Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

KAREN JOHNSON, individually and as )

Personal Representative of the Estate of )

Matilda Tidwell, deceased, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) Case No. CIV-24-1073-R

)

PF CRYSTAL PARK SNF OPS, )

LLC; & STONEGATE SENIOR )

LIVING, L.P., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Karen Johnson’s Motion to Compel Discovery

Responses from Defendant PF Crystal Park SNF Ops, LLC [Doc. No. 33]. Defendant

responded [Doc. No. 34] and Plaintiff replied [Doc. No. 35]. The matter is now at issue.

BACKGROUND1

In February of 2022, 94-year-old Matilda Tidwell was hospitalized after sustaining

head injuries from falling in her home. Doc. No. 17 at p. 1. Ms. Tidwell was thereafter

admitted to Accel at Crystal Park, a nursing facility owned and operated by Defendants, on

March 3, 2022. Id. On March 14, a certified medication aide (“CMA”) at Accel incorrectly

administered 100 mg of morphine, intended for another patient, to Ms. Tidwell. Id. Ms.

1 Due to the dearth of factual allegations in the Amended Petition [Doc. No. 14-9], most of

the background facts are taken from the parties’ Joint Status Report and Discovery Plan,

filed December 20, 2024 [Doc. No. 17]. In accordance with this District’s nomenclature,

the Amended Petition will hereafter be called the Complaint.

Tidwell was taken to the hospital after this incident and on March 20, 2022, was transferred

to hospice care, where she passed away the following day. Id. at pp. 1-2.

Plaintiff Karen Johnson, Ms. Tidwell’s daughter, brought this lawsuit asserting that

Defendants and Defendants’ agents, ostensible agents, servants, and employees were

willful, reckless, and negligent in the medical and nursing care provided to Ms. Tidwell

and in fulfilling their administrative and supervisory duties. Plaintiff argues such conduct

was the direct cause of Ms. Tidwell’s death.

Plaintiff now moves to compel Defendant to (1) produce various documents related

to Ms. Tidwell’s treatment and Accel’s medication administration, policies, and procedures

and (2) provide Plaintiff with the names of the members of Accel’s governing body.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 26(b), district courts have substantial discretion in handling discovery

requests. Murphy v. Deloitte & Touche Grp. Ins. Plan, 619 F.3d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir.

2010). But they are not without instruction. Rule 26 permits discovery into “any

nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the

needs of the case.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). In permitting or denying discovery requests,

courts are instructed to consider “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the

amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’

resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden

or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

“[R]elevance is still to be ‘construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on,

or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on’ any party’s claim or

defense.” United States ex rel. Shamesh v. CA, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). Information “need not be

admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

“Rule 26 requires the Court to limit the scope of discovery—as pertinent here—if

(1) the discovery sought is unreasonably burdensome or duplicative, or can be obtained

from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; or (2)

the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Jobson v. United

States ex rel. Dep’t of Veteran Affs., No. CIV-17-574-SLP, 2018 WL 8299885, at *2 (W.D.

Okla. Aug. 27, 2018) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)).

“A party claiming that a request is important to resolve the issues should be able to

explain the ways in which the underlying information bears on the issues as that party

understands them.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. “The

court’s responsibility, using all the information provided by the parties, is to consider these

and all the other factors in reaching a case-specific determination of the appropriate scope

of discovery.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Request for Production No. 19

RFP No. 19 asks for all documents generated as part of Defendant’s investigation

into the medication error involving Ms. Tidwell. Defendant indicated the existence of one

document responsive to RFP 19: a Medication Error Report [See Doc. No. 33-3.].

Defendant’s Response indicates it has provided Plaintiff with the Medication Error Report

and Plaintiff does not appear to dispute this. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant to

comply with RFP No. 19 is therefore MOOT.

II. Request for Production No. 9

RFP No. 9 seeks communications relating to Matilda Tidwell that were not included

in the nursing center’s chart. Defendant initially denied this request due to concerns that it

implicated privileged communications and quality assurance and peer review documents.

Plaintiff later assured Defendant she is not seeking any attorney-client communications

and has represented she is not seeking quality assurance or peer review materials.

Defendant indicates it is searching for and will provide any relevant, non-privileged pre-

litigation responsive documents it finds. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute this

compromise. Based on the parties’ representations, to the extent Defendant locates such

documents, and with the limitations outlined by Defendant, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

Defendant to comply with RFP No. 9 is GRANTED.

III. Request for Production Nos. 5 & 9 and Interrogatory 17

The remaining discovery disputes center around the theories of liability Plaintiff

plans to assert against Defendant. The theories Plaintiff proceeds with will help determine

the scope of discovery, and as an initial matter, the Court will address the parties’ dispute

over which theories Plaintiff may utilize.

Plaintiff intends to assert multiple theories of Defendant’s liability for her claims:

(1) that the CMA was negligent in administering the morphine (and therefore, the Court

assumes, that Defendant is vicariously liable for her actions) and (2) that Defendant was

directly negligent in fulfilling its administrative and supervisory duties. The Joint Status

Report also indicates Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant was directly negligent in the

hiring, training, retention, and supervision of its employees. Defendant argues that

Plaintiff’s assertions of Defendant’s direct negligence are incorrect and irrelevant.

Oklahoma courts have held that when an employer’s vicarious liability, if any, for

its employees’ harms is established through stipulation, claims against the employer for

negligent hiring, training, or supervision are unavailable. Huntley v. City of Owasso, 497

Fed. App’x 826, 834 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citing N.H. v. Presbyterian Church

(U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592, 600 (Okla. 1999); Jordan v. Cates, 935 P.2d 289, 293 (Okla.

1997)). Moreover, Oklahoma courts have stated that in “situations where the employer

stipulates that liability, if any, would be under the respondeat superior doctrine, . . . any

other theory for imposing liability on the employer [is] unnecessary and superfluous.”

Jordan, 935 P.2d at 293.

In its Response, Defendant argues that because it does not seek to avoid liability for

the CMA’s medication error if the jury decides the error caused Ms. Tidwell’s death,

Plaintiff’s theories of Defendant’s direct negligence are unnecessary.2 But the Court is

2 When referring to Plaintiff’s direct negligence claims, the parties use the term “corporate-

negligence.” The Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the corporate negligence doctrine in

1995, based on an independent duty of hospitals to ensure the safety and welfare of their

patients while confined within the hospital. See Strubhart v. Perry Mem’l Hosp. Tr. Auth.,

903 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1995). However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court limited the doctrine

to “imposing a duty of ordinary care on hospitals to ensure that: 1) only competent

physicians are granted staff privileges, and 2) once staff privileges have been granted to a

competent physician the hospital takes reasonable steps to ensure patient safety when it

knows or should know the staff physician has engaged in a pattern of incompetent

behavior.” Id. at 276. This case is infrequently cited in Oklahoma and Plaintiff’s Complaint

does not appear to assert a claim using the doctrine of corporate-negligence, nor does either

party argue in-depth whether this doctrine even applies to nursing homes and CMAs. At

unaware of any stipulation that Defendant’s liability would fall under the respondeat

superior doctrine. In fact, in the parties’ Joint Status Report, Defendant appears to disclaim

vicarious liability, arguing Ms. Tidwell’s injuries resulted from acts or omissions of

employees or third parties acting outside the scope of their employment. At this point,

Defendant’s direct liability for allegedly negligent fulfillment of its administrative and

supervisory duties remains at issue. The Court will judge the relevance and proportionality

of Plaintiff’s remaining discovery requests accordingly.

A. Request for Production No. 5

RFP No. 5 seeks the unredacted version of a 162-paged Administrative Medication

Report, which details the medications administered to patients at Accel on the date of Ms.

Tidwell’s death. Defendant produced the Report but redacted all information for every

patient except Ms. Tidwell, arguing Plaintiff’s request is overly broad and disproportionate

to the needs of the case. Defendant also asserts such information is irrelevant and

confidential/privileged pursuant to OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2503 and HIPAA.

An unredacted version of the Report would indicate how many patients were

receiving opioids, what dosages they were receiving, where they were located, and who

administered the medications. Plaintiff argues the Report is relevant because it may

indicate whether the CMA mistakenly gave Ms. Tidwell another patient’s medication and

whether she was responsible for too many patients or medications. This Court agrees,

this time, the Court declines to rule on whether this doctrine is applicable or not and

encourages the parties to adjust their terminology if it so happens that Plaintiff is not relying

upon the Strubhart corporate-negligence doctrine.

particularly in light of Plaintiff’s assertions of Defendant’s direct negligence, that such

information is relevant and discovery of the Report is proportionate to the needs of the

case.

Defendant also asserts the Report is protected by Oklahoma’s physician-patient

privilege pursuant to OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2503, which applies to “confidential

communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 12

§ 2503(B). Beyond a conclusory assertion, Defendant has not articulated how the

physician-patient privilege applies to the Report, which does not seem to contain patient

communications for treatment purposes. At this time, therefore, the Court declines to find

the Report protected by physician-patient privilege. See Jackson v. Terrace Gardens

Nursing Ctr., LLC, No. CIV-23-00319-JD, 2025 WL 1020888, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 4,

2025) (quoting Pruess v. Presbyterian Health Plan, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1240

(D.N.M. 2022)) (“‘The party resisting discovery must specifically detail the reasons why

each request is irrelevant or otherwise objectionable’ despite the broad scope of discovery

under Rule 26. . . . The objecting party ‘may not rely on boilerplate, generalized, conclusory

or speculative arguments’ because ‘[a]rguments against discovery must be supported by

specific examples and articulated reasoning.’”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). See

also Hussein v. Duncan Reg’l Hosp., Inc., No. CIV-07-0439-F, 2009 WL 10672479, at *1

n.1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 28, 2019) (although defendants contended records were protected by

physician-patient privilege, court did not discuss such arguments because defendants’

memorandum only developed HIPAA-based objections).

Defendant also states, without support, that the Report is protected by HIPAA. But

“HIPAA provides that ‘[a] covered entity may disclose protected health information in the

course of any judicial . . . proceeding . . . [i]n response to an order of a court . . . , provided

that the covered entity discloses only the protected health information expressly authorized

by such order. . . .’” Id. at *1 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(i)).

“The requirement that documents not be produced without a court order presumes

that the court, in drafting any production order, will balance the patients’ privacy and

confidentiality interests with the documents’ relevance and a party’s need for the

documents, before determining whether the documents should be produced and, if so, with

what constraints.” Id. See Hussein, 2009 WL 10672479 (imposing limitations to protect

patient privacy but ordering production of records of non-party hospital patients where a

hospital argued one of its contracted doctors jeopardized those patients by abandoning

them).

Considering Hussein and Defendant’s failure to support its conclusory assertions

that the Report is privileged, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant to comply with RFP

No. 5 is GRANTED subject to these limitations: Defendant shall redact any details from

the Report that could reveal a patient’s identity, such as their name, relatives’ names,

contact information, etc. Plaintiff shall not attempt to seek any such identification

information from other sources absent leave of court for good cause shown. Additionally,

should any portion of the Report contain privileged physician-patient communications or

other privileged information such as quality assurance documents or incident reports,

Defendant shall redact such details. The redacted records shall not be shown to or discussed

with any person other than individuals working on this litigation on Plaintiff’s behalf. The

records shall be returned to Defendant at the conclusion of the litigation and any possible

appeal, or earlier if the records are no longer needed by Plaintiff for litigation purposes.

B. Request for Production No. 3

RFP No. 3 seeks “all complaints for the years 2020 through 2023” that relate to

“medication errors or other issues with medication administration.” Defendant identified

one responsive document to this request: a Grievance Internal Reporting List, the

production of which Defendant opposes for various reasons.

Defendant argues that incident reports and quality assurance documents such as the

Grievance List are confidential and privileged pursuant to OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-1709,

which provides:

Any authorized person, hospital, sanatorium, nursing home or rest home, or

other organization may provide information, interviews, reports, statements,

memoranda or other data relating to the condition and treatment of any

person to any of the following for use in the course of studies for the purpose

of reducing morbidity or mortality: The State Board of Health, . . . [etc.] . . .

All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other data

furnished by reason of this section, and any findings or conclusions resulting

from such studies, are declared to be privileged communications which may

not be used or offered or received in evidence in any legal proceeding of any

kind or character, and any attempt to use or offer any such information,

interviews, reports, statements, memoranda or other data, findings or

conclusions, or any part thereof, unless waived by the interested parties, shall

constitute prejudicial error in any such proceeding.

(paragraph break added). See City of Edmond v. Parr, 587 P.2d 56, 58 (Okla. 1978)

(records kept by hospital infectious disease control committee, including those pertaining

to an investigation into a patient’s death due to an infection contracted at the hospital, were

privileged pursuant to § 1-1709); Schniederjan v. Four Seasons Nursing Home Ctrs., Inc.,

CIV-00-1707-C, pp. 5-6 (finding a nursing home’s incident reports, quality assurance

documents, and written corrective action documents were not patient records but rather

part of the peer review process and thus privileged from discovery).

But Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that incident reports or quality assurance or

peer review documents are privileged from discovery pursuant to § 1-1709. Instead, she

specifies that she is asking only for complaints, not for analysis of those complaints

generated by attorneys, the quality assurance committee, or anyone affiliated with Accel.

Defendant would have the Court decide that § 1-1709 also applies to actual

complaints but has failed to indicate how or why. See Schneiderhan, CIV-00-1707-C, at

pp. 2-3 (ordering defendant nursing home to produce formal and informal complaints

lodged by individuals or agencies concerning the defendant). The Court does not find the

requested complaints privileged pursuant to § 1-1709.

Defendant also argues that other patients’ complaints are irrelevant to the issues of

the case. The Court disagrees. Complaints filed by residents pertaining to medication errors

or issues are relevant to Defendant’s fulfillment of its administrative and supervisory

duties, as well as Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. See Wethington v. Swainson, No.

CIV-14-899-D, 2017 WL 1366068, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 12, 2017) (citing OKLA. STAT.

tit. 23 § 9.1(A)) (punitive damages considerations include duration and awareness of the

misconduct). Relatedly, Defendant expresses concerns that evidence regarding other

residents’ complaints would be inadmissible at trial and will not lead to admissible

evidence. Defendant argues such evidence is irrelevant and highly prejudicial—but this

once again focuses on Defendant’s assumption that Plaintiff is improperly asserting claims

against Defendant for its allegedly negligent fulfillment of its administrative and

supervisory duties. As this Court has already decided Plaintiff’s direct negligence theories

remain viable, discovery of documents potentially indicative of a pattern of negligence

(such as complaints) is proper.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s request is vague and would require Defendant to

review every chart, email, and other document to find responsive complaints. But

Defendant has already indicated it possesses a Grievance Internal Report List, which

Plaintiff and the Court assume references any relevant complaints. The Court anticipates

Defendant will be able to use such a list to identify the relevant complaints requested by

Plaintiff without placing too great a burden upon Defendant.

Because the Court finds the complaints are relevant to the case issues and not

entirely privileged, Defendant must produce such complaints subject to the limitations

discussed below.

Defendant argues, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff’s request for complaints filed

after Ms. Tidwell’s death is too broad. Plaintiff contends all such complaints are relevant

to persistent medication issues at Accel and whether Defendant knew or should have

known about such issues. But complaints from after Ms. Tidwell’s death are only

minimally relevant to these issues. Defendant need only produce complaints pertaining to

medication errors and administration lodged in the two years prior to the date of Ms.

Tidwell’s incident.

Finally, Defendant expresses concerns that these complaints include privileged and

confidential health information. To the extent such complaints reveal the identities of

complainants or contain personal information that could lead to their identification,

Defendant must both redact such information and maintain the same level of discretion

regarding those documents in the same manner as the Medication Administration Report.

Furthermore, Defendant need not produce the Grievance Internal Reporting List if it is

concerned doing so would reveal privileged incident reports or quality assurance

documents. It must, however, produce appropriately redacted records of any existing

complaints relevant to medication errors or other issues with medication administration.

The Court encourages the parties to meet and confer to discuss a suitable manner of

providing Plaintiff with the relevant complaints in a way that does not overly burden

Defendant or risk divulging privileged information. With the aforementioned limitations,

Plaintiff’s RFP No. 3 is therefore GRANTED in part.

C. Interrogatory No. 17

Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant to provide the names of its governing body

members because they are relevant to her claims that Defendant failed to fulfill its

administrative and supervisory duties. Defendant disagrees, once again asserting that the

issues of this case are limited only to the CMA’s treatment of Ms. Tidwell, making the

names of the governing body irrelevant. Pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(d)(1), qualifying

skilled nursing facilities “must have a governing body, or designated persons functioning

as a governing body, that is legally responsible for establishing and implementing policies

regarding the management and operation of the facility.” The names of the members of the

governing board who establish the policies are clearly relevant to Plaintiffs assertions of

Defendant’s direct negligence. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant to answer

Interrogatory No. 17 is therefore GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel in GRANTED subject to the limitations

delineated above. Defendant has 21 days from the date of this order to supplement its

discovery responses.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 234 day of December, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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