Anthony

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SCOTT ANTHONY, ) Case No. 1:25-cv-1890

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge

) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

JUDGE PATRICK T. MURPHY, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Scott Anthony filed this action without a lawyer on his own behalf and

“as next friend of E.A., a minor” against 17 individuals and entities purportedly

involved in a custody case in the Crawford County, Ohio Juvenile Court and a

criminal matter against Plaintiff in the Crawford County Municipal Court. Plaintiff

asks the Court for a declaratory judgment that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s and

E.A.’s constitutional and statutory rights, an order prohibiting Defendants from

enforcing the juvenile court orders, a stay of enforcement of child custody orders, an

injunction that Defendants not interfere in Plaintiff’s parental rights, an order for

the immediate reunification of E.A. with Plaintiff, and expungement of “all

illegitimate records from fraudulent proceedings.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 6, PageID #9.)

Plaintiff also requests monetary relief. (Id., ¶¶ 7–12.)

Plaintiff moves to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) The Court

GRANTS that application. For the following reasons, the Court DISMISSES this

action.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a 149-page document titled “Verified Complaint.” (See ECF

No. 1.) This document consists of a 10-page complaint, a 6-page “summary

complaint,” and several exhibits, including one that runs 62 pages in length and

contains documents that Plaintiff appears to have attempted to submit to the Ohio

Supreme Court. (Id.) In a repetitive and conclusory fashion, the complaint

challenges the Crawford County Juvenile Court’s orders concerning Plaintiff’s

parental rights and various criminal charges filed against him in the Crawford

County Municipal Court. Plaintiff conflates the two State court actions throughout

the complaint.

According to the complaint, E.A. was removed from Plaintiff’s custody without

a warrant or exigent circumstances in December 2020. Plaintiff claims that the

juvenile proceedings were conducted in secret, with hidden docket numbers and

ex parte communication, and the State court issued orders outside its jurisdiction,

which are therefore void. (ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 15, PageID #14.) It appears that Plaintiff

alleges Defendants retaliated against him for filing lawsuits in the Ohio Supreme

Court and the Ohio Court of Appeals by filing criminal charges against him in

Crawford County Municipal Court. (Id.) He objects to the municipal court’s bond-

forfeiture hearing and claims Defendant Jamie Hitchman (also referred to as

Hitchens), a bail bondsman, entered his home without a warrant, kidnapped Plaintiff,

and extorted Plaintiff’s father under threats that Plaintiff would be jailed and his

children taken. (Id., ¶¶ 18–26, PageID #14–15; see also ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 37–38, PageID

#5.) Also, Plaintiff claims that Defendants used “fabricated warrants and bench

warrants to justify the kidnappings” of Plaintiff and E.A. (ECF No. 1,¶ 38, PageID

#5.)

Plaintiff states that he is a “fit biological father and next friend of E.A.,” a

minor. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 11, PageID #2.) Further, he claims that he and E.A. are

qualified individuals with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

engaged in a conspiracy in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act to “remove E.A.” (Id., ¶ 29, PageID #4.) He claims that Defendants

engaged in “continuing retaliatory conduct, including fraudulent juvenile

proceedings, fabricated indictments, orchestrated arrests, denial of accommodations,

and interstate kidnappings.” (Id., ¶ 31.) Concerning the juvenile court proceedings,

he claims that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his right to family integrity and care

of E.A. through fabricated proceedings; took adverse actions against him because he

filed federal complaints; discriminated against him and E.A. because of their

disabilities when they treated Plaintiff differently than similarly situated parents;

conspired to deprive Plaintiff and E.A. of their constitutional rights and Defendants

in a supervisory capacity failed to intervene; failed to provide Plaintiff and E.A. with

reasonable accommodations; denied them participation in programs and services;

denied E.A. an appropriate education; and disclosed E.A.’s protected health and

educational information without authorization. (Id., ¶¶ 51–64, PageID #7–9.)

Further, Plaintiff alleges that Crawford County and the Galion City School District

“maintained policies, customs, or practices that caused the constitutional violations.”

(Id., ¶ 63, PageID #8.)

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct constitutes fraud, civil

conspiracy, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, false imprisonment, and spoilation of evidence. (Id., ¶ 64, PageID #9.)

Finally, concerning the criminal charges in municipal court, Plaintiff alleges that

numerous criminal charges were filed against him without probable cause, including,

stalking, telecommunications harassment, and aggravated menacing, and these

charges constitute malicious prosecution. (Id., ¶ 42, PageID #6.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions constitute a violation of RICO, the

Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment (retaliation),

the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 (civil rights

conspiracy), the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the IDEA, and

HIPPA/FERPA.

Additionally, Plaintiff filed the following motions: emergency motion for

temporary restraining order and motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 3);

emergency motion for temporary restraining order (ECF No. 4); motion for

preliminary injunction (ECF No. 5); and motion for permission to file electronically

(ECF No. 6). Defendant Michael Bear filed a Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 9).

ANALYSIS

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,

365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The district

court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted or if it lacks an

arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); Lawler

v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d

194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact where it is

premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions

are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

A cause of action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted where it

lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564

(2007). In any civil action, a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 677–78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise

the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the

allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not

required to include detailed factual allegations, but he must provide more than “an

unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a

cause of action does not meet this pleading standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559,

561 (6th Cir. 1998).

I. E.A.’s Claims

As an initial matter, Plaintiff appears to claim that Defendants violated his

minor child’s constitutional rights during the course of the child custody proceedings,

discriminated against him on the basis of disability in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act, failed to convene a proper individualized education program, failed

to provide appropriate educational services and engaged in retaliation in violation of

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and denied him participation in

programs and services in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Non-

attorney parents, however, cannot appear pro se on behalf of their minor child in

lawsuits in federal court.

A party may plead and conduct his own case in person or through a licensed

attorney. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516,

522 (2007). However, the statute “does not permit plaintiffs to appear pro se where

interests other than their own are at stake.” Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970

(6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). This rule “‘protects the rights of those before the

court by preventing an ill-equipped layperson from squandering the rights of the

party he purports to represent.’” Bass v. Leatherwood, 788 F.3d 228, 230 (6th Cir.

2015) (quoting Zanecki v. Health Alliance Plan of Detroit, 576, F. App’x 594, 595 (6th

Cir. 2014) (per curiam)).

Therefore, parents cannot appear pro se on behalf of their minor children

“because a minor’s personal cause of action is [his or] her own and does not belong to

[his or] her parent or representative.” Shepherd, 313 F.3d at 970 (citation omitted).

“W]hile a parent may technically bring suit on behalf of a minor child, he or she may

not do so pro se—that is, the parent can only bring suit on behalf of the minor child

through an attorney.” McCoy v. Akron Police Dep’t, No. 5:21-cv-51, 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 88484, 2021 WL 1857119, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 10, 2021) (citing Shepherd,

313 F.3d at 970). “The general rule prohibiting a non-attorney parent from

representing his or her minor child in federal court ‘is designed to protect the

interests of the minor party[.]’” Adams v. Astrue, 659 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2011)

(citation omitted); see also Wirtz v. Medina City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:21-cv-

1730, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121230, at *5 (N.D. Ohio July 8, 2022) (dismissing

without prejudice Section 1983 claims brought by pro se parent on behalf of her minor

children).

Here, there is no suggestion in the complaint that Plaintiff is a licensed

attorney who may lawfully assert the claims of his minor child. Therefore, to the

extent that the complaint asserts claims on behalf of Plaintiff’s minor child, E.A., the

Court DISMISSES those claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE to any of the child’s

claims being refiled by an attorney.

II. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

To the extent Plaintiff challenges the State court child custody orders, the

Court lacks jurisdiction to consider custody matters. Generally, the Constitution and

Congress have given federal courts authority to hear a case only where diversity of

citizenship exists between the parties or where the case raises a federal question.

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The first type of federal

jurisdiction, diversity of citizenship, applies to cases of sufficient value between

“citizens of different states.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The second type of federal

jurisdiction relies on the presence of a federal question. This type of jurisdiction

arises where a “well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the

cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution

of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers

Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983).

Plaintiff is a Michigan resident and states that he “has been forced to litigate

in Ohio after Ohio agencies seized his child.” (ECF No. 1-2, PageID # 13). To the

extent Plaintiff alleges diversity of citizenship, child custody issues fall under the

domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards,

504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992); Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 794–98 (6th

Cir. 2015). The domestic relations exception deprives a federal court of jurisdiction

where “‘a plaintiff positively sues in federal court for divorce, alimony, or child

custody,’ or seeks to modify or interpret an existing divorce, alimony, or child-custody

decree.” Chevalier, 803 F.3d at 797 (quoting Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 292 (6th

Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff alleges diversity jurisdiction and asks

the Court to void the existing custody decree, enjoin Defendants from interfering with

Plaintiff’s parental rights, or order reunification of the minor child with Plaintiff, the

domestic relations exception applies. Additionally, if federal jurisdiction exists in this

case, it must be based on federal law. Child custody determinations are a matter of

State law. Therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to make a child

custody determination.

Moreover, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review, reverse, or void

State court judgments. A United States district court does not have jurisdiction to

overturn State court decisions even if the request to reverse the State court judgment

is based on an allegation that the State court’s action was unconstitutional. Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005). Federal appellate

review of State court judgments can only occur in the Supreme Court, by appeal or

by writ of certiorari. Id. Under this principle, a party losing his case in State court

is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the State

judgment in a federal district court based on the party’s claim that the State

judgment itself violates his or her federal rights. Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290,

298–99 (6th Cir. 2012).

Put another way, if the source of the plaintiff’s injury is the State court

judgment itself, then the plaintiff’s claim is barred from proceeding in federal court.

McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir.2006); see Berry, 688 F.3d at

299. “If there is some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the

plaintiff asserts an independent claim.” Id.; see Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364,

368–69 (6th Cir. 2008). In conducting this inquiry, the Court also considers the

plaintiff’s requested relief. Evans v. Cordray, 424 F. App’x 537, 539 (6th Cir. 2011).

Here, the source of Plaintiff’s alleged injury appears, in part, to be the child

custody orders. Further, Plaintiff asks the Court to return custody of his child to him

and to prohibit further interference by State agencies or officials. Accordingly, the

Court lacks jurisdiction to vacate the judgment of the State court and grant Plaintiff’s

requested relief.

Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to litigate the child custody matter

for a second time in another court in the hope of obtaining a different result, the Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction to grant that relief. The doctrine of res judicata bars

duplicative litigation based on the same event or events. Montana v. United States,

440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).

The term “res judicata” literally means “a thing [already] adjudicated.” Black’s Law

Dictionary (2d ed). When one court has already resolved the merits of a case, another

court will not revisit them. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153; Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at

326. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata precludes a party from bringing a

subsequent lawsuit on the same claim or from raising a new defense to defeat the

prior judgment. Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 918 F.2d

658, 660 (6th Cir. 1990). The doctrine bars relitigation of every issue actually brought

before the court and every issue or defense that should have been raised in the

previous action. Id. Furthermore, res judicata bars Plaintiff from relitigating in

federal court claims and issues that a State court previously decided. Bragg v. Flint

Bd. of Educ., 570 F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2009).

Here, Plaintiff challenges the judgment of the Crawford County Juvenile

Court, namely the State court’s orders concerning custody of his child. The juvenile

court already decided those issues. This Court cannot revisit those issues and render

decisions that may conflict with the State court orders. Res judicata bars Plaintiff

from relitigating those issues again in federal court. Further, res judicata bars

Plaintiff from litigating issues that should have been raised in state court, including

his claims of a conspiracy, RICO violations, and ADA violations as it relates to

Plaintiff.

III. State Criminal Case

To the extent Plaintiff challenges the legality of a pending municipal court

proceeding, the Court lacks jurisdiction. Where an individual is the subject of an

ongoing State action involving important State matters, he cannot interfere with the

pending State action by maintaining a parallel federal action involving claims that

could have been raised in the State case. Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839, 844–48

(6th Cir. 1988). If the State defendant files such a case, Younger abstention requires

the federal court to defer to the State proceeding. Id.; see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,

Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987).

Based on these principles, abstention is appropriate where: (1) the State

proceedings are ongoing, (2) the State proceedings implicate important State

interests, and (3) the State proceedings afford the plaintiff an adequate opportunity

to raise federal questions. Leveye v. Metro. Pub. Def. Office, 73 F. App’x 792, 794 (6th

Cir. 2003) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–45). Abstention is mandated where federal

court intervention “unduly interferes with the legitimate activities of the state.”

Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Additionally, the principles expressed in Younger apply to

ongoing State civil and criminal proceedings. Watts, 854 F.2d at 844.

Regarding the third requirement of Younger, the relevant inquiry is whether

the State proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.

Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979). The plaintiff bears the burden of

demonstrating that State procedural law bars presentation of his claims. Pennzoil

Co., 481 U.S. at 14. Where a plaintiff has not attempted to present his federal claims

in the State court proceedings, the federal court should assume that State procedures

will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of “unambiguous authority to the

contrary.” Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 15; see also Szarell v. Summit Cnty. Ct. of Com. Pl.,

No. 5:18 CV 2975, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142061, 2019 WL 3946191, at *3 (N.D. Ohio

Aug. 21, 2019) (the third factor of the Younger abstention was satisfied where the

plaintiff failed to allege in the pleadings that the State court proceedings did not or

could not provide her with an opportunity to present her federal claim).

Here, because the State court proceedings in municipal court remain ongoing,

all three factors supporting abstention are present. State court criminal proceedings

implicate important state interests. See Leveye v. Metropolitan Pub. Def. Office, 73

F. App’x 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that a criminal case implicates an

important State interest because State criminal prosecutions have traditionally been

considered an arena in which federal courts decline to interfere) (citing Younger, 401

U.S. at 43-45). And there is no suggestion in the complaint that any purported claim

in this federal lawsuit concerning Plaintiffs criminal charges is barred in the State

action. Therefore, the Court must abstain from interfering with Plaintiff's pending

municipal court criminal proceedings. See Moore v. City of Garfield Heights, No. 12-

ev-1700, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164911, 2012 WL 5845369, at * 5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19,

2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs claims arising from a municipal court proceedings)

(citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, even liberally construed in favor of Plaintiff, the

complaint fails to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief. The Court

GRANTS Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). Pursuant

to Section 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court DISMISSES the complaint and DENIES AS

MOOT Plaintiff's pending motions. (ECF No. 3; ECF No. 4; ECF No. 5; ECF No. 6.)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court certifies that an appeal from this

decision could not be taken in good faith.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 22, 2025

J.PhilipCalabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

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