Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JAMES V. BROWN,

Case No. 1:25-CV-176

Plaintiff,

Judge Michael R. Barrett

v.

ANEEKA COLLINS, et al., ORDER

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) of July 17, 2025, (Doc. 12), as well as the R&R of September

9, 2025, (Doc. 31). Proper notice has been afforded to the parties under 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C), including notice to Plaintiff James V. Brown that he could forfeit rights

on appeal if he failed to file proper objections to the R&R in a timely manner. See

Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d

520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that a failure to file objections generally waives the

right to appeal the district court’s adoption of an R&R). Brown timely objects to the

July 17 R&R, (Doc. 14), but for the following reasons, the Court will overrule those

objections and adopt both R&Rs in full.1

I. BACKGROUND

As summarized by the Magistrate Judge, Brown raises a bevy of claims

through filings that are “rambling and, at times, difficult to decipher”:

1 Brown does not object to the September 9 R&R, and the time to do so has since passed.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff names many Defendants: the

State of Ohio (generally as to all county and municipal

defendants), Highland County Prosecutor, Aneeka Collins;

Highland County Common Pleas Judge, Rocky Coss;

Highland County Sheriff Randall Sanders; Greenfield

Chief of Police Jerry Oyer; Attorney William Armentrout

and the Highland County Public Defender; Highland

County Commissioners; Greenfield Police Department; two

unnamed Greenfield Police Officers; Highland County

Sheriff’s Office; and City of Greenfield. In what can only be

described as a preamble to his allegations, Plaintiff claims

that the Defendants have been engaged in a continuing

conspiracy from 2022 to the present to irreparably harm

him through invalid criminal charges, coerced guilty pleas,

and an illegal prison sentence. Throughout his Complaint,

he further questions the validity of the indictments

underlying his conviction, challenges facts underlying the

charges, and questions the sufficiency of the evidence

against him.

Cataloguing his specific allegations, Plaintiff says that

prosecutor Aneeka Collins, Highland County Sheriff

Randall Sanders, and Greenfield Police Chief Jerry Oyer

provided false evidence to a grand jury, which led to his

indictment. Then, the Greenfield Police Department

impermissibly included him in a “Most Wanted” social

media post and operated outside of its jurisdiction to

execute an arrest warrant at his house, “without valid

reason, and without seeing Plaintiff at the residence based

on a ‘tip’ from an unnamed person.” states that during the

arrest, unnamed police officers kicked in the door, arrested

his mother, and later dragged him from a hospital bed

where he was recuperating from a seizure.

Plaintiff further claims he received no medical care for

seven days while he was held at the Highland County Jail.

And he says that for two days, the “Sheriff’s office” allowed

him to lay on the floor without food, water, or medicines.

Plaintiff additionally complains that the Highland County

Jail did not have an adequate, accessible law library.

Plaintiff also devotes much of his Complaint to attacking

the validity of his convictions and sentence. He suggests

that Collins and Judge Rocky Coss conspired against him,

in violation of their duty to be impartial; and that his

defense counsel, William Armentrout, refused to defend

him. He claims these actions led to his coerced guilty pleas.

He further asserts that charges were brought or threatened

against his mother to induce him to plead guilty.

(Doc. 12, PageID 149-51) (internal citations omitted).

Brown seeks $10,800,000 in compensatory damages, as well as release from

prison, expungement of his state conviction, and investigations into various

individuals and entities. (Doc. 7, PageID 101). He also seeks a default judgment

against Defendant Jerry Oyer for not responding to a summons that was returned as

executed on August 7, 2025. (Doc. 30).

Screening the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Magistrate Judge

recommended that (1) the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the

Greenfield Police Department and the Highland County Sheriff’s Office be dismissed

with prejudice because neither party is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983; (2)

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Oyer and Sanders be

dismissed with prejudice because Brown does not connect them personally to the

allegations in his complaint; (3) to the extent Brown seeks monetary damages from

properly named Defendants in their official capacities, those claims be dismissed with

prejudice on immunity grounds; and (4) all individual-capacity claims against

remaining Defendants be dismissed with prejudice because those Defendants are

either entitled to immunity or are not “persons” or “state actors” within the meaning

of § 1983, or Brown fails to state a claim for relief. (Doc. 12). The Magistrate Judge

recommended that Brown be permitted to proceed on his unlawful arrest claim

against unnamed Greenfield Police Officers, his Fourteenth Amendment deliberate

indifference claims against unnamed officers and/or deputies at the Highland County

Jail, and his Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim related to his

time being held at the Highland County Jail. (Id., PageID 167-68).

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Magistrate Judges are authorized to decide both dispositive and non-

dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

72. When objections are made to a Magistrate Judge’s R&R on a dispositive matter,

the Court “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that

has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Upon review, the Court “may

accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or

return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1).

But “[t]he filing of vague, general, or conclusory objections does not meet the

requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a complete failure to object.”

Cole v. Yukins, 7 F. App’x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Spencer v. Bouchard, 449

F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Overly general objections do not satisfy the objection

requirement.”). And the Court “need not provide de novo review where the objections

are ‘frivolous, conclusive or general.’” Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637-38 (6th Cir.

1986) (per curiam) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir.

1982)). Brown lists a number of objections, some of which do not clear the threshold

for triggering de novo review.2

III. ANALYSIS

First, Brown objects to the recommendation that the claims against

Defendants Sanders and Oyer be dismissed because Brown “does not connect [them]

personally to any allegations set forth,” and fails to “set forth allegations plausibly

demonstrating that Sanders or Oyer encouraged or in some way participated in the

alleged misconduct.” (Doc. 12, PageID 153). In his objections, Brown now says that

Oyer “lead the unlawful entry into [his] home and the [resulting] arrest and violation

of civil rights and liberties,” and “Chief Oyer encouraged and participated in the

alleged misconduct, fact.” (Doc. 14, PageID 178-79). But this does not adequately cure

the deficiency noted by the Magistrate Judge. Brown cannot merely put forth

conclusory allegations for the first time in his objections to a report and

recommendation. See, e.g., Victor v. Dosson, No. 11-CV-13103, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

146137, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 2011) (“a plaintiff may not repair a complaint’s

fatal deficiencies by correcting them in his objections to a report and

recommendation.”). As a result, this objection is overruled.

Brown’s next actual objection appears to challenge the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusions that all properly named Defendants are immune from suit in their official

2 Brown also takes issue with what the Court construes as a minor typographical error: instead of

listing the monetary relief sought as “$10,800,000,” the R&R lists “$10,800,00.” (Doc. 12, PageID 151).

This error is de minimis, and the Court acknowledges that the monetary relief sought is $10,800,000.

capacities to the extent that he seeks monetary damages, and that any remaining

individual-capacity claims are subject to dismissal because Defendants are either

entitled to immunity, not “persons” or “state actors” within the meaning of § 1983, or

because he fails to state a claim for relief. Brown’s arguments are overruled, both

because they are conclusory and because his main challenge on this front appears to

be based upon an alleged violation of the Ohio Revised Code. See Laney v. Farley, 501

F.3d 577, 581 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Allegations of state law or state constitutional

violations will not support a § 1983 claim.”).3

As to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Defendant Armentrout is not a

state actor under § 1983 and Brown “further fails to allege any specific

unconstitutional policy that actually caused the deprivation of his constitutional

rights,” Brown again raises his belief that Armentrout engaged in legal malpractice

while acting as a public defender. He does not, however, meaningfully challenge the

legal reasoning of the Magistrate Judge, nor does he raise any point that could

explain why his claim has any merit under the established framework of § 1983.

Therefore, this objection is overruled.

Finally, Brown disputes the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that alleged

impediments to law library access prevented him from mounting a defense to criminal

charges and preparing for two related civil suits. But his objection on this point

suffers from similar deficiencies as several others in the complaint. Namely, he “fails

to allege facts showing that he was actually impeded in any existing or contemplated

3 Brown does cite 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, but that federal statute addresses employment discrimination

and is inapposite here.

action while a pretrial detainee at the Highland County Jail.” (Doc. 12, PageID 166).

Moreover, Brown was represented by counsel in the criminal action against him, and

his ability to aid in his own defense does not mean that he required law library access

to engage in “hybrid” representation. See State v. Martin, 816 N.E.2d 227, 232 (Ohio

2004). As a result, this objection is overruled.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the objections, (Doc. 14), are OVERRULED, and

the Magistrate Judge’s R&Rs, (Doc. 12, 31), are ADOPTED in full. The motion for

default judgment, (Doc. 30), is DENIED, and Brown’s claims challenging the validity

of his criminal judgment are DISMISSED without prejudice. Brown’s remaining

federal claims are DISMISSED with prejudice, with the exception of his Fourth

Amendment unlawful arrest claim against unnamed Greenfield Police Officers, his

Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against officers and/or deputies

of the Highland County Jail, and his Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-

confinement claim against the Highland County Jail.

The parties are hereby instructed to proceed with this matter as directed by

the Magistrate Judge. (See Doc. 46). Further, the Court CERTIFIES pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal of this order would not be taken in good faith, and

therefore DENIES leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Michael R. Barrett

Michael R. Barrett

United States District Judge