Edwards-Hinton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

ALEXANDER EDWARDS-HINTON )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-03138-SEM

)

LATOYA HUGHES et al. )

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, a Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5), and a Motion for Status (Doc.

6) filed by Plaintiff Alexander Edwards-Hinton, an inmate at

Pinckneyville Correctional Center.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s pleading states Eighth

Amendment claims but denies the Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel,

which renders moot the Motion for Status.

I. COMPLAINT

A. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court

accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing

them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649

(7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721

F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Alleged Facts

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges violations at Western Illinois

Correctional Center against Illinois Department of Corrections

Director Latoya Hughes; Warden Brittany Greene; Administrative

Review Board Chairperson John Loftus; Corrections Sergeants Alex

W. McAdams and Smith; Corrections Officers J. Hall, Siverly, and

Slats; Hearing Investigator T. Shaw; and Adjustment Committee

(“Committee”) Members Corey J. Holzer and Silvester N. Erude.

On February 9, 2023, Plaintiff noticed Defendant McAdams

looking at Plaintiff “with an expression of distaste.” (Pl. Compl., Doc.

1 at 5:17.) Plaintiff observed McAdams became angry after Plaintiff

asked why McAdams was looking at Plaintiff in that manner.

After Plaintiff complied with McAdams’ subsequent order to

stop and submit to a search, Plaintiff began walking to breakfast

when McAdams shoved Plaintiff in the back. Plaintiff stumbled

forward and instinctively turned around into a “defensive stance.”

(Id. at 6:21.) Plaintiff claims that McAdams slammed Plaintiff

against the foyer wall despite complying with McAdams’s order to

submit to restraints, which caused Plaintiff severe shoulder pain.

Thereafter, Plaintiff was escorted to restrictive housing.

Plaintiff asserts that he “pleaded in protest to other John Doe

Correctional Officer that [Defendant] McAdams’ actions [were]

wrong … as they stood watch and failed to intervene.” (Id. at 6:23.)

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s pleading identified three separate

John Doe individuals, followed by a parenthesis that includes the

names of Defendants Hall, Siverly, and Slats.

Plaintiff later appeared before Defendants Holzer and Erude,

acting as Committee members, where Plaintiff was informed that he

was charged with violating the rule against assault. Plaintiff claimed

he had not received notice of the alleged violation, asserting that

Defendant Smith was responsible for ensuring service of process of

the disciplinary report. Plaintiff requested a continuance to gather

facts, call witnesses, and allow the Committee to review the video

evidence of the incident. The Committee determined that Plaintiff

had committed the offense. Plaintiff does not state what

restrictions, if any, were imposed as a result.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Hughes, Loftus, and Shaw

failed to conduct a proper investigation into the alleged rule

violation and that Defendant Greene was responsible for conducting

an impartial disciplinary hearing and reviewing all grievances.

C. Analysis

In an excessive force claim, “the core judicial inquiry is . . .

whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). “Several factors are

relevant in determining whether a defendant applied force in good

faith or for purposes of causing harm, including the need for force,

the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the

officer, efforts made to temper the severity of the force, and the

extent of the injury caused by the force.” Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d

467, 477 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749,

757 (7th Cir. 2010).

Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state an excessive force claim

against Defendant McAdams.

The Seventh Circuit has “long held that as long as procedural

protections are constitutionally adequate, [courts] will not overturn

a disciplinary decision solely because evidence indicates the claim

was fraudulent.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir.

1999). “[E]ven assuming fraudulent conduct on the part of prison

officials, the protection from such arbitrary action is found in the

procedures mandated by due process.” Id.

“Wolff v. McDonnell[, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974),] sets forth the

minimum due process requirements for prison disciplinary

proceedings when the prisoner has been charged with serious

misconduct which could result in loss of good time credits, punitive

segregation, or which might also be punishable in state criminal

proceedings.” Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1285 n.3 (7th Cir.

1981).

However, when an inmate’s “sanction is less onerous” than

revocation of good time credits, prison officials “need not use all of

the procedures required by Wolff when reaching decisions.” Sylvester

v. Hanks, 140 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 1998). An inmate is entitled to

only informal, nonadversary procedures when “the State’s interest

implicates the safety of other inmates and prison personnel.”

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 228–29 (2005); see also Westefer

v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 684-86 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that

informal, nonadversary procedures do not involve the right to call or

cross-examine witnesses, record evidence, receive a written decision,

or administrative appeal).

“[I]nformal due process requires only that an inmate is provided

(1) ‘notice of the reasons for the inmate’s placement’ in segregation

and (2) ‘an opportunity to present his views,’ for instance, in a written

statement or at a hearing.” Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 966 (7th

Cir. 2024) (quoting Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880, 895 (7th Cir.

2024). “[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that ‘[o]rdinarily a

written statement by the inmate will accomplish this purpose .... So

long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and

then-available evidence against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause

is satisfied.’” Adams, 91 F.4th at 895 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459

U.S. 460, 476, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). Due process

is also satisfied if a plaintiff presents his arguments orally during the

Committee hearing. Adams, 91 F.4th at 896.

Because Plaintiff asserts that he was not provided a copy of the

disciplinary report before appearing before the Committee hearing on

the alleged rule violation at issue, Plaintiff stated a Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim against Defendants Erude, Holzer,

McAdams, and Smith. However, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against

the remaining Defendants.

To succeed on a claim for failure to intervene, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that the defendant “(1) knew that a constitutional

violation was committed; and (2) had a realistic opportunity to

prevent it.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 342 (7th Cir.

2017); see also Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1007 (7th Cir. 2018)

(“An officer who fails to intervene to try to prevent known cruel or

unusual force, despite a reasonable opportunity to do so, may be held

liable under § 1983.”).

Plaintiff’s facts are insufficient to state a failure to intervene

claim against Defendants Hall, Siverly, and Slats, as Plaintiff does

not provide any facts regarding their individual location relative to

Plaintiff to infer they had the opportunity to intervene after Plaintiff

admittedly took an aggressive step toward Defendant McAdams.

Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against Defendants Hughes,

Loftus, and Shaw for failing to conduct a proper investigation into

the alleged rule violation. See Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 532

(7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that a prisoner “has no federal due

process right to a prehearing investigation . . . .”).

Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against Defendant Greene

because Plaintiff does not allege Greene’s personal involvement at

the Committee hearing at issue, and the Illinois Department of

Corrections grievance procedures do not establish grounds for a

constitutional violation. See Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 861 F.3d

626, 630 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[Section] 1983 does not establish a

system of vicarious liability; a public employee’s liability is premised

on her own knowledge and actions, and therefore requires evidence

that each defendant, through her own actions, violated the

Constitution.”); see also Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th

Cir. 2017) (“Prison officials who simply processed or reviewed

inmate grievances lack personal involvement in the conduct forming

the basis of the grievance.”).

II. COUNSEL AND STATUS

Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court

cannot require an attorney to accept pro bono appointments in civil

cases. The most the Court can do is ask for volunteer counsel. See

Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992)

(holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional

right to counsel, a district court may, in its discretion, request

counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in certain

circumstances). In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the

Court must ask two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a

reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded

from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the

plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503

F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5) is denied because he has

not satisfied his threshold burden of demonstrating that he has

attempted to hire counsel, which typically requires writing to

several lawyers and attaching the responses received. Plaintiff’s

Motion for Status (Doc. 6) is moot with the entry of the Court’s

Order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5) is DENIED.

2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Status (Doc. 6) is MOOT.

3) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint

[1] under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff states an Eighth

Amendment claim for excessive force against Defendant

McAdams and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim

against Defendants Erude, Holzer, McAdams, and Smith.

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants proceeds in their

individual capacity only. Additional claims shall not be

included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on

motion by a party for good cause shown or under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

4) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to terminate Brittany

Greene, J. Hall, Latoya Hughes, John Loftus, Shaw, Siverly,

and Slats.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court

recommends that Plaintiff wait until counsel has appeared

for Defendants before filing any motions to give

Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those

motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed

an appearance will be denied as premature. Plaintiff need

not submit evidence to the Court unless otherwise directed

by the Court.

6) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a

waiver of service. Defendant has sixty days from service to

file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed their respective

Answer or appeared through counsel within ninety days of

the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion

requesting the status of service. After Defendants have

been served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery

and dispositive deadlines.

7) If a defendant no longer works at the address provided by

Plaintiff, the entity for whom Defendant worked while at

that address shall submit to the Clerk Defendant’s current

work address or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding

address. This information shall be used only for

effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding

addresses shall be kept only by the Clerk and shall not be

kept in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

8) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the

date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to dismiss is not

an answer. The Answer should include all defenses proper

under the Federal Rules. The Answer and later pleadings

shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. An

answer sets forth the Defendants’ positions. The Court

does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and

until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no response to

the Answer is necessary or will be considered.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after

Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance, Defendants’

counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any

motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Therefore, Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions

and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk

to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does not apply to

discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and

responses are not filed with the Court. Instead, Plaintiff

must mail his discovery requests and responses directly to

Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent

to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are

attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.

Discovery does not begin until Defendants’ counsel files an

appearance and the Court enters a scheduling order, which

will provide more detailed information about the discovery

process.

10) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff at

his place of confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange

the time for the deposition.

11) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of

any change in his mailing address and telephone number.

Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in

mailing address or phone number will result in the

dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice.

12) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to

the Clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the

Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service

through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and

will require Defendant to pay the total costs of formal

service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

13) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified

protective order under the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act.

14) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on

Defendants under the standard procedures.

ENTERED December 23, 2025.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

_______________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE