Pacheco

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

5:24-cv-41-MEO

ELIJAH E. PACHECO, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) MEMORANDUM OF

vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

ROBERT ANDERSON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

___________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Robert Anderson, Shelby Wyatt, and

Johnathan Call’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 28], and Motion to Seal [Doc. 27].

I. BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 addressing incidents that

allegedly occurred while he was a pretrial detainee at the Wilkes County Jail (“WCJ”). The

unverified Complaint passed initial review against Robert Anderson and Johnathan Call, WCJ

lieutenants, and Shelby Wyatt, a WCJ captain, for failing to protect the Plaintiff from a physical

assault by other inmates. [Doc. 1: Complaint; Doc. 9: Order on Initial Review]. The Plaintiff seeks

compensatory and punitive damages. [Doc. 1 at 5; see Doc. 9 at 2 n.4, 4-5 (Plaintiff’s claims for

injunctive relief did not survive initial review)].

The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 28: MSJ] and supporting

exhibits, some of which they have moved to seal [Doc. 27: Motion to Seal]. Thereafter, the Court

entered an Order in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising

Plaintiff of the requirements for filing a response to the summary judgment motion and of the

manner in which evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 30: Roseboro Order]. The

Plaintiff filed a verified Response [Doc. 32: MSJ Response], the Defendant filed a Reply [Doc.

35: MSJ Reply], and the Plaintiff filed a Surreply [Doc. 37: Surreply]. These matters are ripe for

disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(internal citations omitted).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving

party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3.

The nonmoving party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings

to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party must oppose a

proper summary judgment motion with citation to “depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the nonmoving party must

present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To that end, only evidence admissible at trial may be considered

by the Court on summary judgment. Kennedy v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 269 F. App’x 302, 308

(4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence and any

inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party

only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). As

the Supreme Court has emphasized,

“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c),

the opponent must do more than simply show there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts …. Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita

Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87,

106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986) (footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of

some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the

requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-28, 106 S. Ct.

2505 (1986). When opposing parties tell two different stories, one

of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no

reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version

of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary

judgment.

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The forecast of evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff as the non-

moving party, shows the following.1

The Plaintiff entered the WCJ as a pretrial detainee on July 19, 2022. [Doc. 28-2: Anderson

Affid. at ¶ 5]. On July 29, 2022, the Plaintiff was assigned to D-Pod, a medium-security open

1 The Plaintiff’s Complaint is unverified and cannot be considered as a forecast of evidence. See

housing pod where inmates typically have a cellmate and they enjoy some social privileges. [Id.

at ¶¶ 6-7]. The Plaintiff’s cellmate was James Robinson. Plaintiff was uncomfortable with

Robinson because he was charged with murder, and because Robinson had told Plaintiff that a

psychiatric evaluation found that he has an aggressive and agitated mental state which precludes

him from having a cellmate. [Doc. 28-6: MSJ Ex at 8-9 (Plaintiff’s deposition excerpt); see Doc.

28-2: Anderson Affid. at ¶ 8; Doc. 28-2: MSJ Ex at 7 (Aug. 4, 2022 Jail Incident Report)].

On August 4, 2022, the Plaintiff told Officer Kyle Hughes, who is not a defendant in this

case, that Robinson had threatened him by saying something like “I’m going to get you hurt….”

[Doc. 28-6: MSJ Ex at 5-6; Doc. 32: MSJ Response at 1; see Doc. 28-2: MSJ Ex at 7]. Inmate

Robinson told the officer that he did not want to continue sharing a cell with the Plaintiff because

of noise and hygiene concerns. [Doc. 28-2: Anderson Affid. at ¶ 9]. Officer Hughes immediately

separated the two, and the Plaintiff was placed temporarily in H-Pod, a maximum-security housing

unit (administrative segregation) where inmates have no cellmates and social privileges are

limited. [Id. at ¶¶ 10-11].

The Plaintiff was frequently reassigned between H-Pod and G-Pod due to rule violations,

suicide watch, and Plaintiff’s own requests. [Id. at ¶ 14]. The Plaintiff submitted written transfer

requests seeking reassignment to another living area in WCJ on February 25, May 18, and June

18, 2023. [Id. at ¶ 15]. The Plaintiff also complained twice during May 2023 that he was being

generally Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2021) (a verified complaint is the equivalent

of an opposing affidavit for summary judgment purposes).

threatened and bullied, however, the Plaintiff refused to provide information so that the matter

could be investigated. [Id. at ¶¶ 16-17].

On or about May 31, 2023, the Plaintiff was placed on lockdown in the H-Pod for a

disciplinary infraction. [Doc. 28-3: Call Affid. at ¶ 14]. Lieutenant Call told the Plaintiff at some

point after the hearing that the Plaintiff’s most recent request for release from administrative

segregation would be approved, and that he would be reassigned to the D-Pod after Plaintiff

completed lockdown. [Id. at ¶ 15]. Call makes every effort to accommodate inmates’ requests to

be reassigned to a different pod so long as there are legitimate reasons for the request and such

would not compromise order and discipline at WCJ. [Id. at ¶ 16]. Because the Plaintiff was

previously housed in H-Pod, he was required to spend time in D-Pod or A-Pod to determine

whether he could acclimate to a less restrictive housing environment. [Id. at ¶ 17]. Call reassigned

the Plaintiff to D-Pod pursuant to WCJ policy because there were few suitable placement options

due to the lack of housing availability and Plaintiff’s housing eligibility. [Id.]. Call asked Plaintiff

whether he had any concerns about the transfer, and the Plaintiff voiced none. [Id. at ¶ 15].

Lieutenant Call approved the Plaintiff’s request for a housing reassignment in late June

2023, and he reassigned the Plaintiff to a private cell on D-Pod. [Id. at ¶¶ 18, 21, 24]. Inmate

Robinson was also being housed in D-Pod at that time. [Id. at ¶ 19]. Robinson had never been

involved in fights at the WCJ, and the only issue that had ever occurred between the Plaintiff and

Robinson was the Plaintiff’s report of fear from nearly a year earlier. [Id. at ¶ 20]. When Call

approved the reassignment, neither he nor the other Defendants thought that the Plaintiff was

particularly vulnerable to a physical attack in D-Pod. [Id. at ¶¶ 20, 24, 26-27; see Doc. 28-2:

Anderson Affid. at ¶¶ 31-32; Doc. 28-4: Wyatt Affid. at ¶¶ 22, 24]. Wyatt was not involved in

making any decision regarding Plaintiff’s transfer or reassignment. [Wyatt Affid. at ¶ 13]. Call

believed that transferring the Plaintiff to D-Pod was reasonable and that it complied with all

applicable laws, rules, policies, and regulations. [Doc. 28-3: Call Affid. at ¶¶ 24, 26-27]. The

Plaintiff did not make any complaints after he returned to D-Pod on June 27, 2023. [Id. at ¶ 22].

On July 9, 2023, 12 days after the Plaintiff returned to D-Pod, there was a physical

altercation between the Plaintiff, Inmate Robinson, and Inmate Joshua Allen. [See Doc. 28-2: MSJ

Ex at 16 (July 9, 2023 Jail Incident Report)]. Officers Brenden Prevette, Cody White, Harrison

Tilley, Ian Grant, and Jonathan Patrick, none of whom are defendants in this case, responded and

stopped the fight. [Doc. 28-2: Anders Affid. at ¶ 25; Doc. 28-2: MSJ Ex at 16]. Wyatt, Anderson,

and Call did not witness or respond to the July 9 altercation. [Doc. 28-4: Wyatt Affid. at ¶ 15; Doc.

28-2: Anderson Affid. at ¶ 23; Doc. 28-3: Call Affid. at ¶ 23].

Officers White and Tilley secured the Plaintiff in H-Pod and asked whether the Plaintiff

had any injuries requiring treatment. [Doc. 28-2: MSJ Ex at 16]. The Plaintiff said that he was

“alright.” [Id.]. Later that day, the Plaintiff submitted a sick call complaining of swelling and

migraines. [Doc. 28-5: MSJ Ex at 1 (July 9, 2023 3:48 PM Kiosk Message)]. The Plaintiff received

x-rays of his skull and shoulder the next day, which were normal. [See id.; Doc. 28-5: MSJ Ex at

2 (July 10, 2023 QMX Mobile Health Report)]. On July 16, 2023, the Plaintiff requested an MRI

of his shoulder. [Doc. 28-5: MSJ Ex at 3 (July 16, 2023 2:33 PM Kiosk Message)]. The next day,

a medical provider offered Plaintiff a cortisone injection, which he declined, and ibuprofen, which

Plaintiff said he would think about. [Id. (July 17, 2023 handwritten notes)]. The Plaintiff submitted

additional requests for medical treatment in September 2023 and January 2024. [Doc. 28-5: MSJ

Ex at 4 (Sept. 3, 2023 2:20 PM Kiosk Message; Sept. 4, 2023 handwritten notes); Id. at 5 (Sept.

18, 2023 8:27 PM Kiosk Message); Sept. 25, 2023 handwritten note); Id. at 6 (Jan. 28, 2024 4:41

AM Kiosk Message; handwritten notes)].

The Plaintiff received a disciplinary infraction for the fight, and Inmates Robinson and

Allen were charged criminally for the incident. [See Doc. 28-2: MSJ Ex at 18 (Disciplinary

Hearing Record); Doc. 28-2: Anderson Affid. at ¶ 30].

The Defendants have filed video footage of the July 9 incident which shows the following,

with progress times noted for reference:

00:01 Several inmates appear to be arguing the dayroom.

00:55 Plaintiff removes his shoes and rolls down his jumpsuit top.

01:34 Plaintiff assumes a fighting stance opposite Inmate Robinson.

03:28 Plaintiff and other inmates continue to argue.

09:03 Inmate Allen hits Plaintiff, who falls to the floor, and the Plaintiff and Allen

struggle on the floor while Inmate Robinson kicks Plaintiff repeatedly.

09:37 Officers respond and separate the inmates.

10:54 Plaintiff is escorted out of the dayroom.

[Doc. 29: Notice of Manual Filing].

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Protect

The Complaint does not specify whether Plaintiff is suing the Defendants in their individual

or official capacities. The Court will address both theories in an abundance of caution. See Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (a pro se complaint, however inartfully pled, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers).

To establish individual-capacity liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must

affirmatively show that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of [his] rights.”

Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up); see Vinnedge v. Gibbs,

550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted).

Suits against an officer in his official capacity “generally represent only another way of

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S.

658, 690 n. 55 (1978)). The Office of Sheriff is not liable under § 1983 for an employee’s acts

“unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused [the] constitutional

tort.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120-21 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).

That is, “[f]or a governmental entity to be liable under section 1983, the official policy must be

the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Moore v. City of Creedmoor, 345 N.C. 356, 366,

481 S.E.2d 14, 21 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Thus, the entity’s

‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Id. (quoting Monell,

436 U.S. at 694).

A pretrial detainee’s failure to protect claim constitutes a due process claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383,

388-90 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying Farmer to a pretrial detainee’s failure to protect and medical

claims). A pretrial detainee states a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a

serious risk of harm on the “purely objective basis that the ‘governmental action’ they challenge

is not ‘rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose’ or is ‘excessive in relation to that

purpose.’” Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson,

576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)). To be sure, however, it remains insufficient “for the plaintiff to allege

that the defendant negligently or accidentally failed to do right by the detainee.” Id. at 611-12.

The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact

with regards to the Defendants’ failure to protect him from an unreasonable risk of harm. The

forecast of evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff demonstrates that: on August 4,

2022, the Plaintiff reported that Inmate Robison threatened him, and the Plaintiff was immediately

removed from D-Pod; upon Plaintiff’s request for transfer, Defendant Call reassigned the Plaintiff

to D-Pod where Inmate Robinson resided approximately 11 months later; Defendant Wyatt was

not involved in the transfer decision; none of the Defendants had a reason to believe that the

Plaintiff was susceptible to violence by Robinson or any other inmate in D-Pod at that time; the

Plaintiff did not object before or after the reassignment; and the Plaintiff was assaulted by

Robinson and another inmate 12 days after Plaintiff returned to D-Pod.

The Plaintiff has not forecast evidence that the Defendants knew or should have known

that Inmate Robinson still posed a serious risk to the Plaintiff’s safety at the time of the

reassignment, or that their failure to recognize that such a risk existed was anything more than

negligent. See, e.g., Carmona v. Martin, No. 23-6930, 2024 WL 4490695 (4th Cir. Oct. 15, 2024)

(affirming summary judgment for defendants where detainee’s vague complaint that he thought

he would be attacked if he were assigned to a certain housing block was inadequate to establish

that a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk

involved in placing him there such that the consequences of the defendants’ conduct would be

obvious); Carpenter v. Trammel, No. 1:18-cv-16, 2019 WL 2088424, at *7 (W.D.N.C. May 13,

2019) (plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages under § 1983 without establishing liability in the

first instance). The Defendants are, therefore, entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

individual-capacity claims against them.

Nor has the Plaintiff forecast any evidence that he was harmed pursuant to a WCJ custom

or policy. Moreover, because there was no underlying constitutional violation with regards to the

Plaintiff’s housing reassignment, any official-capacity claim against the officers with regards to

the housing reassignment necessarily fails. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,

799 (1986) (“If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of an individual police

officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally

excessive force is quite beside the point”); Waybright v. Frederick Cnty., Md., 528 F.3d 199, 203

(4th Cir. 2008) (“supervisors ... cannot be liable under § 1983 without some predicate

‘constitutional injury at the hands of the individual [state] officer,’ at least in suits for damages”).

Accordingly, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted on

Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim.

B. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations but who, in

light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v.

Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled

to qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that the

officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time

of the alleged violation.” E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government officials

breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir.

2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, because Plaintiff has not presented a forecast of evidence regarding any violation of

his constitutional rights, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. As such, summary

judgment for the Defendants would also be proper on this ground.

C. Motion to Seal

Finally, the Defendants ask the Court to seal WCJ “Operating Procedures” and video

footage because they contain non-public and confidential information that is protected from

disclosure pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 153A-98, 132-1.4, 132-1.4A, and 132-1.7, and a

Protective Order entered in this case. [Doc. 27 at 2; Doc. 27-1 at 3; see Doc. 20: Protective Order].

There is a “presumption under applicable common law and the First Amendment that

materials filed in this Court will be filed unsealed.” LCvR 6.1(a); see Rushford v. New Yorker

Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (First Amendment right to access to court

proceedings includes criminal and civil cases). However, a court has authority to seal documents

before it based upon the court’s inherent supervisory authority over its own files and records. See

Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). The denial of access to documents

under the First Amendment must be necessitated by a compelling government interest that is

narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th

Cir. 1986); In re State-Record Co., Inc., 917 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1990). Before sealing judicial

records, a court must identify the interest that overrides the public’s right to an open court, and

articulate supporting findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the

order was properly entered. See Press–Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. of Ca., 464 U.S. 501, 510

(1984). When addressing motions to seal, the Court must consider alternatives to sealing and

specify whether the sealing is temporary or permanent and also may redact such orders in its

discretion. See LCvR 6.1.

The Court finds that WCJ’s internal video footage contains confidential non-public

information that is protected from disclosure, that the WCJ’s interests in the confidentiality of its

internal video footage overrides the public’s right to an open court in this case, that there is no

alternative that will adequately protect these concerns, and that permanently sealing the manually-

video footage is warranted. Accordingly, the Motion to Seal with regards to the manually filed

video footage (Summary Judgment Exhibit D) will be granted. [See Doc. 29: Notice of Manual

Filing].

However, the Motion will be denied as to Defendants’ request to seal WCJ “Operating

Procedures.” The Defendants do not clearly identify the exhibit(s) they are requesting to seal.

Moreover, to the extent that the Defendants are referring to the classification, housing assignment,

and administrative segregation polices that are attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment,

Defendants appear to have waived their request by filing these exhibits on the Court’s public

docket. [See Doc. 28-2 at 8-13; Doc. 28-3 at 8-13; Doc. 28-4 at 7-12]. Moreover, these policies

are interspersed with non-confidential documents such that it would be unduly burdensome for the

Court to extract and seal only certain pages. This denial is without prejudice for the Defendants to

file an Amended Motion to Seal that more fully describes their request and the grounds supporting

the same.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted

and this action is dismissed with prejudice. The Defendants’ Motion to Seal is granted in part and

denied in part.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 28] is GRANTED and this

action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. The Defendants’ Motion to Seal [Doc. 27] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED

IN PART as stated in this Order.

3. The Clerk is respectfully instructed to PERMANENTLY SEAL Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment Exhibit D (manually-filed docket entry 29).

4. The Clerk is respectfully instructed to enter a Clerk’s Judgment, and to terminate this

action.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: December 29, 2025

Matthew E. Orso Wy

United States District Judge ey

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