HOTT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

JORMAN JOSE SILVA SANCHEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. 1:25-cv-02137-JRS-TAB

)

RUSSELL HOTT, )

KRISTI NOEM, )

PAMELA BONDI, )

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR )

IMMIGRATION REVIEW, )

KERRY FORESTAL, )

)

Respondents. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

Jorman Jose Silva Sanchez ("Petitioner") is a noncitizen who entered the

United States through its territorial border in Texas in March of 2024 without

inspection. Dkt. 1; dkt. 1-2. In mid-September of 2025, Petitioner was detained by

Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agents in Chicago, Illinois as part of

a "targeted immigration enforcement operation." Dkt. 1, ¶ 15. Petitioner now

petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking release

from custody or a prompt bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as well as

declaratory relief. Id. at 14. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the

petition to the extent that, within seven days of this Opinion, Respondents are

ordered to either: (1) afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing pursuant to §

1226(a) before an Immigration Judge ("IJ"); or (2) release him from custody, under

the most recent conditions of supervision.

I. Background

Petitioner entered the United States without inspection on or about March 31,

2024, in Texas. Dkt. 1 ¶ 44. Officials from the Department of Homeland Security

("DHS") apprehended Petitioner shortly after he arrived, but released him on his own

recognizance pursuant to INA § 236 [8 U.S.C. § 1226] on or around April 1, 2024. Id.;

dkt. 1-3 (Order of Release on Recognizance). That day, DHS issued Petitioner a Notice

to Appear and placed him in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). Id.; dkt.

1-2 (Notice to Appear). The Notice to Appear charges Petitioner with inadmissibility

under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") [8 U.S.C. §

1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] as "an alien present in the United States without being admitted or

paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as

designated by the Attorney General." Id. The "arriving alien" checkbox is unmarked.

Id.

In September of 2025, Petitioner was living with his family in Chicago when

ICE agents detained him during a "targeted immigration enforcement operation."

Dkt. 1 ¶ 45. ICE issued Petitioner a Form I-830E and a Warrant for Arrest Form I-

200, which commanded "any immigration officer authorized pursuant to sections 236

[8 U.S.C. § 1226] and 287 [8 U.S.C. § 1357] of the Immigration and Nationality Act"

to arrest him. Dkt. 11-1 at 10–19. Petitioner was subsequently transferred to the

Marion County Jail in Indianapolis, Indiana, where he remains in custody. At the

time of his arrest, Petitioner had a pending application for Asylum and Withholding

of Removal. Dkt. 1 ¶ 48.

On October 17, 2025, Petitioner filed this writ of habeas corpus petition,

arguing that Respondents are unlawfully detaining him under 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2)(A). Dkt. 1. Petitioner argues that he is only properly detained under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a), which entitles him to an individualized bond hearing. Id. On

October 20, 2025, the IJ issued a ruling on the Petitioner's motion for a bond hearing.

Dkt. 11-2 (Order of the Immigration Judge). The IJ denied the request for change in

custody status, stating "this Court lacks jurisdiction over bond. See Matter of Yajure

Hurtado 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), and Matter of Q. Li, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA

2025))." Dkt. 11-2 at 1.

II. Discussion

Petitioner claims that his current detention violates the INA (Count I) and the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (Count II). Dkt. 1 at 13–14. In

opposition, Respondents make three arguments: (1) that this Court lacks jurisdiction

over the petition; (2) that Petitioner is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2)(A); and (3) that, in the alternative, Petitioner is lawfully detained under 8

U.S.C. § 1226. Dkt. 11.

As discussed below, the Court finds that Petitioner's detention is governed by

§ 1226(a) and that the detention is unlawful because Petitioner has not been afforded

a bond hearing. Because Petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief on these

grounds, the Court does not address the constitutional arguments.

A. Jurisdiction

A federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner "is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Petitioner argues that this Court has jurisdiction over his petition

because he challenges his detention without a bond hearing in violation of the INA.

Dkt. 15 at 11. Respondents, however, point to three provisions that curtail a district

court's jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by noncitizen detainees: 8 U.S.C. §§

1252(g), 1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(5). In certain immigration matters, the INA does

limit the district courts' jurisdiction. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 292–

96 (2018). None apply here.

i. Section 1252(g)

Section 1252(g) states that "no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause

or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney

General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders

against any alien under this chapter." Following the Supreme Court, the Seventh

Circuit determined that § 1252(g) only bars a district court's judicial review of "the

three listed decisions or actions." E.F.L. v. Prim, 986 F.3d 959, 964 (7th Cir. 2021)

("[sec 1252(g)] does not sweep broadly; only challenges to the three listed decisions or

actions—to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders—are

insulated from judicial review.") (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti–Discrimination

Comm. (AAADC), 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)). The instant petition does not fit into the

enumerated decisions or actions. Petitioner does not challenge the "commencement"

of his removal proceedings because those proceedings commenced a year and a half

ago when he was issued a Notice to Appear. He does not challenge the "adjudication"

of his case because he is not challenging anything related to the removal proceedings

themselves. Last, he does not challenge the execution of his removal order—in fact,

there is no removal order. See dkt. 15 at 5.

Respondents argue that § 1252(g) is more expansive because it "also bars

district courts from hearing challenges to the method by which the Secretary of

Homeland Security chooses to commence removal proceedings, including the decision

to detain an alien pending removal." Dkt. 11 at 4 (emphasis added). Respondents,

however, ignore Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent rejecting attempts to

expand § 1252(g) beyond the three enumerated decisions or activities.1 In Department

of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, the Supreme Court

rejected the government's argument that § 1252(g) barred their review of an APA

claim involving the recission of DACA because the Court had already "rejected as

'implausible'" any claim that § 1252(g) covers "all claims arising from deportation

1 In support, Respondents cite to Alvarez v. ICE, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016), which

concluded that § 1252(g) barred a district court from hearing some parts of a Bivens claim

challenging ICE's methods of commencing removal proceedings once the plaintiff's criminal

sentence ended. As Petitioner points out, the Alvarez plaintiff was making a Bivens claim

challenging the way that the government commenced removal proceedings—whether he

entered into a stipulated removal order or had to attend removal proceedings. The Alvarez

court reasoned that the plaintiff "essentially asked the court to find that the agency should

have chosen a different method of commencing proceedings." Id. Even still, Alvarez reversed

the district court's determination that 1252(g) stripped its jurisdiction over the plaintiff's

claim that his detention violated the Fifth Amendment because his removal was not

reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 1205. Heeding Supreme Court guidance to read § 1252(g) as a

"narrow provision," Alvarez determined the district court had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's

claim that ICE had no statutory grounds to detain him. Id. (citing AAADC, 525 U.S. at 482).

proceedings." 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020) (quoting AAADC, 525 U.S. at 482). More

specifically, confronted with a habeas petition challenging the petitioner's

confinement until his deportation, the Seventh Circuit held that "nothing in § 1252(g)

precludes review of the decision to confine." Carrera-Valdez v. Perryman, 211 F.3d

1046, 1047 (7th Cir. 2000). Indeed, courts have consistently found that § 1252(g) does

not bar a district court's jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of noncitizen's

detention. Ozturk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382, 397 (2d Cir. 2025) ("Section 1252(g) 'does

not preclude jurisdiction over the challenges to the legality of [a noncitizen's]

detention.'") (quoting Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 609 (1st Cir. 2023));

Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, 2025 WL 2809996 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025) (concluding

that § 1252(g) did not apply to habeas challenge of ongoing detention without a bond

hearing); Alejandro v. Olson, 2025 WL 2896348, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2025) (same);

Campos Leon v. Forestal, 2025 WL 2694763, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2025) (same).

Considering this precedent, the Court cannot adopt Respondents' expanded

interpretation of § 1252(g).

ii. Section 1252(b)(9)

Section 1252(b)(9) states, "Judicial review of all questions of law and fact,

including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions,

arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the

United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a

final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court

shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of Title 28 or any other

habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other

provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions

of law or fact."

In Regents of the University of California, the Supreme Court reiterated that

the "arising from" language in § 1252(b)(9) "'does not present a jurisdictional bar'

where those bringing suit 'are not asking for review of an order of removal,' 'the

decision . . . to seek removal,' or 'the process by which . . . removability will be

determined.'" 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 292–93). Here,

Petitioner is not seeking review of an order of removal. As seen above, the government

has not issued a final order of removal. He is also not seeking review of the process

for determining his removability. Petitioner instead challenges his detention without

a bond hearing, which is an issue that can be heard without affecting Petitioner's

ongoing removal proceedings.

Respondents attempt to avoid this interpretation of § 1252(b)(9) by citing to

Justice Thomas's concurrence in Jennings that "detention is an 'action taken ... to

remove' an alien. And even the narrowest reading of 'arising from' must cover claims

that directly challenge such actions." Id. at 318. As the Second Circuit recently

explained in Ozturk v. Hyde, however, the plurality in Jennings explicitly rejected

Justice Thomas's interpretation because "the mere fact that a noncitizen is detained

does not deprive courts of jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(9)." 136 F.4th 382, 399 (2d Cir.

2025). Instead, "'[t]he question is not whether detention is an action taken to remove

an alien but whether the legal questions in this case arise from such an action.'" Id.

(quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 295 n.3) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, Regents

of the University of California, which was decided two years after Jennings, explained

that the "arising from" language does not bar district courts from reviewing cases

where the parties are not challenging removal proceedings.

Following the Supreme Court's guidance, district courts around the country

have determined that § 1252(b)(9) does not strip them of jurisdiction over habeas

challenges to ongoing detention without a bond hearing. See, e.g., Ochoa Ochoa v.

Noem et al., 2025 WL 2938779, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025) (finding that § 1252(b)(9)

did not preclude jurisdiction over petitioner's challenge to his mandatory detention

without a bond hearing under § 1225 because it does not bar "claims challenging the

conditions or scope of detention of aliens in removal proceedings") (internal

quotations omitted); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, 2025 WL 2712427 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23,

2025) (holding that § 1252(b)(9) did not apply to habeas challenge of ongoing

detention without a bond hearing); Leal-Hernandez v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-02428-JRR,

2025 WL 2430025, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025) (rejecting government's jurisdictional

arguments in habeas challenging whether Petitioner was properly subject to

mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).Guerrero Orellana, 2025 WL

2809996 (same).

iii. Section 1252(a)(5)

Respondents also invoke § 1252(a)(5), which reserves for the courts of appeals

"judicial review of an order of removal." At the outset, this provision is not applicable

because Petitioner does not challenge an order of removal. Nevertheless, Respondents

argue that, when read alongside § 1252(b)(9), § 1252(a)(5) bars judicial review of any

issue arising from removal-related activity. Dkt. 11 at 6. Respondents cite the

Jennings concurrence as well as earlier courts of appeals' decisions to expand these

sections to cover any action where a petitioner is in removal proceedings. As stated

above, however, the Jennings plurality rejected this interpretation of the statute's

"arising from" language. Moreover, Respondents' cases explain that § 1252(a)(5) and

§ 1252(b)(9) do not apply to habeas challenges to unlawful detention not involving a

final order of removal. J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016)

(explaining that § 1252(b)(9) does not apply to federal habeas corpus provisions that

do not involve final orders of removal, but finding that, "[i]n light of §§ 1252(b)(9) and

1252(a)(5) and our precedent, the [plaintiffs'] right-to-counsel claims must be raised

through the PFR process because they 'arise from' removal proceedings"); Delgado v.

Quarantillo, 643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Kellici v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 416,

420 (6th Cir. 2006) for the proposition that "district court, not court of appeals, had

jurisdiction where plaintiffs' habeas petitions challenged only the constitutionality of

the arrest and detention, not the underlying administrative order of removal'").

Respondents' cases also involve petitioners and plaintiffs who ask district courts to

review denials of applications to halt removals. See Rosario v. Holder, 627 F.3d 58

(2d Cir. 2010) (finding that district court did not have jurisdiction over petition to

review the BIA's cancellation of petitioners' application to cancel removal); Delgado,

643 F.3d at 55 52 (finding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to compel

the USCIS to consider petitioner's I-212 application). In sum, none of these cases

demonstrate that § 1252(a)(5), when read together with § 1252(b)(9), preclude district

courts from exercising jurisdiction over habeas petitions challenging unlawful

detention.

As a whole, Respondents' jurisdictional arguments fail. This Court has

jurisdiction over Petitioner's challenge to his unlawful detention.

B. Legality of Detention

The merits of the petition revolve around Respondents' statutory authority to

detain Petitioner while his removal proceedings remain pending. Petitioner argues

that the statutory text and context make it so that Respondents can only lawfully

detain him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondents argue that Petitioner is

subject to the broader "catchall provision" in § 1225(b)(2) because he is an "applicant

for admission." Dkt. 11 at 8.

i. Overview of §§ 1225 and 1226

8 U.S.C. § 1226 and § 1225 govern the detention and removal of noncitizens.

In general, § 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States, while § 1225

applies to "certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and

(b)(2)." Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018). Section 1226(a) provides:

On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested

and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed

from the United States .... [T]he Attorney General—

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on—

(A) bond . . . ; or

(B) conditional parole . . ..

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). "Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a)

receive bond hearings at the outset of detention." Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8

C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1). At that hearing, the

noncitizen "may secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge

that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community." Nielsen v. Preap, 586

U.S. 392, 397–98 (2019) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d)); see also Hernandez

v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[T]he burden is on the non-citizen to

'establish to the satisfaction of the Immigration Judge . . . that he or she does not

present a danger to persons or property, is not a threat to the national security, and

does not pose a risk of flight.'") (citing In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (BIA 2006)).

Section 1225(b)(1) deals with "inspection of aliens arriving in the United States

and certain other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled" and provides that

immigration officers shall order certain noncitizens removed without further hearing

or review unless the noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum. §

1225(b)(1)(A)(i). This applies to noncitizens who have engaged in misrepresentation

or have failed to meet document requirements under § 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7). Id.

Section 1225(b)(2) pertains to "[i]nspection of other aliens." In relevant part, it

provides that "in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the

examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not

clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a

proceeding under section 1229a of this title." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis

added). An "applicant for admission" is "[a]n alien present in the United States who

has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a

designated port of arrival . . .)." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). In other words, noncitizens

subject to 1225(b)(2) are not eligible for expedited removal but are subject to

mandatory detention while their full removal proceedings are pending.

ii. Analysis

In this case, the Respondents' actions and their representations to Petitioner

demonstrate that his re-detention in September of 2025 is governed by § 1226. As

seen above, Petitioner was initially detained in 2024. If Petitioner was an "alien

arriving in the United States," the government was obligated by statute to

immediately order Petitioner removed from the United States or refer him to an

asylum officer, at which point he would have been subject to either removal or

mandatory detention pending review of his claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Alternatively,

if Petitioner was "an applicant for admission" to the United States, the government

was obligated to detain him pending resolution of removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2).

The government did not exercise either authority. Instead, DHS issued a

Notice to Appear commencing removal proceedings and released Petitioner on his

own recognizance pursuant to § 1226. Dkt. 1-3. Section 1226—not § 1225—explicitly

authorizes release. More than a year later, once the Petitioner was living in Chicago,

DHS issued an arrest warrant that explicitly invokes § 1226. Dkt. 11-2 at 18. Indeed,

the text of § 1226 authorizes the arrest and detention of aliens with a warrant. Section

1225 does not contain any language about warrants since detention is mandatory.

See Campos Leon v. Forestal, No. 1:25-CV-01774-SEB-MJD, 2025 WL 2694763, at *3

(S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2025) ("It is difficult to find that § 1226(a) carries any meaning if

the aliens it expressly addresses—those arrested and detained pursuant to

warrants—are not actually subject to its provisions."). In sum, DHS's documents

make it clear that Petitioner's current detention is only authorized under § 1226(a).

"[T]he Government has affirmatively decided to treat" Petitioner "as being detained

under Section 1226(a) and it cannot now be heard to change its position to claim that

he is detained under Section 1225(b)." Patel v. Crowley, No. 25 C 11180, 2025 WL

2996787, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2025) (citing Kennedy v. Kijakazi, No. 22-2258, 2023

WL 1990303, at *3 (7th Cir. Feb. 14, 2023)).

The few district court opinions that have found that noncitizens arrested in the

interior were properly detained pursuant to § 1225 emphasize that in those instances,

DHS did not issue a warrant for the alien's arrest and detention. See, e.g., Sandoval

v. Acuna, 2025 WL 3048926, at *5 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025) ("Petitioner does not allege

that the Attorney General issued a warrant for her arrest and detention, further

indicating that Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b) as an 'applicant for

admission,' not § 1226(a)"); Vargas Lopez v. Trump, 2025 WL 2780351, at *7 (D. Neb.

Sept. 30, 2025) ("This failure of proof of a warrant for Vargas Lopez's arrest is fatal

to the Second Cause of action. Vargas Lopez has not provided this Court with the

documents necessary for Vargas Lopez to be eligible for release on bond under §

1226."). In contrast, Cirrus Rojas v. Olson, et al., No. 25-cv-1437-bhl, dkt. 20, (E.D.

Wis. Oct. 31, 2025) found that a petitioner's detention fell under § 1225 despite having

been issued a warrant citing § 1226 and granted bond in a previous hearing. See also

Mejia Olalde v. Noem, 2025 WL 3131942, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025) (finding that

the plain language of § 1225(b)(2) supports the conclusion that Petitioner, who had

been living in the United States for 40 years, was subject to mandatory detention as

an "applicant for admission."). Neither Cirrus Rojas nor Mejia Olalde compel the

Court to conclude that § 1225 applies here. The cases are not identical factually and,

as explained below, the Court finds here that the nature and circumstances of

Petitioner's arrest and proceedings support application of § 1226 rather than § 1225.

a. Plain meaning

Aside from the record evidence, the plain meaning of the statute supports

Petitioner's position that ICE's authority to detain him derives from § 1226(a) and

not from § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Cazarez-Gonzales v. Olson, No. 2:25-CV-590 (S.D. Ind.

Dec. 5 2025) (collecting cases); see also Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland

Sec., No. 25-3050, 2025 WL 3552514, at *8-*10 (7th Cir. Dec. 11, 2025) (stating that

"Plaintiffs have the better argument on the current record" referring to argument

that "ICE's authority to detain a noncitizen discovered within the country derives

from § 1226(a) and not from § 1225(b)."). Respondents argue that § 1225(b)(2) pertains

to Petitioner because he is an "applicant for admission" and "not clearly and beyond

a doubt entitled to be admitted." Dkt. 11 at 8–9. Respondents do not appear to argue

that Petitioner meets the third criterion of "seeking admission." Instead, they claim

that his pending asylum application qualifies him as an "applicant for admission."

Dkt. 11 at 11.

Respondents' attempt to elide "seeking admission" as a criterion for §

1252(b)(2) is unconvincing. See Castañon-Nava, 2025 WL 3552514, at *9 ("And while

a noncitizen arrested in the Midwest might qualify as 'an alien present in the United

States who had not been admitted,' § 1225(a)(1), the mandatory detention provision

upon which Defendants rely, limits its scope to an 'applicant for admission' who is

'seeking admission,' § 1225(b)(2)(A)."). As the Seventh Circuit recently explained

regarding the same argument, "it is Congress's prerogative to define a term however

it wishes, and it has chosen to limit the definition of an 'applicant for admission' to

'an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in

the United States.'" Castañon-Nava, 2025 WL 3552514, at *9 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §

1225(a)(1)). "[Congress] could easily have included noncitizens who are 'seeking

admission' within the definition [of applicant for admission] but elected not to do so."

Id. As such, Respondents' implicit construction of "seeking admission" in §

1225(b)(2)(A) as merely repeating "applicant for admission" would render the phrase

superfluous, "violating one of the cardinal rules of statutory construction." Id. (citing

United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023)).

"[A]s the Supreme Court reminds us, if an interpretation of one provision 'would

render another provision superfluous, courts presume that interpretation is

incorrect.'" Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08 (2010)). Thus, the fact

that Petitioner fits only two out of three criteria does not suffice to show that §

1225(b)(2) applies to Petitioner.

b. Statutory context

"It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute

must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory

scheme." Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989); see also King v.

Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (Our duty, after all, is "to construe statutes, not

isolated provisions.") (internal quotation omitted). Considering § 1225 as a whole, the

most natural meaning is that it applies to "arriving" noncitizens attempting to enter

the United States. Section 1225 is titled: "Inspection by immigration officers;

expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing" and it

repeatedly refers to "arriving" aliens throughout. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)

(screenings for aliens "arriving in the United States"); id. § 1225(b)(2)(C) (aliens

"arriving on land . . . from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States" may

be returned to that territory pending removal proceedings); id. § 1225(d)(1)

(immigration officers authorized to inspect "any vessel, aircraft, railway car, or other

conveyance or vehicle in which they believe aliens are being brought into the United

States"). The statute further explicitly addresses "crewm[e]n" and "stowaway[s]" in §

1225(b)(2), reflecting that Congress envisions § 1225 to apply broadly to "arriving"

noncitizens—not just § 1225(b)(1). In addition, its sister statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225a,

focuses on the pre-inspection of aliens entering the country at foreign airports. As

Respondents concede, Petitioner "is not 'arriving' in the United States." Dkt. 11 at 9.

Respondents' interpretation also disregards the relationship between § 1225

and § 1226 within the INA. While § 1225 focuses on "inspection" of "arriving aliens,"

§ 1226 pertains to the "[a]pprehension and detention of aliens." The plain language

here suggests that § 1226—not § 1225—applies to Petitioner because he is an alien,

who was "apprehended" and "detained" after a warrant was issued for his arrest. The

fact that these two classes of noncitizens would be treated differently makes sense

within broader immigration law. As the Seventh Circuit explained, "the difference in

treatment between a noncitizen at the border and one already in the United States

fits within the broader context of our immigration law. Indeed, '[t]he distinction

between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has

never entered runs throughout immigration law.'" Castañon-Nava, 2025 WL

3552514, at *10 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693); see also Leng May Ma v. Barber,

357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) ("[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction

between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission ... and those

who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.").

c. No statutory surplusage

Last, adopting Respondents' reading would render recent congressional

enactments superfluous. Congress passed the Laken Riley Act in 2025 to amend

section 1226(c) and include more classes of aliens who are ineligible for bond under §

1226(a). Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, sec. 236, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3 (2025). One

of those new classes of non-bondable aliens are aliens not admitted into the United

States who were charged with specific crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) (citing id. §

1182(a)(6)(A)). Under the Respondents' expansive interpretation of § 1225, the

amendment would have no purpose. Section 1225(b)(2) would already provide for

mandatory detention of every unadmitted alien, regardless of whether the alien falls

within one of the new classes of non-bondable aliens established by the Laken Riley

Act. This absurd result is one of the reasons why district courts have rejected

Respondents' interpretation. See, e.g., Beltran Barrera, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4

(noting that the Laken Riley Act makes respondents' interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)

implausible because "[w]hen Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends

its amendment to have real and substantial effect.") (quoting Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S.

386, 397 (1995)); Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379 at *8 (explaining that if "Congress

had intended for Section 1225 to govern all noncitizens present in the country, who

had not been admitted, then it would not have recently adopted an amendment to

Section 1226 that prescribes a subset of noncitizens be exempt from the discretionary

bond framework.").

Respondents do not address the Laken Riley Act nor do they demonstrate how

their reading would not render § 1226(c) superfluous.

d. Prior usage and interpretation

Respondents' argument that only § 1225(b)(1)—and not the entirety of §

1225—applies to "arriving aliens" fails when considering the statute's prior usage and

interpretation. For example, 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c)(1) notes that "[e]xcept as otherwise

provided in this chapter, any arriving alien who appears to the inspecting officer to

be inadmissible, and who is placed in removal proceedings pursuant to section

[1229a] shall be detained in accordance with section [1225(b)]."

Furthermore, the government previously applied section 1226(a) to

noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who entered the country without inspection. See

Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 n.6. ("We acknowledge that for years Immigration Judges

have conducted [section 1226(a)] bond hearings for aliens who entered the United

States without inspection."); Martinez, 2025 WL 2084238, at *6. While interpreting

the meaning of a statute belongs to the "independent judgment" of the courts, "'the

longstanding practice of the government'—like any other interpretive aid—'can

inform [a court's] determination of what the law is.'" Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 385-86 (2024) (quoting NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S.

513, 525 (2014)). The Court finds that the government's longstanding practice, under

which § 1225(b)(2)(A) would not have applied to Petitioner's circumstances, is

consistent with the text and statutory scheme. See, e.g., Lopez Benitez, 2025 WL

2371588, at *8 (reaching same conclusion); Alejandro, 2025 WL 2896348, at *8;

(reaching same conclusion); Campos Leon, 2025 WL 2694763, at *4 (reaching same

conclusion).

C. Legality of Detention under § 1226(a)

Respondents argue that even if Petitioner's detention is authorized under §

1226(a) instead of § 1225, it is lawful because Petitioner received a bond hearing

before an IJ. Dkt. 11 at 11. Thus, § 1226(e) precludes the Court's jurisdiction over this

matter because it bars noncitizens from "challeng[ing] a 'discretionary judgment' by

the Attorney General or a 'decision' that the Attorney General has made regarding

his detention or release." Id. (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003)).

Petitioner replies that he is not challenging a denial of bond—he is challenging his

detention without having received a bond hearing. Dkt. 15 at 11.

Respondents' argument fails. First, as Petitioner argues, it is inaccurate to

characterize the IJ's decision that she lacked authority to provide Petitioner with a

bond hearing as a "discretionary judgment" and/or a "decision . . . regarding the

detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole." § 1226(e).

Petitioner filed a motion for a bond hearing, but it was denied on the papers based on

lack of jurisdiction due to Matter of Yajure Hurtado and Matter of Q. Li. This implies

that the IJ refrained from exercising discretion or making a decision about

Petitioner's bond. Indeed, Matter of Yajure Hurtado—the basis for the IJ's decision—

plainly states that IJs "lack authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens

who are present in the United States without admission." 29 I. & N. Dec. at 225. It

comes to this conclusion because the BIA determined that § 1225(b)(2)(A)—not §

1226(a)—applied to the noncitizen appellant. Id. at 220 ("Under the plain reading of

the INA, we affirm the Immigration Judge's determination that he did not have

authority over the bond request because aliens who are present in the United States

without admission are applicants for admission as defined under section 235(b)(2)(A)

of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their

removal proceedings."). This implies that IJs following Matter of Yajure Hurtado

cannot hold bond hearings for noncitizens such as Petitioner.

Furthermore, Respondent does not cite any binding precedent applying §

1226(e) to the rejection of a bond hearing as opposed to a denial of bond following a

hearing. For example, Respondents' case Demore v. Kim held that § 1226(e) did not

deprive courts of habeas jurisdiction over a challenge to detention under § 1226(c)

because the petitioner did not challenge a discretionary judgment or a decision, but

the statutory framework permitting his detention without bail. 530 U.S. at 516–17.

Respondents' other case, Vidal-Martinez v. Prim, 2020 WL 6441341, at *1 (N.D. Ill.

Nov. 3, 2020), is similarly inapposite. In Vidal-Martinez, the petitioner had a bond

hearing wherein the IJ "determined that Vidal-Martinez was a danger to the public

and declined to grant bond." Id. She then held another hearing where she rejected

the petitioner's argument that there were changed circumstances because he was

unconscious in a stationary vehicle during one of his OWI arrests." Id. The court

denied jurisdiction, citing § 1226(e), because "Vidal-Martinez does not challenge the

process he received during the IJ's bond determination, but instead asks the Court to

displace the IJ's determination and declare that he is eligible to be released on bond."

Id. at *3. The Vidal-Martinez court, however, explicitly recognized that § 1226(e) does

not prohibit habeas review or jurisdiction over a petitioner's constitutional challenge

to mandatory detention. Id. (citing Kim, 538 U.S. at 517 and Al-Siddiqi v. Achim, 531

F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 2008)).

In sum, the IJ's decision to refrain from exercising jurisdiction in no way

constitutes a discretionary judgment and thus, § 1226(e) does not preclude

jurisdiction. Furthermore, Respondents have not shown that Petitioner received a

bond hearing wherein an IJ denied bond. This means that his detention pursuant to

§ 1226(a) is currently unlawful.

III. Scope of Relief

Petitioner requests immediate release from custody or, in the alternative, an

individualized custody redetermination hearing. As Respondents concede, the latter

is appropriate here because detention under § 1226(a) is discretionary and the due

process violation arises from Petitioner's re-detention without a bond hearing.

IV. Conclusion

For the above reasons, Respondents' detention of Petitioner without an

individualized bond hearing violates the "laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C. § 2241(c)(8). Thus, Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted

to the extent, that within seven days of this order, Respondents must either:

(1) provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a)

before an IJ; or (2) release Petitioner from custody, under the most recent conditions

of supervision. Respondents must document that they have provided Petitioner with

a bond hearing or release and file notice with the Court within four days of either

action. The clerk is directed to enter final judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 12/30/2025

JAMES R. SWEENEY I, CHIEF JUDGE

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

22

Distribution:

Joshua G Herman

Law Office of Joshua G. Herman

jherman@joshhermanlaw.com

Anthony W. Overholt

Frost Brown Todd LLP

aoverholt@fbtlaw.com

Shelese M. Woods

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE (Indianapolis)

shelese.woods@usdoj.gov