Harris

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RAYCHELLE MARIE HARRIS * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 25-2519

MIKE TREGRE, ET AL. * SECTION “L” (2)

SHOW CAUSE ORDER AND REASONS

On December 17, 2025, Plaintiff Raychelle Marie Harris filed a Complaint and Ex

Parte/Consent Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 1, 2.

I. APPLICABLE LAW

A court may authorize the commencement of a civil action without the prepayment of fees

or costs “by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person]

possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.”1 Whether to permit

or deny an applicant to proceed in forma pauperis is within the sound discretion of the Court.2

Courts should make the assessment of a plaintiff’s financial ability after considering whether

payment of the filing fee would cause an undue financial hardship.3 This analysis entails a review

of plaintiff’s income sources and the “demands on [her] financial resources, including whether

expenses are discretionary or mandatory.”4

There exists no absolute right to proceed in forma pauperis in federal civil matters,

however. Instead, it is a privilege extended to those unable to pay filing fees when it is apparent

1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

2 Prows v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

3 Prows, 842 F.2d at 140 (citing Smith v. Martinez, 706 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1983)).

4 Id.

that the claims do not lack merit on their face.5 Section 1915(e)(2)(B) grants the Court authority

to summarily dismiss in forma pauperis complaints if the asserted claims are frivolous or malicious

or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.6 Indeed, the statute specifically mandates

that the court “must sua sponte dismiss [the case] at any time if it determines that the action is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune.”7 This statutory review mandate applies equally to

prisoner and non-prisoner in forma pauperis cases.8

A claim is “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”9 A claim

“lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if

the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.”10 A court may

not dismiss a claim simply because the facts are “unlikely.”11 A factually frivolous claim alleges

only facts that are “‘clearly baseless,’ . . . are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional’ . . . [or] rise

to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable

facts available to contradict them.”12 A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be

5 See Startti v. United States, 415 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1969); see also Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387

(5th Cir. 1996) (noting that the revocation of the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis is not new), abrogated in

part on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015).

6 Tam Vo v. St. Charles Par., No. 10-4624, 2011 WL 743466, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2011), R & R, Vo v. St.

Charles Par., NO. 10-4624, 2011 WL 740909 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2011).

7 Amrhein v. United States, 740 F. App’x 65, 66 (5th Cir. 2018).

8 James v. Richardson, 344 F. App’x 982, 983 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Section 1915(e)(2)(B) requires dismissal of frivolous

IFP actions even if those actions are brought by non-prisoner plaintiffs.” (citing Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227,

231 (5th Cir. 2002))); Newsome, 301 F.3d at 231 (applying § 1915(e)(2)(B) to a non-prisoner whose complaint was

frivolous).

9 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

10 Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir.

1997)).

11 Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992)).

12 Id.

granted when the factual allegations do not rise above a speculative level, with the assumption that

all factual allegations in the complaint are true, even if doubtful.13

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application (ECF No. 2) sets forth sufficient information to

enable the Court to determine that she is unable to pay fees in this matter, as required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915. Based upon the information provided, Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed in forma

pauperis in this proceeding under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Although the Court has

permitted the plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must determine whether Plaintiff's

complaint satisfies the requirements of the in forma pauperis statute. Accordingly, summons will

not be issued pending completion of this Court’s statutorily-mandated review.

A. Plaintiff’s Claims Cannot Proceed under Heck and/or Wallace

Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to assert a § 1983 claim against St. John the Baptist Parish

Sheriff Mike Tregre, the St. John the Baptist Sheriff’s Office, three Detectives (Mike Shard, Denis

James and Michael D’Amato), the 40th Judicial District Attorney’s Office, District Attorney

Bridget Dinvaut, and several current or former Assistant District Attorneys (Craig Stewart,

Geoffrey Michel, and Eusi Phillips). ECF No. 1 at 2-4. Plaintiff alleges that, on December 15,

2023, a warrant for her arrest was issued without thorough investigation or probable cause, based

on which she was arrested. Id. at 13. She further alleges that charges were filed against her via

Bill of Information, and Defendants publicized the false charges against her. Id. Plaintiff does not

indicate whether the charges remain pending or were dismissed or whether any conviction based

on same was vacated, set aside or otherwise invalidated.

13 Garrett v. Thaler, 560 F. App’x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007)).

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a claim under

§ 1983 is barred if success in the suit would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding

criminal conviction or a plaintiff's present confinement.14 In other words, a claim for damages

that would render a conviction or sentence invalid is not cognizable under § 1983 unless the

conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid or called into question by

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.15 Where a plaintiff has not established that the criminal

proceedings have terminated in his favor, any claim for malicious prosecution, a due process claim,

a Brady violation, or other § 1983 claim challenging the constitutionality of his conviction and

sentence is barred pursuant to Heck. The Heck doctrine applies to civil actions for both monetary

and injunctive or other relief.16

The Supreme Court has established a modified version of the Heck bar in the pretrial

context in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). In Wallace, the Court explained that, if a pretrial

detainee files civil rights claims related to the validity of a pending criminal proceeding, the best

practice is for the district court to stay the civil rights action until the pending criminal case is

resolved to determine the impact of the Heck limitations.17 The Court explained:

If a plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any

other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated

criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with

common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of

a criminal case is ended. If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed

civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the

civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.18

14 512 U.S. at 487.

15 Id. at 486-87.

16 Clarke v. Stadler, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)).

17 549 U.S. at 393-94; see Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (finding stay of pretrial

§ 1983 challenges to an ongoing state criminal proceeding to be the best practice).

18 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94 (citations omitted).

Thus, when a plaintiff’s criminal charges remain pending, a determination of whether Heck bars a

suit is premature. Instead, the court should stay the § 1983 proceedings until the pending criminal

case has run its course, as until that time it may be difficult to determine the relation, if any,

between the two.19

B. Prosecutorial Immunity

Although Heck and Wallace would normally compel a stay of premature civil claims

intertwined with ongoing state criminal proceedings, when the claims are improper or brought

against immune defendants, the Fifth Circuit has held the trial court should initially address

dismissal of those claims.20

Any claims against St. John the Baptist District Attorney Bridget Dinvaut is equivalent to

suit against the parish.21 “[M]unicipalities cannot be held liable for constitutional torts under

§ 1983 ‘on a respondeat superior theory,’ but they can be held liable ‘when execution of a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts

may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.’”22 Thus, to state a non-frivolous

claim against a district attorney in an official capacity, the plaintiff must establish that the named

defendant is a final parish policymaker and identify the parish policy or custom which allegedly

19 Mackey, 47 F.3d at 746; Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94 (endorsing stay of civil proceedings until completion of

criminal action where Heck may bar damages claims); Hopkins v. Ogg, 783 F. App’x 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2019) (“If a

pretrial detainee brings claims that may ultimately be barred by Heck, the best practice is for the district court to stay

the proceedings until the pending criminal case is resolved.”).

20 See Busick v. City of Madison, 90 F. App’x 713, 714 (5th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the district court should

consider grounds for dismissal other than Heck); see also Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (per

curiam) (recognizing immunity must be considered as a threshold matter prior to applying Heck).

21 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59-60 (2011) (a district attorney in Louisiana is a parish official and claims

against Orleans Parish District Attorney in an official capacity are addressed under the standards of Monell); Burge v.

Par. of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 470 (5th Cir. 1999) (“For purposes of ‘official capacity’ suits under § 1983, the

district attorney's office resembles other local government entities.”); cf. Bean v. Pittman, No. 14-2210, 2015 WL

350284, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2015) (Vance, J. adopting Report and Recommendation of Knowles, M.J.) (official

capacity suit against Jefferson Parish sheriff’s deputies is suit against the parish through the sheriff’s office).

22 Burge, 187 F.3d at 470-71 (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Sec. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694

(1978)).

caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights.23

Moreover, a “prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from personal liability for damages

under section 1983 for actions ‘initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case’ and

those ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’”24 Furthermore, “[a]

prosecutor’s absolute immunity will not be stripped because of action that was in error, was done

maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he

has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”25 The prosecutorial immunity also applies during

“actions apart from the courtroom.”26

Prosecutorial immunity would apply to shield four defendants: District Attorney Bridget

Dinvaut, and current or former Assistant District Attorneys Craig Stewart, Geoffrey Michel, and

Eusi Phillips.

III. CONCLUSION

Although Plaintiff has sufficiently established her inability to pay fees under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1)(2), her Complaint appears to be precluded by Heck and/or Wallace. Even apart from

Heck/Wallace, however, claims against the prosecutors are barred by prosecutorial immunity,

rendering the claims against District Attorney Bridget Dinvaut, and current or former Assistant

District Attorneys Craig Stewart, Geoffrey Michel, and Eusi Phillips subject to summary dismissal

under § 1915(e)(2).

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

23 Rinker v. New Orleans Dist. Att’y, No. 10-0810, 2010 WL 2773236, at *4-5 (E.D. La. June 15, 2010) (citing Murray

v. Town of Mansura, 76 F. App’x 547, 549 (5th Cir. 2003); Treece v. Louisiana, 74 F. App’x 315, 316 (5th Cir. 2003)),

R.&R. adopted, 2010 WL 2773383 (E.D. La. July 12, 2010).

24 Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31(1976));

accord. Quinn v. Roach, 326 F. App’x 280, 292 (5th Cir. 2009).

25 Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)), abrogated in part on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003);

Champluvier v. Couch, 309 F. App’x 902, 903 (5th Cir. 2009).

26 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Proceed /n Forma Pauperis

(ECF No. 2) is GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk withhold issuance of summons at this time

pending completion of the statutorily mandated review;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the reasons set forth above, on or before

Wednesday, February 4, 2026, Plaintiff Raychelle Marie Harris show cause why her Complaint

should not be stayed under Wallace or summarily dismissed with prejudice to being asserted

again until the conditions in Heck are met; or summarily dismissed as frivolous and/or failure to

state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in response to this show cause order, Plaintiff shall file

a response containing a written statement of her position setting forth the status of the criminal

charges referenced in her complaint and the specific facts supporting her cause(s) of action against

each named defendant. PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO RESPOND IN WRITING AS

DIRECTED HEREIN MAY RESULT IN THE DISMISSAL OF HER COMPLAINT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there will be no oral hearing on February 4, 2026, and

the matter will be deemed under advisement on the briefs on that date.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 30th day of December, 2025.

Corrnlltiy Lunau

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE