Sadler

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LARRY D. JOHNSON, M22661, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) Case No. 24-cv-1385-DWD

BRADLEY SADLER, )

JARED PHILLIPS, )

AARON TAYLOR, )

TROY SLINKARD, )

TYLER ROBINSON, )

TYLER CHOATE, )

ANTHONY WILLS, )

MATTHEW DULANEY, )

JANE DOE, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Larry Johnson, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) currently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center, brings this action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights at Menard

Correctional Center (Menard). Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants used excessive force

against him and that Defendant Wills failed to take action in response to grievances about

the incident. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 51) on the issue of

whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, as

required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Plaintiff timely replied

(Doc. 52) and the matter is now ripe for consideration. For reasons explained,

Defendants’ Motion is denied, and this case may proceed to merits discovery.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit by filing a Complaint on May 24, 2024, and by filing

an amended complaint (Doc. 7) on June 6, 2024. Plaintiff alleged that on October 10, 2023,

Defendants Sadler, Phillips, Taylor, Slinkard, and Robinson used excessive force against

him while he was on the prison yard. (Doc. 7 at 10). He specifically alleges that they

sprayed him with insprajet and mace, shot him with pepper balls, and otherwise

physically battered him. During the fracas, Defendant Dulaney grabbed and squeezed

his genitals and also tore out some of his dreadlocks. (Doc. 7 at 11). Plaintiff was escorted

to a room where he was cuffed to a stool that was attached to the floor. Defendant Sadler

then entered the room and struck Plaintiff’s face with a closed fist. Defendant Choate

also entered and sprayed Plaintiff’s face with mace while Plaintiff was restrained. (Doc.

7 at 11). Plaintiff alleges that Jane Doe nurse entered the room to check his blood pressure

but otherwise refused care despite his pleas for help and his visible injuries. (Doc. 7 at

11).

Plaintiff alleges he filed multiple grievances about the incident and his desire for

medical care, but as of April of 2024 he had not received the care he desired. He argues

that Defendant Wills must have been aware of his condition because some of the

grievances were submitted as emergencies and Wills was a signatory on those grievances.

Plaintiff also contacted the Governor’s Office about the lack of a response from the prison,

and in December of 2023 he got a responsive memorandum from Wills indicating an

investigation was ongoing and that Plaintiff would be notified of the outcome. (Doc. 7 at

12, 30). Plaintiff’s complaint included additional allegations that were severed into

separate lawsuits because they concerned temporally distinct incidents.

The Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed on the following claims:

Claim 1: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against

Defendants Sadler, Dulaney, Phillips, Taylor, Slinkard,

Robinson, and Choate, for their conduct on October 10,

2023;

Claim 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Jane Doe 1 for denying Plaintiff medical care on October 10,

2023;

Claim 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Wills for failing to thoroughly investigate

Plaintiff’s multiple grievances;

(Doc. 12).

The parties undertook discovery on the exhaustion of administrative remedies,

and in doing so they have identified one grievance relevant to the exact claims in this

case. They have also identified other grievances that are tangentially related. Plaintiff

has submitted a response accompanied by relevant exhibits that detail his efforts to

follow the status of his grievances.

FINDINGS OF FACT

On October 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed grievance K4-1023-0914 as an emergency, but

on October 25, 2023, Warden Wills deemed the grievance a non-emergency. The

grievance alleges:

I am grieving the fact that on 10/10/23 at around 2pm on the restrictive

housing yard #5 I was extracted by tactical team members by excessive

force. During the extraction I was punched, kicked, sprayed with multiple

cans of mace, the insprajet and shot with multiple pepper balls. Once I was

detained and in cuffs on the ground the tact team members continued to

punch and kick me in my face, head, and body. One tact team member even

intentionally pulled some of my dreadlocks out of the back of my head and

told he me is keeping them as a souvenir and trophy. Once removed from

the yard the officers escorting me inside of the North 2 building’s infirmary

the officers deliberately ran my head into the gate opening before going

inside the building. Once inside the infirmary I was taken to the interview

room to the furthest left and cuffed to the floor and ordered to sit there and

don’t move. Then Lt. B. Sadler entered the room in a rage and hit me in the

face while I was cuffed, shackled, and chained to the floor. Then he left and

a few minutes later another tact team member came and stood at the door

of the interview room I was in and sprayed mace into my face while I was

cuffed, shackled and chained to the floor.

(Doc. 51-7 at 3-4). The grievance was stamped as received for first level of review on

October 26, 2023, and for second level review on November 13, 2023. (Doc. 51-7 at 3). On

July 1, 2024,1 a grievance officer recommended that the grievance be deemed resolved

because the matter was pending investigation by internal affairs. (Doc. 51-7 at 1). On

July 9, 2024, Warden Kevin Reichert concurred with the grievance officer’s response. The

Administrative Review Board (ARB) received Plaintiff’s grievance on July 17, 2024, and

a member of the ARB declared that on July 31, 2024, the grievance was still awaiting a

disposition from the ARB. (Decl. of Paige Long, Doc. 51-6 at p.4 ¶ 11). In response to the

Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff supplied a final disposition from the ARB for

grievance K4-1023-0914, dated August 6, 2024. The disposition indicated the ARB

deemed the matter “Resolved. The investigation into this matter is ongoing.” (Doc. 52 at

26).

1 The grievance officer’s response had a “date of review” of April 29, 2024, but the grievance officer’s electronic

signature on the recommendation line was dated July 1, 2024. (Doc. 51-7 at 1).

In relation to grievance K4-1023-0914, Plaintiff also tendered handwritten request

slips that he submitted at the prison inquiring about the status of the grievance. On April

18, 2024, he was informed that grievance K4-1023-0914 had been answered on November

1, 2023, and returned to him. (Doc. 52 at 22). When he inquired a second time, on April

25, 2024, he was informed that the grievance was pending second level review. (Doc. 52

at 23). These queries and the responses from the prison are also cataloged in Plaintiff’s

CHAMPS counseling summary. (Doc. 51-4 at 4). Plaintiff also tendered copies of

correspondence from the Governor’s Office from December 4, 2023, acknowledging

receipt of correspondence from him, and a December 8, 2023, memorandum from

Defendant Wills indicating he had received correspondence from the Governor’s Office

and that an investigation into Plaintiff’s allegations was ongoing and that he would be

notified of the decision. (Doc. 52 at 42-43).

Aside from grievance K4-1023-0914, Plaintiff submitted two additional grievances

on October 18, 2023—grievances K4-1023-0906 and K4-1023-0916. Grievance K4-1023-

0916 concerned Defendant Dulaney’s alleged conduct of grabbing and squeezing

Plaintiff’s genitals during the yard incident. (Doc. 52 at 38-39). On October 25, 2023,

Defendant Wills expedited the grievance for emergency processing, and on October 26,

2023, a grievance officer recommended the grievance be deemed resolved because it was

forwarded to internal affairs for investigation and PREA protocol was initiated. (Doc. 52

at 36. Wills concurred with this recommendation on November 3, 2023. (Doc. 52 at 36).

On March 19, 2024, the ARB denied grievance K4-1023-0916 because the internal affairs

investigation concluded the allegations were unsubstantiated. (Doc. 52 at 41). Plaintiff

also included a March 25, 2024, memorandum from Warden Wills informing him that his

allegations were found to be unsubstantiated and that he could grieve that finding if he

wished to challenge it. (Doc. 52 at 44).

By contrast, grievance K4-1023-0906 was deemed a non-emergency and was

forwarded to the counselor for a first level response on October 26, 2023. (Doc. 52 at 35).

This grievance described Plaintiff’s injuries from the battering and his desire for care.

(Doc. 52 at 54-55). In the grievance, Plaintiff clearly described the interaction with Jane

Doe 1 whom he alleges took his blood pressure but otherwise refused treatment despite

his visible injuries. Plaintiff explained that he was unable to get Jane Doe 1’s name

because she refused to give it to him, and he could not see due to the mace in his eyes.

He also explained he is legally blind without special contact lenses, and the mace

impaired the function of his contacts. (Doc. 52 at 55). On February 5, 2025, a memo was

sent from the nursing supervisor to the counselor/grievance office concerning grievance

K4-1023-0906. The nursing supervisor indicated she was writing in response to the

grievance transmitted to her office for a response on November 1, 2023. She indicated

that Plaintiff was seen for chemical exposure on October 10, 2023, and for right side pain

on November 24, 2023. She noted he was seen by the doctor on July 1, 2024. In sum, she

indicated that Plaintiff’s medical needs had been addressed as of the writing of the memo

on February 5, 2025. (Doc. 52 at 56). The Menard grievance log submitted by the

Defendants reflects that grievance K4-1023-0906 still had not yet been returned by the

grievance office to Plaintiff, and the log contains no final disposition for the grievance.

(Doc. 51-2 at 2). This is in contrast to grievances K4-1023-0914 and K4-1023-0916, which

both show on the log dates for processing at all levels of Menard review, as well as final

dispositions. (Doc. 51-2 at 2). The original copy of grievance K4-1023-0906 indicates that

the counselor signed off on the grievance for it to be returned to Plaintiff on February 11,

2025. (Doc. 52 at 54).

Plaintiff also included a July 26, 2024, memorandum from Defendant Wills

indicating that he was in receipt of concerns Plaintiff sent to the Governor’s office about

grievance processing. (Doc. 52 at 69). In the memo, Wills indicated that grievance records

showed Plaintiff’s grievances had been received and were being processed. Plaintiff was

advised to send written correspondence to the grievance office if he wished to know the

status of a specific grievance. (Doc. 52 at 69).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Legal Standards

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In

determining a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most

favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex

Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Courts generally cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment. See

Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is

not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether

there is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

However, when the motion for summary judgment pertains to a prisoner’s failure to

exhaust administrative remedies, the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to conduct an

evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a prisoner’s efforts to

exhaust. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008).2 After hearing evidence,

finding facts, and determining credibility, the court must decide whether to allow the

claim to proceed or to dismiss it for failure to exhaust. Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004

(7th Cir. 2018). The court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing if there is no

genuine dispute of material fact, and the determination is purely legal. See e.g., Walker v.

Harris, 2021 WL 3287832 * 1 (S.D. Ill 2021); Miller v. Wexford Health Source, Inc., 2017 WL

951399 *2 (S.D. Ill. 2017).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner may not bring

a lawsuit about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available

administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey, 544 F.3d at 740. “The exhaustion

requirement is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear the burden of proving.”

Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011). For a prisoner to properly exhaust his

administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the place, and

at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022,

1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each step within the

administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Id. at 1024.

2 The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460 (2025), held that if the facts

necessary for a ruling on exhaustion are intertwined with the merits of the claim, a jury trial is required.

But the Perttu Court did not go so far as to extend the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial to all

exhaustion disputes. In this case, there is no intertwinement of the facts, so Perttu does not require that this

issue be determined at a jury trial.

There are no exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, however, the Supreme

Court and Seventh Circuit have emphasized in recent years that the exhaustion process

must be available. An ”available” remedy is one that is “capable of use for the

accomplishment of a purpose” and “is accessible or may be obtained.” Crouch v. Brown,

27 F.4th 1315, 1320 (7th Cir. 2022) citing Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016). If

availability is at issue, the Court must resolve that issue before proceeding to the merits

of the exhaustion dispute. Wallace v. Baldwin, 55 F.4th 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2022) (the district

court must first consider the threshold question of if exhaustion was available). There

are three circumstances that might support a finding of unavailability: (1) a process may

be unavailable if it is so opaque that it becomes incapable of use; (2) a process may be

unavailable if administrators thwart an inmate from using it via machination,

misrepresentation, or intimidation; or, (3) a process may be unavailable if it operates as a

“dead end” with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief for

aggrieved inmates. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016).

In Dole and Gooch, the Seventh Circuit considered situations where a process was

unavailable due to acts or misrepresentations by prison administrators. See Dole v.

Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that an inmate did all he could to

exhaust a grievance when he placed the appeal in his cell bars for mailing, but it got lost

and he had no direction on what to do about a lost grievance); Gooch v. Young, 24 F.4th

624 (7th Cir. 2022) (finding the grievance process was unavailable where prison staff

threatened Plaintiff and refused to give him the appropriate grievance form). In

Hernandez, Smallwood, and Reid the Seventh Circuit considered instances when a process

was unavailable due to complexity or an inmate’s inability to use the process. See

Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 842-43 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding that the jail grievance

process was unavailable to an inmate who was hospitalized after excessive force and had

no information about how to file a grievance); Smallwood v. Williams, 59 F.4th 306 (7th Cir.

2023) (discussing an inmate’s ability to understand the process in light of his IQ, as well

as the possibility the inmate was given misinformation about the process); Reid v. Balota,

962 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding the process unavailable where mixed messages

about how to proceed made the process obscure). Finally, in Wallace v. Baldwin, the

Seventh Circuit recently remanded a case to the district court for a more thorough

consideration of the availability in light of the inmates’ allegations that the process was a

dead end for their particular issue. 55 F.4th 535 (7th Cir. 2022) (finding that the district

court should have considered the inmates’ evidence that other inmates got no response

to grievances about double-celling, as well as the evidence the prison may simply reject

a double-celling grievance as lacking merit).

As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the grievance process

outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017).

An inmate may request that a grievance be handled as an emergency by forwarding it

directly to the CAO. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840. If it is determined that there exists a

substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious or irreparable harm, the

grievance is handled on an emergency basis, which allows for expedited processing of

the grievance. Id.

If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he can file an appeal with

the IDOC Director through the Administrative Review Board (ARB). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE

§ 504.850(a). The ARB must receive the appeal within 30 days of the date of the CAO’s

decision. Id. The inmate must attach copies of the responses from the grievance officer

and CAO to his appeal. Id. If an inmate is appealing a grievance that the CAO

determined to be of an emergency nature, then the ARB shall expedite processing of the

appeal. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(f).

B. Analysis

The Defendants contend that Plaintiff simply sued before exhausting his remedies,

while Plaintiff counters that the grievance process was not available. Specifically,

Plaintiff contends he did not know what to do about a grievance that was not garnering

a response, he feared his grievance was lost, and he believed the response would be a

dead end based on a similar response he got to a grievance filed the same day. The Court

must resolve the issue of availability before considering the substantive dispute about

exhaustion.

The Defendants contend that the grievance process was available by reference to

other grievances that Plaintiff filed and fully exhausted during the relevant timeframe.

They also provided evidence that in April of 2024, Plaintiff inquired multiple times about

the status of grievance K4-1023-0914, and on both occasions he was provided a timely

update indicating the grievance was still being processed.

By contrast, Plaintiff contends he encountered delayed response times on multiple

occasions with relation to the excessive force incident that is the subject of this lawsuit,

and he also received responses he perceived as indications the grievance process was a

dead end. First, as to delayed grievance processing, Plaintiff’s exhibits demonstrate that

he filed at least six grievances about the alleged incident of excessive force. Grievances

K4-1023-0906 (filed 10/18/23), K4-1123-1482 (filed 11/17/23), K4-1123-1593 (filed

11/19/23), and K4-1123-1772 (filed 11/29/23) all dealt with his desire for medical care

for his injuries. Grievance K4-1023-0914 (filed 10/18/23) dealt with the staff conduct

during the excessive force, and Grievance K4-1023-0916 (filed 10/18/23) dealt with an

alleged sexual assault by a defendant during the incident. The first three medical

grievances were denied emergency status, and it does not appear from the record

evidence that they got any responses until at least February 11, 2025. Specifically,

grievances K4-1023-0906, K4-1123-1482, and K4-1123-1593 are all listed in the Defendants’

grievance processing chart as overdue for a response, with no indication that they ever

got responses even from the first level counselor stage. (Doc. 51-3 at 2). Despite the lack

of evidence from the Defendants about the four medical grievances, Plaintiff submitted

first level counselor responses accompanied by memorandums from the healthcare unit

that were all dated February 11, 2025. (Doc. 52 at 54-62). Grievance K4-1123-1772 was

submitted on November 29, 2023, concerning Plaintiff’s ongoing injuries from the alleged

excessive force and it was deemed an emergency by Warden Wills on December 1, 2023.

(Doc. 52 at 48-49). Despite being deemed an emergency by the Warden, the grievance

did not get a response from the grievance office until November 20, 2024, nearly an

ENTIRE YEAR after the Warden deemed it an emergency. (Doc. 52 at 47). Collectively,

the four medical grievances show a substantial delay or total non-response in the

processing of Plaintiff’s grievances about the excessive force incident.

Grievances K4-1023-0914 and K4-1023-0916 took a slightly different trajectory than

the medical grievances. Grievance K4-1023-0916 concerning the alleged sexual

misconduct by Defendant Dulaney was deemed an emergency by the Warden on October

25, 2023, and by November 3, 2023, it had completed the entire grievance process at

Menard. (Doc. 52 at 50-53). The institution recommended the grievance be resolved

because an investigation was ongoing into the alleged misconduct. On March 19, 2024,

the Administrative Review Board found the issue appropriately addressed by the prison

and denied the grievance because the internal investigation had determined the

allegations of sexual misconduct were not substantiated. (Doc. 52 at 41). On March 25,

2024, Warden Wills sent Plaintiff a memorandum summarizing the findings of the

internal investigation that indicated his concerns were unsubstantiated, but noted he had

a right to grieve the findings of the investigation. (Doc. 52 at 42).

By contrast, Grievance K4-1023-0914 about the alleged excessive force by staff was

denied emergency status on October 25, 2023. (Doc. 52 at 26). The grievance was

returned from the first level review by the counselor on November 3, 2023, and it was

received for grievance officer review on November 13, 2023. (Doc. 51-3 at 2). Plaintiff

wrote the Governor’s Office about the issue in December of 2023, and in December of

2023 Warden Wills wrote him a responsive memorandum indicating the investigation

was ongoing. (Doc. 52 at 42-43). On April 19, 2024, Plaintiff wrote his counselor for an

update and was told K4-1023-0914 had been returned to him in November. (Doc. 52 at

22). On April 25, 2024, he wrote for another update and was told K4-1023-0914 was

pending second level review. On July 9, 2024, K4-1023-0914 was deemed resolved by the

grievance officer and Warden because the internal investigation was ongoing. (Doc. 52

at 27). On August 6, 2024, the ARB deemed the grievance resolved because the

investigation by internal affairs was ongoing. (Doc. 52 at 30).

The facts Plaintiff has presented demonstrate characteristics of all three types of

unavailability. The four medical grievances, including one that was deemed an

emergency, took between a year and nearly sixteen months to receive responses. In the

approximately sixteen months, three of the medical grievances only received first level

counselor responses, with no indication in the records of if they have ever been fully

processed by the prison to date. Plaintiff’s grievance about the excessive force also took

nine months to be processed at all levels of review. While this is not quite as extreme, it

is noteworthy that he inquired about the status in December of 2023 and April of 2024

only to be ambiguously told the investigation was ongoing with no projection about

when it might conclude. Together, these facts suggest a scenario where the grievance

process was practically unavailable due to the dilatory nature of the prison’s grievance

processing. Plaintiff argues that because the grievance process has an aspirational

deadline for grievances to be processed by the grievance officer within 2 months, that

these long processing times alone show unavailability. Though the 2-month timeframe

is not treated as concrete in the caselaw, it is fair to argue that processing that took

anywhere from 9-16 months is nowhere near the goal of completion within 2 months

when reasonably feasible. Plaintiff’s unavailability argument related to the timeliness of

grievance processing is well-placed and plausibly supports a finding the process was

unavailable because the prison refused to process the grievances for an inexcusably long

time.

Aside from the slow processing, Plaintiff also argues that the grievance process

was a dead end for grievance K4-1023-0914 because he knew from grievance K4-1023-

0916 that prison officials would merely state an investigation was ongoing without taking

any substantive action. This theory is supported by Plaintiff’s own experience in this case

because both grievances K4-1023-0916 and K4-1023-0914 got the boilerplate response

from prison officials at the local institutional level that the matter was being investigated

internally, and thus the grievance would be deemed resolved. This form of deference,

with no guidance on when the investigation might conclude or if Plaintiff could have any

input, is like getting no response at all or like officials refusing to address the issue for

non-substantive reasons. Since the Wallace case that set forth the standards for finding a

dead end in the grievance context, a handful of district courts have addressed the dead-

end theory3 and only one the undersigned located found that a dead end was established.

In Adamczyk v. IDOC, 2025 WL 2771380 at *5 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2025), a judge

concluded that the grievance process was a dead end for a civil detainee seeking to

challenge punitive conditions of his confinement because, in response, grievance officers

indicated that conditions were an administrative decision that they did not control. The

3 See e.g., Dagans v. Cecil, 2024 WL 3830275 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2024) (finding that Plaintiff’s conclusory

allegations that the officers did not respond to his grievances were not enough to demonstrate a dead end);

Austin v. Rhoades, 2023 WL 2374361 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2023) (finding that a Plaintiff did not substantiate the

dead end theory where he offered no evidence that he actually tried to grievance the strip search policy

before suing to no avail).

Adamczyk Court relied on just a single grievance wherein the counselor, grievance officer,

and warden, all agreed that the grievance should be denied because the conditions of

detention and placement for sexually dangerous civil detainees were administrative

decisions that the prison itself could not influence. Adamczyk v. IDOC, Case No. 22-cv-

863 (S.D. Ill.) (Doc. 134-2 at 25-28). Here, Plaintiff is similarly situated in that he has just

two grievances showing the situation he describes. Though the Seventh Circuit has said

that establishing a dead end is a tall task, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s evidence is

sufficient in this case to establish that he faced a dead end when grievances K4-1023-0914

and K4-1023-0916 both were deemed “resolved” at the prison level simply because an

internal investigation was going on, with no further commentary on if Plaintiff had any

recourse. By deeming the grievances resolved with no further guidance, the prison

grievance process in essence refused to address Plaintiff’s concerns and shirked the

responsibility to another department. This made the process a dead end.

The outcome of grievance K4-1023-0916 also leads to the third basis for potential

unavailability. This grievance concerned Plaintiff’s allegation that during the October 10,

2023, excessive force incident, Defendant Dulaney sexually assaulted him by grabbing

and gratuitously squeezing his genitals. The grievance was expedited as an emergency

and by November 3, 2023, all levels of the prison’s internal grievance process had deemed

the grievance “resolved” because an investigation was ongoing. By contrast, in March of

2024, the ARB denied the grievance because the internal investigation had concluded and

found Plaintiff’s allegations unsubstantiated. (Doc. 52 at The ARB’s ruling diverged

from the prison’s because instead of deferring to the internal investigation, it

substantively decided that the investigation results were correct. (Doc. 52 at 41). A few

weeks after the ARB ruled, Plaintiff got a memorandum from Warden Wills detailing the

results of the same investigation that the ARB referenced, but the memorandum

specifically said that Plaintiff could grieve the outcome of the investigation if he was

unsatisfied. (Doc. 52 at 44). This bit of information makes the grievance process opaque

or difficult to understand with relation to internal investigations. Why did the ARB

substantively rule on the results of the investigation if the results had not even been

disclosed to Plaintiff yet, and if he was supposed to have an opportunity to substantively

grieve the results? If Plaintiff tried to submit a substantive grievance about the outcome

of the investigation, would it have been denied as duplicative? Why was Plaintiff not

informed at any earlier point in the grievance process when the investigation was

mentioned that he would eventually have a chance to appeal the outcome if he disagreed

with it? It seems that the ARB waited for the investigation to be concluded for grievance

K4-1023-0916 before it ruled, but then for grievance K4-1023-0914 it did not wait for the

investigation to conclude, instead just agreeing the grievance was “resolved” because the

investigation was ongoing. This disparate handling of two very similar grievances makes

it unclear if there is a standard process for handling a grievance linked to a pending

internal investigation, and it makes it unclear if inmates really can substantively appeal

an investigation once it is concluded.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the grievance process was not

available to Plaintiff for grievance K4-1023-0914. This finding is sufficient to cover Claims

1 and 3 against Defendants Sadler, Phillips, Taylor, Slinkard, Robinson, Choate, and

Wills. To the extent that Wills argues that grievance K4-1023-0914 did not mention him,

Plaintiff’s additional evidence about his efforts to contact Wills regarding grievance

processing are sufficient to demonstrate Wills was on notice of the issue with an

opportunity to respond. Defendant Dulaney did not raise the affirmative defense of

failure to exhaust, and it is clear grievance K4-1023-0916 exhausted the claim against him

prior to the filing of this suit.

This leaves Claim 2 against Jane Doe, the nurse that Plaintiff first saw for care on

October 10, 2023. By oversight of the parties and the Court, Jane Doe was omitted from

the John Doe identification process that occurred in the Fall of 2024. The Court will set a

new schedule to identify Jane Doe. It is apparent from the grievance records that

grievance K4-1023-0906, submitted on October 18, 2023, is sufficient to describe Jane Doe

because it identifies the very encounter described in the complaint. The Court finds it

unnecessary to reconsider the exhaustion process with relation to Jane Doe because the

records submitted with the current round of summary judgment briefing plainly show

that grievance K4-1023-0906 was left pending at the prison level from October 18, 2023,

until at least February 11, 2025. (Doc. 52 at 54-56). As the Court discussed in relation to

availability, this extreme lag of 16 months rendered the process unavailable. Therefore,

once Jane Doe is identified, served, and files an answer, she shall join the rest of the parties

at the merits stage of the case.

DISPOSITION

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 51) on the issue of exhaustion

of administrative remedies is DENIED in full because the administrative remedy process

was not available for the reasons explained in this Order. This finding applies to all

Defendants named in all claims (Claims 1-3), including Jane Doe.

Plaintiff shall have 21 days to file a Notice containing as much descriptive

information as he possesses about Jane Doe. The Warden of Menard shall then have 21

days to tender responsive information and to file a Notice of Compliance. Plaintiff shall

have 21 days from the Warden’s Notice of Compliance to move to substitute Jane Doe. If

Plaintiff fails to meet this deadline, Jane Doe may be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 29, 2025

/s/ David W. Dugan

______________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge