Simpson

□ Southern District of Texas

. ENTERED

December 30, 2025

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

HENRY SIMPSON, §

(TDCJ #00899703), §

— §

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. . § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-25-4488

§

KOLTON STOKER, et al., §

§

§

Defendants. §

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO CERTIFY A CLASS

The plaintiff, Henry Simpson (TDCJ #00899703), is a state inmate currently

incarcerated at the Pack I Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—

Correctional Institutions Division. Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, he filed

a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that four employees of the University

of Texas Medical Branch violated his civil rights by denying him certain medical

care and by taking improper co-payments from his inmate account. (Dkt. 1). On □

December 1, 2025, the Court ordered Simpson to provide a more definite statement

of his claims. (Dkt. 9). Simpson has not yet complied with that order. Instead, he

has now filed a motion to certify his action as a class action. (Dkt. 10). This motion

is denied for the reasons explained below.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 22, 2015, Simpson filed a complaint under § 1983, seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief based on alleged violations of his civil rights. (Dkt.

1). Because the complaint was not filed on the approved form for prisoner civil-

rights complaints, the Court ordered Simpson to file an amended complaint on the

proper form. (Dkt. 6). Simpson filed his amended complaint on October 9, 2025.

(Dkt. 8).

In his amended complaint, Simpson sues TDCJ employees Kolton Stoker,

Susan Odak, L. Tanner-Harrell, and E. Maxxie, all of whom he alleges work at the

Pack I Unit. (/d. at 3). Simpson alleges that in April 2025, his prescribed medical

“rollator” broke. (Id. at 4). He alleges that he was prescribed a new rollator and was

issued a medical pass to be allowed to have it in his possession. (Id). Simpson

alleges that he “re-ordered the exact same one as previously allowed,” but

defendants Odak, Tanner-Harrell, and Maxxie each refused to allow him to have the

rollator when it arrived. (/d.). He alleges that the rollator was prescribed by “several

expert doctors” and that Odak, Tanner-Harrell, and Maxxie are retaliating against

him and denying him his Eighth Amendment right to medical care by refusing to

allow him to have and use the prescribed rollator. (/d.).

In what appears to be a second claim, Simpson alleges that defendant Stoker

has engaged in a scheme to fraudulently collect co-payments for medical visits that

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should be exempt from payment under TDCJ policies. (/d.). He alleges that

defendants Odak, Tanner-Harrell, and Maxxie have assisted Stoker with perpetrating

this allegedly fraudulent scheme. (/d.). Simpson admits that at least some of the

allegedly improper co-payments were later refunded to him after an investigation.

(Id.). He contends that these actions violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free

from illegal seizures. (/d.).

As relief, Simpson asks the Court to order that he be given his prescribed

medical rollator, along with compensation and punitive damages. (/d.). He does not

specify the relief he would like for the allegedly improper co-payments.

Simpson’s action is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),

which requires the Court to screen complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief from

the government as soon as feasible after docketing and dismiss any claims that are

frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or

that seek money damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (providing for the screening of suits

filed by persons proceeding in forma pauperis). To facilitate this screening, the

Court ordered Simpson to file a more definite statement of his claims. (Dkt. 9). This

Order included specific questions intended to clarify the factual basis for Simpson’s

claims against each defendant. (d.). Simpson’s response is not yet due, so the

required screening is not yet complete.

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Simpson has now filed a motion asking the Court to certify this case as a class

action. (Dkt. 10). In his motion, Simpson states that inmates Perry Patterson and

Michael Hernandez have each filed civil-rights actions in the Southern District of

Texas alleging claims against defendant Stoker for fraudulently collecting co-

payments for medical visits. (Jd. at 1). Simpson alleges that the funds are being

taken despite notifications to stop, that the funds are being refunded only after

investigations that show fraud, and that these facts show that Stoker is deliberately

violating TDCJ policy. Ud.). Simpson alleges that his claims, along with those of

Patterson and Hernandez, raise common questions of law and fact that should be

considered together. (/d.). Simpson also alleges that “multiple other prisoners” have

the same claim and will seek to join the class action. (Id. at 2). He asks the Court

to certify a class action as to his claims against only defendant Stoker and only as to

the “illegally seized co-pay fees.” (/d.).

Il. DISCUSSION

“The class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted

by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.

Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700—

01 (1979)) (cleaned up). To obtain class certification, a litigant must demonstrate

that:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is □

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impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of

the claims or defenses of the class; and

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class. □

FED R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349 (listing the four threshold

requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of

representation for purposes of class certification under Rule 23(a)). In addition, the

proposed class must satisfy at least one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b).

See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613-14 (1997). The party |

seeking class certification has the burden to establish that all the required elements

are satisfied. See Gene & Gene LLC v. BioPay LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 325 (5th Cir.

2008); O’Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 319 F.3d 732, 737-38 (Sth Cir.

2003). If any one of the requirements is not satisfied, denial of the motion for class

certification is warranted.

Even if the Court assumes that Simpson could meet the first three threshold

requirements for class certification, he cannot meet the fourth requirement of

adequacy of representation. To meet the adequacy requirement “the court must find

that class representatives, their counsel, and the relationship between the two are

adequate to protect the interests of absent class members.” Unger v. Amedisys Inc.,

401 F.3d 316, 321 (Sth Cir. 2005) (citing Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 562

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(5th Cir. 2002)). To adequately protect the interests of others, the class

representatives must “possess a sufficient level of knowledge and understanding to

be capable of ‘controlling’ or ‘prosecuting’ the litigation.” Berger v. Compaq

Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 482-83 (5th Cir. 2001). Because of this requirement,

courts have uniformly prohibited pro se litigants from acting as class representatives

because “the competence of a layman representing himself [is] clearly too limited to

allow him to risk the rights of others.” Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407

(4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); see also DeBrew v. Atwood. 792 F.3d 118, 132 (D.C.

Cir. 2015) (“[A] pro se litigant who is not trained as a lawyer is simply not an

adequate class representative.”); Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d

1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he competence of a layman is ‘clearly too limited

to allow him to risk the rights of others.’”); Aiello v. Collier, No. 2:21-cv-67, 2021

WL 3176008, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2021) (denying a motion for class

certification filed by apro se prisoner because he could not show that he could “fairly

and adequately protect the interest of the class”); 7A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur

R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1769.1 & n.13 (3d ed.) (“[C]lass

representatives cannot appear pro se.”) (collecting cases). It is therefore “plain error

to permit [an] imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent his

fellow inmates in a class action.” Oxendine, 509 F.2d at 1407.

In addition, even if meen had requested the appointment of counsel in his

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motion, the Court would deny such a request for two reasons. First, while Rule 23(g)

requires a court certifying a class to appoint class counsel, “the purpose of Rule 23(g)

is not to enable pro se plaintiffs to obtain recruited counsel in conjunction with class

certification; the purpose of the rule is to ensure that the proposed class counsel is

adequate.” Howard v. Pollard, 814 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)

(emphasis in original). Rule 23(g) is therefore not a means through which a pro se

litigant may obtain appointed counsel to represent a proposed class. Id.

Second, Simpson has not established that he is entitled to the appointment of

counsel on his own behalf. There is no constitutional right to the appointment of

counsel in civil rights cases. See Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 126 (Sth Cir.

2007). A court is not required to appoint counsel unless the case presents exceptional

circumstances. See Naranjo v. Thompson, 809 F.3d 793, 803 (Sth Cir. 2015). To

determine whether exceptional circumstances exist, the court considers (1) the

complexity of the case; 2) whether the litigant can adequately present his case;

(3) whether the litigant can adequately investigate his case; (4) whether skill in the

presentation of evidence and in cross examination will be necessary; and (5) whether

appointing counsel will aid in the efficient and equitable disposition of the case. See

Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (Sth Cir. 1982).

The pleadings currently before the Court show that the legal issues in

Simpson’s case are not complex. His filings are generally neatly printed or typed

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and show that he is aware of the relevant facts and understands the relevant legal

issues. He has ably represented his own interests in the proceedings to date, and his □

‘motion does not identify any exceptional circumstance that would require the

appointment of counsel at this time. Had Simpson affirmatively requested the

appointment of counsel to pursue this action as a class action, his request would have

been denied.

Because Simpson cannot properly serve as an adequate representative party

in a class action, he has not satisfied the required threshold elements for class

certification. His motion to certify this action as a class action is denied.

Il. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:

1. Simpson’s motion to certify a class, (Dkt. 10), is DENIED.

2. Simpson is reminded that his response to the Order for More Definite

Statement must be filed by December 31, 2025, or his action may be dismissed

without further notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

The Clerk will send a copy of this order to Simpson.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas on Bz 30 , 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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