Doe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-cv-61621-STRAUSS

JOHN DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARCO RUBIO et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________________/

OMNIBUS ORDER

THIS MATTER came before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Under

Pseudonyms [DE 3] (the “Pseudonym Motion”), Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time and

Order to Show Cause [DE 20] (the “Extension Motion”), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File

Amended Complaint [DE 21] (the “Leave Motion”). For the reasons described below, the Court

will deny the Pseudonym Motion and grant in part and deny in part the Extension Motion and

Leave Motion.

BACKGROUND

On August 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Complaint on behalf of himself and numerous

others. See generally [DE 1]. Plaintiff filed his Complaint under the pseudonym of “J. Doe,” id.

at 1, and separately moved for himself and all other anonymous Plaintiffs to proceed under

pseudonyms “because the release of their names would expose them to a significant risk of harm,

and because proceeding anonymously will not significantly burden the Defendants or other

parties.” [DE 3] at 2.

Since Plaintiff filed this action on August 11, 2025, the deadline to perfect service

originally was November 10, 2025. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (requiring service of summons and

complaint to be perfected upon defendant within ninety days after filing of complaint). This Court

later extended the deadline to perfect service to November 26, 2025, upon Plaintiff’s prior motion

for extension of time. See generally [DE 18]. After that extended deadline lapsed, the Court

entered an order requiring Plaintiff to “show cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for

failure to perfect service of process.” [DE 19] at 1. Plaintiff responded by filing the Extension

Motion, which asks for the Court to extend all deadlines by an additional sixty days and issue an

order “requiring Defendant to show cause why it failed to respond.” [DE 20] at 1. In the Extension

Motion, Plaintiff states in a conclusory fashion that he “has acted diligently but needs additional

time to complete service or file amended pleadings.” Id. Plaintiff also states that “Defendant has

failed to respond to service, including ignoring certified mail notices.” Id. Notably, this Court has

previously explained to Plaintiff—in detail—the steps that he must take to perfect service on

Defendants. See [DE 15] at 2-3. To date, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has perfected

service.

Plaintiff has also moved for leave to file an amended complaint, stating that an amendment

is needed to clarify some of his claims and add or correct allegations to ensure compliance with

federal pleading standards. [DE 21] at 1. According to Plaintiff, an amendment will not cause

prejudice because the case is in an early procedural posture. Id.

ANALYSIS

I. PSEUDONYM MOTION [DE 3]

“‘Generally, parties to a lawsuit must identify themselves’ in the pleadings.” In re Chiquita

Brands Int’l, Inc., 965 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 322

(11th Cir. 1992)). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that ‘every pleading’ in federal

court ‘must name all the parties.’” Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)). “This rule serves more than administrative convenience. It protects

the public’s legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts involved, including the identities of the

parties.” Id. (quoting Frank, 951 F.2d at 322). “This creates a strong presumption in favor of

parties proceeding in their own names. Defendants have the right to know who their accusers are,

as they may be subject to embarrassment or fundamental unfairness if they do not.” Id. (citation

omitted).

“Yet the rule is not absolute. A party may proceed anonymously in federal court by

establishing ‘a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary and constitutionally-

embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.’” In re Chiquita Brands, 965 F.3d at

1247 (quoting Plaintiff B, 631 F.3d at 1315-16). But the foregoing exception is narrow; parties

may only use fictitious names in exceptional cases. Id. “In evaluating whether a plaintiff has

shown that he has such a right, the court ‘should carefully review all the circumstances of a given

case and then decide whether the customary practice of disclosing the plaintiff’s identity should

yield to the plaintiff’s privacy concerns.’” Plaintiff B, 631 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Frank, 951 F.2d

at 323).

The Eleventh Circuit has explained that the first step of the requisite inquiry is to consider

three factors: (1) whether the party seeking anonymity “is challenging government activity”; (2)

whether the party “would be compelled, absent anonymity, to disclose information of utmost

intimacy”; and (3) whether the party “would be compelled, absent anonymity, to admit an intent

to engage in illegal conduct and thus risk criminal prosecution.” In re Chiquita Brands, 965 F.3d

at 1247 (citing Plaintiff B, 631 F.3d at 1316). Ultimately, though, “whether a party’s right to

privacy overcomes the presumption of judicial openness is a totality-of-the-circumstances

question.” Id. at 1247 n.5. In addition to the above-mentioned factors, “[o]ther factors to consider

include whether the party seeking anonymity is a minor or faces a real threat of physical harm

absent anonymity” and “whether the party’s requested anonymity poses a unique threat of

fundamental unfairness to the defendant.” Id. at 1247 (citations omitted).

In Chiquita, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the type of evidence needed to support

proceeding under pseudonyms. See 965 F.3d at 1248. The case arose from multidistrict litigation

in which the plaintiffs alleged that a Colombian paramilitary group killed their family members,

with Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (and other affiliated entities) giving the paramilitary group

financial support that supposedly contributed to the deaths. Id. at 1242-43. The Eleventh Circuit

first recognized that “different litigants may face different risks of harm.” Id. at 1248. The parties

seeking to proceed anonymously in the case “cite[d] general evidence showing that those who

oppose paramilitary groups or paramilitary-affiliated entities face risks of paramilitary violence.”

However, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the pseudonym motions

because “this evidence d[id] not compel the conclusion that the MDL plaintiffs face[d] those

risks.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff’s Pseudonym Motion does not meet the high burden to overcome the strong

presumption of openness in judicial proceedings because it states one conclusory line that “the

release of their names would expose them to a significant risk of harm . . . .” [DE 3] at 2. Without

more elaboration, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has met his burden. Looking beyond the

Pseudonym Motion, the 131-page, 335-plus-paragraph Complaint likewise does not establish that

Plaintiff has met his burden. The Complaint asserts numerous causes of action against a whole

host of different parties (some of which are not even actually named as Defendants) and makes

very serious but unsubstantiated accusations of corruption, fraud, extrajudicial killings, and other

misconduct in Bolivia and elsewhere. See generally [DE 1]. Although Plaintiff is challenging

government actions (not only those of the U.S. government but of foreign governments as well),

Plaintiff fails to allege in any direct or specific way how he or the other anonymous parties on

whose behalf the action is purportedly brought are at risk such that they overcome the strong

presumption in favor of parties not using pseudonyms.

Indeed, the Complaint predominantly includes references to general instances of alleged

misconduct rather than specific ones. It is true that beyond detailing the alleged corruption and

human rights abuses in Bolivia, Plaintiff also alleges that “Plaintiff and Bolivian victims have

suffered . . . [p]hysical and emotional harm caused by torture and extrajudicial killings . . . .” Id.

¶ 335, at 129; see also id. ¶ 43, at 23. (“Additional Interested Party: 1-1000 Victims of torture,

extrajudicial killings, and other abuses in Bolivia who have suffered harm due to the Bolivian

regime’s actions allegedly funded by mismanaged Venezuelan assets.”). Moreover, Plaintiff

references some specific instances, such as the death of a protected witness in Miami. See, e.g.,

[DE 1] at 129. Even so, a cursory review of the Complaint does not reveal specific harms that

Plaintiff and the other anonymous parties are currently at risk of if they cannot proceed under

pseudonyms in this action.

While the Court recognizes the seriousness of the allegations in the Complaint, the Court

cannot accept the assertion that non-specific instances of alleged fraud, corruption, or extrajudicial

killings will justify Plaintiff and every other supposed party proceeding anonymously without

more corroboration. Again, “different litigants may face different risks of harm[.]” In re Chiquita

Brands, 965 F.3d at 1248. And the overall lack of specificity as to the actual parties makes it

nearly impossible for the Court to assess the relevant factors that it must, i.e., whether Plaintiff and

the other anonymous parties, if named, will be required to reveal (1) information of the utmost

intimacy, (2) illegal conduct that could subject themselves to the possibility of criminal

prosecution, (3) details of a person who is a minor, or (4) real threats of physical harm, beyond the

highest level of generality. See id. at 1247.

Therefore, the Pseudonym Motion is due to be denied. Even though the Court will allow

Plaintiff to file an amended Complaint, as described below, he must include his name. When he

files the amended complaint, he may renew the Pseudonym Motion—but only if Plaintiff clearly

substantiates the risks that he specifically may face.

II. EXTENSION MOTION [DE 20]

Plaintiff asks for a sixty-day extension of all deadlines and for an order to show cause

directed at “Defendant.”1 [DE 20] at 1. The Court must extend the time for service if a plaintiff

shows good cause for the failure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Yet the Court has already extended the

service deadline once to accommodate Plaintiff. See [DE 18]. On November 10, 2025, Plaintiff

requested an extension of thirty days. [DE 17] at 3. Although the Court only granted that request

in part, Plaintiff has now effectively received almost two weeks more than what his previous

motion sought to complete service. Even so, because Plaintiff has not been entirely idle when

attempting to perfect service, the Court will extend the deadline one last time. But the Court will

not grant Plaintiff the additional sixty days that he requests. Instead, Plaintiff will be given an

additional two weeks to perfect service. The Court also declines to issue an order to show cause

to any Defendant. Indeed, although Plaintiff seeks an order requiring Defendant to show cause

why it has failed to respond, Plaintiff’s own motion indicates that Plaintiff “needs additional time

to complete service[,]” [DE 20] at 1, thus effectively conceding that service is incomplete and that

a response from Defendant is not-yet required. The Extension Motion will thus be granted in part

and denied in part.

1 Plaintiff sues more than one Defendant.

III. LEAVE MOTION [DE 21]

Plaintiff has not indicated that he has perfected service and, indeed, seeks additional time

to complete service. Depending on the status of service, Plaintiff may not need leave of court to

amend his Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A) (“A party may amend its pleading once as

a matter of course no later than . . . 21 days after serving it . . . .” (emphasis added)). Regardless,

“[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Because

the case is at the pleadings stage and Plaintiff has not previously amended his Complaint, the Court

will grant Plaintiff leave to amend.

However, the Court will not deem the Proposed Amended Complaint [DE 21-1] the

operative Complaint because it would create a “shotgun pleading.” See Weiland v. Palm Beach

Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Complaints that violate either Rule

8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’”). Rule

8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A few types of shotgun pleadings exist, but “[t]he unifying

characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to . . . give the defendants adequate

notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland, 792

F.3d at 1323. “The most common type—by a long shot—is a complaint containing multiple counts

where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to

carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” Id. at

1321. Another type of shotgun pleading occurs when the complaint is “replete with conclusory,

vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” Id. at

1322.

For starters, the current Complaint already qualifies as a shotgun pleading because multiple

counts contain the same allegation that “Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the preceding

paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.” E.g., [DE 1] ¶¶ 314, 318, 320, 327. The result is a

Complaint where numerous counts adopt all the allegations of the preceding counts. See Weiland,

792 F.3d at 1321. Despite this deficiency, Plaintiff’s proposed amendment seeks to “incorporate[]

all facts from the original complaint . . . .” [DE 21-1] ¶ 9. This incorporation does not specify

how the plethora of allegations in the original Complaint would interact with the sparse allegations

in the proposed amendment and would further compound the already deficient aspects of the

original Complaint.

Another problem is that the original Complaint does not contain Plaintiff’s name. As stated

above, Plaintiff has not met his heavy burden of showing that proceeding anonymously is justified

and thus must file a pleading containing his real name (albeit with the ability to renew the

Pseudonym Motion upon legitimate substantiation). So, because the original Complaint fails to

include Plaintiff’s name, it cannot be incorporated by reference. Therefore, even though the Court

will allow an amendment, Plaintiff must file a new complaint that adheres to federal pleading rules,

specifically those included in Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2

Therefore, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

2 Pro se litigants are required to comply with procedural rules. See McNeil v. United States, 508

U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation

should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”); Albra v.

Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]lthough [courts] are to give liberal

construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants, ‘[courts] nevertheless have required them to

conform to procedural rules.’” (citing Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002))).

1. The Pseudonym Motion [DE 3] is DENIED. Plaintiff's filings must include his

name. However, Plaintiff may renew the motion if he provides more specific details regarding

the specific risks he faces rather than just general risks of harm.

2. The Extension Motion [DE 20] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Plaintiff must perfect service no later than January 5, 2026.

3. The Leave Motion [DE 21] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff

must file an amended complaint that complies with this Court’s procedural rules by January 12,

2026.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 22nd day of December 2025.

United States Magistrate Judge

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