Com. v. Griggs, E.

J-S28008-25

2025 PA Super 285

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

ELIJAH GRIGGS :

:

Appellant : No. 1819 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 15, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):

CP-67-CR-0003763-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 23, 2025

Elijah Griggs appeals from the judgment of sentence of six to twenty-

three months of incarceration and $9,685.08 in restitution. We affirm.

We glean the following background information from the certified record.

Appellant, who drove a dark-colored Chrysler 300, was employed at Diva

Logistics in York, Pennsylvania, as a truck driver with a route that took him to

Netcong, New Jersey, every weekday evening. The company’s transportation

manager, Michael Ward, repeatedly addressed Appellant’s tardiness with him.

In late January 2023, Appellant gave notice of his intent to resign at the end

of the following week.

On February 3, 2023, Appellant was scheduled to depart the facility at

5:15 p.m. Mr. Ward arrived at the workplace at approximately 4:00 p.m.,

leaving his personal Mitsubishi Outlander in the company’s front parking lot.

His vehicle had no damage to its quarter panel or windshield when he left it

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there. Within half an hour thereafter, Mr. Ward had completed his inspection

of the fleet of trucks located in the property’s other parking lot. None had any

cracked or shattered windows or other damage.

When Appellant failed to timely appear for his shift, Mr. Ward sent

another driver on Appellant’s route. Appellant telephoned Mr. Ward at roughly

5:45 p.m. to inquire where his truck was. Mr. Ward informed Appellant of what

had transpired and that he was accepting the resignation early. Appellant

became agitated and expressed displeasure that Mr. Ward had not informed

him of this turn of events earlier. At around 6:15 p.m., Appellant appeared in

Mr. Ward’s office to berate him in person, and left the building within ten

minutes. Mr. Ward went outside at approximately 10:45 p.m. to discover that

his personal vehicle and three of the company-owned trucks in the lot had been

damaged. Specifically, windows of the trucks had been chipped, cracked, or

shattered, while Mr. Ward’s Outlander sustained damage to its windows and

body.

Mr. Ward called the police, and Officers Brett Green and Alexis Haggerty

of the Northern York Regional Police were dispatched to Diva Logistics just

before midnight. They spoke with Mr. Ward and photographed the affected

vehicles, concluding that the damage was consistent with being stuck by

projectiles such as BBs, pellets, or marbles. All told, the cost to repair the

damage to the vehicles was just under $9,700.

Mr. Ward also provided the officers with surveillance footage of the

parking lots. The video depicted what Mr. Ward identified as Appellant’s

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Chrysler 300 arrive in the lot at 5:44 p.m. on the day in question. The car

remained in place for twenty minutes, until it pulled up in front of one of the

trucks that Mr. Ward found to be damaged, which was one Appellant used to

drive for the company. At that point, another employee arrived in the lot and,

after he had entered the building, Appellant’s vehicle backed out and stopped

in front of another truck Appellant used to drive, which also was among the

damaged vehicles. The Chrysler then pulled in between two trucks, one of

which was the third to sustain damage. At 6:11 p.m., Appellant’s car left the

lot and was recorded by a second camera a minute later entering the

company’s front lot where Mr. Ward’s personal vehicle was parked. Appellant

debarked from the car more than twenty minutes later and went in the front

door of the business. Appellant exited the building at 6:39, returned to his

car, and left the lot at 6:41.

During the course of the ensuing investigation, the officers contacted

Appellant by telephone. He admitted to being in the parking lots on the night

in question, and explained his movements that were captured by the

surveillance cameras as a deliberate attempt to show the company’s human

resources department, with whom he was speaking on the phone at the time,

that he was at the worksite. Appellant admitted to the officers that he had

been upset because he made a long drive to work only to be told to leave.

Based upon this evidence, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with

criminal mischief, graded as a felony of the third degree. He proceeded to a

jury trial wherein Mr. Ward and Officer Green testified to the above facts. The

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jury also viewed the surveillance footage, during which Officer Green

highlighted the appearance therein of the passenger window of Appellant’s car

being rolled down on that cold February night when it stopped near the affected

vehicles, at angles consistent with the use of a BB or pellet gun, and the visible

changes to the windows of the trucks occurred while Appellant remained in

place.1

Following the close of evidence, the trial court charged the jury as to the

elements of criminal mischief. It instructed them that, to find Appellant guilty,

it must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he “intentionally

damaged real or personal property of another.” N.T. Trial, 7/30-31/24, at 203.

If and only if the jury so found, it then had to “determine beyond a reasonable

doubt the following additional element: was the value in excess of $5,000?”

Id. On the verdict slip, the jury indicated that it found Appellant guilty, and

circled “yes” next to the question: “Do you find that the defendant caused

pecuniary loss in excess of $5,000?” Verdict, 7/31/24 (comma added).

After ordering a pre-sentence investigation, the trial court imposed the

aforementioned sentence. Appellant promptly filed post-sentence motions,

which were denied without a hearing. This timely appeal followed. Both

Appellant and the trial court complied with their respective obligations pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises two issues for our review:

____________________________________________

1 The police did not recover evidence of the weapon or projectiles that had

caused the damage.

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[1.] Where the jury found that [Appellant] caused pecuniary loss

of more than $5,000—but not that he intended to cause pecuniary

loss of more than $5,000—does grading his criminal mischief

conviction as a third-degree felony constitute an illegal sentence

under Apprendi v. New Jersey[, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),] and

Alleyne v. United Sates[, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)]?

[2.] Did the [trial] court impose an illegal sentence in grading

[Appellant]’s criminal mischief offense as a third-degree felony

where, even assuming there was evidence that [Appellant]

intended to cause damage, there was no evidence that he

specifically intended to cause pecuniary loss in an amount

exceeding $5,000?

Appellant’s brief at 4 (cleaned up, emphasis in original).

Appellant’s issues implicate the legality of his sentence. 2 See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Seladones, 305 A.3d 83, 85 (Pa.Super. 2023) (“[A] claim

that the court improperly graded an offense for sentencing purposes implicates

the legality of a sentence.” (cleaned up)). He thus presents questions of law

subject to de novo, plenary review. Id. In particular, when faced with

contentions that the sentence imposed exceeded that allowable by law, an

appellate court must “review the verdict slip and instructions as a whole to

establish the level of culpability the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt

separate and apart from the challenged facet of the jury instructions. We then

____________________________________________

2To the extent that Appellant’s challenges were raised for the first time on

appeal, waiver pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) do not

apply. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Warunek, 279 A.3d 52, 54 (Pa.Super.

2022) (“A challenge to the legality of the sentence can never be waived and

may be raised by this Court sua sponte.” (cleaned up)).

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ascertain the maximum sentence that would have been imposable at that level

of culpability.” Commonwealth v. Dixon, 255 A.3d 1258, 1266 (Pa. 2021).

The criminal mischief statute states, pertinent to our discussion, as

follows:

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of criminal mischief if

he:

(1) damages tangible property of another intentionally,

recklessly, or by negligence in the employment of fire,

explosives, or other dangerous means listed in

[§] 3302(a) of this title (relating to causing or risking

catastrophe);

(2) intentionally or recklessly tampers with tangible

property of another so as to endanger person or

property;

(3) intentionally or recklessly causes another to suffer

pecuniary loss by deception or threat;

(4) intentionally defaces or otherwise damages tangible

public property or tangible property of another with

graffiti by use of any aerosol spray-paint can, broad-

tipped indelible marker or similar marking device;

(5) intentionally damages real or personal property of

another; or

(6) intentionally defaces personal, private or public

property by discharging a paintball gun or paintball

marker at that property.

(b) Grading.--Criminal mischief is a felony of the third degree if

the actor intentionally causes pecuniary loss in excess of $5,000,

or a substantial interruption or impairment of public

communication, transportation, supply of water, gas or power, or

other public service. It is a misdemeanor of the second degree if

the actor intentionally causes pecuniary loss in excess of $1,000,

or a misdemeanor of the third degree if he intentionally or

recklessly causes pecuniary loss in excess of $500 or causes a loss

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in excess of $150 for a violation of subsection (a)(4). Otherwise

criminal mischief is a summary offense.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3304.

With exceptions not relevant here, the maximum sentence for a third-

degree felony is seven years. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(3). For misdemeanors

of the second and third degrees, the maximums are two years and one year,

respectively. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104(2)-(3). Meanwhile, a person convicted

of a summary offense may not be sentenced to more than ninety days in

prison. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1105.

In the case sub judice, Appellant was charged with and convicted for

violating subsection (a)(5) of the criminal mischief statute. The trial court

concluded that the jury’s findings that Appellant was guilty and that he caused

pecuniary loss in excess of $5,000 rendered his offense a third-degree felony.

Accordingly, it deemed it within its authority to sentence him to six to twenty-

three months of confinement and to pay restitution to Mr. Ward and Diva

Logistics.

Appellant does not challenge the Commonwealth’s proof that the victims

sustained pecuniary losses of $4,806.55 and $4,878.53, respectively. Rather,

Appellant questions whether the absence of a factual finding by the jury that

he not only intended to damage the victims’ property, but that he specifically

intended to cause losses totaling more than $5,000, renders his sentence

illegal.

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Appellant presents two distinct bases for a finding of illegality. The first

flows from Apprendi and its progeny, which mandate that any fact that

increases a defendant’s sentencing exposure is an element of the offense that

must be determined by the fact-finder beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Appellant’s brief at 12-13. His second argument speaks not to whether the

sentence-enhancing fact was found by the jury, but whether the

Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to support the finding. In this vein,

Appellant asserts that, while “the Commonwealth presented evidence that he

intentionally damaged vehicles owned by his former employer and

supervisor[,]” and to show how much pecuniary loss resulted, it proffered “no

evidence, however, as to the amount of loss [he] intended to inflict—let alone

that such amount exceeded $5,000.” Appellant’s brief at 27.

The foundation of each of Appellant’s theories is his construction of

§ 3304(b) as requiring proof that he specifically intended his victims to sustain

losses of more than $5,000 before his § 3304(a)(5) conviction may be graded

as a third-degree felony. This is a matter of statutory interpretation to which

the following principles apply.

Our legislature has established that “[t]he object of all interpretation and

construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the

General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). It is axiomatic that “[t]he plain

language of the statute is the best indicator of the legislature’s intent. To

ascertain the plain meaning, we consider the operative statutory language in

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context and give words and phrases their common and approved usage.”

Commonwealth v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 247 A.3d 934, 942 (Pa.

2021). The provisions of the Crimes Code must “be construed according to the

fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing

constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in

[Title 18] and the special purposes of the particular provision involved.” 18

Pa.C.S. § 105. We presume that the legislature did not intend a result that is

absurd, unreasonable, or impossible of execution. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).

This Court must “interpret statutory language not in isolation, but with

reference to the context in which it appears.” Commonwealth v. Kingston,

143 A.3d 917, 922 (Pa. 2016). “[E]very portion of statutory language is to be

read together and in conjunction with the remaining statutory language, and

construed with reference to the entire statute as a whole.” Commonwealth

v. Glenn, 233 A.3d 842, 845 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up).

Where the words are clear, we interpret the statute in accordance with

its plain meaning without looking further than its text. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Strunk, 325 A.3d 530, 534 (Pa. 2024). It is only when a

provision, read in context, is susceptible to at least two reasonable

interpretations, or “raises non-trivial interpretive difficulties on its face,” that

we deem the language to be ambiguous. See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 337

A.3d 385, 409 n.113 (Pa. 2025) (cleaned up).

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Finally, while statutes are generally to be liberally construed, penal

provisions are strictly construed. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1), (c). However,

this rule of lenity does not require us to “give the words of a statute their

narrowest possible meaning, nor does it override the general principle that the

words of a statute must be construed according to their common and approved

usage.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 311 A.3d 1034, 1048 n.20 (Pa. 2024)

(cleaned up).

Mindful of these principles, we consider the interpretations suggested by

the parties. Appellant posits that when our legislature declared that a

conviction for criminal mischief may only be graded as a third-degree felony if

“the actor intentionally causes pecuniary loss in excess of $5,000,” it

unambiguously called for proof that the accused had a goal of inflicting at least

$5,000 of property damage when he engaged in his mischief. See Appellant’s

brief at 16. He reasons as follows:

A plain reading of the grading provision here shows it centers on

the amount of loss intended and not the amount of loss caused.

Indeed, for enhanced grading, the statute says quite simply that a

defendant must intentionally cause a certain amount of loss—not

just intentionally cause some loss. The former implicates grading

while the latter is more germane to conviction. Applying the

language of the statute as written and giving effect to its natural

meaning, only setting out to cause more than $5,000 in pecuniary

loss authorizes enhanced grading.

If the General Assembly had intended to base third-degree-felony

grading solely on the dollar value of the loss, it could easily have

done so by eliding the word “intentionally” from the clause stating

the requirements for such grading. In fact, the General Assembly

has accomplished as much in grading several other offenses. See,

e.g., 18 Pa.C.S. § 3903(a)(5), (a.2)(2), (b) (grading numerous

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forms of theft strictly on the basis of the amount of money taken);

18 Pa.C.S. § 4105(c)(1) (grading five forms of bad checks based

solely on the dollar amount of the check passed).

The inclusion of such language, where the General Assembly opted

to exclude it from the grading provisions of other criminal statutes,

represents a choice that should be given effect. The plain language

of the statute therefore requires proof that a defendant intended

to cause more than $5,000 of pecuniary loss in order to grade

criminal mischief as a third-degree felony. It is not enough that

more than $5,000 in loss was caused.

Id. at 16-18 (footnote and some citations omitted, emphasis in original).

The Commonwealth disagrees with Appellant’s interpretation, but

nonetheless contends that the statute is unambiguous. It advocates that

“[t]he only reasonable construction of [§] 3304 is that the defendant’s intent

applies to the act of causing damage, while the resulting monetary loss

determines the grade of the offense.” Commonwealth’s brief at 22. The

Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s construal is unreasonable in that it

“would create an impossible burden of proof for the Commonwealth and render

the felony grading provision a nullity[.]” Id. It expounds:

[Appellant’s] interpretation requires the Commonwealth to prove,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant possessed the

conscious objective not just to cause damage, but to cause damage

exceeding a specific dollar amount. This creates an absurd and

nearly impossible evidentiary burden. The Commonwealth would

have to prove the defendant’s state of mind as to the monetary

value of the destruction he was about to cause. Short of a

defendant announcing his financial intentions on video or leaving a

detailed note, it is difficult to imagine what evidence could ever

satisfy this burden. For example, if a defendant intentionally steals

copper pipes from air conditioners at a commercial facility to sell for

$2,000 of scrap metal, and the cost of replacement of the air

conditioners is $600,000, the defendant can, at most, be sentenced

for a third[-]degree misdemeanor according to [Appellant]. Under

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[his] reading, unless the Commonwealth could prove he knew the

replacement cost of the air conditioners and specifically intended to

exceed the $5,000 threshold, a felony conviction would be

impossible.

Id. at 22-23 (citation omitted).

The Commonwealth insists that the reference to the intentional state of

mind in the grading portion of § 3304 was included not to require proof that

the defendant acted with the goal of inflicting a certain measure of loss, but as

a function of the fact that different mens reae can support a criminal mischief

conviction. It contends that our legislature’s chosen language indicates an

intent to qualify only the most culpable for felony grading:

The base offense of criminal mischief can be committed with

several different states of mind. For example, some forms of

mischief can be committed “intentionally or recklessly.” 18

Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(2), (3). Others, including the type [Appellant]

committed, require that the defendant act “intentionally.” Id. at

§ 3304(a)(5). This deliberate legislative choice directly impacts

the grading scheme in subsection (b). The third-degree[-

]misdemeanor grade, for instance, can be triggered by conduct

that is either intentional or reckless. In contrast, the higher

grades of a second-degree misdemeanor and a third-degree

felony can only be triggered if the actor “intentionally causes” the

requisite pecuniary loss. The legislature clearly intended a

combination of the actor’s mens rea and the amount of loss

actually caused to govern the seriousness of the offense.

Id. at 24 (some citations omitted, emphasis in original).

Upon careful consideration of the statutory language, we agree with the

Commonwealth’s reading, which we perceive to reflect the whole of § 3304’s

plain language in context, and find this interpretation reinforced, rather than

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contradicted, by Appellant’s references to the grading provisions of other penal

statutes.

In arguing that the reference to intent in § 3304(b) implicates the desire

to achieve a certain level of damage and not the thought behind the criminal

act, Appellant first referenced § 3903, which supplies the following value-

specific grading provisos for all theft offenses:

(a) Felony of the second degree.--Theft constitutes a felony of

the second degree if:

....

(5) The amount involved is $100,000 or more but less than

$500,000.

(a.1) Felony of the third degree.--Except as provided in

subsection (a) or (a.2), theft constitutes a felony of the third

degree if the amount involved exceeds $2,000, or if the property

stolen is an automobile, airplane, motorcycle, motorboat or other

motor-propelled vehicle, or in the case of theft by receiving stolen

property, if the receiver is in the business of buying or selling

stolen property.

(a.2) Felony of the first degree.--Except as provided in

subsections (a) and (a.1), theft constitutes a felony of the first

degree if:

....

(2) the amount involved is $500,000 or more.

(b) Other grades.--Theft not within subsection (a), (a.1) or

(a.2), constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree, except that

if the property was not taken from the person or by threat, or in

breach of fiduciary obligation, and:

(1) the amount involved was $50 or more but less than $200

the offense constitutes a misdemeanor of the second

degree; or

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(2) the amount involved was less than $50 the offense

constitutes a misdemeanor of the third degree.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3903.

What Appellant fails to appreciate is that each of the theft offenses to

which this grading statute applies requires proof of intentional acts. See 18

Pa.C.S. §§ 3921 (theft by unlawful taking), 3922 (theft by deception), 3923

(theft by extortion), 3924 (theft of lost property), 3925 (receiving stolen

property), 3927 (theft by failure to make required disposition of funds

received). Similarly, the statute he cites establishing various grades for the

offense of passing bad checks based solely upon the amount of the instrument,

does not involve more than one level of criminal culpability in defining the

crime. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4105. In these instances, there is simply no need for

the grading provisions to mention levels of culpability because the offense is

only committed upon proof of one particular mental state.

Unlike the theft and forgery offenses cited by Appellant, the multiple

definitions of the crime of criminal mischief stated in § 3304(a) incorporate

widely-varying degrees of criminal culpability, spanning the full gamut of states

of mind from intentional down to criminal negligence, the least culpable mens

rea that can support criminal punishment. Were the loss-based gradings listed

in § 3304(b) in the same manner as they are in the above-discussed statutes

cited by Appellant, a person would be punishable to the same extent for

causing more than $5,000 in damages to his neighbor’s car through the

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negligent use of fireworks as he would for intentionally setting fire to the

vehicle. Further, under Appellant’s reading of § 3304(b), two individuals who,

by committing the indistinguishable acts, intentionally damaged identical cars,

each causing losses in excess of $5,000, would nevertheless face wildly

disparate punishment based upon whether they had an established history of

knowing the prices of cars and car repairs.

Overall, we deem Appellant’s construction of the criminal mischief

statute to be unreasonable, when viewed in the context of the Crimes Code as

a whole, and one that is not required by the plain meaning of the language

employed by the General Assembly. We simply do not discern from the

language of § 3304 the legislative intent to make ignorance or lack of life

experience a sentencing boon in that people who commit the identical acts are

subject to different punishments, not because of any difference in what they

did, but because of what they knew about how much things cost.

Instead, we perceive the plain language of § 3304(b) to reflect a

legislative intent to: (1) reserve the third-degree-felony and second-degree-

misdemeanor gradings for individuals who intentionally cause damage, with

the differentiation between the two being the pecuniary value of that damage;

(2) provide the lesser third-degree-misdemeanor grading for intentional or

reckless acts causing a smaller amount of loss; and (3) establish that criminal

mischief achieved through mere negligence or resulting in minimal damage

shall be a summary offense.

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Consequently, the Commonwealth was not required to prove, and the

jury was not required to find, that Appellant damaged the company trucks and

Mr. Ward’s personal vehicle with the intent to cause more than $5,000 in

losses. The burden necessary to sustain Appellant’s § 3304(a)(5) conviction,

graded as a third-degree felony, was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he

intentionally damaged that property and that his intentional acts resulted in

losses exceeding $5,000. The Commonwealth offered evidence to sustain

each of those elements, and the jury found that it proved them all. Cf.

Commonwealth v. Kearney, 225 A.3d 590, 596 (Pa.Super. 2019) (vacating

sentence for criminal mischief graded as a third-degree misdemeanor because

the Commonwealth offered no evidence that the damage the defendant caused

to a windshield amounted to a loss of at least $500).

Since Appellant’s sentence is well within the lawful maximum, we have

no cause to disturb it.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/23/2025

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