Com. v. Brown, L.

J-S42009-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

LAURIE SUE BROWN :

:

Appellant : No. 473 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 27, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-08-CR-0000148-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 23, 2025

Appellant, Laurie Sue Brown, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered on February 27, 2025, as made final by the denial of Appellant’s

post-sentence motion on March 10, 2025. On this direct appeal, Appellant's

counsel filed a petition for leave to withdraw and an accompanying brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth

v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We conclude that Appellant’s counsel

has complied with the procedural requirements necessary to withdraw.

Moreover, after independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the

appeal is wholly frivolous. We, therefore, grant counsel’s petition to withdraw

and affirm the judgment of sentence.

J-S42009-25

Appellant entered an open guilty plea to possession with the intent to

deliver marijuana (“PWID”) and flight to avoid apprehension.1 On February

27, 2025, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a term of 9 to 24 months

in prison for the PWID conviction and to serve a consecutive term of 10 to 36

months in prison for the flight to avoid apprehension conviction, for an

aggregate sentence of 19 to 60 months’ imprisonment.

On March 6, 2025, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, where

she claimed that her aggregate sentence was “too harsh in consideration of

her lack of lengthy criminal history, age, and circumstances.” Post-Sentence

Motion, 3/6/25, at 1. The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion

on March 10, 2025 and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Further, on

this appeal, Appellant’s counsel filed a petition for leave to withdraw and an

Anders brief.

Before reviewing the merits of this appeal, this Court must first

determine whether counsel has fulfilled the necessary procedural

requirements for withdrawing as counsel. Commonwealth v. Miller, 715

A.2d 1203, 1207 (Pa. Super. 1998).

To withdraw under Anders, counsel must satisfy certain technical

requirements. First, counsel must “petition the court for leave to withdraw

stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel

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1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5126(a), respectively.

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has determined that the appeal would be frivolous.” Miller, 715 A.2d at 1207.

Second, counsel must file an Anders brief, in which counsel:

(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts,

with citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in the

record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set[s] forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is

frivolous; and (4) state[s] counsel’s reasons for concluding

that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the

relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes

on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is

frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Finally, counsel must furnish a copy of the Anders brief to his or her

client and advise the client “of [the client’s] right to retain new counsel,

proceed pro se or raise any additional points worthy of this Court’s attention.”

Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa. Super. 2007).

If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the

responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the

proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal

is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5; see also

Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc) (holding that the Anders procedure requires this Court to review “the

entire record with consideration first of the issues raised by counsel. . . .

[T]his review does not require this Court to act as counsel or otherwise

advocate on behalf of a party. Rather, it requires us only to conduct a review

of the record to ascertain if[,] on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that

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J-S42009-25

counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated. We need not analyze those

issues of arguable merit; just identify them, deny the motion to withdraw, and

order counsel to analyze them”). It is only when all of the procedural and

substantive requirements are satisfied that counsel will be permitted to

withdraw.

In the case at bar, counsel complied with all of the above procedural

obligations. We must, therefore, review the entire record and analyze whether

this appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. Our analysis begins with the claim

raised in the Anders brief:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it sentenced

[Appellant] to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment [of 19

to 60] months?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

Appellant's claim on appeal challenges the discretionary aspects of her

sentence. “[S]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the

sentencing judge, whose judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Ritchey, 779 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super.

2001). Pursuant to statute, Appellant does not have an automatic right to

appeal the discretionary aspects of her sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for permission to appeal the

discretionary aspects of her sentence. Id.

As this Court explained:

[t]o reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we

conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether

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appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902,

903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence,

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal

defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [42 Pa.C.S.A.]

§ 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Appellant claims that her aggregate sentence is manifestly excessive,

as the trial court failed to consider “her limited criminal history, age, and

circumstances.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. As to this claim, Appellant filed a

timely notice of appeal, raised the claim in her post-sentence motion, and

properly included a Rule 2119(f) statement in her brief. Therefore, we turn

to the issue of whether Appellant’s claim raises a substantial question.

Generally, to raise a substantial question, an appellant must “advance

a colorable argument that the trial judge's actions were: (1) inconsistent with

a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental

norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. McKiel,

629 A.2d 1012, 1013 (Pa. Super. 1993); Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748

A.2d 721, 726 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc). Additionally, in determining

whether an appellant has raised a substantial question, we must limit our

review to Appellant's Rule 2119(f) statement. Goggins, 748 A.2d at 726.

This limitation ensures that our inquiry remains “focus[ed] on the reasons for

which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal,

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J-S42009-25

which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. at 727

(emphasis omitted).

Appellant contends that her aggregate sentence is excessive because

the trial court failed to consider certain mitigating circumstances. Under our

precedent, Appellant's claim presents a substantial question, thus permitting

our review. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 125 A.3d 822, 826 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (“an excessive sentence claim – in conjunction with an assertion

that the court failed to consider mitigating factors – raises a substantial

question”); Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 340 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(holding: a claim that the appellant’s sentence was unduly excessive,

“together with his claim that the court failed to consider his rehabilitative

needs and mitigating factors upon fashioning its sentence, presents a

substantial question”).2

We have explained:

sentencing is vested in the discretion of the trial court, and

will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that

discretion. An abuse of discretion involves a sentence which

was manifestly unreasonable, or which resulted from

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. It is more than just an

error in judgment.

____________________________________________

2 We note that we have also “held on numerous occasions that a claim of

inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial

question for our review.” Commonwealth v. Eline, 940 A.2d 421, 435 (Pa.

Super. 2007) (quotations, citations, and corrections omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 469 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(collecting cases). Nevertheless, in light of our conflicting precedent, we will

review the merits of Appellant's discretionary aspects of sentencing claim.

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Commonwealth v. Crork, 966 A.2d 585, 590 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quotation

marks and citations omitted).

Appellant claims that the trial court failed to adequately consider “her

limited criminal history, age, and circumstances.” Appellant’s Brief at 12.

Appellant’s discretionary aspect of sentencing claim fails because, during

Appellant's sentencing hearing, the trial court was informed by a pre-sentence

investigation (“PSI”) report. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/11/25, at 3. Given

this fact, we must “presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant

information regarding [Appellant's] character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.

Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988). To be sure, our Supreme Court has

held:

A [PSI] report constitutes the record and speaks for itself. In

order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of

engaging in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly

that [sentencing courts] are under no compulsion to employ

checklists or any extended or systematic definitions of their

punishment procedure. Having been fully informed by the

[PSI] report, the sentencing court's discretion should not be

disturbed. This is particularly true, we repeat, in those

circumstances where it can be demonstrated that the judge

had any degree of awareness of the sentencing

considerations, and there we will presume also that the

weighing process took place in a meaningful fashion. It would

be foolish, indeed, to take the position that if a court is in

possession of the facts, it will fail to apply them to the case

at hand.

Id.

Further, as the trial court explained in its opinion to this Court:

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J-S42009-25

At the time of sentencing, this court had a [PSI] report and

sentencing guideline form. The sentences imposed for each

conviction are within the standard range of the sentencing

guidelines. The court incorporated the [PSI report] into its

reasons for sentencing. Further, the court stated that the

[PWID] charge was first filed in June 2022. Appellant was

aware of the charge. She failed to appear for a plea hearing

and a bench warrant was issued. She was not picked up until

2024. She made no effort to address the charges from the

time she missed the hearing to the time of being picked upon

pursuant to the bench warrant. Therefore, she incurred the

flight to avoid apprehension [charge]. Finally, Appellant took

very little responsibility for her actions.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/11/25, at 3 (some capitalization omitted).

The trial court expressly considered Appellant’s mitigating

circumstances when it imposed Appellant’s sentence in this case. Appellant’s

claim to the contrary is belied by the record and, thus, frivolous.

We have independently considered the issue raised within Appellant’s

brief and we have determined that the claim is frivolous. In addition, after an

independent review of the entire record, we see nothing that might arguably

support this appeal. The appeal is therefore wholly frivolous. Accordingly, we

affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition for leave

to withdraw.

Petition for leave to withdraw appearance granted. Judgment of

sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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J-S42009-25

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/23/2025

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