Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

UNITED STATES OF )

AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

v. ) No. 1:25-cv-00173-SDN

)

MAINE DEPARTMENT )

OF EDUCATION, )

)

Defendant )

ORDER ON MOTION TO INTERVENE

Portland Public Schools (PPS) seeks to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 to

move to quash the third-party subpoena that the United States served on the Maine

Principals Association (MPA). Motion (ECF No. 42) at 1. PPS argues that the Family

Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), see 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, precludes

production of its students’ education records and the Court should either grant

intervention by right, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), or permissive intervention under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).1 Motion at 3-7. For the following reasons, I grant PPS

permissive intervention in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) for the limited

purpose of moving to quash the third-party subpoena served on the MPA.

I. Discussion

Rule 24(b)(1)(B) gives a reviewing court discretion to “permit anyone to

intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common

1 Because I conclude that PPS may permissively intervene, I decline to address whether it has a right

to intervene under Rule 24(a).

question of law or fact.” In assessing timely motions for permissive intervention, “the

district court can consider almost any factor rationally relevant” and has “very broad

discretion in granting or denying the motion,” Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental

Ethics & Election Pracs., 172 F.3d 104, 113 (1st Cir. 1999), so long as it considers

“whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the

original parties’ rights,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).

I will begin by considering the potential prejudice of allowing intervention.

PPS made a timely application to intervene. See R & G Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home

Loan Mortg. Corp., 584 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009) (“A motion to intervene is timely if it

is filed promptly after a person obtains actual or constructive notice that a pending

case threatens to jeopardize his rights.”). Counsel for the Government signed the

subpoena on August 14, 2025. ECF No. 28-1. PPS filed its motion to intervene on

September 17. ECF No. 42. Thus, PPS acted promptly by coordinating and filing its

motion to intervene, and the Government has pointed to no prejudice warranting

denial. See Response (ECF No. 45). Moreover, PPS, as an institution subject to

FERPA, offers a perspective that will aid the Court in deciding the motion to quash

the third-party subpoena, because neither the Government nor the MPA is subject to

FERPA’s strictures.

PPS’s FERPA defense against production shares a common question of law

with the MPA’s defense, which satisfies the requirement of Rule 24(b)(1)(B), namely,

whether the Government can carry the heightened burden required by FERPA before

student education records may be produced, and whether any of FERPA’s exceptions

may warrant production of education records containing student identifying

information. Compare ECF No. 28 at 9-11, with ECF No. 42-1 at 3-4; see also

Smith v. Brown Univ., 695 F. Supp. 3d 246, 249 (D.R.I. 2023) (“FERPA does not

provide an evidentiary privilege for discovery purposes but places a higher burden on

a party seeking access to student records to justify disclosure.”).

Because granting PPS limited involvement will not prejudice the Government

and PPS’s defense against production of its students’ education records shares a

common question of law with the motion to quash the third-party subpoena,

permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1)(B), (b)(3) is appropriate.

II. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, PPS’s motion to intervene is GRANTED for the

limited purpose of filing its attached motion to quash, see ECF No. 42-1, and

appearing at any associated hearings.

NOTICE

In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), a party may

serve and file an objection to this order within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy thereof.

Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right

to review by the District Court and to any further appeal of this order.

Dated: December 22, 2025

/s/ Karen Frink Wolf

United States Magistrate Judge