Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

INOVA ENERGY, LLC, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-817

V. : (JUDGE MANNION)

PIKE COUNTY LIGHT & POWER:

COMPANY and CORNING

ENERGY CORPORATION formerly :

known as CORNING NATURAL

GAS HOLDING CORPORATION, _ :

Defendants:

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court is the motion to dismiss, (Doc. 16), filed by

Defendants Pike County Light & Power Company and Corning Energy

Corporation. Defendants’ motion sets forth three arguments as to why the

court should dismiss Plaintiff Inova Energy, LLC’s antitrust lawsuit. First,

Defendants contend that the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

should resolve Plaintiff's claims under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.

(Doc. 16, | 5(a)). Second, Defendants argue that they are immune from

antitrust liability under the state action immunity doctrine. (/d., J 5(b)).

Finally, absent valid federal antitrust claims in light of the two

aforementioned legal theories, Defendants argue that the court lacks

supplemental jurisdiction to consider any remaining state claims. (/d., □□

5(C)).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves a private antitrust action initiated by Inova Energy,

LLC (hereinafter referred to as “Inova” or “Plaintiff’), a Pennsylvania foreign

LLC engaged in the business of selling electricity to retail customers within

the commonwealth of Pennsylvania as an Electric Generation Supplier

(“EGS”). (Doc. 7, J 2). The first named Defendant in this matter, Pike

County Light & Power Company, is a Pennsylvania Electric Distribution

Company (“EDC”) and a wholly owned subsidiary of the second named

Defendant, Corning Energy Corporation, a New York corporation formerly

known as Corning Natural Gas Holding Company (herein collectively

referred to as “Defendants” or “Pike”). (Doc. 7, □□ 2-3).

Inova’s original complaint was filed on November 8, 2024, in the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania and was amended on March 31, 2025.

Subsequently, Judge John R. Padova of the Eastern District issued an

order transferring the case to this court on the grounds of improper venue.

The amended complaint, filed with this court on March 31, 2025,

alleges that Pike engaged in “illegal anticompetitive conduct to insulate,

extend, and protect its monopoly over the electric distribution service

territory”. (Doc. 7, J 1). More particularly, Inova alleges that Pike failed to

provide them with customer data necessary to offer competitive electric

generation services to its customers, despite being required to exchange

this data under the Electricity Generation Customer Choice and

Competition Act (“Competition Act”) and the Pennsylvania Public Utility

Commission's (“PUC” or “Commission”) regulations. (Doc. 7).

For context, the Competition Act, passed by the Pennsylvania

General Assembly in 1996, restructured Pennsylvania’s electricity market

by providing retail customers with “direct access to a competitive market for

the generation and sale or purchase of electricity.” 66 Pa.C.S. §2802(13).

To accomplish this market transition, the Competition Act delegated “full

power and authority” to the Commission “to enforce, execute and carry out

... Its regulations,” in order to “prevent anticompetitive ... conduct.” 66

Pa.C.S.A. §§501, 2811. Accordingly, the Commission’s role was to

promulgate regulations at a micro level to effectively implement the broad

requirements outlined in the Competition Acct.

Under 66 Pa.C.S.A. §2807, the Competition Act established broad

requirements for EDCs such as Pike to follow, including the obligation to

provide adequate and accurate customer information to ESGs such as

Inova. To ensure compliance with these requirements, EDCs were required

to file various plans, reports, and contracts for the Commission’s approval,

including tariffs and default service plans. Through these filings, the

Commission required EDCs to show that they incorporated Electronic Data

Interchange (“EDI”) protocols, which was the default standard for

transferring and exchanging customer data with ESGs. /n re Standards for

Electronic Data Transfer and Exchange, Docket No. M-00960890, F.0015,

1998 WL 553021. However, the Commission allowed EDCs to petition for

waivers to certain regulations, including the EDI requirements, provided

they demonstrate that such an exception is justified. See 52 Pa. Code

§5.41.

With this regulatory framework in mind, the Commission issued

various orders approving Pike’s default service plans and EDI waiver

petition after demonstrating that the cost of implementing an EDI system

was high relative to Pike’s size as a company. (Doc 7, ff] 33-48). As a

result, Pike argues that they do not have the customer information that

Inova requests, nor are they required to provide such information in light of

the Commission’s orders granting their waiver petition. (Doc 23, at 7).

Inova argues that, despite Pike being granted a waiver from

implementing the EDI standards, they are still required to provide the

requested customer data through a website-based File Traisfer Protocol

("FTP”) platform, which was the alternative data exchange method that the

companies agreed Pike would use for customer data exchange. (Doc. 24

at 3). Stated differently, Inova claims that the Commission’s order granting

Pike’s petition for a waiver “merely authorizes the use of an alternative

delivery method; it does not relieve Pike of its duty to furnish the information

itself.” (Doc. 24 at 3).

According to Inova’s amended complaint, the failure to provide this

necessary customer data in accordance with the Competition Act and the

Commission’s regulations is a violation of both federal and state laws.

Specifically, at the federal level, Inova maintains that Pixe’s actions

implicate Sections 1 through 4 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C.

§§1-4), as well as Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C.

§§15, 26). At the state level, Pike’s actions allegedly violate Pennsylvania’s

Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) (73 P.S.

§201), and also constitute tortious interference under Pennsyivania law.

Pike’s instant motion to dismiss was filed on May 15, 2025. Inova filed

a brief in opposition, (Doc. 24), on June 18, 2025, to which Pike responded

with a subsequent reply brief (Doc. 27). Having reviewed all relevant

pleadings, the court finds the motion now ripe for disposition.

ll. Discussion

Pike’s motion to dismiss sets forth three arguments for the court to

consider. Primarily, Pike argues that Inova’s claims fall within the special

expertise of the Commission and should therefore be dismissed under the

primary jurisdiction doctrine (Doc. 16, ff] 5(a)). Alternatively, Pike argues

that they are immune from antitrust liability under the state action immunity

doctrine, given that the Commission has authorized and actively supervises

Pike’s activities within the restricted electricity market. (/d., 9] 5(b)). Finally,

if the court agrees that Pike is immune from antitrust claims, Pike argues

that the court lacks supplemental jurisdiction to consider any remaining

state claims. (/d., {J 5(c)).

For purposes of Pike’s motion to dismiss this court has taken as true

Inova’s allegations that Pike was required to provide the requested

customer data under the Competition Act and the Commission’s

regulations yet failed to do so. On the basis of such allegations the court

agrees that deference should be given to the Commission to resolve the

merits of Inova’s claims on primary jurisdiction grounds. Accordingly, the

court will not address the remaining arguments, except for the issue of

primary jurisdiction. '

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a longstanding legal principle

aimed at “promoting proper relationships between the courts and

administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties.” United

States v. Western Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956). As explained by the

Supreme Court, the primary jurisdiction doctrine:

applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and

comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the

resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have

been placed within the special competence of an administrative

body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending

referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.

Id. at 64.

While “[nJo fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine,” id., the

Third Circuit has recognized the following four-factor test for determining

whether a district court should abstain from hearing an otherwise valid

claim on primary jurisdiction grounds:

1 The Court’s resolution of Pike’s claims concerning state-action

immunity and the absence of supplemental jurisdiction depends on the

Commission’s determination.

1) Whether the question at issue is within the conventional

experience of judges or whether it involves technical or policy

considerations within the agency's particular field of expertise; 2)

Whether the question at issue is particularly within the agency's

discretion; 3) Whether there exists a substantial danger of

inconsistent rulings; and 4) Whether a prior application to the

agency has been made.

Baykeeper v. NL Industries, Inc., 660 F.3d 686, 691 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing

Global Naps, Inc. v. Bell Atl—N.J., 287 F.Supp.2d 532, 549 (D.N.J.2003)).

As the court will analyze below, all four of these factors weigh in favor of

the primary jurisdiction doctrine.

i. The Need for the Commission’s Expertise

In order to analyze Inova’s claims under the first factor, the “question

at issue” must be identified and described with particularity. Broadly

speaking, the underlying dispute in this case revolves around Pike’s

obligations as an electric distributor to provide customer data to its supplier,

Inova. These obligations are regulated through the Commission, and are

enforced on an individual basis through regulatory orders and through the

company’s filings, which require the Commission’s approval. Therefore, the

question at issue is whether these regulations required Pike to provide the

requested customer data, and the extent to which the Commission’s orders

granting Pike’s waiver limited these requirements. This question falls

directly within the Commission's field of expertise.

As briefly mentioned, the Commission operates with authority

granted to it by the Pennsylvania General Assembly and is responsible for

promoting competition within Pennsylvania’s electric utility industry in

accordance with the Competition Act. In furtherance of this cbjective, the

Commission requires electric utility companies to incorporate interaction

and coordination protocols that enable the transfer of electronic data and

customer information from distributors to suppliers. These requirements,

which included EDI implementation, were set forth in Pike’s Electric

Generation Supplier Coordination Tariff. (Doc. 7, ] 24-25). However, since

the adoption of the EDI standards, the Commission has issued a series of

regulatory orders granting Pike’s petitions for EDI waivers while: approving

Pike’s default service plans reflecting these waivers. (Doc. 7, | 33-48). The

crux of this dispute lies in the impact of these regulatory orders.

Although the parties appear to agree on the procediural history

between Pike and the Comission, they each reference the Sommission’s

orders as evidence to support their claims. On one hand, Pike argues that

they have no obligation to provide the information requested by Inova,

stating, “nor is [Pike] compelled to provide information beyorid what the

Commission had required in its various orders.” (Doc. 23, at 7). However,

Inova contends that Pike “incorrectly interprets [the orders] as a waiver from

the obligation to provide the underlying customer data.” Inova further cites

to Pike’s latest waiver petition and claims that Pike had agreed to provide

the customer data through the alternative FTP protocol. (Doc. 24, at 3).

Consequently, Inova’s claims directly implicate Pike’s filings and the

subsequent orders issued by the Commission granting Pike’s waiver

petition.

Faced with a similar issue in MC/, the Third Circuit described the

scope of the Commission’s expertise in the context of the primary

jurisdiction doctrine, stating:

The Pennsylvania Public Utility Law requires public utilities to file

tariffs with the PUC. See 66 Pa.C.S. § 1302 (Purdon 1979 &

Supp.1995). These tariffs are binding and dispositive ofthe rights

and liabilities between the customer and the public utility. See 66

Pa.C.S. § 1303 (Purdon 1979). The PUC has enforcemenit power

over its tariffs and regulations, and matters that pertain to those

tariffs are considered to be within the particular experrtisie of the

PUC. See 66 Pa.C.S. § 501, et seq. (Purdon 1979).

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1103

(3d Cir. 1995). More directly, the court held that “issues that implicate a

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utility’s tariff are deemed to be within the special expertise of the PUC’. /d.

at 1104.

While Inova’s claims extend beyond a tariff dispute, the court finds no

meaningful distinction in this case. The core issue revolves around Pike’s

adherence to their filings and a series of regulatory orders issued by the

Commission. Therefore, resolving this dispute entails questions of

compliance that fall directly under the Commission’s enforcernent power.

Accordingly, the Commission is best positioned to resolve Ineva’s claims.

ii. The Commission’s Discretion over Inova’s Claims

The second factor weighs in favor of primary jurisdiction for similar

reasons. As public utilities, Pike and Inova operate under the supervision

of the Commission and are required to comply with its orders and

regulations. These orders and regulations are designed to prornote greater

competition in the electricity generation market, to the extent that it serves

the public interest. See 66 Pa.C.S.A. §2802. Importantly, the Commission

recognizes that, on a case-by-case basis, serving the public interest may

necessitate waiving these competition-enhancing regulatiors. See 52 Pa.

Code §5.43(a). The approval of such exceptions is therefore: contingent

upon a public interest inquiry, a process in which the Commisision retains

complete discretion. See 66 Pa.C.S.A. §501; see also City of Pittsburgh v.

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West Penn Power Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 n.13 (W.D. Pa. 1998)

(citations omitted) (holding that “[t]he extent to which competition may be

allowed between utilities is a matter within the exclusive discretion of the

PUC.”).

In this case, Pike sought an exception by filing a petition for a waiver

from the EDI standards and submitted supporting facts to justify their

grounds for the request. The Commission considered Pike’s concerns and,

at its discretion, determined that granting Pike this waiver was in the public

interest. (Doc. 7, J] 45, 46). In this same vein, determining whether Pike’s

failure to provide the customer data exceeded the scope of the waiver may

ultimately necessitate a similar public interest inquiry, a process that is

solely within the Commission’s discretion.

iii. Substantial Danger of Inconsistent Rulings

Given the nature of the inquiry that is required to resolve Inova’s

clains—particularly the interpretation of various orders from the

Commission and the scope of Pike’s waiver regarding data exchange—

there is a significant risk that the court’s decision would conflict with that of

the Commission. Whether the Commission “expressly authorized Pike to

proceed in the manner about which Inova complains,” (Doc. 23, at 18), as

Pike contends, or whether Pike’s refusal to comply with Inova’s request

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was done in defiance of the Commission, its regulations, and various

orders, is a question that only the Commission can answer with certainty.

Inova argues that the Commission's inability to award damages

eliminates the risk of inconsistent rulings. (Doc. 24 at 7). However, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected the argument that agencies lose

primary jurisdiction over claims solely because they seek monetary relief,

describing it as a “simplistic notion” that “ignores the reality that frequently

both the courts and administrative agencies must each play roles in the

adjudication of certain matters.” Elkin v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 491 Pa. 123,

420 A.2d 371, 375 (1980).

To accommodate an agency’s inability to award damages, Elkin

recognized a “bifurcated procedure,” whereby issues concerning liability

are referred to an administrative agency while the civil suit is stayed to allow

the issue of damages to proceed pending the agency’s determination. /d.

at 376. This mechanism was bolstered by the Third Circuit in MC/, 71 F.3d

at 1106, which utilized the bifurcated procedure from Elkin by instructing

the district court to transfer a third-party claim to the PUC for a

determination of liability while retaining jurisdiction over damages pending

the PUC’s decision. In fact, despite Inova’s argument that a request for

damages prevents the court from deferring to the Commission, Inova

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immediately presents an alternative argument requesting that the court

bifurcate their claims. See (Doc. 24, at 7) (stating that “should the Court

find primary jurisdiction is deemed to rest with the PUC, it is respectfully

submitted the judicial proceedings be suspended while the technical issue

is referred to the PUC for its views’).

Accordingly, given the prior findings that Inova’s claims fall within the

Commission’s expertise, the court will not circumvent the Commission's

discretion to adjudicate liability. Doing so would pose a significant risk of

inconsistent rulings.

iv. Prior Relief Sought from the Commission

Finally, the Commission provides several procedures to address

Inova’s claims. These include formal and informal complaint procedures

under 52 Pa. Code §§5.21 and 56.163, a dispute resolution process

outlined in 52 Pa. Code §54.122(4)(i)-(iv), and various petition procedures

for clarifying and resolving controversies, including 52 Pa. Code §§5.42 and

5.572. Despite these options, Inova failed to raise their claims to the

Commission entirely.

Although Inova correctly notes that none of these procedures offered

through the Commission can provide monetary relief, the court will maintain

jurisdiction over Inova’s claims. By doing so, Inova will have the opportunity

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to proceed on the issue of damages through this court upon a favorable

ruling from the Commission.

lll. Conclusion

Accordingly, upon review of Pike’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 16),

Inova’s claims will be stayed and transferred to the Commission for a ruling

on liability. The court will retain jurisdiction over this case pending the

Commission’s determination of liability. An appropriate order follows.

United States District Judge

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