Young

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ANNETTE YOUNG,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:23-cv-1162-KCD-DNF

v.

AFFORDABLE CARE, LLC, A

FOREIGN PROFIT

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

Plaintiff Annette Young sues her former employer, Affordable Care,

LLC, for discrimination. Before the Court are cross-motions for summary

judgment. (Docs. 59, 60.) The questions presented are whether Young’s claims

under the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act,

and the Florida Civil Rights Act should proceed to a jury or be decided here as

a matter of law. For the reasons that follow, the FMLA claims survive, while

the disability claims do not.

I. Background

The parties agree on little, so to compile the timeline of events, the Court

presents both disputed and undisputed facts.1 Young worked for Affordable

1 Affordable Care’s response to Young’s summary judgment motion (Doc. 67) did not follow

the Court’s procedures outlined in the Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. 21).

That order requires the opposing party’s statement of material facts to mirror the moving

Care for nearly two years. First, she was a Manager of Field Operations, then

she moved to the Field Trainer Specialist (“FTS”) role. Her supervisor was

Deanna Ali, the Senior Director of Training and Development.

FTS employees are expected to travel extensively to assigned dental

practices and stay for days at a time to train staff. Ali testified that Young had

problems following her assigned travel schedule, with one instance being after

Hurricane Ian in October 2022. Ali told Young, “I realize that the impacts of

this storm are out of your control but working towards meeting our customers’

needs is a priority. The urgency and importance of this service has not been

demonstrated by you since you transferred to the training team.” (Doc. 60-5.)

Laura Lovell, the Senior Manager of Employee Relations and HR

Business Partner, also testified that Young “was underperforming … or had []

issues with following expectations of her management, and her manager [Ali]

and I gave her many counseling sessions and communications regarding not

following expectations.” (See Doc. 59-3 at 14.) Young disputes that these

counseling sessions occurred. (Doc. 66 ¶ 14; Doc. 66-1 ¶ 7.)

According to Lovell, Young was making unilateral decisions about her

travel without consulting her manager and failed to show up for work as

party’s statement of material facts by admitting and/or denying each of the assertions in

matching numbered paragraphs with record citations. Affordable Care did not do that. See

Doc. 67. Thus, the Court will consider some aspects of Young’s timeline as undisputed. (See

Doc. 21 at 5); Toliver v. City of Jacksonville, No. 3:15-cv-1010-J-34JRK, 2017 WL 1196637, at

*13 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2017).

scheduled. (Doc. 66 at 16-17, 36.) Ali testified similarly. (Doc. 59-2.) According

to him, “there was constant, constant misunderstanding from [Young],” and

“Annette consistently always had a reason why she couldn’t attend an

assignment.” (Id. at 44-45.) Young, however, tells a different story. She

contends she was never told her performance was an issue. (Doc. 66 ¶¶ 5, 22.)

The alleged “final straw” involved Young’s assignment to travel and

work at Dr. John Harvey’s practice in LaGrange, Georgia. After receiving the

assignment on March 30, 2023, Young emailed Ali to ask whether “in general

if you could switch me up, so I’m not staying in the same office repetitively”

because Young wanted “to get out an explore and do more[.]” Ali denied the

request and stated, “Annette, it is difficult for me to rely on you at this point

to ensure that you are going to be at your assigned location each week. This

uncertainty cannot continue and is not fair to your teammates or the practices

that we support. I expect you to be at the LaGrange site on Monday and

through the duration of your assignment. If you are not, then I will have no

choice but to take further disciplinary action.” (Doc. 60-7 at 3.) Young

responded that it wasn’t a problem. (Id. at 2.)

Young worked at the LaGrange dental practice on March 31, 2023. It is

undisputed that the practice closed early that day, but the reason for the early

closure is heavily disputed. Affordable Care claims that Young closed the

practice early to get a head start on her drive home to Florida, which was

prohibited without approval. And Ali did not approve of closing the practice

early.

Young alleges that Dr. Harvey closed the practice early because his

dental assistant was not there and there were no patient appointments, so she

had no choice but to close early. Ali alleges that Dr. Harvey was upset that

Young left early (Doc. 67-7 at ¶ 4.) But Young presents evidence that Dr.

Harvey praised her performance. (Doc. 59-16.) At bottom, there is conflicting

evidence as to what might have happened that day.

Affordable Care alleges that Young’s “unilateral decision” to close the

LaGrange office early resulted in her termination on March 31, 2023. Ali

received at least two emails about Young on that day. One was from Garrett

Pelton, VP of Field Operations:

We continue to have commitment challenges from Annette Young. We

are in a very difficult situation when we deploy her to a location, and

she doesn’t show up as expected or she decides to leave early. The

doctors have certain expectations and we have made commitments to

those doctors that Annette will show up and have an impactful visit

during the time she is in their office. Most recently, we had issues in

Lagrange, Georgia, not only with her, not showing up when expected,

but then also leaving the practice early on Friday. This is not the first

time that we have ran into this with Annette. Bobby and I have both

found we are making excuses too often for her inadequate performance.

I do not want to put you in a difficult situation, but I would like to

request that we not send Annette into my region any longer. It is

creating a credibility problem between operations and our doctors, and

I cannot continue to risk the relationship damage she is causing. Please

give me a call if you have any questions. I am so sorry for the negative

email, but this is gotten to a point that we can no longer count on

Annette to provide quality service to our affiliated doctors.

(Doc. 60-10.) The other was from Bobby Donnell, Director of Field Operations,

which reads: “I would like to ask a favor of you, and not have Annette Young

back in any of my practices. Including the events from this week, we have

consistently had issues with her performance and attendance in practices. The

MFO’s feel like they must go behind each of her visits to regain the confidence

of the PO’s in the training team.” (Doc. 66-2 at 51.)

The stated reason for Young’s termination on Affordable Care’s

Employee Status Change Form was: “Employee has multiple instances of not

showing up for assignments or trying to get out of assignments. She has

become unreliable. Today she took it upon herself to close a practice early so

she could leave early. This is not her decision to make.” (Doc. 60-12.) Still, five

days after her termination, Tiama Smith, Lead Field Training Specialist for

Affordable Care, sent Young a professional recommendation letter, stating

that she witnessed Young’s “exceptional skills” and was “confident that

Annette’s attitude and skills would make her a valuable contributor to any

organization.” (Doc. 59-4.)

In the days preceding March 31, Young was suffering from medical

issues that necessitated her taking time off work. That timeline is largely

undisputed. On February 10, Young emailed and texted Ali about a doctor’s

order to rest her voice for a week. The email reads:

From: Annette Young <Annette. Young@affordablecare.com>

Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 3:05 PM

To: Deena Ali <Deena.Ali@affordablecare.com>

Subject: Work next week

Hi Deena

My Doctor has me on full voice rest! My voice box is extremely swollen and has lesions she said sheis

concerned my vocal cords could be paralyzed or something else is going on. She wants me to rest fora

full week no talking. Has me on Z pack and steroids if that doesn’t help | have to see a ENT for a

procedure.

Annette Young

Field Trainer Specialist

239-292-5299

Annette. Young@affordablecare.com

(Doc. 59-2 at 161.) Young sought medical treatment for the same symptoms

and conditions on February 13, 17, and 28. She eventually returned to work on

March 2.

Young attended three additional medical appointments in March, one of

which required her to miss an additional two days of work. During a visit on

March 28, the doctor stated that she could return to work the next day with no

limitations and was excused from work on March 27 and 28. (Doc. 67-13.)

Also on March 28, Ali emailed Young and HR, requesting that Young

work with HR to get approval for her medical leave. (Doc. 59-11.) Young

emailed HR the same day:

From: Annette Young «Annette. Young@affordablecare.com=>

Date: March 28, 2023 at 3:40:35 AM HST

To: Deena Ali <Deena.Ali@affordablecare.com>. HR Benefits □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

Subject: Re: Next week

Good morning,

Lam trying to see what I need to do regarding my medical stuff] have going on. My doctor wrote me off for

yesterday and today returning to work tomorrow duc to medication she started me on that has made me sick. |

will have a endoscopy in office ¢ done the week I am home base and can return to work as scheduled after my

home week.

Can someone please get in touch with me and advise as to my options.

Annette Young

Field Trainer Specialist

239-292-5299

Annette. Young(@affordablecare.com

(Doc. 59-11 at 2.) HR’s response was directed to Ali and Lovell and did not copy

Young. It was HR’s impression that Young did not need to take leave because

she wasn’t going to miss enough days:

From: HR Benefits <HRBenefits@affordablecare.com>

Sent: Tuesday, March 28, 2023 3:06 PM

To: Deena Ali; HR Benefits

Ce: Laura Lovell

Subject: RE: Next week

Attachments: LOA Request Form 2023.pdf

Good afternoon,

| hope all is well. It looks like her doctor’s note has her listed to return on 3/29 with no restrictions. We would go by

what the doctor's note says on when she can return. A leave is only needed when an employee will be out for more than

4 days. Since she has only missed Monday and today, she would not need to be placed out at this time and could just

use sick time for the days that she missed.

also including the leave of absence request form in case any additional time is needed for a continuous or

intermittent leave (such as recurring doctor appointments). We would then review and send out any other additional

needed information.

Sincerely,

HR Benefits Team

“AFFORDABLE CARE

RH

(Doc. 59-12.)

Also on March 28, Ali emailed Donnell and Pelton to express concern

with Young’s reliability because of her medical issues:

From: Deena Ali <Deena.Ali@affordablecare.cam=>

Sent: Tuesday, March 28, 2023 8:29:50 AM

To: Bobby Donnell <Bobby.Donnell@affordablecare.com>; Garrett Pelton <Garrett.Pelton@affordablecare.com>

Subject: Annette Young

Hello Bobby and Garrett: :

Annette is dealing with some medical concerns 30 lve asked her to go through HR for medical leave. This was

advised to me by Laura Lovell. | can not continue to have her be unreliable like she is, and since she is using

medical concerns as her reasoning this is the course of action | nead to take. I wanted to let you both know. Thank

you.

Deena Ali

(773)606-6111

(Doc. 59-14.) Three days later, Young was terminated. Unsurprisingly, Young

relies on this letter to argue that Affordable Care terminated her due to her

medical issues.

The day Young was terminated, HR realized they had not copied her on

the earlier email from the 28th, and responded:

From: HR Benefits

Sent: Friday, March 31, 2023 4:58:43 PM

To: Annette Young

Ce: HR Benefits

Subject: Leave Information

Good afternoon,

{hope all is well. | apologize for the delay. We had previously sent this over to Deena but realized you were not CC’ed on

that email. | have attached the leave of absence request form for you here. A leave is not typically needed if an

employee is out for less than 4 days. However, if additional time is needed for doctor's visits or other medical reasons,

you may want to complete and return the attached form to start the intermittent leave process.

Please let us know if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

HR Benefits Team

“AFFORDABLE CARE

RH

(Doc. 59-13.)

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is not a substitute for trial. It is appropriate only

“when a movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and [she] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Gonzalez v. Indep. Ord.

of Foresters, No. 24-10758, 2025 WL 337898, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 30, 2025).

“When deciding a motion for summary judgment, a judge is not himself to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Las Brisas Condo. Homes Condo.

Ass'n, Inc. v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co., No. 2:21-CV-41-KCD, 2023 WL 8978168,

at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2023). “An issue is genuine if a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Do v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. 1:17-

CV-23041-JLK, 2019 WL 331295, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2019).

“The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no

genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial.” Andrews v. Ciccone,

No. 3:23-CV-88-MMH-SJH, 2025 WL 2508878, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2025).

“[A] fact is material if it may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable

substantive law.” Toca v. Debonair Props. LLC, No. 2:23-CV-303-KCD, 2025

WL 2106674 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2025).

“When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party

must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox,

Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995). This requires the nonmovant to

“identify specific evidence in the record” and “articulate the precise manner in

which that evidence supports [its] claim.” Alexander as trustee of Franklin

Pharmacy, LLC v. Aaron, No. 3:15-CV-1314-AKK, 2017 WL 11437294, at *1

(N.D. Ala. June 1, 2017); see also Diaz v. Kaplan Higher Educ., L.L.C., 820 F.3d

172, 177 (5th Cir. 2016).

III. Discussion

“The FMLA grants an eligible employee the right to take up to 12

workweeks of unpaid leave annually for any one or more of several reasons,

including [b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee

unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.” Hurlbert v.

St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). To

protect this right, the FMLA allows employees to bring a private cause of action

for interference or retaliation. Id. Young has pled both claims here, so the

Court considers each in turn.

A. FMLA Interference (Count I)

An employee establishes an FMLA interference claim when she

“demonstrate[s] by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to an

FMLA benefit that was denied.” Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1331

(11th Cir. 2018); see also Martin v. Brevard Cnty. Pub. Schs., 543 F.3d 1261,

1266-67 (11th Cir. 2008). Young alleges that Ali and Lovell interfered with her

FMLA rights by firing her after she requested leave. (Doc. 59 at 10-11

(“Differently put, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment knowing she

was eligible for FMLA leave, and that her prior and future absences would

have/would be FMLA-protected.”))

“An interference claim has two elements: (1) the employee was entitled

to a benefit under the FMLA; and (2) her employer denied her that benefit.”

White v. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 2015).

“The first element ... subsumes several sub-elements,” including “(1) that the

defendant is a covered entity; (2) that the plaintiff is eligible for FMLA benefits;

(3) that the plaintiff sought leave for a qualifying reason; and (4) that the

plaintiff provided notice meeting certain criteria.” Moore v. GPS Hosp.

Partners IV, LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1297, n.1 (S.D. Ala. 2019).

An employer’s motives for denying an FMLA benefit to which the

employee is entitled are usually irrelevant. See Strickland v. Water Works &

Sewer Bd. of City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1208 (11th Cir. 2001). Even

so, an employer is not liable “if [it] can show that it [acted] for a reason wholly

unrelated to the FMLA leave.” Id. If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,

the question at summary judgment becomes “whether the evidence, viewed in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, establishes as a matter of

law that the employer would have terminated the employee regardless of her

request for or use of FMLA leave.” Batson, 897 F.3d at 1331-32. So the plaintiff

must ultimately show that the request for FMLA leave was the proximate

cause of her termination. See Schaaf v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 602 F.3d

1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that, for an employer to be held liable

for FMLA interference, the request for leave must have been the proximate

cause of the termination).

1. FMLA Qualifying Condition

Here, Young alleges that she was denied the right to take FMLA leave.

An employee is qualified to take FMLA leave if she suffers from a “serious

health condition” that makes her “unable to perform the functions of [her]

position.” Hurley v. Kent of Naples, Inc., 746 F.3d 1161, 1166 (11th Cir. 2014).

As defined in the FMLA, “serious health condition” means “an illness, injury,

impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves (A) inpatient care in

a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing

treatment by a health care provider.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). To qualify as

“continuing treatment,” it (1) must involve a period of incapacity of more than

three consecutive, full calendar days, and (2) must require either (a) treatment

by a healthcare provider at least twice within 30 days of the first day of

incapacity or (b) treatment by a healthcare provider at least once that results

in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the healthcare

provider. Ramji v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., LLC, 992 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th

Cir. 2021); see 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a)(1)-(2). “The term incapacity means

inability to work ... or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious

health condition, treatment therefore, or recovery therefrom.” 29 C.F.R. §

825.113(b).

Though disputed by the parties, the Court finds that Young’s condition

satisfies all these definitions. Her doctor advised her on February 10 to rest

her voice and use it as little as possible. (Doc. 78 at 4.) Young conveyed to Ali

that her doctor was concerned that her swollen vocal cords had lesions. (Doc.

59-2 at 161.) Based on the record, the Court can suppose that Young’s job as

an FTS involved working in person and talking extensively to practice staff

and personnel. (Doc. 60 ¶ 7.) Orders from her doctor to talk as little as possible

for a week made her unable to perform her work activities. See 29 C.F.R. §

825.113(b). And Young was excused from work for the week. (Doc. 59-7.) That’s

more than three consecutive, full days, so it meets the first half of the

“continuing treatment” standard. 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a)(1)-(a)(2).

Young also states that she had follow-up appointments on February 13,

17, and 28 for her voice issues, which Affordable Care does not dispute. That

satisfies the second qualifying condition for “continuing treatment,” since her

treaters prescribed a continuing regimen of treatment. See 29 C.F.R. §

825.115(a)(2). Young, therefore, had a qualifying “serious health condition.” 29

U.S.C. § 2611(11)(B). And that condition rendered her unable to perform the

essential functions of her job. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D).

2. Denial of an FMLA Benefit

To succeed under her interference theory, Young must demonstrate that

she was “denied a benefit to which [s]he was entitled under the FMLA.”

Martin, 543 F.3d at 1266-67. According to Young, she successfully made this

showing by proving that she was fired after requesting FMLA leave (Doc. 52

at ¶ 39), thereby demonstrating that Affordable Care denied her the benefit of

the leave to which she was entitled. Affordable Care, on the other hand,

contends that it fired Young for independent performance-related reasons, and

thus it did not violate the FMLA.

Affordable Care is entitled to summary judgment if it acted for a reason

“wholly unrelated” to her request for FMLA leave. Strickland, 239 F.3d at

1208. An employer does not violate the FMLA by firing an employee who is

eligible for FMLA leave. After all, “the right to commence FMLA leave is not

absolute.” Krutzig v. Pulte Home Corp., 602 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2010).

Instead, “if a dismissal would have occurred regardless of the request for

FMLA leave, an employee may be dismissed,” even if it “prevent[s her] from

exercising [her] right to leave or reinstatement.” Id. Accordingly, the mere fact

that Young was eligible for FMLA leave is not determinative. See Montgomery

v. Ion Media Mgmt. Co., No. 8:10-cv-429-T-33AEP, 2011 WL 1791294, at *11

(M.D. Fla. May 10, 2011) (explaining that an employee is not “insulated from

termination” just become he has raised “the possibility of her need for FMLA

leave” or even by “formally request[ing] such leave”); see also Gamba v. City of

Sunrise, 157 F. App’x 112, 113 (11th Cir. 2005).

Unlike retaliation claims, there is no burden shifting or formal pretext

analysis. See Herren v. La Petite Acad., Inc., 820 F. App’x 900, 906 (11th Cir.

2020) (distinguishing between FMLA retaliation and interference claims).

Instead, Affordable Care bears the burden of establishing a lack of causal

connection. Id. Accordingly, the question is “whether the evidence, viewed in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, establishes as a matter of

law that the employer would have terminated the employee regardless of her

request for or use of FMLA leave.” Batson, 897 F.3d at 1331-32.

Affordable Care argues that it disciplined and fired Young for

independent reasons. That is, for her repeated failures to obtain approval to

change her schedule after they counseled her on company expectations, and

ultimately, for her unilateral decision to close the LaGrange office early. (Doc.

67 at 18-20.) Although Affordable Care provided evidence of these issues,

Young has presented facts to the contrary. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (noting that the non-movant cannot rest on “mere

allegations” of disputes, “but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence

specific facts” showing there is a dispute for trial).

Young’s declaration states that she was “never issued any disciplinary

action, performance improvement plan, or other performance related

deficiency document,” and “did not have any counseling sessions” with anyone

at the company. (Doc. 66-1 ¶¶ 5, 7.) But three days before she was terminated,

Ali stated that Young was unreliable due to her medical issues. (Doc. 59-14.)

And five days after she was terminated, Tiama Smith, Lead FTS for Affordable

Care, sent Young a professional recommendation letter, stating that she

witnessed Young’s “exceptional skills.” (Doc. 59-4.) Given these competing

facts, the Court cannot say that Young’s termination was for a reason wholly

separate from her medical issues and request for medical leave. Because the

facts regarding her termination are in sharp dispute, summary judgment is

improper for either party on the FMLA interference claim.

B. FMLA Retaliation (Count II)

A claim for FMLA retaliation is generally evaluated under the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under that framework, the plaintiff must

establish a prima facie case for retaliation. If the plaintiff does so, the burden

shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate reason for the termination. If the

employer provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to

show that the asserted rationale is pretextual. See Martin, 543 F.3d at 1268.

1. Prima Facie Case of Retaliation

To state a claim for retaliation under the FLMA, “an employee must

allege that (1) [she] engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) [she]

suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3) the decision was causally

related to the protected activity.” Walker v. Elmore Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 379 F.3d

1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2004). Unlike an interference claim, a retaliation claim

places an “increased burden” on a plaintiff to show “that [her] employer’s

actions were motivated by an impermissible retaliatory or discriminatory

animus.” Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1207. A plaintiff’s ultimate burden is to

“demonstrate that [her] employer intentionally discriminated against [her].”

Id.

Young engaged in statutorily protected conduct when she requested

leave. She also suffered an adverse employment action when Affordable Care

terminated her. The FMLA makes it “unlawful for any employer to interfere

with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right”

provided under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). The dispute here boils down

to whether Young “came forth with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue

of fact that [her] application for FMLA leave caused [her termination].”

Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798 (11th Cir.

2000).

To establish causation, “a plaintiff need only show that the protected

activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated.” Clover v. Total Sys.

Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1354 (11th Cir. 1999). Usually, “close temporal

proximity between the employee’s protected conduct and the adverse

employment action is sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine

issue of material fact.” Brungart, 231 F.3d at 799. But “temporal proximity,

without more, must be very close.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d

1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007). And temporal proximity alone “is not sufficient to

establish a causal connection when there is unrebutted evidence that the

decision maker was not aware of the protected activity.” Krutzig, 602 F.3d at

1235.

On these issues, there is a dispute of material fact. Ali said that Young

had become unreliable because of her medical issues. (Doc. 59-14.) And that

same day, Young emailed HR, requesting that someone contact her to discuss

her options regarding medical leave. (Doc. 59-11 at 2.) Young was terminated

three days later. Although proximity alone is insufficient to show causation

when “an employer contemplates a given action” before the exercise of FMLA

rights, see Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 434 F.3d 1227,

1232 (11th Cir. 2006), there’s no evidence that Affordable Care had discussed

terminating or disciplining Young before she contacted HR about medical

leave. To be sure, performance issues were discussed, but no one mentioned

termination or taking disciplinary action against her for her purported

failures. Young’s medical issues began on February 10, but Ali only began

mentioning medical issues as a concern on March 28, the day Young requested

information about taking leave from HR. (Doc. 59-14.) Accordingly, Young’s

evidence of temporal proximity suffices to show causation.

2. Nonretaliatory Reasons for Termination and Pretext

Even though Young has made out a prima facie case, Affordable Care

can avoid this claim by providing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

its actions. See Alexander v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1335 (11th Cir.

2000). As mentioned, Affordable Care cites Young’s purported performance

issues. But Young offers evidence to “show that the employer’s proffered reason

was pretextual.” Martin, 543 F.3d at 1268. Evidence of pretext should

demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

incoherencies, or contradictions” in the proffered reasons “that a reasonable

factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Combs v. Plantation

Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997). Ultimately, to “avoid summary

judgment,” a plaintiff “must introduce significantly probative evidence” of

pretext. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 1993).

According to Affordable Care, it fired Young because: “Employee has

multiple instances of not showing up for assignments or trying to get out of

assignments. She has become unreliable. Today she took it upon herself to

close a practice early so she could leave early. This is not her decision to make.”

(Doc. 60-12.) To show pretext, Young “must meet that reason head on and rebut

it.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (reasoning

that an employee cannot “succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that

reason”).

The evidence is in dispute over how and why the LaGrange practice was

closed early on March 31. There’s also a dispute of material fact over Young’s

performance issues. Lovell testified that Young “was underperforming … or

had [] issues with following expectations of her management, and her manager

[Ali] and I gave her many counseling sessions and communications regarding

not following expectations.” See Doc. 59-3 at 14. But Young disputes that these

counseling sessions took place. (Doc. 66 ¶ 14; Doc. 66-1 ¶ 7.) According to

Lovell, Young was making unilateral decisions about her travel without

consulting her manager and failed to show up for work as scheduled. (Id. at 16-

17, 36.) Ali testified similarly. (Doc. 59-2.) But Young says she was never

informed there were any issues with her performance. (Doc. 66 ¶¶ 5, 22.) And

Affordable Care took no action until Young began asking about medical leave.

At bottom, Young has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether Affordable Care’s reasons for

terminating her were inconsistent and therefore pretextual, sufficient to take

the issue to a jury. See Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Delaware, LLC, 854

F.3d 1261, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2017). When viewed in the light most favorable

to Young, it is debatable whether Affordable Care’s reasons for terminating

her were pretextual. So Affordable Care is not entitled to summary judgment

on the retaliation claim.

C. Disability Discrimination

In Counts III and V, Young claims Affordable Care violated the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Florida Civil Rights Act

(“FCRA”). (Doc. 25 at 10, 12.) Courts analyze disability discrimination claims

the same way under both laws. Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, 234 F.3d 1219,

1221 (11th Cir. 2000). To prevail on these claims, Young must show: “(1) she is

disabled; (2) she is a qualified individual; and (3) she was subjected to unlawful

discrimination because of her disability.” Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361,

1365 (11th Cir. 2000).

As to the first element, “the term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an

individual—(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one

or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an

impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” D’Angelo v.

ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. §

12102(2)). The ADA directs courts to construe “disability” in “favor of broad

coverage of individuals” to the “maximum extent permitted by the terms” of

the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4). Accordingly, courts have noted that the bar

to be considered “disabled” under the ADA is not a high one. See, e.g., Mazzeo

v. Color Resols. Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1268 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2014).

For an employee alleging that an employer “regarded” her as impaired,

she need not prove that the impairment—in actuality or in perception—limits

a major life activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). That said, it does not “apply

to impairments that are transitory and minor,” defining a “transitory

impairment” to mean one with an “actual or expected duration of 6 months or

less.” Id. § 12102(3)(B). Thus, “an employee has a ‘disability’ under the ADA

when that employee actually has, or is perceived as having, an impairment

that is not transitory and minor.” EEOC v. STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305, 1315

(11th Cir. 2019).

Young alleges that there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could

find she had a record of disability, or was perceived as disabled. (Doc. 66 at 21.)

She cites her medical records in support (Id.; Doc. 78.) Affordable Care argues

that Young makes only conclusory allegations that she is disabled as defined

by the ADA, unsupported by facts. (Doc. 60 at 22.) The Court agrees with

Affordable Care.

It is unclear what physical impairment Young suffers from that

substantially limits one or more major life activities. Her amended complaint

cites a laundry list of activities, “including but not limited to sleeping, eating,

walking, working, and sitting.” (Doc. 25 n.2.) And the pleading states that her

medical conditions affect her immune and lymphatic systems. (Id.) But those

conditions aren’t discussed to any extent in the medical records. Instead, the

records focus on laryngitis or voice loss. But Young doesn’t explicitly say that

this is the medical condition limiting her major life activities. The Court is

instead left to guess.

The Court could assume that Young’s disability is speaking due to voice

loss and other issues with her voice box, but she provides no medical records

that support the assertion she is prohibited from speaking beyond a transitory

period. “It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability status

under this test to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an

impairment.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198

(2002). At bottom, the Court simply won’t do this work for Young. See Herman

v. Mr. Cooper Grp. Inc., No. 2:23-CV-948-JES-KCD, 2024 WL 3277021, at *1

(M.D. Fla. July 2, 2024) (“In our adversarial system, a claimant must present

her case. It is not a court’s job to conduct research to provide the proper support

for [conclusory] arguments.”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194

F.3d 252, 260 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The district court is free to disregard arguments

that are not adequately developed[.]”). At summary judgment, “the onus is

upon the parties to formulate arguments.” Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp.,

43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995).

Young also argues that a jury could find that Affordable Care perceived

her as disabled, but this argument fails for the same reason. (Doc. 66 at 21.)

Under the “regarded as” prong, a person is “disabled” if her employer perceives

her as having an ADA-qualifying disability, even if there is no factual basis for

that perception. Williams v. Motorola, Inc., 303 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir.

2002). As with actual impairments, however, the perceived impairment must

be one that, if real, would limit substantially a major life activity of the

individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C); see also Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203,

1208 (11th Cir. 1999). Again, Young provides no evidence to show that a

medical condition affects a function that qualifies as a major life activity.

Young failed to show that Affordable Care perceived her limitations in

performing her job as having a permanent or long-term impact and as

preventing or severely restricting her from performing activities of central

importance to most people’s lives. At bottom, Young offers no evidence that she

cannot perform major life activities. Thus, Affordable Care is entitled to

summary judgment on Counts III and V.

D. Retaliation

Finally, in Counts IV and VI, Young alleges that Affordable Care

retaliated against her under the ADA and FCRA after she requested

accommodation in the form of a modified work schedule to attend doctor

appointments. (Doc. 25 at 14; Doc. 66 at 22.) These claims fail for the same

reason as above. The ADA requires that employers reasonably accommodate

qualified individuals with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (discussing

accommodations that must be offered “for individuals with disabilities”)

(emphasis added). Young has not shown that she has a qualified disability

under the ADA. Thus, Affordable Care is entitled to summary judgment on

Counts IV and VI as well.

IV. Conclusion

1. Annette Young’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) is

DENIED.

2. Affordable Care, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 60) is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

a. Summary judgment as to Counts I and II (FMLA interference

and retaliation) is denied.

b. Summary judgment as to Counts III, IV, V, and VI (ADA and

FCRA discrimination and retaliation) is granted.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on December 31, 2025.

KyleC.Dudek

United States District Judge

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