.

Pennsylvania Tpk. Comm'n, 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1995); Carter v. City of Philadelphia,

181 F.3d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1999).

When presented with a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, “the Court must determine

whether the defendant is making a ‘facial or factual challenge to the court's subject-matter

jurisdiction.’” Garcia, 2020 WL 2786930, at *3 (quoting Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220

F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also Leadbeater v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A, No. 16-7655 (JMV),

2017 WL 4790384, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2017) (“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction, a court must first determine whether the party presents a facial or

factual attack because the distinction determines how the pleading is reviewed.”). A facial attack

“challenges subject matter jurisdiction without disputing the facts alleged in the complaint, and it

requires the court to consider the allegations of the complaint as true.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824

F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Conversely, a factual

attack “attacks the factual allegations underlying the complaint's assertion of jurisdiction, either

through the filing of an answer or ‘otherwise present[ing] competing facts.’” Id. (quoting Const.

Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014)).

“When a party moves to dismiss prior to answering the complaint...the motion is generally

considered a facial attack.” Saint-Jean, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 97 (quoting Leadbeater, 2017 WL

4790384, at *3). Further, where a defendant invokes an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity

defense in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the motion is generally considered a facial attack.

See Garcia, 2020 WL 2786930, at *4 (“Defendants, by asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity,

raise a facial 12(b)(1) challenge.”); see also Berk v. New Jersey Unemployment Ins., No. 23-12891,

2024 WL 4891749, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2024) (“Here, Defendant's motion asserts the defense

of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment based on the facts as pled in the Complaint,

thereby raising a facial attack.”); Perez v. New Jersey, No. 14-4610, 2015 WL 4394229, at *3

(D.N.J. July 15, 2015).

A facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) is akin to a challenge under Rule 12(b)(6). See

Saint-Jean, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 97 (“a [12(b)(1)] facial motion is handled much like a 12(b)(6)

motion”); see also Const. Party of Pa., 757 F.3d at 358 (“a [12(b)(1)] facial attack calls for a

district court to apply the same standard of review it would use in considering a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6)”]. Thus, when “reviewing a facial attack, the Court should consider only the

allegations in the complaint, along with documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party[,]” and “allegations in the complaint [shall be]

accepted as true.” Saint-Jean, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 97.

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to move to

dismiss a count for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). A complaint is plausible on its face when there is enough factual content “that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the plausibility standard “does not

impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir.

2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result, a plaintiff must “allege

sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.”

Id. at 789.

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court must accept all factual

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). A court, however, is “not compelled

to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as

factual allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). If, after viewing the

allegations in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff, it appears that no relief could be granted

under any set of facts consistent with the allegations, a court may dismiss the complaint for failure

to state a claim. DeFazio v. Leading Edge Recovery Sols., 2010 WL 5146765, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec.

13, 2010).

It is well established that a pro se complaint “however inartfully pleaded[,] must be held

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294

F.3d 492, 500 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court is obligated to construe pro se claims liberally and

afford pro se plaintiffs the benefit of every doubt. Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 926

(3d Cir. 2005). Notwithstanding, plaintiff’s claims must also be supported by “a short and plain

statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 further

requires that a complaint’s allegations be “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d).

Although Rule 8’s requirements likewise apply “flexibl[y]” to a pro se plaintiff, Mala v. Crown

Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013), a plaintiff is “not absolved from complying

with Twombly and the federal pleading requirements merely because [he] proceeds pro se.” Thakar

v. Tan, 372 F. App’x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants assert that the Complaint should be dismissed because the NJOAG, and Shaw

in her official capacity, are immune from suit pursuant to Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity. (Def. Mot., ECF 13-1 at 10.) Defendants further assert that the NJOAG, and Shaw in

her official capacity, are not persons subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff failed to

allege sufficient facts to support his due process and equal protection claims, and that Shaw is

immune from suit based on the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. (Id. at 14-23.) Defendants also

contend that 18 U.S.C. § 242 “does not provide a litigant with a private cause of action.” (Id. at 7

n.4.)3 Plaintiff alleges that his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal

protection clauses were violated, and that Defendants’ actions deprived him of his rights under the

color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. (Compl. at 3.)

A. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that “[t] he judicial power of the

United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or

prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects

of any foreign state.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Notwithstanding this language, the Supreme Court

has long interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to immunize states, absent their consent, from

federal suits brought by their own citizens as well. See, e.g., Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v.

Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990) (“This Court has drawn upon principles of sovereign immunity

to construe the [Eleventh] Amendment to establish that an unconsenting State is immune from suits

brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.”) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Further, “the [Supreme] Court [has]

held that the Eleventh Amendment applies to suits against subunits of the State.” Haybarger v.

Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Pennhurst State

Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). To this end, “a suit may be barred [by the

Eleventh Amendment] even though the state is not named a party to the action, as long as the state

is the real party in interest.” Carter, 181 F.3d at 347 (quoting Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail

Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 65[9] (3d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).

3 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is barred by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. (Def. Mot., 13-1 at 3, 24-26.) This Court has already denied Plaintiff’s request

for injunctive relief (see ECF 7, ECF 8), and need not further address this issue here.

Courts in the Third Circuit apply the following three-factor test (the “Fitchik Factors”) to

determine whether an entity is a subunit of the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment:

(1) Whether the money that would pay the judgment would come from the

state (…whether payment will come from the state's treasury, whether

the agency has the money to satisfy the judgment, and whether the

sovereign has immunized itself from responsibility for the agency's

debts);

(2) The status of the agency under state law (this includes four factors—

how state law treats the agency generally, whether the entity is

separately incorporated, whether the agency can sue or be sued in its

own right, and whether it is immune from state taxation); and

(3) What degree of autonomy the agency has.

Fitchik., 873 F.2d at 659; see also Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d

at 198. No one factor is dispositive; rather, courts must balance each of the three factors. See

Stephens v. Grewal, No. 22-01989, 2023 WL 3478458, at *4 (D.N.J. May 15, 2023),

reconsideration denied, No. 2201989KMWMJS, 2023 WL 9043934 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2023) (“An

entity does not need to meet all three factors for immunity to apply; the Court is responsible to

balance the factors, which have equal weight, after a highly fact intensive review.”); see also

Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[w]e now treat all three Fitchik

factors as co-equals”).

Here, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity applies to the NJOAG. Courts in this

District have consistently held that the NJOAG is a subunit of the state of New Jersey, and, thus,

is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Hockaday v. New Jersey Att'y Gen.'s

Off., No. 16-0762, 2016 WL 6694483, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2016) (“The [New Jersey] Attorney

General's Office…[is] indisputably [a] subunit of the State[] entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rahman v. NJ Att'y Gen., New Jersey

State Police, No. 22-04703, 2023 WL 6048808, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 2023) (dismissing pro se

plaintiff’s complaint against the NJOAG because “it is well established” that the NJOAG is

“entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity” as a subunit of the State of New Jersey); Polanco v.

New Jersey Atty. Gen.'s Off., No. 12-778, 2013 WL 1339127, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2013) (“suits

against the New Jersey Attorney General's Office…are suits against the state itself, and are

prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment”); El v. Atl. City Freeholders Bd. of Commissioners, No.

22-6281, 2023 WL 8271768, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2023) (“The Office of the Attorney General

of New Jersey is...entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). Further, to the extent that Plaintiff

has brought this suit against Shaw in her official capacity as the case manager assigned to

Plaintiff’s Appellate Division case, such suit is also barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity. See Dongon v. Banar, 363 F. App'x 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2010) (“the state courts, its

employees, and the judges are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because they

are part of the judicial branch of the state of New Jersey, and [are] therefore considered ‘arms’ of

the state”); see also Robinson v. New Jersey Mercer Cnty. Vicinage-Fam. Div., 514 F. App'x 146

(3d Cir. 2013) (upholding district court’s dismissal of pro se plaintiff’s claims against the Family

Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Mercer Vicinage, and its employees in their official

capacities, since the court was “clearly a part of the State of New Jersey[,]” and, thus, “both the

court itself and its employees in their official capacities were unconsenting state entities entitled

to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment”).

Because Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity applies to the NJOAG and Shaw in her

official capacity, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

B. Section 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) states in relevant part that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State…subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to

the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Section 1983 provides a remedy for individuals whose federal

constitutional rights have been violated by persons or entities acting under the color of state law.

See Cooper v. Cape May Cnty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 175 F. Supp. 2d 732, 742–43 (D.N.J. 2001). To

state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant: (1) violated

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) the alleged deprivation

was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. Mikhaeil v. Santos, 646 F.

App’x 158, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his equal protection and due process rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment. (Compl. at 3.) Defendants contend that the NJOAG, and Shaw in her

official capacity, are not persons amenable to suit under Section 1983. (Def. Mot., ECF 13-1 at

14-16.) Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has failed to establish equal protection and due

process claims. (Id. at 19-23.)

1. Persons Under Section 1983

The Supreme Court has long held that a State, as well as state officials in their official

capacities, are not “persons” amenable to suit under Section 1983. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their

official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983”). State agencies are also not considered “persons”

under Section 1983. See id. at 60-61, 71 (upholding Michigan Supreme Court ruling that the

Michigan Department of State Police was not a “person” under Section 1983); see also Landi v.

Borough of Seaside Park, No. 07-5319, 2009 WL 606141, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2009) (“a cause

of action brought pursuant to § 1983, cannot be asserted against the State, [or] its agencies”);

Mitchell v. Cnty. of Bergen, No. 23-596, 2024 WL 1526121, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 2024).

Here, neither the NJOAG nor Shaw in her official capacity are “persons” under Section

1983. See Higgs v. Dep't of Corr., No. 23-23402, 2024 WL 1366474, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2024)

(dismissing pro se plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the NJOAG since “the Office of the

Attorney General for the State of New Jersey [is] not a ‘person’ amenable to suit under § 1983”),

aff'd sub nom. Higgs v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., No. 24-1712, 2024 WL 3811985 (3d Cir. Aug.

14, 2024); see also Dawkins v. Off. of Att'y Gen., No. 18-11174, 2018 WL 6322618, at *2 (D.N.J.

Dec. 4, 2018) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s Section 1983 action against the NJOAG because the

NJOAG is not a “person[] within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”) (internal quotation marks

omitted); Baquero v. Mendoza, No. 18-15081, 2019 WL 3712201, at *3 n.3 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2019)

(noting that state officials, including state judicial officers and employees, are not “persons” under

Section 1983), aff'd, 828 F. App'x 137 (3d Cir. 2020). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims

against the NJOAG must fail as a matter of law, as do Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against

Shaw, to the extent that she has been sued in her official capacity.

2. Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State

shall…deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § 1; Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 294 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Feb.

2, 2016). “To bring a successful claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a denial of equal protection,

plaintiffs must prove the existence of purposeful discrimination....They must demonstrate that they

received different treatment from that received by other individuals similarly situated.” Holley v.

Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 14-7534, 2018 WL 4953008, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2018) (quoting

Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. Of Phila., 587 F.3d 176, 196 (3d Cir. 2009)); see also

Callaway v. Small, 576 F. Supp. 3d 232, 248 (D.N.J. 2021).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory fashion that “[t]here is a pattern of

unconstitutional practices involving government officials, and entities that discriminate based on

race and gender, resulting in unfair treatment and equal protection under the law.” (Compl., ECF

1-1 at 1.) However, Plaintiff has failed to provide any facts supporting his assertion that the

NJOAG and Shaw violated his equal protection rights by purposefully discriminating against him

based on his race and gender. In fact, Plaintiff’s only factual allegation as to Shaw is that he

received an email from Shaw on September 16, 2024, merely notifying him that his motion for

leave to appeal had been rejected. (Id. at 1-2.) This Court need not accept Plaintiff’s “naked

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). Further, rather than providing a factual basis for his equal protection

claim, Plaintiff uses his Complaint to express dissatisfaction with what he believes are disfavorable

state court rulings against him, such as the dismissal of the Malpractice Suit, and the denial of his

request to be provided transcripts at public expense. (See Compl., ECF 1-1.) The proper avenue

for Plaintiff to challenge these state court rulings is the appellate process rather than a suit in federal

district court. See Fam. C.L. Union v. State, 386 F. Supp. 3d 411, 442 (D.N.J. 2019) (“a federal

district court is not to appoint itself a de facto court of appeal to correct [alleged] errors in state

court proceedings”), aff'd sub nom. Fam. C.L. Union v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., Div. of Child

Prot. & Permanency, 837 F. App'x 864 (3d Cir. 2020). Accordingly, since Plaintiff’s Complaint,

construed liberally, does not provide a factual basis to plausibly show that he was subjected to

“purposeful discrimination” based on his race and gender, Plaintiff’s equal protection claim must

fail. See Holley, 2018 WL 4953008, at *2.

3. Due Process Claim

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall…

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend.

XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause “confers both substantive and procedural rights.” Albright v.

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994). Regarding substantive due process claims under Section 1983,

“[t]he Third Circuit has recognized that two very different threads make up the fabric of

substantive due process: substantive due process relating to legislative action and substantive due

process relating to non-legislative action.” Chey v. LaBruno, 608 F. Supp. 3d 161, 180 (D.N.J.

2022) (quoting Newark Cab Ass'n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 2018)).4 To state

a non-legislative substantive due process claim under Section 1983, a Plaintiff “must allege [that

he] has ‘a property interest protected by the substantive due process clause, and the government's

deprivation of that protected interest shocks the conscience.’” Chey, 608 F. Supp. 3d at 180

(quoting Joey's Auto Repair & Body Shop v. Fayette Cnty., 785 F. App'x 46, 49 (3d Cir. 2019)).

“To state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must

allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth

Amendment's protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did

not provide ‘due process of law.’” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir.

2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint, construed liberally, fails to plead either a substantive or

procedural due process claim. As to substantive due process, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not

provide any factual basis showing that the NJOAG or Shaw engaged in conscience shocking

behavior or deprived him of a protected property interest. See Chey, 608 F. Supp. 3d at 180.

4 Since Plaintiff has alleged due process violations by the NJOAG, an executive branch entity of the state of New

Jersey, and Shaw, a New Jersey judicial branch employee, this Court will analyze Plaintiff’s due process claim as a

non-legislative substantive due process claim.

Instead, Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory fashion that Shaw “impeded the appeal by diverting it

from its intended path” merely by notifying Plaintiff that his motion for leave to appeal had been

denied. (See Compl., ECF 1-1 at 1-2.) Further, when discussing the denial of his request for

transcripts at public expense and his subsequent motion for leave to appeal in the Statement of

Claim section of his Complaint, Plaintiff does not even mention the NJOAG or any of its

employees. (See id.)

As to procedural due process, the Third Circuit noted in Alvin that:

[A] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it

has made procedural protection available and the plaintiff has simply

refused to avail himself of them. A due process violation is not complete

when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State

fails to provide due process. If there is a process on the books that appears

to provide due process, the plaintiff cannot skip that process and use the

federal courts as a means to get back what he wants.

227 F.3d at 116 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As Defendants note in their

Motion, on August 28, 2024, Shaw advised Plaintiff via email that his motion for leave to appeal

the denial of his request for transcripts at public expense should be filed with the New Jersey

Supreme Court. (Def. Mot., ECF 13-1 at 22; ECF 13-2, Ex. K.) Instead of heeding this advice and

seeking recourse with the appropriate higher court, Plaintiff initiated this current action roughly

three and a half weeks after the Appellate Division denied his motion for leave to appeal. (See

Compl.; Def. Mot., 13-1 at 6-7, 22-23; ECF 13-2, Ex. I.)

For the aforementioned reasons, Plaintiff has failed to plead a substantive or procedural

due process claim.

C. Quasi-Judicial Immunity

“[Q]uasi-judicial immunity is a doctrine under which government actors whose acts are

relevantly similar to judging are immune from suit…Quasi-judicial absolute immunity attaches

when a public official's role is functionally comparable to that of a judge.” Dotzel v. Ashbridge,

438 F.3d 320, 325 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[A]ctions taken

by judicial staff in aid of the court are also protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.”

Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Colgate Palmolive Co., No. 22-6623, 2023 WL 7151580, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct.

31, 2023), aff'd, No. 23-2982, 2024 WL 3250938 (3d Cir. July 1, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct.

1315, 221 L. Ed. 2d 399 (2025); see also Stephens v. Martini, No. 22-1971, 2022 WL 1237786, at

*3 n.3 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2022) (noting that quasi-judicial immunity “extend[s] to those functioning

as an arm of the court or who are acting at the direction of the judge[,]” such as “law clerks, case

managers, administrators, or other court staff”) (emphasis added). Quasi-judicial immunity may

apply where a quasi-judicial official has been sued in his or her individual capacity. See Russell v.

Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 246 n.6 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Dotzel, 438 F.3d at 327 (finding that

Appellants “were acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, and [, thus,] are absolutely immune from suit

in their individual capacities”) (emphasis added);

Here, this Court finds that quasi-judicial immunity applies to Shaw. Shaw was acting “as

an arm of the court” and “in aid of the court” when she notified Plaintiff that his motion for leave

to appeal had been received, that his motion should instead be filed with the New Jersey Supreme

Court, and that his motion was denied. See Stephens, 2022 WL 1237786, at *3 n.3; Kamdem-

Ouaffo, 2023 WL 7151580, at *4; (see also Def. Mot., ECF 13-2, Ex. K; Compl., ECF 1-1 at 1-

2.) Thus, to the extent Shaw has been sued in her individual capacity, Plaintiff’s claims against her

must be dismissed. See Dotzel, 438 F.3d at 327.

D. 18 U.S.C. § 242 – Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law

18 U.S.C. § 242 (“Section 242”) provides in relevant part that:

Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,

willfully subjects any person in any State…to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws

of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on

account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race,

than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this

title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 242. Section 242 is a criminal statute, and does not provide a private right action. See

Washington v. Grace, 445 F. App'x 611, 615 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[t]o the extent that [pro se Plaintiff-

Appellant] Washington attempted to sue under 18 U.S.C. § 242…that statute does not create a

private right of action”); see also Lampon-Paz v. Dep't of Just., No. 17-6395, 2017 WL 4030577,

at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2017) (“18 U.S.C. § 242…is a criminal statute, which does not contain a

private right of action”); Davis v. Norwood, 614 F. App'x 602, 605 (3d Cir. 2015) (“18 U.S.C. §

242, which criminalizes the deprivation of rights under color of law, does not provide a private

right of action”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 242 claim must be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and

Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate order follows.

/s/ Jamel K. Semper .

Hon. Jamel K. Semper

United States District Judge

Orig: Clerk

cc: Cari Fais, U.S.M.J.

Parties