Bland

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

WALLISHA BLAND, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 24-3200

)

SETH BRAMWELL et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 7)

filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff Wallisha Bland, an inmate at Logan Correctional

Center (“Logan”).

I. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient

claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if

it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Upon

reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, construing

them liberally in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).

However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be

provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States,

721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

II. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff’s pleading names the following officials: Corrections Lieutenant Seth

Bramwell, former Logan Warden Melinda Eddy, Physician Risha Fennell, Corrections

Major Melinda Hickey, Assistant Warden Michael Long, Healthcare Administrator

Shelby Russell, Corrections Sergeant Spellman, the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”), and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Finnell and Russell neglected to treat her sickle

cell anemia by refusing to refer Plaintiff to see her hematologist every three months as

recommended. Instead, Plaintiff claims that Finnell has revised Plaintiff’s referrals to

once a year. Plaintiff also asserts that Fennell and Russell have refused to take her medical

claims seriously and continually tell Plaintiff that she should instead file a grievance.

C. Analysis

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) is granted. The

Clerk of the Court is directed to docket Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint need only contain a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in

sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief above

a speculative level.” Bravo v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 812 F.3d 599, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2016);

see also Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 2013)

(“Instead, a plausible claim must include ‘factual content’ sufficient to allow the court ‘to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

Despite naming Defendants Bramwell, Eddy, Hickey, Long, and Spellman,

Plaintiff does not mention specific acts or omissions that would permit the Court to

infer that each committed a constitutional violation. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331,

334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant by including

the defendant’s name in the caption.”).

Plaintiff also does not state a claim against the IDOC as § 1983 “provides a remedy

for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law.”

First Midwest Bank Guardian of Estate of LaPorta v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir.

2021). The IDOC is not a person within the meaning of § 1983. See Owens v. Evans, 878

F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (“IDOC was properly dismissed because it is not a person

subject to suit under § 1983.”); Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012)

(concluding that a building, such as a jail or correctional facility, cannot be sued under §

1983).

Defendant Wexford can be held liable under § 1983 if an unconstitutional act is

caused by: “(1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its officers; (2) a

governmental practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is widespread

and well settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.” Thomas v. Cook Cty.

Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill.,

Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the standard for municipal liability

in Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), applies to corporations as

well). “The ‘official policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the

municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby [clarify] that

municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is … responsible.”

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphases in original).

Plaintiff does not state a plausible claim against Defendant Wexford because

Plaintiff does not allege any fact that establishes or permits the reasonable inference that

a Wexford official policy or custom caused his injury. See Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med.

Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) (“An official policy or custom may be established

by means of an express policy, a widespread practice which, although unwritten, is so

entrenched and well-known as to carry the force of policy, or through the actions of an

individual who possesses the authority to make final policy decisions on behalf of the

municipality or corporation.”).

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and

unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs of prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on a claim of deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must satisfy a test that has both an

objective and subjective part. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). Under the

objective part, a plaintiff must show that his medical condition is sufficiently severe.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the subjective part, the prison official

must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. A “deliberate

indifference” standard is used in the medical care context. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.

“A medical professional acting in his professional capacity may be held to have

displayed deliberate indifference only if the decision by the professional is such a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a

judgment.” Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d

886, 895 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Construing Plaintiff’s account as accurate, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s

account is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs claim against Defendants Fennell and Russell.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

against Defendants Fennell and Russell. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants

proceeds in their individual capacity only. Additional claims shall not be

included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for

good cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2) This case is now in the process of service. The Court recommends that Plaintiff

wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give

Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed

before Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will be denied as premature.

Plaintiff need not submit evidence to the Court unless otherwise directed by the

Court.

3) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of service.

Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants have not

filed their respective Answer or appeared through counsel within ninety days of

the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service.

After Defendants have been served, the Court will enter an order setting

discovery and dispositive deadlines.

4) If a defendant no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for

whom Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk

Defendant’s current work address or, if not known, Defendant’s forwarding

address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be kept only by the Clerk and shall

not be kept in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

5) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends the

waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The Answer should include all

defenses proper under the Federal Rules. The Answer and later pleadings shall

be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. An answer sets forth the

Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions

unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no response to the Answer

is necessary or will be considered.

6) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel

has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive electronic

notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Therefore, Plaintiff

does not need to mail copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed

with the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does not apply to discovery

requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed with the Court.

Instead, Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses directly to

Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned

unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery

does not begin until Defendants’ counsel files an appearance and the Court enters a

scheduling order, which will provide more detailed information about the discovery

process.

7) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of confinement.

Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.

8) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing

address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in

mailing address or phone number will result in the dismissal of this lawsuit with

prejudice.

9) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within thirty

days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal

service through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and will require

Defendant to pay the total costs of formal service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

4(d)(2).

10) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under the

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

11) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendants under the standard

procedures.

ENTERED December 22, 2025.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless

____________________________________

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE