SHEEHAN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CIARA SHEEHAN, ET AL. : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. :

:

EVERSTORY PARTNERS, ET AL. : NO. 24-6581

MEMORANDUM

Padova, J. December 23, 2025

Plaintiffs Ciara Sheehan, Justine Heydorn, Lisa Polascak, Tara Iannacone, and Lorraine

Hernandez, former employees of Defendant Everstory Partners (“Everstory”), have brought this

action against Everstory and Matthew Sobon, their former supervisor, asserting federal and state

law claims of sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation, as well as a state law claim

of wrongful discharge and a claim under Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment and Collection Law.

Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Civil Complaint (“Amended

Complaint”) in part, asking this Court to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims with the exception of

Polascak’s Wage Payment and Collection Law claim. We deny the Motion for the reasons set forth

below.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Amended Complaint alleges the following facts. Everstory owns funeral homes and

cemeteries, including Kirk & Nice Suburban Chapel and Sunset Memorial Park in Huntingdon

Valley, Pennsylvania, where all of the Plaintiffs worked. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 32.) Sobon is an

employee of Everstory and was Plaintiffs’ supervisor. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs began working for

Everstory at different times, with Hernandez starting in August 2015, Polascak starting in

December 2019, Sheehan starting in August 2021, Iannacone starting in November 2021, and

Heydorn starting in June 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 26-30.)

Plaintiffs heard Sabon and Funeral Director and General Manager Joe Lebisky make sexual

remarks while they were employed by Everstory. In one instance, some of the Plaintiffs heard

Sabon and Lebisky refer to an unidentified female employee of Everstory as a “cunt” and a “useless

bitch.” (Id. ¶ 34.) The other Plaintiffs were aware of these comments. (Id. ¶ 35.) In addition,

Lebisky frequently commented in front of Plaintiffs that the building in which Plaintiffs worked

was “nothing but a fucking sorority.” (Id. ¶ 38.) He also made sexual comments to Plaintiffs

Hernandez and Heydorn. Specifically, Lebisky frequently made comments to Hernandez such as

“your tits look great,” which the other Plaintiffs witnessed. (Id. ¶¶ 39-40.) Lebisky also repeatedly

stated that Heydorn “could crush his head with her thighs.” (Id. ¶ 41 (emphasis omitted).)

Plaintiffs all heard Lebisky make these comments to Heydorn. (Id. ¶ 42.)

Lebisky also engaged in performative sexual harassment directed towards Heydorn and

two other female employees of Everstory. On one occasion in July 2022, “Lebisky placed a pair

of men’s underpants in a high-traffic, common area . . . with a note to Plaintiff Heydorn stating

that he could not wait to see her” (the “underpants incident”). (Id. ¶ 50.) All of the Plaintiffs saw

Lebisky’s underpants and note. (Id. ¶ 51.) In May 2021, Lebisky “drew devil horns and a

mustache” on a picture of an unidentified female employee and wrote “Fatal Attraction” on the

picture to indicate that the female employee was sexually obsessed with him (the “Fatal Attraction

picture”). (Id. ¶¶ 44, 45.) Polascak and Hernandez both saw this picture. (Id. ¶ 46.) In March

2022, Lebisky wrote the name of an unidentified female employee, whom he perceived to be

overweight, and the words “Lift 5000” on a lift in a common area (the “Lift 5000 incident”). (Id.

¶¶ 47-48.) Sheehan, Iannacone, Polascak, and Hernandez saw the message on the lift. (Id. ¶ 49.)

In addition, an unnamed manager repeatedly called Polascak “ugly” in March 2020. (Id. ¶ 43.)

In 2022 and 2023, Plaintiffs complained about Defendants’ violation of rules promulgated

by the State Board of Funeral Directors, which Defendants had ordered Plaintiffs to violate. (Id.

¶¶ 52-53.) In one instance, Polascak refused Sobon’s request that she illegally cremate a body

without any paperwork, an incident that Sheehan reported to Everstory. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 58.) Sobon

also asked “Polascak to violate the law by hiding the fact that a direct cremation package was sold

by the cemetery to a family.” (Id. ¶ 56.) When Polascak refused Sobon’s requests that she violate

the law, Sobon screamed at her and threatened to fire her. (Id. ¶¶ 55, 57.) Iannacone reported to

Everstory that Sobon pressured her and other Plaintiffs to perform illegal disinterments without

the proper paperwork, which Plaintiffs refused to do. (Id. ¶¶ 59-60.) In yet another incident,

Everstory “pressured . . . Heydorn to illegally identify a body that had been placed in the wrong

crypt without authorization,” but Heydorn refused to violate the law. (Id. ¶¶ 61-62.)

On February 13, 2023, Polascak made a complaint of sex discrimination to Everstory’s

Human Resources Department. (Id. ¶ 63.) Plaintiffs Sheehan, Heydorn, Iannacone, and

Hernandez all participated in the investigation of Polascak’s complaint. (Id. ¶ 64.) Later that

month, Sheehan, Heydorn, and Iannacone complained to their General Manager, Donald

Underwood, that Sobon was discriminating against them on the basis of their sex. (Id. ¶¶ 65-66.)

They asked Underwood to help them make a report to HR. (Id. ¶ 67.) Polascak attended the

meeting with Underwood and also asked for his help in connection with her own complaint of sex

discrimination. (Id. ¶ 68.) Instead of helping Plaintiffs, Underwood, in violation of company

policy, told Sobon about their complaints of sex discrimination. (Id. ¶ 69.)

The weekend after Sobon learned about Polasack’s sex discrimination complaint, he

“continually called her and left multiple voicemail messages in an effort to intimidate her into

withdrawing her complaint of discrimination.” (Id. ¶ 71.) In addition, Everstory made escalating

threats to terminate Polascak if she refused to violate the law. (Id. ¶ 72.) Polascak was concerned

that she would lose her licensure if Everstory fired her, so she resigned her job on February 24,

2023. (Id. ¶¶ 73-74.) Everstory failed to pay Polascak her final paycheck. (Id. ¶ 75.)

On March 20, 2023, about a month after they complained about sex discrimination,

Sheehan, Heydorn, and Iannacone were suspended for violating Everstory’s “policy by accepting

and/or authorizing payment for performing pallbearing services” even though Everstory was aware

that none of them had violated this policy. (Id. ¶¶ 77-78.) Everstory terminated Sheehan, Heydorn,

and Iannacone on March 27, 2023. (Id. ¶ 79.) Sobon and Lebisky participated in Everstory’s

decision to terminate these Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 80.) A male employee who allegedly engaged in the

same conduct was not disciplined or terminated. (Id. ¶ 81.)

On May 7, 2023, Hernandez made a complaint of sex discrimination to Lebisky. (Id. ¶¶

82-83.) On May 15, 2023, Hernandez was terminated, purportedly due in part, to the language she

used in making her complaint. (Id. ¶ 84.) Plaintiffs were all replaced by male employees. (Id. ¶

85.)

The Amended Complaint asserts eight claims for relief. Count I is a claim brought by all

Plaintiffs against Everstory for retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). Count II is a claim brought by all Plaintiffs against

Everstory and Sobon for retaliation in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act

(“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq. Count III is a claim brought by all Plaintiffs against

Everstory for disparate treatment sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Count IV is a claim

brought by all Plaintiffs against Everstory and Sobon for disparate treatment sex discrimination in

violation of the PRHA. Count V is a claim brought by all Plaintiffs against Everstory for hostile

work environment in violation of Title VII. Count VI is a claim brought by all Plaintiffs against

Everstory and Sobon for hostile work environment in violation of the PHRA. Count VII is a claim

brought by Sheehan, Heydorn, Polascak, and Iannacone against Everstory for wrongful discharge

in violation of Pennsylvania common law. Count VIII is a claim brought by Polascak against

Everstory for failure to pay her all wages that it owed her in violation of the Pennsylvania Wage

Payment and Collection Law, 43 Pa. Stat. § 260.1. et seq.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants have moved to dismiss Counts I through VII pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). When we apply Rule 12(b)(6), we “consider only the complaint, exhibits

attached to the complaint, [and] matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic

documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon [those] documents.” Alpizar-Fallas v.

Favero, 908 F.3d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir.

2010)). “A complaint is properly dismissed for failing to state a claim ‘if, accepting all well-

pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, a court finds that [the] plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.’” Talley v. Pillai, 116

F.4th 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc.,

643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011)). “[W]e need not ‘accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation.’” Host Int’l, Inc. v. MarketPlace, PHL, LLC, 32 F.4th 242, 248 (3d Cir.

2022) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)) (citation omitted). The complaint

must allege “‘sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible,’ thus enabling

‘the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for [the] misconduct

alleged.’” Warren Gen. Hosp., 643 F.3d at 84 (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,

210 (3d Cir. 2009)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). A

complaint fails to allege a facially plausible claim if the factual allegations in the complaint are

not sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Geness v. Admin. Off. of Pa.

Cts., 974 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Hostile Work Environment

Defendants argue that Counts V and VI should be dismissed because the Amended

Complaint fails to allege plausible claims that Defendants created a hostile work environment

based on sexual harassment in violation of Title VII and the PHRA on behalf of any of Plaintiffs.

We analyze Plaintiffs’ claims under Title VII and the PHRA under the same standard. See Faush

v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Claims brought under the

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq., are generally ‘interpreted

coextensively with Title VII claims.’” (quoting Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 179 n.1 (3d

Cir. 2009)). A facially plausible hostile work environment claim must allege the following: “‘1)

the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his/her sex, 2) the discrimination was

severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, 4) the discrimination

would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) [with regard to a claim

brought against an employer] the existence of respondeat superior liability.’” Moody v. Atl. City

Bd. of Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 213 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706

F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013)) (citation omitted).

We previously addressed Defendants’ assertion that Counts V and VI should be dismissed

with respect to the hostile work environment claims asserted by Sheehan, Heydorn, Polascak, and

Iannacone in our Memorandum denying Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and

“conclude[d] that the Amended Complaint states a facially plausible hostile work environment

claim based on sexual harassment on behalf of [Sheehan, Heydorn, Polascak, and Iannacone].”

See Sheehan v. Everstory Partners, Civ. A. No. 24-6581, 2025 WL 2671056, at *7-9 (E.D. Pa. Sept.

17, 2025). That conclusion is now the law of this case. See Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Lafarge N.

Am., Inc., 59 F.4th 55, 61 (3d Cir. 2023) (“The law of the case doctrine ‘prevents reconsideration

of legal issues already decided in earlier stages of a case.’” (quoting Bedrosian v. IRS, 42 F.4th

174, 181 (3d Cir. 2022))). Therefore, in connection with this Motion, we need only address

Defendants’ arguments with respect to Hernandez’s hostile work environment claim.

1. Intentional Discrimination on the Basis of Sex

Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint fails to allege the first element of a facially

plausible hostile work environment claim on behalf of Hernandez because its allegation that

“Lebisky would frequently make sexual comments to Plaintiff Hernandez such as ‘[Plaintiff

Hernandez], your tits look great” (Am. Compl. ¶ 39 (emphasis omitted)) is insufficient to support

a reasonable inference that Hernandez suffered intentional discrimination because of her sex. We

note that, while this is the Amended Complaint’s only allegation of a sexually harassing remark

made directly to Hernandez by Lebisky, it is not the only allegation of a sexually harassing remark

or sexually harassing conduct that Hernandez personally experienced or witnessed, or of which

she was aware. As we described above, the Amended Complaint alleges that some of the Plaintiffs

heard Sobon and Lebisky “refer to a female employee as a ‘cunt’ and a ‘useless bitch’” and that

all of the Plaintiffs were aware of these remarks. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-35.) All of the Plaintiffs are

also alleged to have witnessed Lebisky making frequent comments that the building in which they

worked was “‘nothing but a fucking sorority.’” (Id. ¶ 38.) Lebisky frequently said, in front of all

Plaintiffs that Heydorn “could crush his head with her thighs.” (Id. ¶¶ 41-42 (emphasis omitted).)

The Amended Complaint also alleges that Hernandez saw the Fatal Attraction picture, the Lift

5000 incident, and the underpants incident. (See id. ¶¶ 44, 46, 47-51.) The Amended Complaint

also alleges that “[a]ll Plaintiffs were adversely affected by the aforementioned hostile work

environment on the basis of sex.” (Id. ¶¶ 110, 114 (emphasis omitted).) Viewing these allegations

of the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Hernandez, we conclude that the

Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that Hernandez was subjected to intentional sexual

harassment and thereby satisfies the pleading requirement for the first element of a hostile work

environment claim on her behalf. We therefore deny the Motion to Dismiss with respect to this

argument.

2. The Severity or Pervasiveness of the Sexual Harassment

Defendants also argue that the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege the second

element of a hostile work environment claim, i.e., that Hernandez suffered sexual harassment that

was severe or pervasive. The Supreme Court has explained that the “‘severe or pervasive’”

standard “is an objective standard, based on ‘an environment that a reasonable person would find

hostile or abusive.’” Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co, 636 F. App’x 831, 846 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.17, 21 (1993)). “To determine if the alleged harassment is so

hostile or abusive to rise to the level of an unlawful hostile environment, the Supreme Court directs

courts to ‘look[] at all the circumstances,’ including the frequency of the alleged conduct.” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23) (citation omitted). “‘The question of

whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive must be judged by looking at all the

circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably

interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Flores v. Charlton, Civ. A. No. 17-4848, 2019

WL 3801951, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2019) (quoting Moody, 870 F.3d at 215). “‘Isolated

incidents and offhanded comments . . . are not sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment

claim,’ ‘even if they engender offensive feelings in an employee.’” Id. at *4 (alteration in original)

(first quoting Stucke v. City of Phila., 685 F. App’x 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2017); then quoting Greer v.

Mondelez Global, Inc., 590 F. App’x 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014)).

As we discussed in the preceding paragraph, the Amended Complaint alleges that “Lebisky

made frequent sexual comments to Hernandez such as ‘[Hernandez] your tits look great.’” (Am.

Compl. ¶ 39 (emphasis omitted).) Defendants argue that this allegation is insufficient to allege

frequency because it does not specify “the actual frequency or dates of the alleged comments” and

suggest that Lebisky only made this comment once, which, while inappropriate, would not be

sufficient to establish a hostile work environment. (Defs. Mem. at 24.) However, when we apply

the 12(b)(6) standard, “‘all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and

interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must be drawn in favor

of them.’” St. Luke’s Health Network, Inc. v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 967 F.3d 295, 299 (3d Cir.

2020) (quoting McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009)). The Oxford English

Dictionary defines “frequently” as “[a]t frequent or short intervals, often, repeatedly.” Oxford

English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/frequently_adv?tab=meaning_and_use#369

9174 (last visited Dec. 2, 2025). This established definition thus allows for the reasonable

inference that Lebisky made these comments significantly more than once, and we reject

Defendants’ contrary assertion. Viewing the allegations of frequency in the Amended Complaint

in the light most favorable to Hernandez, we conclude that these allegations satisfy the frequency

aspect of the severe or pervasive requirement. Moreover, while Lebisky’s comments may not have

been physically threatening, they were clearly humiliating and more than mere offensive

utterances. See Flores, 2019 WL 3801951, at *3. We therefore conclude that these allegations

support a reasonable inference that the harassment of Hernandez was severe as well a frequent.

For these reasons, we conclude that the Amended Complaint plausibly pleads the second element

of a hostile work environment claim with respect to Herandez, and we deny the Motion to Dismiss

with respect to this argument.

3. The Effect of this Conduct

As noted above, in order to satisfy the third and fourth elements of a hostile work

environment claim, the Amended Complaint must plausibly allege that the sexual harassment

detrimentally affected Hernandez and that this conduct “‘would detrimentally affect a reasonable

person in like circumstances.’” Moody, 870 F.3d at 213 (quoting Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167) (citation

omitted). Defendants contend that the Amended Complaint fails to satisfy these factors. The

Amended Complaint specifically alleges that all of the Plaintiffs were adversely affected by the

hostile work environment. (Am. Compl. ¶ 110.) Moreover, we easily conclude that the allegations

of Lebisky’s frequently repeated comments that the Plaintiffs’ workplace was “a fucking sorority,”

that Hernandez’s “tits look great,” and that Heydorn could crush his head with her thighs, together

with the Fatal Attraction picture and the Lift 5000 and underpants incidents, give rise to an

inference that a reasonable person in like circumstances would have been detrimentally affected.

See Mandel, 706 F.3d at 161, 168 (finding that an objectively reasonable person could be offended

by comments made by supervisors who referred to a female employee as “‘darling,’ ‘the woman,’

‘fluffy,’ ‘missy,’ ‘hon,’ and ‘toots’; having her body, clothing, and physical appearance

commented on; being told that she was ‘foolish not to use [her] assets . . . [and] being told [by a

manager] that he fantasized about her while he was having sex with his wife” (first alteration in

original)). We thus conclude that the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges the third and fourth

elements of a hostile work environment claim on behalf of Hernandez and we deny the Motion to

Dismiss with respect to this argument. Having rejected all of Defendants’ arguments that the

Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege a claim of hostile work environment against

Everstory, we deny the Motion to Dismiss with respect to Count V of the Amended Complaint and

with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim against Everstory in Count VI.

4. Sobon

Defendants also argue that we should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim of hostile work environment

in violation of the PHRA against Sobon in Count VI because the Amended Complaint does not

allege that he aided and abetted, or personally engaged in, sexually harassing conduct against

Plaintiffs. “‘The PHRA allows individual supervisors to be held liable for aiding and abetting an

employer’s violation of the PHRA under 43 P.S. § 955(e).’” Lara v. Samuel Adams Pa. Brewing

Co., Civ. A. No. 20-0498, 2020 WL 5211206, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2020) (quoting Merces-

Clark v. Pennsylvania, Civ. A. No. 13-2111, 2013 WL 6096324, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2013)).

“‘[A] supervisory employee may also be found liable for direct acts of discrimination under §

955(e) if the supervisor shared the intent and purpose of his employer.’” Id. (quoting Merces-Clark,

2013 WL 6096324, at *3). “[T]o make out a PHRA claim for aiding and abetting against an

individual employee, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about and substantially

assisted or encouraged the discrimination that the plaintiff experienced.” Lett v. Se. Pa. Transp.

Auth., Civ. A. No. 19-3170, 2022 WL 4542093, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2022) (citing Failla v.

City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1998); Landy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d

139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973)). N ascertaining “whether a defendant provided substantial

encouragement or assistance, the Court considers ‘the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of

assistance given by the defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation to the

other and his state of mind.’” Id. at *20 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b), cmt. on

clause (b)) (citing Jackson v. T&N Van Serv., 117 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). The

United States Corut of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also found that “repeatedly refus[ing] to

take prompt action to end the harassment directed at [a] Plaintiff . . . would constitute aiding and

abetting.” Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 1996).

The Amended Complaint alleges that some of the Plaintiffs heard Sobon personally engage

in one act of sexually harassing conduct by referring to a woman who was employed by Everstory

as “a ‘cunt’ and a ‘useless bitch.’” (Am. Compl. ¶ 34 (emphasis omitted).) The Amended

Complaint also alleges that, the weekend after Sobon learned that Polascak had made a complaint

of discrimination, he “continually called her and left multiple voicemail messages in an effort to

intimidate her into withdrawing her complaint of discrimination.” (Id. ¶ 71.) Viewing these

allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, we conclude that they sufficiently allege that

Sobon personally was aware of the harassment of Polascak through her complaint and not only

took no action to end that harassment but actively attempted to prevent her from pursuing her

complaint by intimidating her. We thus conclude that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges

that Sobon aided and abetted sexual harassment in violation of the PHRA. See Dici, 91 F.3d at

553.

Based on our prior determination that the Amended Complaint alleges facially plausible

hostile work environment claims in Counts V and VI on behalf of Plaintiffs Sheehan, Heydorn,

Polascak, and Iannacone, and our conclusion here that Counts V and VI of the Amended Complaint

state facially plausible hostile work environment claims based on sexual harassment on behalf of

Hernandez, and that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges a hostile work environment claim

in violation of the PHRA against Sobon, we deny the Motion to Dismiss as to both Counts V and

VI of the Amended Complaint.

B. Sexual Discrimination – Disparate Treatment

Count III of the Amended Complaint asserts a claim for disparate treatment sex

discrimination in violation of Title VII against Everstory and Count IV asserts a claim of disparate

treatment sex discrimination in violation of the PHRA against Everstory and Sobon. Title VII

makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or

otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The PHRA similarly makes it unlawful for any

employer to “refuse to hire or employ or contract with, or to bar or to discharge from employment

[an] individual . . . or to otherwise discriminate against such individual . . . with respect to

compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment or contract” on the basis

of “race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin or non-job related handicap or

disability . . . .” 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 955(a). Disparate treatment claims under Title VII and the

PHRA “are governed by essentially the same legal standards.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp.,

809 F.3d 780, 791 n.8 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Defendants ask us to dismiss Counts III

and IV on the ground that the Amended Complaint fails to allege a facially plausible disparate

treatment claim on behalf of any Plaintiff.

Where, as here, a complaint does not allege direct evidence of discrimination, we review

discrimination claims using the burden shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McMullen v. Arcadia Univ., 779 F. App’x 916, 918 (3d Cir. 2019).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained the McDonnell Douglas

framework for sex discrimination claims as follows:

Under this framework, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of sex

discrimination, which requires showing that she (1) “is a member of a protected

class;” (2) is “qualified for the position” she seeks to retain; (3) “suffered an adverse

employment action;” and that (4) “‘the action occurred under circumstances that

could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”

Id. (quoting Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008)). “‘The burden of establishing a

prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.’” Id. (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). “To establish the fourth element [of a prima facie case of

sex discrimination], a plaintiff may either: (1) introduce evidence of comparators . . .; or (2) rely

on circumstantial evidence that otherwise shows a causal nexus between his membership in a

protected class and the adverse employment action.” Greene v. Virgin Islands Water & Power

Auth., 557 F. App’x 189, 195 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

1. Polascak

Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint fails to allege a plausible disparate

treatment sex discrimination claims with respect to Polascak because it fails to plead that

Defendants took adverse any action against her. “What constitutes an ‘adverse employment’ action

for purposes of Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision is not a heavy lift, but it is not weightless.”

Smith v. Phillips & Assoc., Inc., Civ. A. No. 24-0476, 2025 WL 2725932, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Sept.

25, 2025) (quoting Betts v. Summit Oaks Hosp., 687 Fed. App’x. 206, 207 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing

Cavanaugh v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP., 733 F. Supp. 3d 362, 369 (M.D. Pa. 2024), appeal dismissed

sub nom. Cavanaugh v. WalMart Stores E. LP, No. 24-2077, 2024 WL 5055841 (3d Cir. Oct. 22,

2024)). To satisfy the requirement that a complaint allege an adverse employment action, “an

employee must [allege] only ‘some harm’ or ‘disadvantageous change’ with respect to ‘an

identifiable term or condition of employment.’” Stallworth v. Milan Laser Corp., Civ. A. No. 25-

0393, 2025 WL 2637234, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2025) (quoting Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,

601 U.S. 346, 347 (2024)). The complaint need not allege “that the harm incurred was

‘significant,’” Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355 (citations omitted), because the Supreme Court in

Muldrow “expressly rejected the rule that the harm an employee suffers must be ‘significant . . .

[o]r serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective.” McCrorey v. City of Phila., No. 23-2539,

2025 WL 1392164, at *3 (3d Cir. May 14, 2025) (alterations in original) (quoting Muldrow, 601

U.S. at 355). Rather, “an adverse employment action means . . . that the employer treated the

employee ‘worse’ because of a protected characteristic.” Peifer v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 106

F.4th 270, 277 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355). Thus, an “employee claiming

discrimination is only required to show they suffered ‘some harm’ with respect to ‘an identifiable

term or condition of employment.’” McCrorey, 2025 WL 1392164, at *3 (quoting Muldrow, 601

U.S. at 355). Nonetheless, “while Muldrow lowered an employee’s burden of proof with respect

to adverse employment actions, the employee must still demonstrate an ‘injury respecting [his]

employment terms or conditions’ to establish an adverse employment action.” Gabriel v. DSM

Biomedical, Inc., Civ. A. No. 24-4546, 2025 WL 2250265, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2025) (quoting

Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 348, 359) (citing Peifer, 106 F.4th at 277). “If proven, a hostile work

environment and constructive termination both constitute adverse employment actions.” Id. at *8

(citing Greer v. Mondelez Glob., Inc., 590 F. App’x 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014); Green v. Brennan,

578 U.S. 547, 555 (2016); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 247, n.32 (3d Cir. 2006)).

Defendants argue that the First Amended Complaint fails to allege a facially plausible

disparate treatment sex discrimination claim as to Polascak because it does not allege that

Everstory terminated her employment. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 74.) However, the Amended Complaint

need not allege that Polascak was fired in order to allege that she suffered an adverse employment

action. See McCrorey, 2025 WL 1392164, at *3. Rather, it is enough allege that she experienced

a hostile work environment. See Gabriel, 2025 WL 2250265, at *8. We concluded, in our

Memorandum denying Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration, that the Amended Complaint

plausibly alleges that Defendants subjected Polascak to a hostile work environment in violation of

Title VII and the PHRA. See Sheehan, 2025 WL 2671056, at *9. Accordingly, we further conclude

that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that Defendants took an adverse action against

Polascak. See Gabriel, 2025 WL 2250265, at *8. We therefore deny the Motion to Dismiss with

respect to this argument.

2. Sheehan, Heydorn, and Iannacone

Defendants argue that we should dismiss the Amended Complaint’s disparate claims with

respect to Sheehan, Heydorn, and Iannacone because the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly

allege that their sex was a but-for cause of their terminations. As we mentioned above, to allege a

prima facie case of disparate treatment sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and the PHRA,

the Amended Complaint must allege that the adverse action(s) suffered by Plaintiffs “‘occurred

under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.’”

McMullen, 779 F. App’x at 918 (quoting Makky, 541 F.3d at 214). The Amended Complaint

alleges that Plaintiffs Sheehan, Heydorn, and Iannacone were suspended on March 20, 2023, and

fired on March 7, 2023, for violating certain company policies that they did not violate and also

alleges that these Plaintiffs were treated differently from a male employee who violated these same

policies but was neither disciplined nor terminated. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77-81.) The First Amended

Complaint also alleges that all Plaintiffs were replaced by male employees. (Id. ¶ 85.)

Defendants argue that the First Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege that Plaintiffs

Sheehan, Heydorn, and Iannacone were suspended and terminated under circumstances that could

give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination on the basis of their sex because it does not

sufficiently describe the comparator, i.e., the male employee who was allegedly not disciplined or

fired for violating the same policies that Plaintiffs were incorrectly accused of violating. One way

for a complaint to allege the inference of intentional discrimination, is “by pointing to a similarly-

situated individual who is outside the plaintiff’s protected class, who engaged in the same conduct

as the plaintiff, but whom the defendant treated more favorably.” Solano v. Slippery Rock Univ.

of Pa., Civ. A. No. 24-1542, 2025 WL 2403909, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2025) (citing Simpson

v. Kay Jewelers, 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1998)). However, “[a]t the pleadings stage, ‘[t]he

complaint is not required to identify any comparators who have received more favorable treatment

than the plaintiff.’” Robinson v. Am. Reading Co., Civ. A. No. 24-5608, 2025 WL 1243058, at *4

(E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2025) (second alteration in original) (quoting Houle v. Walmart Inc., 447 F.

Supp. 3d 261, 280 (E.D. Pa. 2020)) (citing Grigsby v. Pratt & Whitney Amercon, Inc., Civ. A. No.

07-0785, 2008 WL 471549, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2008)). “An inference of discrimination

‘could be supported in a number of ways, including, but not limited to, comparator evidence,

evidence of similar . . . discrimination of other employees, or direct evidence of discrimination

from statements or actions by her supervisors suggesting . . . animus.’” Hornby v. Endless

Mountain Behav. Health Ctr., Inc., Civ. A. No. 25-0465, 2025 WL 2713741, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept.

23, 2025) (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Golod v. Bank of America Corp.,

403 F. App’x 699, 702 (3d Cir. 2010)) (citation omitted). Evidence that the employee was replaced

by someone outside of her protected class may also support an inference of discrimination.

Edwards v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 533 F. Supp. 3d 215, 222 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (citing Johnson v.

Keebler-Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 214 F. App’x 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2007)); see also Lazard v. All

Restore, LLC, Civ. A. No. 19-6040, 2021 WL 1175137, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2021) (“In the

Third Circuit, the fact that a plaintiff was replaced by an individual who is not a member of their

protected class is sufficient to establish an inference of discrimination.” (citing Johnson, 214 F.

App’x at 242)). “Derogatory or negative remarks can also satisfy the fourth prong of a prima facie

case . . . .” May v. PNC Bank, 434 F. Supp. 3d 284, 296 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (citing Rossi v. Wyoming

Valley Health Care Sys., Civ. A. No. 09-0179, 2010 WL 2766343, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 13, 2010)).

As we described above, the First Amended Complaint alleges the following: (1) Plaintiffs

Sheehan, Heydorn, and Iannacone were suspended on March 20, 2023, and fired on March 27,

2023, for violating certain company policies that they did not violate (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77-79); (2)

a male employee who did violate those policies was not disciplined or terminated (id. ¶ 81); (3) all

of the Plaintiffs were replaced by male employees (id. ¶ 85); (4) Sobon constantly yelled at and

belittled all of the Plaintiffs but did not yell at or belittle male employees (id. ¶¶ 36-37); (5) Lebisky

frequently referred to the building in which Plaintiffs work as “nothing but a fucking sorority” (id.

¶ 38); (6) both Sobon and Lebisky made sexually harassing comments to, or took sexually

harassing actions direct to, or in the presence of, Plaintiffs and other women who worked for

Everstory (id. ¶¶ 34-35, 39-42, 44-51). Considering all of these allegations together, “and viewing

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s],” we conclude that the Amended Complaint

sufficiently alleges that Plaintiffs Sheehan, Heydorn, and Iannacone were suspended and

terminated under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination

on the basis of their sex. Talley, 116 F.4th at 206. We therefore deny the Motion to Dismiss with

respect to this argument.

3. Hernandez

Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint fails to allege that Hernandez suffered an

adverse employment action under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional

discrimination on the basis of her sex because it specifically alleges that Everstory claimed that

Hernandez was fired because of the language that she used in making a complaint to her supervisor

about sex discrimination. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 83-84.) Defendants contend that this allegation

asserts that Hernandez was fired because of the language she used, not because of her sex.

However, viewing this allegation in the light most favorable to Hernandez, Talley, 116 F.4th at

206, we find that this allegation merely states that Everstory claimed that Hernandez was fired

because of the language she used, not that her language was the actual reason for Hernandez’s

firing.

Defendants also argue that we should dismiss Hernandez’s disparate treatment sex

discrimination claims because the First Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to

plausibly allege that she was fired under circumstances that could give rise to an inference that she

was fired because of her sex. As we described above, the Amended Complaint alleges that

Hernandez was replaced by a male employee (Am. Compl. ¶ 85); that Sobon constantly yelled at

and belittled all of the Plaintiffs but did not yell at or belittle male employees (id. ¶¶ 36-37); that

Lebisky frequently referred to the building in which Plaintiffs work as “nothing but a fucking

sorority” (id. ¶ 38); that Lebisky frequently made sexually harassing comments to Hernandez, such

as “your tits look great” (id. ¶ 39); and that both Sobon and Lebisky made sexually harassing

comments or took sexually harassing actions directed to, or in the presence of, Hernandez and

other women who worked for Everstory (id. ¶¶ 34-35, 41-42, 44-51). Considering all of these

allegations together, “and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” we conclude

that the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that Hernandez was terminated under

circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination on the basis of her

sex. Talley, 116 F.4th at 206. We therefore deny the Motion to Dismiss with respect to this

argument and, as we have denied the Motion with respect to the arguments made that Counts III

and IV should be dismissed with respect to each Plaintiff, we deny the Motion to Dismiss as to

Counts III and IV of the Amended Complaint.

C. Retaliation

Count I of the Amended Complaint asserts a claim for retaliation in violation of Title VII

against Everstory and Count II asserts a claim of retaliation in violation of the PHRA against

Everstory and Sobon. “The standard for retaliation is consistent between the two statutes, Title VII

and PHRA.” Ogilvie v. Summa Glob. Educ., Civ. A. No. 23-4884, 2025 WL 77076, at *2 (E.D.

Pa. Jan. 10, 2025)). Title VII’s antiretaliation provision provides that “an employer may not

‘discriminate against’ an employee ‘because,’ among other things, the employee ‘has opposed any

. . . unlawful employment practice.’” Peifer, 106 F.4th at 279 (alteration in original) (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). “To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, therefore, a plaintiff must

show that (1) ‘she engaged in a protected activity,’ (2) ‘she suffered an adverse employment

action,’ and (3) ‘there was a causal connection between the participation in the protected activity

and the adverse action.’” Id. (quoting Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 257). “Title VII defines a

protected activity as an instance where an employee has opposed any practice made unlawful or

has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation under Title VII.” Wadhwa

v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 505 F. App’x 209, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–

3(a)). “Protected activity includes oral and written complaints and protests, whether formal or

informal, to discriminatory practices prohibited by the statute.” Parker v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc.,

322 F. Supp. 2d 624, 630 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (citing Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of New

Jersey, 260 F.3d 265, 287-88 (3d Cir. 2001)). “‘Whether the employee opposes, or participates in

a proceeding against, the employer’s activity, the employee must hold an objectively reasonable

belief, in good faith, that the activity they oppose is unlawful under Title VII.’” Wadhwa, 505 F.

App’x at 215 (quoting Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006)).

1. Protected Activity

Defendants argue that we should dismiss Counts I and II because the Amended Complaint

fails to allege facts that would establish that any of the Plaintiffs engaged in protected activity. The

Amended Complaint alleges the following: (1) “Polascak made a complaint of sex discrimination

to [Everestory’s] Human Resources Department” on February 13, 2023; (2) Sheehan, Heydorn,

Iannacone and Hernandez participated in the investigation of that complaint; (3) Sheehan,

Heydorn, and Iannacone all complained to their General Manager, Donald Underwood, during a

February 2023 meeting that “Sobon was discriminating against them because of their sex”; (4)

Polascak made a complaint of discrimination to Underwood during the same meeting; (5) and

Hernandez made a complaint of sex discrimination to Lebisky on May 7, 2023. (Am. Compl. ¶¶

63-66, 68, 83.)

Defendants argue that these allegations are insufficient to plausibly allege that Plaintiffs

engaged in protected activity because the Amended Complaint does not allege the specific actions

about which Plaintiffs complained. As we discussed above, the Amended Complaint plausibly

alleges that all of the Plaintiffs were subjected to a hostile work environment based on sex by

Lebisky and Sobon. The Amended Complaint also alleges that “all Plaintiffs were treated poorly

compared to male employees, and were constantly belittled and yelled at by Defendant Sobon,”

who did not belittle or yell at male employees. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-37.) The Amended Complaint

further alleges that all of the Plaintiffscomplained about sexual discrimination to Everstory’s HR

department and/or to their manager(s) that they were being discriminated against on the basis of

their sex. (See id. ¶¶ 63, 65-66, 68, 83.) Moreover, the Amended Complaint specifically alleges

that Sheehan, Heydorn and Iannacone complained that Sobon discriminated against them on the

basis of their sex. (Id. ¶ 66.) Reading all of the allegations of the Amended Complaint in the light

most favorable to Plaintiffs, we find that it plausibly alleges that the Plaintiffs engaged in protected

activity. See Malantonio v. Valley Cafe, Civ. A. No. 23-5125, 2024 WL 3433306, at *2 (E.D. Pa.

July 16, 2024) (finding that complaint sufficiently alleged protected conduct where it alleged that

the plaintiff informally protested his manager’s alleged racial and sex-based discrimination by

complaining to the owner that the manager had made racial comments and engaged in sexual

harassment and had described those comments and actions). Therefore, we deny the Motion to

Dismiss with respect to this argument.

2. Adverse Employment Action

Defendants argue that we should dismiss Polascak’s retaliation claim because the Amended

Complaint fails to allege that she suffered an adverse action. Unlike the requirement for a disparate

treatment claim, the “‘materially adverse’ standard articulated in Burlington Northern and Santa

Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) still applies” to the adverse employment action

element of a retaliation claim. Robinson v. Euro Motors, Civ. A. No. 23-3561, 2024 WL 4394737,

at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2024) (citing Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 357). Thus, to support a retaliation

claim, the alleged “adverse action must be ‘materially adverse[,]’ such that it is ‘harmful to the

point that [it] could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.’” Smith v. City of Atl. City, 138 F.4th 759, 775 (3d Cir. 2025) (alterations in

original) (quoting Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 57)); see also id. at 776 (determining that employer’s

sending the plaintiff “to perform fire suppression in [a] tropical storm emergency without training

and then suspend[ing] him when he did not follow orders,” satisfied the second prong of a prima

facie case of retaliation). Courts have found that assigning employees to undesirable work tasks,

among other things, can “amount[] to materially adverse consequences that would dissuade a

reasonable worker from engaging in protected activities.” Baughman v. Marathon Petroleum

Logistics Servs., LLC, Civ. A. No. 24-0287, 2025 WL 492003, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2025)

(citations omitted). Courts have also determined that general antagonism, together with a failure

to investigate sexual harassment complaints, interference with the plaintiff’s job performance, and

unwarranted discipline “would be sufficient to deter a reasonable worker from making a charge of

discrimination.” Smith v. RB Distrib., Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 645, 664 (E.D. Pa. 2020). In addition,

“repeated harassment can constitute a retaliatory adverse action.” Hamilton v. Norristown State

Hosp., Civ. A. No. 23-4068, 2024 WL 3623521, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2024) (citing Robinson v.

SEPTA, Civ. A. No. 22-4572, 2024 WL 1936242, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 2024)) (add’l citations

omitted); see also Robinson v. SEPTA, 2024 WL 1936242, at *6 (“In a retaliatory harassment

claim, harassment that ‘well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting

a charge of discrimination’ is sufficient to establish an adverse employment action.” (quoting

O’Shea v. Interboro Sch. Dist., Civ. A. No. 13-6305, 2014 WL 5038391, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9,

2014)).

In this case, the Amended Complaint alleges that Polascak made a complaint about sex

discrimination to Everstory’s Human Resources Department on February 13, 2023, and

subsequently complained to General Manager Underwood about sex discrimination. (Am. Compl.

¶¶ 63, 68.) Thereafter, in violation of company policy, Underwood allegedly shared Polascak’s

complaints with Sobon who, in turn, continually called and left voicemail messages for Polascak

the following weekend “in an effort to intimidate her into withdrawing her complaint of

discrimination.” (Id. ¶ 71.) The Amended Complaint also alleges that, after Polascak complained

about discrimination, Everstory “continually and with escalating severity threaten[ed] to terminate

Plaintiff Polascak if she refused to violate the law.”1 (Id. ¶ 72.)

Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to Polascak, we conclude that they

plausibly allege that Polascak suffered a materially adverse employment action after she

complained about sexual discrimination to Everstory. See Robinson v. SEPTA, 2024 WL

1936242, at *6. Accordingly, we deny the Motion to Dismiss as to this argument.

3. Causation

Defendants also argue that the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege the third

element of a prima facie case of retaliation because the Amended Complaint does not allege that

any of the Plaintiffs’ protected activity was a “but-for” cause of any adverse action. However, a

plaintiff is not required “to establish but-for causation as part of her prima facie case.” Carvalho-

Grevious, 851 F.3d at 260. The Third Circuit has, in fact, held that “at the prima facie stage, a

plaintiff need only proffer evidence sufficient to raise the inference that . . . her protected activity

was the likely reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. at 253. Thus, “‘a plaintiff may rely

on “a broad array of evidence” to demonstrate the causal link between [the] protected activity and

the adverse [employment] action taken.’” Id. at 260 (second alteration in original) (quoting Marra

1 The Amended Complaint also alleges that, as a result of Everstory’s threats to fire her for

refusing to violate the law, and knowing that she could lose her licensure if she were terminated

by Everstory, Polascak was constructively terminated from her job when she resigned on February

24, 2023. (Am. Compl. ¶ 74.) We note that “[a] constructive discharge constitutes an ‘adverse

employment action’ for purposes of Title VII—if proven, it is the legal equivalent of being

terminated.” Ellingsworth v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 546, 556 (E.D. Pa. 2017)

(citation omitted). Nonetheless, we need not determine, at this juncture, whether the Amended

Complaint plausibly alleges that Polascak was constructive terminated.

v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 302 (3d Cir. 2007)). The Third Circuit has instructed “that

when ‘the temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action is “unusually

suggestive,”’ that alone suffices to establish a causal connection.” Kern v. DAS Cos., No. 24-

2420, 2025 WL 2170324, at *9 (3d Cir. July 31, 2025) (quoting LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty.

Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007)). “When this is not the case, courts must determine

‘whether the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference.’” Id.

(quoting LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 232). Thus, a plaintiff can also meet this burden through allegations

regarding “an employer’s inconsistent explanation for taking an adverse employment action” or

through “a pattern of antagonism.” Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 260 (first quoting Waddell v.

Small Tube Products, Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1986;) and then quoting Woodson v. Scott

Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 921 (3d Cir. 1997)). Moreover, “[t]hese are not the exclusive ways to

show causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference.”

Kachmar v. SunGard Data Systems, Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Waddell, 799

F.2d at 73).

a. Polascak

Defendants argue, generally, that the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts from which

a causal connection could be inferred between the protected activity of any Plaintiff and any

adverse employment action suffered by that Plaintiff. While Defendants do not specifically argue

that the Amended Complaint fails to allege causation with respect to Polascak, we have examined

the allegations of the Amended Complaint and found that they are sufficient to plausibly allege the

third factor of a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to Polascak. The Amended Complaint

alleges that: (1) Polascak made her first complaint about sex discrimination on February 13, 2023;

(2) General Manager Underwood subsequently told Sobon about her complaint; (3) Sobon made

multiple calls to Polascak the following weekend in an attempt to intimidate her into withdrawing

her complaint; (4) following Polascak’s complaint of sex discrimination, Everstory continually

threatened to terminate Polascak if she did not violate the law; and (5) Polascak resigned her

employment with Everstory on February 24, 2023. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63, 68-69, 71-72, 74.)

Thus, the Amended Complaint alleges that Polascak was subjected to a materially adverse

employment action, i.e., harassing telephone calls from her superior, either five or six days after

she first complained about sex discrimination to Everstory’s Human Relations Department.2

Everstory’s other adverse employment actions directed at Polascak occurred no more than eleven

days after Polascak complained to Everstory’s Human Relations Department that she had been

subjected to sex discrimination. (See id.) While the Third Circuit has noted that “‘there is no

bright line rule as to what constitutes unduly suggestive temporal proximity,’” it has determined

that a temporal proximity of seven days between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action “is in the realm of what this Court and others have found sufficient at the prima

facie stage.” Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2012)

(quoting LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 233) (citations omitted). Viewing the allegations of the Amended

Complaint in the light most favorable to Polascak, we find that they sufficiently allege that

Everstory subjected Polascak to adverse employment actions beginning five days after she

engaged in protected activity. We conclude, accordingly, that the Amended Complaint plausibly

2 February 13, 2023, the day Polascak allegedly first complained about sex discrimination,

was a Monday. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 63.) Plaintiff resigned from Everstory on February 24, 2023,

the Friday of the following week. (See id. ¶ 74.) Therefore, Saturday, February 18, 2023 and

Sunday, February 19, 2023 comprise the only weekend between the day Plaintiff complained about

sex discrimination to Everstory’s Human Relations Department and the day she resigned.

February 18, 2023 was five days after Polascak’s complaint of sex discrimination and February

19, 2023 was six days after Polascak’s complaint of sex discrimination.

alleges a causal connection between Polascak’s protected activity and an adverse employment

action.

b. Hernandez

Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts from which a causal

connection could be inferred between Hernandez’s complaint of sex discrimination and her

termination. Specifically, Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege

causation because it alleges that Hernandez was terminated due to the language she used in making

her complaint of sex discrimination, rather than for making a claim of sex discrimination. The

Amended Complaint alleges that Hernandez made a complaint of sex discrimination to Lebisky

on May 7, 2023. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 82-83.) The Amended Complaint further alleges that Everstory

terminated Hernandez on May 15, 2023, and that the company “stat[ed] in part that the termination

was due to the language used by Plaintiff Hernandez in making her complaint.” (Id. ¶ 84.) Reading

the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Hernandez, we find that it alleges that

Hernandez was fired by Everstory eight days after she engaged in protected activity and that her

firing was related to her complaint of sex discrimination. Under these circumstances, we conclude

that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges sufficient facts to raise an inference that there was

a causal connection between Hernandez’s complaint of sex discrimination and her termination by

Everstory. See Kern, 2025 WL 2170324, at *9.

c. Sheehan, Heydorn, and Iannacone

Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege causation with

respect to Sheehan, Heydorn, and Iannacone because it alleges that they did not experience an

adverse employment action until they were suspended from their employment with Everstory one

month after they made their complaints of discrimination to General Manager Underwood.

Defendants rely on Kortyna v. Lafayette College, 726 F. App’x 934 (3d Cir. 2018), in which the

Third Circuit found that a complaint “failed to allege a causal link between [a plaintiff’s]

complaints of sex or disability discrimination and his firing” because “the timing of his firing,

more than three weeks after his last complaint, [did] not by itself support an inference of

retaliation” and the complaint did not allege any facts that would show “a pattern of antagonism

between the complaints and the firing.” Id. at 938 (quotation omitted) (citing Thomas v. Town of

Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003).

The Amended Complaint alleges that, in February 2023, “Plaintiffs Sheehan, Heydorn and

Iannacone complained to their General Manager, Donald Underwood . . . , that Sobon was

discriminating against them because of their sex.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65, 66.) The Amended

Complaint further alleges that Polascak attended the meeting in which these complaints were

made. (Id. ¶ 68.) Since the Complaint also alleges that Sobon called Polascak the weekend after

this meeting, and those phone calls were made on February 18 or 19, 2023, this meeting must have

occurred before February 18, 2023. (Id. ¶ 71; supra n. 2.) The Complaint further alleges that

Plaintiffs Sheehan, Heydorn, and Iannacone were suspended by Everstory “[o]n or around March

20, 2023, around a month after their complaints of sex discrimination.” (Id. ¶ 77.) We find that

this timing “does not by itself support an inference of retaliation.” Kortyna, 726 F. App’x at 938

(citing Thomas, 351 F.3d at 114). However, viewing the allegations of the Amended Complaint in

the light most favorable to Sheehan, Heydorn, and Iannacone, we find that the allegations that

Everstory (1) falsely accused these Plaintiffs of having violated Everstory’s policies and practices

“by accepting and/or authorizing payment for pallbearing services[;]” (2) suspended Sheehan,

Heydorn, and Iannacone based on these false accusations one month after they made their

complaints of sex discrimination; (3) fired them one week after suspending them; and (4) included

Sobon and Lebisky in the decision to terminate these Plaintiffs’ employment, show a post-

protected activity pattern of antagonism on the part of Everstory against Sheehan, Heydorn, and

Iannacone. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77-80.) These allegations, in combination with the allegations

regarding the timing of these Plaintiffs’ suspensions support the conclusion that the Amended

Complaint plausibly alleges a causal connection between Sheehan’s, Heydorn’s and Iannacone’s

complaints of sex discrimination and their terminations. See Marra, 497 F.3d at 303 (emphasizing

“that it matters not . . . whether each piece of evidence of antagonistic conduct is alone sufficient

to support an inference of causation, so long as the evidence permits such an inference when

considered collectively” (citation omitted)). We therefore reject Defendants’ arguments that the

Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege that Plaintiffs’ complaints of sex discrimination were

causally connected to the adverse actions that Everstory took against them. Having rejected this

and all of Defendants’ other arguments for dismissal of Counts I and II, we deny the Motion to

Dismiss insofar as it seeks dismissal of these Counts.

D. Wrongful Discharge

Count VII of the Amended Complaint asserts a claim on behalf of Sheehan, Heydorn,

Polascak, and Iannacone for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy of Pennsylvania

against Everstory. “Pennsylvania law recognizes the doctrine of at-will employment so that, as a

general rule, no cause of action exists based upon an employer’s termination of an at-will

employment relationship.” Spierling v. First Am. Home Health Servs., Inc., 737 A.2d 1250, 1252

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (quoting Shick v. Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa. 1998)). “Generally, an

employer ‘may discharge an employee with or without cause, at pleasure, unless restrained by

some contract.’” Id. (quoting Shick, 716 A.2d at 1233). However, “[t]he employer’s privilege to

dismiss an employee with or without cause is not absolute . . . and may be qualified by the dictates

of public policy.” Id. at 1252-53 (quoting Shick, 716 A.2d at 1233). Thus, “[a]n employee may

bring a cause of action for a termination of [the employment] relationship only in the most limited

circumstances, where the termination implicates a clear mandate of public policy.” Weaver v.

Harpster, 975 A.2d 555, 563 (Pa. 2009). “These circumstances include instances in which the

discharge of an at-will employee would violate a constitutional, contractual, or statutory provision

. . . .” Salsberg v. Mann, 310 A.3d 104, 126 (Pa. 2024) (citations omitted).

In order to state a claim for wrongful discharge, a complaint must allege that the plaintiff

(1) “was terminated, either directly or through constructive discharge; and (2) that discharge

violated a ‘clearly defined mandate of public policy.’” Williamson v. Friend MTS (US) Inc., Civ.

A. No. 19-5866, 2021 WL 11550119, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2021) (quoting McKinley v.

Lycoming, Civ. A. No. 10-921, 2012 WL 1514880, at *1l (M.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2012)). There are

“‘three limited circumstances in which public policy will trump employment at-will.’” Spyridakis

v. Riesling Grp., Inc., 398 F. App’x 793, 799 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fraser v. Nationwide Mut.

Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 2003)). Specifically, “‘[a]n employer (1) cannot require an

employee to commit a crime [and fire the employee for refusing to do so], (2) cannot prevent an

employee from complying with a statutorily imposed duty, and (3) cannot discharge an employee

when specifically prohibited from doing so by statute.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting

Fraser, 352 F.3d at 111); see also Ogilvie v. Summa Glob. Educ., Civ. A. No. 23-4884, 2025 WL

77076, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2025) (same).

Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint fails to state a facially plausible wrongful

discharge claim because it does not allege sufficient facts to show that Everstory required Plaintiff

to commit illegal acts. The Amended Complaint alleges that Everstory terminated the

employment of Sheehan, Heydorn, Polascak and Iannacone because they “reported violations of

statutory and/or professional duties and/or refused to violate statutory and/or professional duties.”

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 116-17.) The Amended Complaint further alleges that, during 2022 and 2023,

“Sheehan, Heydorn, Polascak and Iannacone made multiple complaints regarding [Everstory’s]

violations of the law, specifically rules promulgated by the State Board of Funeral Directors.” (Id.

¶ 52 (emphasis omitted).) The Amended Complaint also alleges that “Sheehan, Heydorn, Polascak

and Iannacone refused to violate the law themselves, despite being ordered to multiple times by

Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 53.) The Amended Complaint specifically alleges that “Polascak refused a

request by Defendant Sobon to illegally cremate a body without any paperwork” and, after she

refused this order because performing a cremation under these circumstances would be illegal

“Sobon screamed at her and threatened to terminate her employment.” (Id. ¶¶ 54-55.) Sobon also

“ordered . . . Polascak to violate the law by hiding the fact that a direct cremation package was

sold by the cemetery to a family” and screamed at Polascak and threatened to fire her when she

refused his order. (Id. ¶¶ 56-57.) The Amended Complaint also alleges that Sheehan told Everstory

that “Sobon had tried to pressure Polascak into illegally cremating a body,” and Iannacone told

Everstory that Sobon “pressured her and other Plaintiffs to perform illegal disinterments without

the proper paperwork.” (Id. ¶¶ 58-59.) In addition, Everstory “pressured . . . Heydorn to illegally

identify a body that had been placed in the wrong crypt without authorization.” (Id. ¶ 61.)

Plaintiffs refused these illegal orders. (Id. ¶¶ 60, 62.) Defendants contend that these allegations

fail to plausibly allege that terminating Sheehan, Heydorn, Polascak, and Iannacone under these

circumstances violated a clear mandate of public policy because it is not clear that “rules

promulgated by the State Board of Funeral Directors” constitute clear mandates of public policy.

(Id. ¶ 52.)

The Pennsylvania State Board of Funeral Directors is an administrative entity charged with

enforcement of the Pennsylvania Funeral Director Law. See 63 Pa. Stat. §§ 479.1, 479.16. The

State Board of Funeral Directors is a part of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of

State. 49 Pa. Code. § 13.1. The Funeral Directors Law empowers the State Board of Funeral

Directors “to formulate necessary rules and regulations not inconsistent with [the Funeral Director

Law] for the proper conduct of the business or profession of funeral directing and as may be

deemed necessary or proper to safeguard the interests of the public and the standards of the

profession.” 63 Pa. Stat. § 479.16. The regulations promulgated by the State Board of Funeral

Directors identify “[f]urnishing embalming, other services or merchandise without having

obtained written permission from a family member or other person authorized by law to make

funeral arrangements for the deceased” as unprofessional conduct. 49 Pa. Code. § 13.202(11). In

addition, Pennsylvania law prohibits individuals who are not licensed funeral directors from selling

direct cremation services. See Pre-Need Family Servs. E. Region v. Bureau of Prof. &

Occupational Affairs, 904 A.2d 996, 1000-02 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (determining that the sale of

“goods and services related to direct cremation to the public” by individuals who are not licensed

funeral directors constitutes the “unlicensed practice of funeral directing in violation of the Law”);

see also 63 Pa. Stat. § 479.13(a), (c). We conclude that the Amended Complaint’s allegations that

Everstory instructed Plaintiffs to violate Pennsylvania laws and regulations by: (1) cremating a

body without any paperwork; (2) hiding the fact that a direct cremation package had been sold to

a family; (3) performing disinterments without the proper paperwork; and (4) “identify[ing] a body

that had been placed in the wrong crypt without authorization” plausibly alleges that Everstory

instructed Plaintiffs to violate the laws and regulations of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 54, 56, 59, 61.) We further conclude that the Amended Complaint therefore alleges

that Everstory required Plaintiffs to violate the public policy of Pennsylvania. See Spyridakis, 393

F. App’x at 799 (quoting Fraser, 352 F.3d at 111). We therefore deny the Motion to Dismiss with

respect to this argument.

Defendants also argue that we should dismiss Count VII with respect to Polascak because

the Amended Complaint does not allege that Everstory terminated her, but only that she was

constructively discharged because she was concerned that she could lose her license if she were

terminated. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73-74.) As we noted above, a complaint can state a claim of wrongful

discharge by alleging that the plaintiff was terminated through constructive discharge. Williamson,

2021 WL 11550119, at *6 (quoting McKinley, 2012 WL 1514880, at *1l). “An employee is

constructively discharged if his ‘employer makes working conditions so intolerable that the

employee is forced to resign.’” Id. (quoting Kroen v. Bedway Sec. Agency, Inc., 633 A.2d 628,

633 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)). The Amended Complaint alleges that, after Polascak made her

complaint of discrimination, Everstory “continually and with escalating severity threaten[ed] to

terminated . . . Polascak if she refused to violate the law.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 72.) Being “‘threatened

with discharge’” is one of the factors that has been recognized by the Third Circuit as supporting

a claim of constructive discharge. Lewis v. Univ. of Pa., 779 F. App’x 920, 922 (3d Cir. 2019).

Viewing the allegations of the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Polascak, we

conclude that it plausibly alleges that she was constructively discharged by Everstory through its

continual and escalating threats to terminate her for refusing to violate the law regarding furnishing

services, such as cremation, without first obtaining written permission from a family member and

for refusing to “hid[e] the fact that a direct cremation package was sold by the cemetery to a

family” in violation of 49 Pa. Code. § 13.202(11) and 63 Pa. Stat. § 479.13(a), (c). (See Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 54-57, 72-74.) We therefore deny the Motion to Dismiss with respect to this argument

and we deny the Motion with respect to Count VII.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we deny the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint in

its entirety. An order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John R. Padova

____________________________

John R. Padova, J.