Toler

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

ZACHARY L. TOLER, CASE NO. 3:25 CV 2266

Plaintiff, JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

v.

JUDGE MARY PAT ZITTER, et al., MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Zachary Toler filed this action pro se to contest child custody orders entered in

the Mercer County Common Pleas Court from 2013 to 2025. See Doc. 4. He names as Defendants

Mercer County, Mercer County Common Pleas Juvenile Court Judge Mary Pat Zitter and

Magistrate Richard M. Delzeith, court-appointed Guardian Ad Litem Molli A. Schleucher, and

Brittany Schwartz, the mother of his minor child. Id. at 2. Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for conspiracy to violate civil rights, denial of procedural and substantive due process, and

denial of equal protection. Id. at 4-5. He also asserts a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Id.at 5. Plaintiff lodges these allegations against various Defendants in their individual capacities,

as well as the County as such by way of a Monell claim. Id. at 2, 5. Plaintiff seeks monetary

damages, an order declaring the state court orders to be void, an order granting him immediate

custody of his minor child, and an order restraining the state court from issuing any other orders

that he believes will violate his rights. Id. at 5-6.

Plaintiff also submitted a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 1). He used an

outdated form which the Court no longer accepts because it does not provide sufficient information

on income, assets, and debt. Generally, the Court would order Plaintiff to amend his Motion by

completing and filing the current form; however, because this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to review, reverse, and replace state court child custody orders, any amendment would

be futile. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s request to proceed In Forma Pauperis, but, for the reasons

set forth below, will dismiss his Complaint, with prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

In June 2013, Plaintiff filed an action in the Mercer County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile

Division seeking to establish paternity and parenting time with his minor biological daughter.

(Doc. 4, at 3). He contends Defendants have denied his rights through perjury, evidence

suppression, and “procedural fraud.” Id. He claims he requested medical records in 2013, but they

were never provided. Id. He asserts the child’s mother began to make exaggerated medical claims

about the child, including undocumented medical issues, allergies, acid reflux, asthma, and feeding

difficulties. Id. He contends his attorney withdrew in 2014, claiming a “possible threat.” Id.

Another attorney withdrew on the day of trial after demanding a $2,000 payment, leaving him

without counsel on the day of the hearing. Id.

In 2015, the court ordered psychological testing. Id. After three facilities refused to do the

testing, a fourth accepted. Id. He contends the evaluator’s report claimed to review 77 pages of

evidence, including pictures of bruising, but, despite requests, the documents were never sent to

Plaintiff. Id. He claims this enabled supervised visitation restrictions to be imposed on him. Id.

Plaintiff further alleges the child support calculations were fraudulent, resulting in overpayments.

Id. Finally, he contends he was denied discovery and medical records. Id. at 4.

Plaintiff claims that in August 2025, he discovered a large cash transaction had taken place

with an unknown individual at a secluded location with the child present. Id. Plaintiff does not

explain what type of transaction this was. See id. He concludes that it constituted child

endangerment and prompted him to file an emergency Motion for Custody. Id. He claims the court

would not allow the child to testify during an ex parte hearing and denied his request for emergency

custody. Id. He states, “[t]he same unsubstantiated medical allegations from 2013 were recycled

in 2025, proving the systematic nature of the fraud.” Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365

(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is required to dismiss

an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted or lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989);

Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact

when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are

clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks

“plausibility in th[e] complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading

must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). The factual

allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level

on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.

The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading

that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561

(6th Cir. 1998).

DISCUSSION

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

As an initial matter, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review, reverse, or void

state court judgments. United States District Courts do not have jurisdiction to overturn state court

decisions even if the request to reverse the state court judgment is based on an allegation that the

state court’s action was unconstitutional. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.

280, 292 (2005). Federal appellate review of state court judgments can only occur in the United

States Supreme Court after the Court grants a petition for a writ of certiorari. Id. Under this

principle, generally referred to as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party losing his case in state

court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in

a United States District Court based on the party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates his

federal rights. Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298-99 (6th Cir. 2012).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on two United States Supreme Court decisions

interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).1 See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) provides:

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a

decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari

where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or

where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its

being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where

any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the

462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). This provision “is designed to

prohibit end-runs around state court judgments” by requiring litigants seeking review of that

judgment to first directly appeal to the state high court and then petition for a writ of certiorari

with the United States Supreme Court. Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Children & Family

Servs., 606 F.3d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 2010). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is based on the

negative inference that, if appellate court review of state judgments is vested in the Supreme Court,

then it follows that such review may not occur in the lower federal courts.” Id. at 309.

Rooker-Feldman applies narrowly. It does not bar federal jurisdiction “simply because a

party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state court.” Exxon Mobil

Corp., 544 U.S. at 293. It also does not address potential conflicts between federal and state court

orders, which fall within the parameters of the doctrines of comity, abstention, and preclusion.

Berry, 688 F.3d at 299. Instead, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only where a party losing

his or her case in state court initiates an action in federal district court complaining of injury caused

by a state court judgment itself and seeks review and rejection of that judgment. Berry, 688 F.3d

at 298-99; In re Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). Stated differently, Rooker-Feldman does

not deny a federal court jurisdiction over a federal claim independent of a state-court judgment.

Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 293.

There is a fine line between review of a state court judgment itself and adjudicating an

independent federal claim raising similar issues as those resolved in such judgments. To determine

whether Rooker-Feldman bars a claim, the Court must look to the “source of the injury the plaintiff

alleges in the federal complaint.” McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006);

Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority

exercised under, the United States.

see also Berry, 688 F.3d at 299; Kovacic, 606 F.3d at 310. If the source of the plaintiff’s injury is

the state court judgment itself, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the federal claim.

McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. “If there is some other source of injury, such as a third party’s

actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.” Id.; see Lawrence, 531 F.3d at 368-69. In

conducting this inquiry, the Court also considers the plaintiff’s requested relief. Evans v. Cordray,

424 F. App’x 537, 540-41, (6th Cir. 2011).

Here, Plaintiff asks this Court to void the state court orders and restrain the state court from

enforcing those orders. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to conduct that review or grant

that relief.

Furthermore, this Court cannot conduct an independent evaluation and issue its own child

custody order. First, child custody decisions are governed by state law, not federal law. This Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide child custody issues.

Res Judicata

Moreover, the doctrine of res judicata bars this Court from entertaining and deciding issues

that were already decided by the state court. The term “res judicata” literally means “a thing

adjudicated,” and is defined as “[a]n issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision.”

Res judicata, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The doctrine of res judicata bars duplicative

litigation based on the same event or events. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979);

Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). When one court has already

resolved the merits of a case, another court will not revisit them. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153. The

doctrine of res judicata therefore precludes a party from bringing a subsequent lawsuit on the same

claim or from raising a new defense to defeat the prior judgment. Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch,

Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 918 F.2d 658, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1990). It bars relitigation of every

issue actually brought before the Court and every issue or defense that should have been raised in

the previous action. Id. Furthermore, res judicata bars a plaintiff from relitigating in federal court

claims and issues that were previously decided by a state court. Bragg v. Flint Bd. of Educ., 570

F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2009).

The doctrine of res judicata consists of two separate preclusion concepts, issue preclusion

and claim preclusion. Heyliger v. State Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Tenn., 126 F.3d 849, 852 (6th

Cir. 1997). Claim preclusion generally refers to the effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing

successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same

issues as the earlier suit. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748-49 (2001). Issue preclusion

generally refers to the effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of an issue of

fact or law actually litigated, resolved in a valid court determination, and essential to the prior

judgment, whether or not the issue arises as part of a separate claim. Id.

This case is barred by issue preclusion. The issues of child custody, child support, and

parenting time were decided by the Mercer County Juvenile Court. This Court cannot revisit those

issues and render decisions that may conflict with the state court orders. Res judicata bars

relitigation of these issues in federal court.

Not Subject to Suit

Even if this pleading were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata,

this action could not proceed against these Defendants because none of them is subject to suit.

Judge Zitter and Magistrate Delzeith are absolutely immune from suits for damages that are based

on decisions they made in the course of presiding over a case. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9

(1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Ms. Schleucher, as the court-

appointed Guardian Ad Litem, is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for actions within the scope

of her role as “advocate for the child in judicial proceedings.” Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456,

1458 (6th Cir. 1984); Arsan v. Keller, 784 F. App’x 900, 908 (6th Cir. 2019). Ms. Schwartz is not

subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a private party. That statute only applies to individuals

acting under color of state law. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). Mercer County

cannot be held liable for the decisions of judges presiding over cases; § 1983 does not permit a

plaintiff to sue a local government entity on the theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. New York

City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692-94 (1978). A plaintiff may only hold a local

government entity liable under § 1983 for the entity’s own wrongdoing. Id. There is no suggestion

in the Complaint of any action taken by Mercer County apart from the decisions of judges in its

domestic relations or juvenile court.

Conspiracy Claim

Finally, Plaintiff fails to state a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. To state such a

claim, Plaintiff must allege facts supporting the assertion that Defendants (1) conspired for the

purpose of depriving him of the equal protection of the laws, and (2) committed an act in

furtherance of such conspiracy motivated by racial or other class-based invidiously discriminatory

animus. Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1050 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Vakilian v. Shaw, 335

F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S.

825, 828-29 (1983)). The acts that allegedly “deprived the plaintiff of equal protection must be the

result of class-based discrimination.” Vakilian, 335 F.3d at 518-19. Conspiracy claims must be

pled with specificity. A plaintiff fails to adequately state a claim for relief if his allegations are

premised upon mere conclusions and opinions. Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10,

12 (6th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff must make sufficient factual allegations to link two alleged

conspirators in the conspiracy and to establish the requisite “meeting of the minds” essential to the

existence of the conspiracy. McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a

plaintiff failed to state a claim for conspiracy pursuant to § 1985 for failure to allege a meeting of

the minds).

Here, Plaintiff merely recites the elements of the cause of action and concludes that there

was a conspiracy motivated by gender discrimination. There are no facts in the Complaint which

explain or support that conclusion. This claim is stated solely as a legal conclusion and is

insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 1) be, and the

same hereby is, GRANTED; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that this action be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); and the Court

FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this

decision could not be taken in good faith.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: December 29, 2025