amazon.com Services, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC; No. 25-886

AMAZON LOGISTICS, INC.,

D.C. No.

2:24-cv-09564-

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

SPG-MAA

v.

TEAMSTERS AMAZON OPINION

NATIONAL NEGOTIATING

COMMITTEE,

Intervenor - Appellee,

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

BOARD, a federal administrative

agency; MARVIN E. KAPLAN, in

his official capacity as the Chairman

of the National Labor Relations

Board; DAVID M. PROUTY, in their

official capacity as Member of the

National Labor Relations Board;

WILLIAM COWEN, in his official

capacity as Acting General Counsel

of the National Labor Relations

Board; J. DOE, in his or her official

capacity as National Labor Relations

Board Administrative Law Judge,

Defendants - Appellees.

2 AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Sherilyn Peace Garnett, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 14, 2025

Pasadena, California

Filed December 29, 2025

Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Danielle J. Forrest, and

Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Forrest

SUMMARY *

Labor Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying

Amazon.com Services, LLC’s motion for a preliminary

injunction to stop administrative proceedings before the

National Labor Relations Board (Board) after Amazon was

charged with unfair-labor practices under the National Labor

Relations Act for refusing to recognize and bargain with the

Teamsters Amazon National Negotiating Committee

(Teamsters), which represent a group of former Amazon

delivery drivers.

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB 3

Amazon argued that the Board and its administrative

procedures for adjudicating labor disputes are

unconstitutional and sued to enjoin the Board and its named

officials from engaging in unconstitutional administrative

proceedings. The district court concluded that it lacked

jurisdiction to issue the requested relief under the Norris-

LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113, which strips federal courts

of power “to issue any . . . injunction in a case involving or

growing out of a labor dispute.”

The panel held that the definition of “labor dispute” set

forth in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(a),

imposes separate mandates for the pending case and the

underlying labor dispute, both of which were satisfied

here. First, the panel held that section 113(a)’s case-related

requirements were satisfied. Both Amazon and the

Teamsters are entangled in or implicated in the issues to be

decided here because Amazon’s constitutional challenges

concern the agency’s adjudication of the ULP claims that the

Teamsters initiated. Second, the panel also held that the

underlying Board proceeding is obviously a labor dispute. It

concerns the terms of employment and the representation of

the drivers, and the dispute is between employers and

employees, namely, Amazon and the

Teamsters. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district

court’s denial of Amazon’s motion for a preliminary

injunction.

4 AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB

COUNSEL

Kamran Mirrafati (argued), Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Los

Angeles, California; Brian M. Stolzenbach, Seyfarth Shaw

LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Giovanna Ferrari, Seyfarth Shaw

LLP, San Francisco, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Hector De Haro (argued), Julie Gutman-Dickinson, and

Sophie Newman, Bush Gottlieb, Glendale, California;

Willie J. Burden Jr. and David O’Brien Seutholz,

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Washington, D.C.;

for Intervenor-Appellee.

David P. Boehm (argued), Senior Attorney; Grace L.

Pezzella and Paul A. Thomas, Trial Attorneys; Michael S.

Dale, Supervisory Attorney; Kevin P. Flanagan, Deputy

Assistant General Counsel; Dawn L. Goldstein, Deputy

Associate General Counsel; Nancy E. Kessler Platt,

Associate General Counsel; Stephanie Cahn, Acting Deputy

General Counsel; William B. Cowen, Acting General

Counsel; National Labor Relations Board, Washington,

D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB 5

OPINION

FORREST, Circuit Judge:

Amazon was charged with unfair-labor practices under

the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) for refusing to

recognize and bargain with the Teamsters Amazon National

Negotiating Committee (Teamsters), which represented a

group of former Amazon delivery drivers. Amazon argues

that the National Labor Relations Board (Board) and its

administrative procedures for adjudicating labor disputes are

unconstitutional, and it sued to enjoin the Board and its

named officials “from engaging in unconstitutional

administrative proceedings designed to unlawfully force

Amazon into collective bargaining with the Teamsters.” The

district court denied Amazon’s motion for a preliminary

injunction to stop the administrative proceedings,

concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to issue this relief under

the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This Act strips federal courts of

power “to issue any . . . injunction in a case involving or

growing out of a labor dispute.” 29 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, the

question presented here is whether this case, asserting

constitutional challenges related to the Board, involves or

grows out of a labor dispute. Because we conclude that it

does, we affirm the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Board

Given the nature of Amazon’s claims in this lawsuit, we

begin with the challenged administrative structure. The

Board is charged with administering the NLRA. NLRB v. SW

Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. 288, 297 (2017). The Board was

established by Congress. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). It has five

6 AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB

members who are appointed by the President with the advice

and consent of the Senate. Id. Board members serve five-

year terms and are removable by the President “upon notice

and hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but

for no other cause.” Id.

Congress also established General Counsel for the

Board. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d). The General Counsel

investigates charges of unfair labor practices (ULP) asserted

under the NLRA, files complaints, and prosecutes the

complaints before the Board. Id. The General Counsel is

appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of

the Senate, to a four-year term but may be removed by the

President at any time. Id.; see NLRB v. Aakash, Inc., 58 F.4th

1099, 1103–06 (9th Cir. 2023); see also Exela Enter. Sols.,

Inc. v. NLRB, 32 F.4th 436, 441–45 (5th Cir. 2022) (holding

“the NLRA does not provide tenure protections to the

General Counsel” so the President may remove the General

Counsel “without cause”).

Typically, a complaint is assigned to an Administrative

Law Judge (ALJ) for an initial hearing, report, and

recommended order. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)–(c); 29 C.F.R.

§ 102.34. But the Board, or an individual member of the

Board, may also conduct the hearing in the first instance. See

29 C.F.R. §§ 102.34, 102.50. ALJs are appointed by the

Board, 5 U.S.C. § 3105, and are removable by the Board

“only for good cause established and determined by the

Merit Systems Protection Board,” id. § 7521(a).

The Board is not bound by an ALJ’s findings or

conclusions. Once an ALJ has issued a report and

recommended order, the parties may file exceptions with the

Board. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c); 29 C.F.R. § 102.46. If no party

files exceptions, the ALJ’s recommended order becomes the

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB 7

Board’s order. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). Once the Board issues a

final decision, it may petition a federal court of appeals for

enforcement of the order. Id. § 160(e). Conversely, an

“aggrieved party” may petition a court of appeals to modify

or set aside the Board’s final order. Id. § 160(f).

B. Amazon’s Challenge

Amazon terminated its package-delivery contract with

Battle Tested Strategies (BTS) in April 2023, with a two-

month post-cancellation window in which BTS would

continue to deliver some Amazon packages. Shortly after the

cancellation, BTS recognized Teamsters Joint Council 42 as

the bargaining representative for its drivers and signed a

collective bargaining agreement with the union. The

Teamsters argued that Amazon and BTS were joint

employers and demanded that Amazon bargain with the

union, as the representative of BTS drivers. Amazon

declined and ceased contracting with BTS as scheduled.

The Teamsters filed various ULP charges against

Amazon with the Board. The Board’s General Counsel filed

a complaint based on those charges, alleging, in part, that

Amazon levied threats to discourage unionization, punished

those who unionized, and improperly refused to recognize

the Teamsters as a bargaining representative. Amazon then

sued the Board in this action seeking injunctive and

declaratory relief establishing that the statutory restrictions

on the President’s ability to remove the Board members and

ALJs are unconstitutional. Amazon also moved for a

preliminary injunction seeking to prevent the administrative

proceeding from going forward. The Teamsters moved to

intervene to protect the delivery drivers’ interests and file an

opposition to Amazon’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

8 AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB

The district court granted the motion, authorizing the

Teamsters to “fully participate in this action as a full party.”

The district court denied Amazon’s motion for a

preliminary injunction to halt the Board proceedings. It held

that the Norris-LaGuardia Act displaced the court’s

jurisdiction to issue an injunction because this case involves

a labor dispute. The district court also concluded that, even

if it had jurisdiction, Amazon had not proven that it would

suffer any irreparable harm from the asserted unlawful

removal restrictions. This appeal followed.

After oral argument on August 14, 2025, we ordered the

parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the Fifth

Circuit’s decision in Space Exploration Technologies Corp.

v. NLRB (SpaceX), 151 F.4th 761 (5th Cir. 2025), which was

issued on August 19. We also denied Amazon’s second

emergency motion for a stay of the administrative

proceedings pending appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

The Norris-LaGuardia Act removes the power of federal

courts to issue injunctive relief in cases “involving or

growing out of a labor dispute.” 29 U.S.C. § 101. Whether

this Act applies is a question of law that we review de novo.

BNSF v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Loc. 174, 203 F.3d 703, 707

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), as amended (Mar. 8, 2000).

The issue before us is a matter of statutory interpretation.

So “we start where we always do: with the text of the

statute.” Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374, 381

(2021). The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that “[n]o court

of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue

any . . . temporary or permanent injunction in a case

involving or growing out of a labor dispute.” 29 U.S.C.

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB 9

§ 101. The Act defines a “labor dispute” as “any controversy

concerning terms or conditions of employment, or

concerning the association or representation of persons in

negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to

arrange terms or conditions of employment.” Id. § 113(c). It

also explains:

A case shall be held to involve or to grow out

of a labor dispute when the case involves

persons who are engaged in the same

industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have

direct or indirect interests therein; or who are

employees of the same employer; or who are

members of the same or an affiliated

organization of employers or employees;

whether such dispute is (1) between one or

more employers or associations of employers

and one or more employees or associations of

employees; (2) between one or more

employers or associations of employers and

one or more employers or associations of

employers; or (3) between one or more

employees or associations of employees and

one or more employees or associations of

employees; or when the case involves any

conflicting or competing interests in a “labor

dispute” (as defined in this section) of

10 AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB

“persons participating or interested” therein

(as defined in this section).

Id. § 113(a) (emphasis added). 1

The Board and the Teamsters argue that this case grows

out of a labor dispute because Amazon brought a

constitutional challenge in district court only after the Board

decided to prosecute ULP claims against Amazon that the

Teamsters initially raised. They further contend that § 113(a)

establishes separate specifications for the pending case and

the underlying labor dispute. The pending case must involve

the “persons” identified in the first part of § 113(a), and the

underlying labor dispute must fall within the three numbered

descriptions in the second part. Applying this understanding,

the Board and the Teamsters reason that because this case

involves “an affiliated organization of . . . employees” (the

Teamsters) and because the underlying labor dispute is

between an “employer[] . . . and [an] . . . association[] of

employees” (Amazon and the Teamsters), both aspects of

§ 113(a) are satisfied. Id.

Amazon, on the other hand, argues that its constitutional

challenges to the Board and its proceedings are too far

removed from a labor dispute to trigger the Norris-

LaGuardia Act’s jurisdictional limitation. Adopting

wholesale the Fifth Circuit’s recent analysis in SpaceX,

Amazon contends that the Act does not apply because

(1) this is not an action between Amazon and its employees,

(2) the parties here are not “engaged in the same industry,

1

There are a few statutory and judicial exceptions to the Norris-

LaGuardia Act under which federal courts may still issue injunctions.

See 29 U.S.C. § 107; Reuter v. Skipper, 4 F.3d 716, 720 (9th Cir. 1993).

Amazon does not raise any of these exceptions here.

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB 11

trade, craft, or occupation,” id. § 113(b), and (3) its

constitutional claims do not relate to the “terms or conditions

of employment,” id. § 113(c).

We agree that § 113(a) imposes separate requirements

related to the pending case and the underlying labor dispute.

In defining when a case “involves or grows out of a labor

dispute,” this provision first defines “case,” identifying four

categories of cases based on the “persons” involved. 29

U.S.C. § 113(a). It then identifies the potential party

configurations of the underlying “dispute.” Id. And it ends

by identifying a final category of “case” based not on the

“persons” involved but rather the existence of “conflicting

or competing interests in a ‘labor dispute.’” Id.

“When Congress uses ‘one term in one place, and a

materially different term in another, the presumption is that

the different term denotes a different idea.’” FDA v. R.J.

Reynolds Vapor Co., 606 U.S. 226, 238–39 (2025) (quoting

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (1st ed. 2012)). Amazon’s

proposed reading of the Act, and the one adopted by the Fifth

Circuit, flouts this rule by ignoring the different statutory

descriptions for the case and the underlying dispute. See

SpaceX, 151 F.4th at 770 (noting that the definition of “labor

dispute” includes “any controversy concerning terms or

conditions of employment” but concluding the case

challenging removal protections for agency actors does “not

concern ‘terms or conditions of employment’”). This gloss

overlooks a common canon of statutory interpretation and

distorts the analysis. It is also at odds with the Third Circuit’s

recent decision in Spring Creek Rehabilitation & Nursing

Center LLC v. NLRB (Spring Creek), No. 24-3043, 2025 WL

3467537 (3d Cir. Dec. 3, 2025).

12 AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB

The plain text provides that the underlying labor dispute

must concern “terms or conditions of employment, or . . . the

association or representation of persons.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 113(c). The pending case need only “involve or . . . grow

out of” that dispute, it need not itself be a labor dispute. Id.

§ 113(a); accord id. § 101; see also Spring Creek, 2025 WL

3467537, at *3 (noting the distinction between the labor

dispute and the subject litigation). Thus, SpaceX’s reasoning

that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply because a case

raising constitutional challenges to the Board’s structure did

not concern “terms or conditions of employment, or . . . the

association or representation of persons,” is inapt. Id.

§ 113(c); see 151 F.4th at 770.

Having established that § 113(a) imposes separate

mandates for the pending case and the underlying labor

dispute, we now consider whether they are met here.

A. The Case

As stated above, § 113(a)’s explication of case requires

one of two categories to be satisfied. The first category

centers on the status of the “persons” involved in the case:

“the case involves persons who are engaged in the same

industry, trade, craft, or occupation,” “who . . . have direct

or indirect interests [in the labor dispute],” “who are

employees of the same employer,” or “who are members of

the same or an affiliated organization of employers or

employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 113(a). The second category

centers on the interests involved: “the case involves any

conflicting or competing interests in a ‘labor dispute’ . . . of

‘persons participating or interested’ therein.” Id. Construing

§ 113, the Supreme Court reasoned that a case involves or

grows out of a labor dispute under the Act when the

“persons” identified are “involved on both sides of the case”

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB 13

or when the case “‘involves any conflicting or competing

interests’ in a labor dispute of ‘persons’ who stand in any

one of several defined economic relationships.” 2 United

States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 275

(1947).

We also consider the meaning of “involves.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 113(a). “Involves” means “[t]o envelop within the folds of

some condition or circumstance” and “[t]o entangle (a

matter), to render intricate.” Involve, The Oxford English

Dictionary (1933) (parentheses in original); accord Involve,

Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934)

(defining involve as “to implicate; as to involve one in debt

or a crime; to be seriously involved” and “to contain by

implication; to require, as implied elements, antecedent

conditions, effect, etc.” (emphases omitted)). Thus, a case

must entangle or envelop the persons or interests described.

Section 113(a)’s case-related requirements are met here.

Amazon brought this action because it is an employer facing

ULP charges that will be adjudicated in Board proceedings.

And the Teamsters is a party in its capacity as the bargaining

representative for BTS drivers whose contract was

terminated by Amazon and the entity that initiated the ULP

allegations against Amazon. This case clearly “involves

2

The statute provides that the presentation of “conflicting or competing

interests in a ‘labor dispute’” must be of “‘persons participating or

interested’ [in the labor dispute].” 29 U.S.C. § 113(a). A person

“participating or interested in a labor dispute” is defined as a person or

association against whom “relief is sought” or who “is engaged in the

same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs,

or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or agent

of any association composed in whole or in part of employers or

employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or occupation.” Id.

§ 113(b).

14 AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB

persons who . . . have direct or indirect interests [in the

underlying labor dispute].” 29 U.S.C. § 113(a). Both

Amazon and the Teamsters are entangled in or implicated in

the issues to be decided here because Amazon’s

constitutional challenges concern the agency’s adjudication

of the ULP claims that the Teamsters initiated. By raising its

ULP allegations with the Board, the Teamsters availed itself

of its sole mechanism for vindicating its rights under the

NLRA. “Congress has entrusted to the Board exclusively the

prosecution of the [ULP] proceeding by its own complaint,

the conduct of the hearing, the adjudication and the granting

of appropriate relief.” Amalgamated Util. Workers v.

Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 309 U.S. 261, 265 (1940); see

also Spring Creek, 2025 WL 3467537, at *4 (holding a

constitutional challenge to the NLRB involved or grew out

of a labor dispute because the challenge “could not have

[been] brought . . . but for the underlying dispute”).

Amazon suggests that § 113 is not satisfied because it

did not name the Teamsters as a party to this lawsuit. We

disagree. “One who is not an original party to a lawsuit may

of course become a party by intervention . . . .” Karcher v.

May, 484 U.S. 72, 77 (1987). The Teamsters intervened

here, without objection from Amazon, and the district court

ordered that the Teamsters could “participate in this action

as a full party.” The Teamsters undoubtedly have a strong

interest in this case. See Spring Creek, 2025 WL 3467537,

at *4 n.4 (concluding that filing the initial ULP charge and

intervening in the challenge to the NLRB’s constitutional

authority gave the union a strong interest in the case). Thus,

we conclude that this case satisfies § 113(a)’s requirements.

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB 15

B. The Labor Dispute

As already discussed, § 113 defines both the substantive

and procedural contours of a “labor dispute.” Subsection (c)

provides that a “‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy

concerning terms or conditions of employment, or

concerning the association or representation of persons in

negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to

arrange terms or conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 113(c). And subsection (a) makes clear that “such dispute”

may take multiple forms. Id. § 113(a).

Here, the underlying Board proceeding obviously is a

labor dispute. It concerns the terms of employment and the

representation of the BTS drivers. Id. § 113(c). And the

dispute is “between one or more employers . . . and one or

more employees or associations of employees,” id.

§ 113(a)—namely, Amazon (as employer) and the

Teamsters (as the drivers’ bargaining representative). This

dispute satisfies § 113.

C. Amazon’s Counterarguments

Amazon makes several arguments for why this case does

not trigger the Norris-LaGuardia Act, none of which are

persuasive.

1.

Relying on SpaceX, Amazon argues that the Act does not

apply because “[t]his case involves a suit between Amazon

and the NLRB, not between Amazon and its employees.”

See SpaceX, 151 F.4th at 770 (holding the “suits” at issue

fell outside the Act because “they are not between the

Employers and their employees—they are between the

Employers and the NLRB”). This argument fails to

distinguish between the case-related and labor dispute-

16 AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB

related requirements. A controversy “between one or more

employers . . . and one or more employees or associations of

employees” is one of the forms of labor disputes that trigger

§ 113(a). The pending case does not itself have to be in this

form to “involve or . . . grow out of a labor dispute.” Again,

there is no reason to ignore the “well-established canon of

statutory interpretation that the use of different words . . .

demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different

meaning for those words.” United States v. Lemus, 93 F.4th

1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting SEC v. McCarthy, 322

F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003)).

The statutory history further reinforces that the Act’s

application is not confined to lawsuits between employers

and employees. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 256 (1st ed.

2012) (explaining that statutory history is “part of the

context of a statute”). In 1914, Congress passed the Clayton

Act, which prohibited injunctive relief in “any case between

an employer and employees” (and in cases involving similar

relationships). 29 U.S.C. § 52. The Norris-LaGuardia Act,

passed in 1932, expanded the Clayton Act’s bar on

injunctive relief to other types of cases arising out of labor

disputes. BNSF, 203 F.3d at 711 (noting it was “Congress’s

explicit intention[]” in passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act to

expand “labor dispute” beyond disputes involving an

employer and employee). The Fifth Circuit’s narrow reading

conflicts with Congress’s legislative judgment.

The Fifth Circuit also relied on history—legislative

history. It observed that “Congress passed the Act ‘in

response to federal-court intervention on behalf of

employers through the use of injunctive powers against

unions and other associations of employees.’” SpaceX, 151

F.4th at 770 (quoting Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v.

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB 17

Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702, 715 (1982)). And

from this, it concluded that “Congress was not aiming to bar

constitutional challenges to agency structure; it was

targeting judicial overreach against employees.” Id.

There are two problems with this reasoning. First, “the

will of Congress” is reflected in its legislative text, and we

undermine that will if we read the text “in a spirit of

mutilating narrowness.” United States v. Hutcheson, 312

U.S. 219, 235 (1941); see also Spring Creek, 2025 WL

3467537, at *6 (rejecting this aspect of SpaceX, and

declining “to read into the Act an exception that does not

exist”). Where the plain text is clear, “speculation about

what Congress may have intended matters far less than what

Congress actually enacted.” Medina v. Planned Parenthood

S. Atl., 606 U.S. 357, 381 (2025). Second, Amazon’s

requested injunction would impede union activities, the very

outcome the Act was enacted to prevent. As previously

discussed, the Teamsters availed itself of its sole mechanism

for vindicating its rights under the NLRA by presenting its

ULP allegations to the Board. See Amalgamated Util.

Workers, 309 U.S. at 264. Thus, enjoining the Board’s

adjudication of those issues would enjoin the Teamsters’

efforts to receive the labor protections afforded by Congress.

See generally Spring Creek, 2025 WL 3467537, at *6.

Precedent supports this conclusion. The Supreme Court

has construed the Norris-LaGuardia Act to cover cases other

than those between employer and employee. See, e.g., New

Negro All. v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 560–61

(1938) (reading the Act to “embrace controversies other than

those between employers and employees; between labor

unions seeking to represent employees and employers; and

between persons seeking employment and employers”);

Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 146

18 AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB

(1942) (“We recognize that by the terms of the statute there

may be a ‘labor dispute’ where the disputants do not stand in

the proximate relation of employer and employee.”). The

Fifth Circuit’s earlier decision in United Steelworkers of

America v. Bishop, 598 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1979), is also

instructive. In Bishop, a customer filed a replevin action

against a steel-fabrication plant when its order was not

completed due to a workers’ strike. Id. at 410. The customer

demanded that the plant return the unfabricated steel, and a

court issued an injunction compelling the plant to do so. Id.

at 410–11. The Fifth Circuit held that the court lacked

jurisdiction to issue the injunction, notwithstanding that the

lawsuit concerned a contract action between the customer

and plant. Id. at 414–15. “It is implicit, if not explicit, in [29

U.S.C. § 113] that a sufficient connection may exist between

a litigant not directly involved in the labor dispute and the

labor dispute itself that the case can be said to arise from the

labor dispute, even though the union itself is not directly

enjoined.” Id.

Amazon relies on Columbia River Packers for the

proposition that the present case involves a controversy

“upon which the employer-employee relationship has no

bearing.” 315 U.S. at 147. Columbia River Packers is

inapposite because it concerns what constitutes a “labor

dispute” under 29 U.S.C. § 113(c), whereas this case

concerns what constitutes a case that “involve[s] or . . .

grow[s] out of a labor dispute” under § 113(a).

At issue in Columbia River Packers was a fish

processor’s antitrust suit brought against an association of

independent fishermen. See 315 U.S. at 143–44. Although

the association called itself a union, its members were

fishermen who owned their boats and “carr[ied] on their

business as independent entrepreneurs, uncontrolled by the

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB 19

[plaintiff processing company] or other processors.” Id. at

144–45. The association contracted with processors,

obliging the processors to purchase fish only from union

members and union members to sell only to contracted

processors. See id. at 145. The plaintiff processing company

refused to contract on these terms, and, given the

association’s control over the fish supply, was unable to

source enough fish for its business. See id. The Supreme

Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was inapplicable

because the case involved “a dispute among businessmen

over the terms of a contract,” not a § 113 labor dispute. Id.

The fish sellers were not employees of the processors, did

not seek to be, and thus operated “free from such controls as

an employer might exercise.” Id. at 147. That is, the dispute

was a “controvers[y] upon which the employer-employee

relationship,” and consequently the Act, “ha[d] no bearing.”

Id.

Here, the existence of a labor dispute cannot reasonably

be contested. Indeed, Amazon does not dispute that the

charges pending before the Board are a labor dispute. Rather,

Amazon argues that the relationship between the claims

raised here and that underlying dispute is too attenuated to

say that this case “involv[es] or grow[s] out of [that] labor

dispute.” 29 U.S.C. § 101. Amazon also suggests that it

cannot be said that this case grows out of a labor dispute

because Amazon has raised constitutional challenges.

The latter point is foreclosed by precedent. See Reuter v.

Skipper, 4 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1993) (“reject[ing]”

plaintiff’s argument that “because her action [was] founded

upon an alleged constitutional violation . . . her case [was]

not a ‘labor dispute’” under the Act); see also Spring Creek,

2025 WL 3467537, at *6 (recognizing the Act’s “anti-

injunction provisions . . . serve the broader goal of

20 AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB

preventing judicial interference in management-labor

relations” and that “Congress has not exempted challenges

to agency structure from the Act’s ambit” (citation

modified)). The constitutional nature of Amazon’s claims is

not determinative. The former point also fails. Returning to

Bishop, the Fifth Circuit faulted the district court for only

superficially examining the contract suit without

recognizing that a labor dispute was the underlying cause of

the contractual controversy. 598 F.2d at 415; see also Loc.

1814, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. N.Y. Shipping Ass’n,

965 F.2d 1224, 1235 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing that RICO

disputes can be labor disputes, and “the categories are not

mutually exclusive”). So too here. Amazon’s constitutional

challenges concern the Board’s power to adjudicate the labor

dispute that exists between Amazon and the Teamsters.

Indeed, Amazon acknowledges that “[t]his lawsuit was

sparked by” those proceedings.

In sum, Amazon’s assertion that this case does not

involve a labor dispute because the controversy presented is

not directly between employer and employee or has no

bearing on the employer-employee relationship is

unpersuasive.

2.

Amazon also argues that the Act does not apply because

“[t]his case does not involve parties ‘engaged in the same

industry, trade, craft, or occupation’ because it is a suit

between Amazon and [the Board].” We need not wrestle

long with this point because § 113(a) provides multiple

categories of cases that grow out of a labor dispute, and a

“case involv[ing] persons who are engaged in the same

industry, trade, craft, or occupation” is only one of them. 29

U.S.C. § 113(a). Where we conclude that one of the other

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB 21

statutory categories applies, we need not address this

alternative category.

3.

Finally, Amazon urges us to adopt SpaceX’s application

of the Thunder Basin factors. See SpaceX, 151 F.4th at 771

(discussing Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200

(1994)). The Thunder Basin inquiry arises when Congress

enacts a statutory-review scheme of agency action that

implicitly divests district courts of jurisdiction. See 510 U.S.

at 207. Typically, Congress does so by providing for direct

judicial review of administrative action in the courts of

appeals. Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175, 185 (2023).

In this context, courts ask “whether the particular claims

brought were ‘of the type Congress intended to be reviewed

within this statutory structure.’” Id. at 186 (quoting Thunder

Basin, 510 U.S. at 212). In other words, the Thunder Basin

inquiry probes whether an alternative review scheme for

some claims covers all claims arising out of the subject

agency action. See id. at 185.

In SpaceX, the Fifth Circuit held that even if the Norris-

LaGuardia Act’s “plain text [was] not dispositive,” suits

involving constitutional challenges to the Board “would still

fall within the district courts’ jurisdiction” under Thunder

Basin. SpaceX, 151 F.4th at 771. That invocation of Thunder

Basin was misplaced. The question is not whether the

Norris-LaGuardia Act implicitly divests courts of

jurisdiction over a type of claim. It is whether the explicit

text of the Act bars jurisdiction to issue injunctions. That

question is answered by the text, not by Thunder Basin. See

Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399, 413 (2020) (“[W]here, as here,

the words of a statute are unambiguous, the ‘judicial inquiry

is complete.’” (alteration omitted) (quoting Desert Palace,

22 AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB

Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003))); see also Spring

Creek, 2025 WL 3467537, at *6 n.6 (“The Thunder

Basin factors are [] off point in addressing the jurisdictional

question here.”).

Both Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting

Oversight Board and Axon recognize that Congress’s

explicit words control—even where Thunder Basin might

otherwise apply. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477, 489

(2010) (applying Thunder Basin because the text did “not

expressly limit the jurisdiction that other statutes confer on

district courts”); Axon, 598 U.S. at 185 (noting that Congress

may explicitly substitute an alternative review scheme); see

also Axon, 598 U.S. at 208 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in

judgment) (explaining that Thunder Basin “defies” or

“[m]aybe worse . . . exhibits familiarity with none” of the

text-first principles of statutory interpretation). These cases

also emphasize that Thunder Basin is about the power of

judicial review in the district court—not the power of the

judiciary as a whole. See Axon, 598 U.S. at 185–86; see also

Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 489. Indeed, the Norris-

LaGuardia Act’s administrative-review scheme likely would

not preclude this suit from being heard in district court. See

Axon, 598 U.S. at 189–96 (applying the Thunder Basin

factors to conclude that similar challenges to removal

protections for Federal Trade Commission and Securities

and Exchange Commission ALJs could proceed in federal

court). Ultimately, the subject matter of this case may be

reviewable, but federal courts nonetheless lack the power to

grant the injunctive relief that Amazon sought.

III. CONCLUSION

In the split between the Third and Fifth Circuits, we

agree with the Third Circuit. “Federal courts are courts of

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NLRB 23

limited jurisdiction. [We] possess only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be

expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted);

accord Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10

(1799). Subject to exceptions not at issue here, Congress

displaced the federal judiciary’s power to issue injunctive

relief in cases “involving or growing out of a labor dispute.”

29 U.S.C. § 101. This case comes within the definition of

such limitation, to which the district court properly adhered

by denying Amazon’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

AFFIRMED.