Thompson v. Central Valley School District No 365

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RANDEY THOMPSON, No. 24-5263

D.C. No.

Plaintiff - Appellant,

2:21-cv-00252-

SAB

v.

CENTRAL VALLEY SCHOOL

DISTRICT NO 365; BEN SMALL, OPINION

Individually as Superintendent of the

Central Valley School District;

DEBRA LONG, Central Valley

School District No 365 Board of

Education and in their individual

capacity Board of Education

Members and Directors; MYSTI

RENEAU, Central Valley School

District No 365 Board of Education

and in their individual capacity Board

of Education Members and Directors;

KEITH CLARK, Central Valley

School District No 365 Board of

Education and in their individual

capacity Board of Education

Members and Directors; TOM

DINGUS, Central Valley School

District No 365 Board of Education

and in their individual capacity Board

of Education Members and Directors;

2 THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365

CYNTHIA MCMULLEN, Central

Valley School District No 365 Board

of Education and in their individual

capacity Board of Education

Members and Directors,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Stanley Allen Bastian, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 17, 2025

Seattle, Washington

Filed December 29, 2025

Before: William A. Fletcher, Ronald M. Gould, and Ana de

Alba, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould

SUMMARY *

First Amendment/Retaliation

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary

judgment for the Central Valley School District (“CVSD”)

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365 3

and individual school administrators in a suit brought by

Randy Thompson, a former middle school assistant

principal, alleging retaliation in violation of the First

Amendment.

Thompson was placed on paid administrative leave and

subsequently transferred to a teaching position as a result of

his posting on Facebook a comment about the Democratic

National Convention that used epithets, slurs, and violent

language.

Applying the two-step Pickering framework, the panel

affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Thompson made

out a prima facie First Amendment retaliation claim for

private speech he made on a matter of public concern. The

panel assumed, without deciding, that a reasonable jury

could conclude that placing Thompson on paid

administrative leave could constitute an adverse

employment action and that the record supported a finding

that the Facebook post was a substantial or motivating factor

in that decision. However, CVSD sufficiently showed a

reasonable prediction of disruption under Pickering Step

Two. CVSD’s interest in creating a safe and inclusive

school environment outweighed the public interest

commentary contained in Thompson’s speech.

Because Thompson’s First Amendment rights were not

violated, the panel affirmed the district court’s finding of

qualified immunity in favor of the individual school

officials.

4 THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365

COUNSEL

Michael B. Love (argued), Riverside NW Law Group,

Spokane, Washington; Robert F. Greer, Megan C. Clark, and

Samir Dizdarevic-Miller, Etter McMahon Lamberson Van

Wert & Oreskovich PC, Spokane, Washington; for Plaintiff-

Appellant.

Michael E. McFarland Jr. (argued), Rachel K. Stanley, and

Christopher J. Kerley, Evans Craven & Lackie PS, Spokane,

Washington, for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Randey Thompson, a former assistant principal for

Evergreen Middle School in the Central Valley School

District (“CVSD”), brought suit for retaliation in violation

of the First Amendment after he was placed on paid

administrative leave and subsequently transferred to a

teaching position as a result of his posting on Facebook a

comment about the Democratic National Convention that

used epithets, slurs, and violent language.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

the CVSD and the individual school administrators,

concluding that Thompson had made a prima facie claim for

retaliation, but that the CVSD met its burden of showing that

its interests outweighed Thompson’s interests in his post.

The district court also concluded that qualified immunity

applied to the individual school administrators. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365 5

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A

In August 2020, Randey Thompson was an assistant

principal at Evergreen Middle School in the CVSD. After

watching the Democratic National Convention, Thompson

made a post on his Facebook page. Thompson contends that

the post made on his private Facebook page shared his

personal comments and opinions only with his “friends” on

Facebook. The post stated verbatim (including its

typographical errors):

Demtard convention opens and the only facts

spoken were the names. Lie after lie. The fact

checkers could retire on Michelle Obama’s

rant alone. What s hatefull racists bitch. If

you need to lie to try and win you are just shit.

If you believe them you are even worse.

Wake the fuck up America. You are being

played by a fake media, athleats and

performers (who are really clueless and flyers

with pedophile man) and the former DNC,

now just the little bitch of Marxist BLM,

Antifa, and Soroas socialist. You are missing

out on a great country and the rest of us are

sick and tired of your act and going to take

you to the woodshed for a proper education.

May God help you to pull your heads out of

your asses so we will not have too. Time for

the red tide. Lets see how long until the FB

liberal defenders take this one down.

While scrolling through Facebook, a CVSD employee

saw the post on her newsfeed. She took a screenshot of the

6 THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365

post and sent it to her sister, another CVSD employee. The

sister forwarded the screenshot to a CVSD administrator,

who shared the post with another CVSD administrator, who

in turn brought the post to the attention of CVSD

Superintendent Ben Small.

Two days after the post was made, on August 19, 2020,

Thompson received a phone call from then-Assistant

Superintendent Jay Rowell. Rowell asked Thompson if he

had made a Facebook post about the Democratic National

Convention. Thompson confirmed that he had and told

Rowell it was a political post on his private Facebook

account and had been sent only to friends and relatives who

shared his political beliefs. Thompson emphasized that the

post was made on his own time and on his personal device.

Rowell then informed Thompson that he was being placed

on paid administrative leave effective

immediately. Thompson was not allowed on CVSD

property, nor was he allowed to contact CVSD employees,

teachers, parents, and students. Immediately after this

conversation, Thompson deleted the Facebook post.

On the next day, August 20, 2020, the CVSD retained

attorney Amy Allen to conduct an independent investigation

into the Facebook post. Allen interviewed the employees

who had seen the post. Those employees expressed concern

about the post because they thought it used hateful language.

The employees specifically noted the use of the term

“demtard” was highly offensive and potentially harmful to

students, families, and community members.

Allen then interviewed CVSD administrators to

determine whether this was a unique occurrence or part of a

pattern of behavior. One administrator told Allen that, in a

presentation to staff, Thompson had referred to current

THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365 7

students as “Tide Pod Challenge Kids” and “snowflakes.”

Another administrator told Allen that Thompson used the

word “short bus” when referring to students enrolled in

special education classes. A third administrator told Allen

that Thompson, while speaking to a focus group of ten

students who self-identified as African-American, asked a

Black student if he felt that teachers had treated him

differently than “normal” students.

On August 22, 2020, Thompson received a letter from

the CVSD dated August 20, 2020, reiterating that he was

being placed on administrative leave because of

unprofessional conduct and that, while on leave, he was

prohibited from having written or verbal contact with

students.

In September 2020, Rowell conducted “impact

interviews” of a sample of Board Members, in-district

administrators, in-district teachers, and parents of current

CVSD students to determine the potential impact of

Thompson’s Facebook post and the incidents reported to

Allen by CVSD administrators. Rowell concluded that the

interviewees were shocked and concerned about the

statements, and many of those interviewed found the

Facebook post and the other comments made by Thompson

during school insensitive and detrimental to Thompson’s

relationship with staff, students, and CVSD community

members.

On September 22, 2020, the school Board held a “notice-

and-opportunity meeting” to provide Thompson with the

opportunity to address the allegations against him, which

included his Facebook post and the derogatory comments he

made at school that were discovered during the

investigation.

8 THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365

In the meeting, Thompson initially said that his

Facebook was “hacked” and that a hacker made the post. 1

The CVSD retained a forensic investigator who found no

evidence of unauthorized use of Thompson’s Facebook

account, noted that Thompson was reluctant to provide his

electronic devices, and reported that Thompson provided

only an incomplete history of his Facebook data. Based on

the forensic investigator’s report, Rowell concluded that

Thompson was not being truthful.

On January 21, 2021, the CVSD offered Thompson a

voluntary transfer to a teaching position if he signed a release

of claims. The agreement said that if Thompson signed the

release, the CVSD would end its investigation and would not

terminate him. Rowell told Thompson and his union

representative that the transfer agreement was proposed in

part to avoid formally alleging that Thompson lied about his

Facebook account being hacked. Thompson rejected the

transfer offer.

A second notice-and-opportunity meeting was held on

May 6, 2021, to address two new allegations against

Thompson. The first new allegation was that Thompson

interfered with the CVSD’s investigation by deleting his

emails and refusing to transfer his data to the forensic

examiner. The second new allegation was that Thompson

was dishonest when he claimed his Facebook was hacked.

At that hearing, Thompson claimed that he deleted his

personal emails as a regular practice but kept anything

1

Thompson claimed that he had a slightly differently worded version of

the post that he intended to put on his Facebook. While there were minor

spelling and word changes in the version Thompson says he intended to

post, the word “demtard” and language about taking individuals “to the

woodshed for a proper education” were present in both posts.

THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365 9

related to this investigation; that he was reluctant to give the

forensic investigator information for his own privacy and to

protect his friends; and that he wiped and sold his old devices

and could not provide them. He asserted that he had been

hacked but admitted that he had no evidence of the alleged

hack.

On May 10, 2021, Superintendent Small sent a Notice of

Transfer to a Subordinate Position via certified and regular

mail to Thompson. The letter identified seven reasons for

the transfer: (1) Thompson’s behavior as an administrator

had disrupted harmony among building staff and CVSD

representatives, to the point that returning him to his prior

position supported a reasonable prediction of disruption;

(2) his comments were insensitive and contrary to the

CVSD’s mission of creating an inclusive culture, causing

concerns about Thompson’s ability to be an administrator

promoting the CVSD’s best interests; (3) Thompson’s

behavior, including his lack of inclusiveness, caused

decreased confidence of administrators and caused concerns

about his willingness to promote and embrace the CVSD’s

interest in an inclusive learning and working environment;

(4) Thompson’s behavior interfered with his ability to do his

job, especially as a student disciplinarian and staff evaluator;

(5) the CVSD believed that Thompson interfered with a

CVSD investigation about his behavior and he was not

truthful during the investigation; (6) Thompson’s response

to the CVSD’s concerns about his behavior demonstrated a

lack of awareness and insight needed for a school

administrator; and (7) in balancing the totality of

circumstances, the best interests of the CVSD would be

served by transferring Thompson from an administrative

position to a non-administrative certificated teaching

position.

10 THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365

Thompson asked for another hearing with the school

Board, and that hearing was held on June 14, 2021. See

Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.405.230. On June 25, 2021,

Thompson received a letter saying that the Board upheld the

Superintendent’s decision to transfer him to a certified

teaching position.

B

Thompson sued the CVSD and several individual school

administrators on August 23, 2021, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging in part that his First Amendment rights had

been violated. On January 12, 2022, the individual

administrators moved for summary judgment on the sole

question of qualified immunity. On February 24, 2022, the

district court denied the motion, concluding that there were

genuine questions of material fact. On interlocutory appeal,

we affirmed the denial of summary judgment. See

Thompson v. Small, No. 22-35192, 2023 WL 3580744, at *1

(9th Cir. May 22, 2023).

After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for

summary judgment. The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of the CVSD. It concluded that although

Thompson made out a prima facie First Amendment

retaliation claim, the CVSD met its burden under

Pickering. The court determined that the CVSD’s interests

in fostering a safe and inclusive school environment

outweighed Thompson’s First Amendment interests, and

that the CVSD would have transferred Thompson absent his

Facebook post. The district court also found that the

individual school administrators were entitled to qualified

immunity. Thompson timely appealed.

THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365 11

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment and its determinations of qualified immunity.

Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013);

Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th

Cir. 2021). “Summary judgment is appropriate when,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any

material facts.” United States v. JP Morgan Chase Bank

Account No. Ending 8215, 835 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir.

2016) (quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

We review a public employee’s First Amendment

retaliation claim against their government employer under

the two-step Pickering framework. See Pickering v. Bd. of

Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).

At Step One, the plaintiff must show that (1) he spoke on a

matter of public concern, (2) he suffered an adverse

employment action, and (3) his protected expression was a

substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action.

Riley’s Am. Heritage Farms v. Elsasser, 32 F.4th 707, 721

(9th Cir. 2022). If the plaintiff satisfies Step One, he has

established a prima facie claim for First Amendment

retaliation. The burden then shifts to the public employer at

Pickering Step Two to demonstrate either: (1) that its

legitimate administrative interests in promoting an efficient

workplace and avoiding workplace disruption outweigh the

plaintiff’s First Amendment interests; or (2) alternatively,

the government would have taken the same actions absent

plaintiff’s expressive conduct. Id.

12 THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365

A

First, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that

Thompson made a prima facie claim of retaliation for private

speech he made on a matter of public concern. “Speech

involves a matter of public concern when it can fairly be

considered to relate to ‘any matter of political, social, or

other concern to the community.’” Johnson v. Multnomah

Cnty., 48 F.3d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Connick v.

Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). To determine whether

the speech in question was on “a matter of public concern,”

we consider the “content, form and context of a given

statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Id. (quoting

Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48).

Thompson’s Facebook post was made on his private

Facebook account and criticized the Democratic National

Convention. It was private speech on a matter of public

concern. We are not persuaded by the CVSD’s arguments

that Thompson’s use of slurs or violent language in the

Facebook post took the political post outside the realm of

public concern. 2 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,

387 (1987) (“[T]he inappropriate or controversial character

of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals

with a matter of public concern.”).

Second, we assume, without deciding, that a reasonable

jury could conclude that placing Thompson on paid

administrative leave could constitute an adverse

2

Because we hold that Thompson’s speech was private speech on a

matter of public concern sufficient to establish a prima facie claim, we

do not reach Thompson’s arguments that the CVSD conceded these

Pickering elements or that the doctrines of judicial admission or waiver

should apply. See Thompson v. Small, No. 22-35192, 2023 WL

3580744, at *1 (9th Cir. May 22, 2023).

THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365 13

employment action given that Thompson was cut off from

CVSD property and contact with other CVSD staff, and

therefore may have suffered “general stigma.” See Dahlia

v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2013)

(“[U]nder some circumstances, placement on administrative

leave can constitute an adverse employment action.”).

Third, the record supports that the Facebook post was a

substantial or motivating factor in placing Thompson on

administrative leave. The CVSD placed Thompson on

administrative leave within only a few days after discovering

the Facebook post, and the individual administrators’

testimony confirmed that Thompson’s Facebook post was

the catalyst to opening the investigation of Thompson’s

practices and conduct when he taught at the school. The

temporal proximity between the speech and the placement

on administrative leave supports Thompson’s prima facie

claim for retaliation. See Anthoine v. N. Cent. Cntys.

Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 750 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence

that an action was a substantial or motivating factor in an

adverse employment action can be found from the fact that

the speech and the action were proximate in time, or that the

employer expressed opposition to the speech). Furthermore,

that the CVSD admitted the Facebook post’s language—

including Thompson’s use of the word “demtard”—was the

sole reason for Thompson’s placement on administrative

leave supports Thompson’s prima facie claim for retaliation.

B

We nonetheless affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of the CVSD because the CVSD

met its burden under Pickering Step Two. The CVSD was

justified in putting Thompson on paid administrative leave

because of its reasonable prediction of disruption, and the

14 THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365

record supports that the CVSD showed its interests in

ensuring its administrators foster a safe and inclusive

educational environment outweigh Thompson’s First

Amendment interests. Therefore, Thompson’s claim fails.

The Pickering balancing test “recognizes that a

government employer has ‘broader discretion to restrict

speech when it acts in its role as employer, but the

restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has

some potential to affect the entity’s operations.’” Moser v.

L.V. Metro. Police Dep’t, 984 F.3d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 2021).

When we balance competing interests, we use a “sliding

scale” in which the state’s burden to justify a particular

discharge or adverse employment action “varies depending

upon the nature of the employee’s expression.” Id. at 905–

06 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 150); see also Hyland v.

Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1139 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that

the government’s burden to show disruption “varies with the

content of the speech”). The Pickering balancing inquiry

ultimately poses a question of law. Moser, 984 F.3d at 905.

1. Thompson’s First Amendment Interests

We have recognized that although speech about matters

of public concern “occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy

of First Amendment values,” Dodge v. Evergreen Sch. Dist.

#114, 56 F.4th 767, 782 (9th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks

omitted), “not all statements of ‘public concern’ are treated

equally under the Pickering balancing test,” Moser, 984

F.3d at 905. That speech touches upon an issue of “public

concern” at Step One of the Pickering balancing test does

not end our “inquiry into the content of [the] speech” for

purposes of determining “how much weight to give the

government employee’s First Amendment interests” at Step

THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365 15

Two. Moser, 984 F.3d at 906; see also Damiano v. Grants

Pass Sch. Dist. No. 7, 140 F.4th 1117, 1140 (9th Cir. 2025).

The “apex” of First Amendment protection is reserved

for political speech that addresses problems at the

government agency where the employee works. Moser, 984

F.3d at 906; Damiano, 140 F.4th at 1140. But we have also

recognized that the protection afforded to government

employee’s speech may be lessened where the speech is

derogatory in nature. For instance, we have previously

suggested in dicta that “racially charged comments that have

no connection to the government employee’s workplace

arguably receive less First Amendment protection under the

Pickering balancing test[.]” Id. at 906 (citing Grutzmacher

v. Howard Cnty., 851 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2017)). In Moser,

we cited a Fourth Circuit case, Grutzmacher v. Howard

Cnty., for the proposition that derogatory speech that touches

on a matter of public concern as a whole, but is unrelated to

an individual’s workplace or expertise, might be entitled to

less weight under Step Two of the Pickering balancing test.

But we did not decide precisely how the use of derogatory

language in such speech would affect the Pickering Step

Two analysis because the plaintiff’s use of a derogatory term

was not at issue. Moser, 984 F.3d at 903 n.1; see also

Hernandez v. City of Phoenix, 43 F.4th 966, 978–79 (9th Cir.

2022) (“Speech that expresses hostility toward racial or

religious minorities may be of particularly low First

Amendment value at [Step Two] of the Pickering balancing

test . . . , but its distasteful character alone does not strip it of

all First Amendment protection.” (emphasis added)).

Because the derogatory speech is at issue here, we do so

now.

Grutzmacher is instructive. In Grutzmacher, the Fourth

Circuit held that at least some of a county fire department

16 THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365

employee’s string of Facebook posts, comments, and “likes”

were on a matter of public concern because the posts as a

whole addressed gun control. 851 F.3d at 342–43. At issue

there, as here, was that some comments that the plaintiff

“liked” or used on Facebook were derogatory, racially-

charged or violent. Id. at 337–38. The Grutzmacher court

held that the Pickering balancing test favored the county at

Step Two because the plaintiff’s Facebook activity was “not

of the same ilk” as cases where a government official’s

speech was “grounded . . . in specialized knowledge,” and

that the county’s interest in efficiency and preventing

disruption “outweighed the public interest commentary

contained in [p]laintiff’s Facebook activity.” Id. at 347–48.

We similarly reasoned in Hernandez v. City of Phoenix,

without deciding, that an employee’s speech was of

“comparatively low value” under Pickering Step Two when

the employee’s speech addressed a matter of public concern,

but did so in a way expressing racial and religious hostility.

43 F.4th at 979.

As in Grutzmacher and Hernandez, Thompson’s

Facebook post was not grounded in specialized knowledge,

nor based on insight he had gained into the school system

while acting as an assistant principal. See Damiano, 140

F.4th at 1140 (“[W]e have long recognized ‘the importance

of allowing teachers to speak out on school matters,’ . . .

because ‘[t]eachers are, as a class, the members of a

community most likely to have informed and definite

opinions’ on such matters.” (quoting Settlegoode v. Portland

Pub. Schs., 371 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 2004))). Although

Thompson’s post, read broadly, touched on a matter of

public concern, Thompson’s use of disability-related slurs

like “demtard” and his use of violent language suggesting

taking individuals “to the woodshed for a proper education”

THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365 17

are not speech entitled to the highest constitutional

protection. See Hernandez, 43 F.4th at 979 (remarking that

speech that expresses hostility toward racial or religious

minorities may receive less protection under Pickering);

Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 345 (finding that a government

employer’s interest in efficiency and preventing disruption

outweighed the plaintiff’s interest in speaking in a violent

manner regarding gun control). Stated another way, the

“demtard” slur was not comparable in speech value to

comments of teachers that are based on knowledge they

gained as educators. For these reasons, we give Thompson’s

interest in his Facebook post speech little weight under

Pickering Step Two.

2. The CVSD’s Interests

For “the government’s interest as an employer in a

smoothly-running office” to outweigh “an employee’s [F]irst

[A]mendment right[s], [the government] must demonstrate

actual, material and substantial disruption, or reasonable

predictions of disruption in the workplace.” Robinson v.

York, 566 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). We

have determined that the extent of disruption the CVSD must

show under Pickering Step Two is based on a “sliding scale”

when balanced against the weight we give Thompson’s First

Amendment interests. Moser, 984 F.3d at 905. Because we

hold here that Thompson’s First Amendment interests are not

entitled to the “apex” of First Amendment protection, the

CVSD need not show as much potential disruption to

prevail. The CVSD cannot rely on “mere speculation” or

“bare assertions of future conflict” at the summary judgment

stage. See Nichols v. Dancer, 657 F.3d 929, 933–34 (9th Cir.

2011). Instead, the CVSD must provide evidence sufficient

for us to evaluate fully and fairly whether claims or

predictions of disruption are reasonable. Id.; see also Craig

18 THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365

v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 F.3d 1110, 1119 (7th

Cir. 2013) (“[A]n employer’s assessment of the possible

interference caused by the speech must be reasonable—the

predictions must be supported with an evidentiary

foundation and be more than mere speculation.” (quotation

marks and citation omitted)).

The Supreme Court has told us that several factors are

relevant to assessing the impact of a public employee’s

speech on a public employer’s operations, including:

whether the statement impairs discipline by

superiors or harmony among co-workers, has

a detrimental impact on close working

relationships for which personal loyalty and

confidence are necessary, or impedes the

performance of the speaker’s duties or

interferes with the regular operation of the

enterprise.

Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.

These factors weigh in favor of the CVSD. The CVSD

reasonably predicted that a Facebook post by a school

administrator using disability-related slurs and violent

language was likely to disrupt CVSD operations. The

predictable disruption was intensified and reinforced by

Thompson engaging in speech while serving in a public-

facing role as an assistant principal that undermined the

CVSD’s written resolution to foster a safe and supportive

educational environment. As an employee of the CVSD,

Thompson had a responsibility to uphold the district’s

formal commitment to equity and inclusion. As evidenced

by his Facebook post and workplace comments, Thompson

did not uphold his commitment, and we accordingly find that

THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365 19

Thompson’s derogatory and violent language could

substantially disrupt the orderly operation of the school.

Interviewees’ statements about Thompson confirmed the

CVSD’s earlier prediction that the Facebook post was

reasonably likely to disrupt school operations. Specifically,

other CVSD administrators expressed concern about their

ability to work with Thompson based on his language in the

Facebook post, and questioned his ability to be in a

leadership position. Many interviewees expressed that the

disability-related slur and violent language did not reflect the

CVSD’s core values, negatively portrayed the CVSD, and

ran counter to the CVSD’s Resolution Recommitting to

Equity and Inclusion. Additionally, interviewees confirmed

that they believed Thompson’s ability to discipline students

would be impacted if students learned of the Facebook post.

Ultimately, interviewees questioned Thompson’s ability to

work effectively with students and parents, or to act as a

representative of the school. As such, Thompson’s

statements can be fairly viewed as creating disharmony

among co-workers and detrimentally impacting his close

working relationships requiring loyalty and confidence.

Finally, Thompson’s position in a public-facing,

supervisory role as an assistant principal is relevant in

assessing likely disruption. The “extent of an employee’s

authority and interactions with the public also bears on the

degree of government interest in preventing disruption.”

Rankin, 483 U.S. at 392. The government’s interest in

“avoiding disruption is magnified when the employee

asserting [a First Amendment] right serves in a ‘confidential,

policymaking, or public contact role.’” Moran v. State of

Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390–91). And, we have recognized that

public school employment “is precisely the type of

20 THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365

employment relationship” to which “a wide degree of

deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.”

Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149

F.3d 971, 981 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at

151–52).

The CVSD contended and put forth evidence that

Thompson worked in a supervisory and disciplinary role,

and that his comments and language conflict with the

CVSD’s resolution recommitting the CVSD to equity and

inclusion and to “fostering an equitable school culture.”

Moreover, interviewees raised the specific concern that

Thompson engaged in speech inconsistent with the CVSD’s

values while he served as a representative of the school

leadership. Recognizing the “wide degree of deference” we

afford the CVSD’s judgment when making employment

decisions, this evidence sufficiently shows that the CVSD’s

prediction of disruption from the Facebook post was

reasonable and not based on “rank speculation or bald

allegation.” Damiano, 140 F.4th at 1138; see also Nichols

v. Dancer, 657 F.3d 929, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding

that “mere speculation” and “bare assertions of future

conflict” are insufficient for summary judgment under

Pickering Step Two); Brewster, 149 F.3d at 981.

We hold that the CVSD sufficiently showed a reasonable

prediction of disruption under Pickering Step Two. Because

we give Thompson’s speech little weight under the

Pickering balancing test, we hold that the CVSD’s interest

in creating a safe and inclusive school environment

outweighs the public interest commentary contained in

Thompson’s speech. In so holding, we caution that the

Pickering balancing test is a “particularized balancing on the

unique facts presented in each case,” and we do not suggest

that every time employee speech contains slurs or violent

THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365 21

language, the government interest will automatically prevail

at Pickering Step Two. See Brewster, 149 F.3d at 980

(quoting Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1560–61 (9th Cir.

1995)). Each case should be examined in its unique context,

considering the totality of circumstances. We must strive to

reach “the most appropriate possible balance of competing

interests.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 150. In this case, we are

particularly mindful of the extreme import of ensuring the

maintenance of a safe and supportive school environment

where children have a chance to reach their full potential.

Because we conclude that the CVSD met its burden to

show that its interests outweigh Thompson’s First

Amendment interests, we decline to reach the alternative

ground as to whether the CVSD would have taken the same

actions absent Thompson’s expressive conduct. Riley’s, 32

F.4th at 721. We therefore affirm that the CVSD correctly

met its burden under Pickering Step Two.

C

Because we hold that Thompson’s First Amendment

rights were not violated, we affirm the district court’s finding

of qualified immunity in favor of the individual school

officials. See Cuevas v. City of Tulare, 107 F.4th 894, 898

(9th Cir. 2024) (“Qualified immunity protects government

officials from liability under § 1983 unless (1) they violated

a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the

unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the

time.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of the CVSD and affirm

22 THOMPSON V. CVSD NO 365

the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the

individual school administrators.

AFFIRMED.