Crowder

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

1:24-cv-00059-KDB

DANIEL L. CROWDER, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. )

) MEMORANDUM OF

) DECISION AND ORDER

KIMBERLY BURRESS, et al., )

)

Defendant. )

____________________________________)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on remand from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit to further develop this Court’s immunity rulings on Plaintiff’s substantive and procedural

due process claims.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 20, 2024, pro se Plaintiff Daniel L. Crowder (“Plaintiff”) filed this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of himself and his wife Diane L. Crowder.1 [Doc. 1].

Plaintiff named as Defendants four members of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision &

Parole Commission (the “Commission”), including Gregory Moss, Jr., Graham Atkinson, Haley

Phillips, and Darren Jackson (collectively, the “Commission Members”), and probation officers

Bethany Herman and Kimberly Buress. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint without

prejudice on initial review for reasons not relevant here. [See Doc. 6]. Plaintiff timely filed an

1 At the time, Plaintiff and his wife were prisoners of the State of North Carolina, having been arrested as

co-defendants in June 2016. They spent the next seven years “in and out of court … waiting on trial.”

[Doc. 4 at 1]. After eventually pleading guilty, completing his state sentence, and serving 75 days in county

jail on related charges, Plaintiff was released from custody on or about July 20, 2024, subject to a 12-month

term of post-release supervision. [Doc. 1 at 15]. The Court dismissed Diane Crowder as a Plaintiff in this

matter on initial review because she did not sign the Complaint. [Doc. 6 at n.1].

Amended Complaint. [Doc. 7]. He named the same Defendants, again in their individual and

official capacities. [Id. at 12-13].

Plaintiff alleged as follows.

On December 19, 2023, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Randolph Correctional

Center in Asheboro, North Carolina, Defendant Herman contacted the Plaintiff’s mother and told

her that Plaintiff would not be allowed to live with or contact his co-defendant wife during his 12-

month term of post-release supervision (or “PRS”). [Id. at 15]. The Commission imposed this

“no-contact condition” of Plaintiff’s post-release supervision.

On or about January 2, 2024, Defendant Herman emailed Plaintiff’s case manager

reiterating that Plaintiff would not be allowed to live with his wife while on PRS and advised that

he would need to make alternative living arrangements. [Id.]. Plaintiff asked his case manager to

appeal this condition. On or about January 10, 2024, Defendant Herman replied that she had

already spoken with the Commission confirming the condition and that Plaintiff would have to

appeal with the Commission. [Id. at 15-16]. On February 27, 2024, after apparently having been

transferred to Craggy Correctional Center in Asheville, North Carolina, and after Plaintiff appealed

with the Commission, Plaintiff learned that the condition would not be changed. [Id. at 17-18].

Plaintiff further alleged that the challenged condition is not among those “allowed” by

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1368.4.2 [Id. at 19]. Rather, it is a discretionary condition imposed by the

Commission under § 15A-1368.4(c), which allows the Commission to impose conditions on a

supervisee “it believes reasonably necessary to ensure that the supervisee will lead a law-abiding

life or to assist the supervisee to do so….” [Id. at 20].

2 Section 15A-1368.5 sets forth inter alia the required and appropriate controlling conditions of post-release

supervision in North Carolina as well as provision for discretionary conditions the Commission may

impose. N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1368.5(b), (c), (e).

Plaintiff claimed the subject condition of his parole “would be an ongoing violation” of his

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. [Id. at 19-20]. Plaintiff also alleged that “[his]

situation is rare, where a husband and wife are ‘co-defendants,’ therefore this post release condition

should only be imposed after a persons [sic] due process is given.” [Id. at 20]. He sought monetary

relief and a permanent injunction allowing he and his wife to live together as husband and wife

after their release from custody. [Id. at 24].

On initial review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Court allowed Plaintiff’s claims

for prospective injunctive relief against the Defendants in their official capacities to proceed and

dismissed Plaintiff’s damages claims against the Defendants in their individual capacities “because

as parole officers and members of the [Commission], they are immune from liability in money

damages.” [Doc. 10 at 5-6]. Then, on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court invoked Younger

to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for prospective injunctive relief. [Doc. 39 at 10].

Plaintiff appealed, challenging the Court’s dismissal of his claims against the Defendant

Commission Members and Defendant Herman.3 Plaintiff challenged three aspects of the Court’s

decision: “(1) its invocation of Younger abstention; (2) its dismissal of Crowder’s damages claims

on immunity grounds; and (3) its failure to address a procedural due process claim that Crowder

purportedly pled.” Crowder v. Herman, No. 24-6674, 2025 WL 3012353, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 28,

2025). The Fourth Circuit dismissed the portion of Plaintiff’s appeal challenging Younger

abstention because the term of his PRS ended in May 2025, rendering his claim for injunctive

relief moot. Id. at *3. On the immunity question, the Fourth Circuit concluded that it could not

determine whether this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for money damages based on absolute

or qualified immunity or whether this Court “separately considered the conduct of the four

3 The Plaintiff does not challenge the dismissal of Defendant Buress on appeal.

Commission members, who imposed the no-contact condition, and the parole officer, who

administered the condition.” Id. Finally, the Fourth Circuit noted that it read Plaintiff’s Complaint

to state both procedural and substantive due process claims and that, on remand, the Court should

separately address Plaintiff’s due process claims when addressing Plaintiff’s damages claims. Id.

at *3-4. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal of the dismissal of his claims

for injunctive relief and remanded the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims for this Court “to further

develop its immunity rulings as to Crowder’s substantive and procedural due process claims.” Id.

at *4. The Court construes this directive to require it to more precisely convey its holdings on

initial review of Plaintiff’s claims for damages in his Amended Complaint, which the Court does

here.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must review the Complaint to determine

whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, § 1915A requires

an initial review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and the court must identify

cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an

indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as

fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore,

a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear

failure to allege facts in his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law.

Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that his Fourteenth Amendment procedural

and substantive due process rights would be violated by the imposition of the challenged condition

of his post-release supervision. On remand, the Court again considers Plaintiff’s individual

capacity procedural and substantive due process claims against Defendant Herman and the

Defendant Commission Members.

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a right secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed

by a “person” acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S.

166 (2023).

“The Fifth Amendment [as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment]

provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

Although the amount and quality of process that our precedents have recognized as ‘due’ under

the Clause has changed considerably since the founding, it remains the case that no process is due

if one is not deprived of ‘life, liberty, or property.’” Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 90 (2015) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted).

To succeed on a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a cognizable

“liberty” or “property” interest; (2) the deprivation of that interest by some form of state action;

and (3) that the procedures employed were constitutionally inadequate. Bhattacharya v. Murray,

93 F.4th 675, 700 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).

The Due Process Clause also provides substantive rights which “protects individual liberty

against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement

them.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, to succeed on a substantive due process claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show

both the deprivation of his life, liberty or property interest by a state actor, and that the deprivation

of this interest was “arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” Id. at 129; see also Equity in Athletics,

Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 109 (4th Cir. 2011). However, “[t]here is no general liberty

interest in being free of even the most arbitrary and capricious government action; the substantive

component of the due process clause only protects from arbitrary government action that infringes

a specific liberty interest.” Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 749 (4th Cir. 1999) (citations

omitted).

A. Defendant Commission Members

Judges enjoy “matchless” protection from suit for alleged deprivation of rights, including

against allegations of malice or corruption. McCray v. State of Md., 456 F.2d 1, 3 (1972),

overruled on other grounds, Pink v. Lester, 52F.3d 73, 77 (4th Cir. 1995). This rule is tolerated

because “judicial officers in whom discretion is entrusted must be able to exercise discretion

vigorously and effectively, without apprehension that they will be subjected to burdensome and

vexatious litigation.” Id. In determining whether to expand this immunity to “lesser judicial

personnel,” the reasons underlying the creation of the immunity shield must be considered. Id.

“The proper approach is to consider the precise function at issue, and to determine whether the

officer is likely to be unduly inhibited in the performance of that function by the threat of liability

for tortious conduct.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“The immunity of ‘quasi-judicial’ officers such as prosecuting attorneys and parole board

members derives, not from their formal association with the judicial process, but from the fact that

they exercise a discretion similar to that exercised by judges.” Id.; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.

409, 423 n. 20 (1976)) (“When judicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is

because their judgments are ‘functionally comparable’ to those of judges—that is, because they,

too, ‘exercise a discretionary judgment’ as part of their function.”). “Like judges, they require the

insulation of absolute immunity to assure the courageous exercise of their discretionary duties.”

Id. Where an official is not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial discretion, however, courts should

not extend the protection of absolute immunity, “regardless of any apparent relationship of his role

to the judicial system.” Id. at 3-4.

Here, in imposing the no-contact condition at issue, the Defendant Commission Members

were performing a quasi-judicial function and are absolutely immune from suits for damages under

§ 1983. As Plaintiff alleged, the Commission imposed the discretionary no-contact condition

under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1368.4(c), which allows the Commission to impose conditions on a

supervisee “it believes reasonably necessary to ensure that the supervisee will lead a law-abiding

life or to assist the supervisee to do so….” [Id. at 19-20 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A-1368.4(c))]. In

this regard, their alleged function was “functionally comparable” to that of a judge. See Imbler,

424 U.S. at 423 n. 20; United States v. Byrd, 808 Fed. App’x 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2020) (unpublished

disposition) (“The imposition of conditions of supervised release ‘is a core judicial function.’”)

(quoting United States v. Miller, 77 F.3d 71, 77, (4th Cir. 1996)); see also Pope v. Chew, 521 F.2d

400, 405 (1975) (“Parole Board members have been held to perform a quasi-judicial function in

considering applications for parole and thus to be immune from damages in § 1983 actions.”);

Peoples v. Leon, 63 F.4th 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2023) (applying judicial immunity to parole board

members’ determination of conditions of post-supervision release); Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d

1128, 1131 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[A]bsolute immunity applies if parole officials have the power to

attach conditions to a prisoner’s early release.”). Moreover, subjecting Commission Members to

liability for the exercise of their discretionary duties would greatly undermine and inhibit their

ability to effectively function in that role.4

For these reasons, regardless of the nature of the constitutional violation alleged, the Court

concluded that the Defendant Commission Members were immune from suit and dismissed

Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim against them on initial review. See Franklin v. Shields, 569

F.2d 784, 798 (4th Cir. 1977).

B. Defendant Herman

“Probation officers are also entitled to absolute immunity from suits for damages for

alleged conduct performed in a quasi-judicial capacity.... A determination that a violation of a

[supervisee's] conditions of supervision has occurred is a quasi-judicial function entitled to such

immunity.” Young-Bey v. Jones, Civ. No. 21-771, 2021 WL 1215771, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 31,

2021).

Additionally, a probation officer’s enforcement of a supervisee’s conditions of post-release

supervision is also entitled to immunity. In Douglas v. Muncy, 570 F.2d 499, 500-01 (4th Cir.

1978), the Fourth Circuit held that the district court “was correct in its conclusion” that a parole

officer “who allegedly arbitrarily enforced the conditions of his parole” was immune from liability

under § 1983. Although the Court did not clarify the nature of the immunity protecting the parole

officer defendant, it cited Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1970), in support of its

4 As discussed infra, the Court recognizes that post-release supervision is mandatory for most felons in

North Carolina. Nonetheless, the imposition of the no-contact condition here was discretionary under the

relevant statutory scheme. Furthermore, even if the condition imposed were not discretionary, the nature

of imposing conditions of post-release supervision more generally is nonetheless a quasi-adjudicatory act

that qualifies for absolute immunity. See Peoples, 63 F.4th at 141.

conclusion. See Douglas, 570 F.2d at 501. And Burkes noted that probation officers preparing

and submitting probation reports in criminal cases perform a quasi-judicial function and are

entitled to “similar, if not the same, immunity that is accorded to judges for acts done by them in

the exercise of their judicial functions.” Burkes, 433 F.2d at 319.

Giving Plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, he alleges that Defendant

Herman administered the no-contact condition imposed under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1368.4(c). That is,

he alleges that she communicated the condition to Plaintiff’s mother and his case manager, advised

Plaintiff through his case manager that he would need to make alternative living arrangements,

and informed Plaintiff’s case manager that she had already confirmed with the Commission that

Plaintiff would be subject to the condition after Plaintiff indicated his desire to appeal.

While the Fourth Circuit has not plainly recognized a probation officer’s administration of

PSR conditions as a quasi-judicial function, under Douglas, it seems that Defendant Herman is

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity Moreover, there seems not much difference in a probation

officer preparing and submitting probation reports in criminal proceedings or determining whether

parole conditions have been violated, which have been routinely considered quasi-judicial

functions, and administering post-release supervision or probation conditions. See Gilmore v.

Bostic, 636 F.Supp.2d 496, 504 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 27, 2009); Harrison v. Gunnells, C/Ano. 9:23-

00584-RMG-MHC, 2024 WL 4682522, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2024); see also Benthall v. Smith,

No. 1:17cv959, 2017 WL 6403025, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 31, 2017), aff’d, 709 Fed. App’x 226

(4th Cir. 2018) (“Because defendant [pretrial services officer] is entitled to immunity for reporting

suspected pretrial release violations to the court, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for money damages must

be dismissed.”). For these reasons, the Court concluded that Defendant Herman is entitled to

absolute immunity from Plaintiff’s due process claims here.

Moreover, even if Defendant Herman’s alleged relevant function were not squarely

protected by absolute immunity, she is nonetheless protected by qualified immunity. “Qualified

immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations but who, in light of clearly

established law, could reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652

F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir.

2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a

plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and

(2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Public

officers “who act in obedience to a judicial order or under the court’s direction” are afforded

qualified immunity. McCray, 456 F.2d at 5. District courts may decide “which of the two prongs

of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the

particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

Even where an officer commits a constitutional violation, that officer is still entitled to

qualified immunity if, in light of clearly established law, the officer could reasonably believe his

actions were lawful. Henry, 652 F.3d at 531. The law is “clearly established” for qualified

immunity purposes by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, or

the highest court of the state where the case arose. Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 114 (4th Cir.

1998) (en banc). This inquiry is limited to the law at the time of the incident, as “an official could

not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For defendants to be entitled to qualified immunity, they must not have

been on notice that their conduct violated established law. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741

(2002). This does not mean “the very action in question [had] previously [been] held unlawful.”

Estate of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Village of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 910 (4th Cir. 2016).

Rather, the unlawfulness of the action must have been apparent “in light of pre-existing law.”

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “In determining whether the specific right

allegedly violated was ‘clearly established,’ the proper focus is not upon the right at its most

general or abstract level, but at the level of its application to the specific conduct being challenged.”

Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993, 995 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 312

(4th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted)). “If there is a ‘legitimate question’ as to whether an official’s

conduct constitutes a constitutional violation, the official is entitled to qualified immunity.” Id.

(quoting Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 775 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1010

(1989)). “As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but

the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,

341 (1986).

Here, Plaintiff claims that he has a right to contact and reside with his co-defendant spouse

during his 12-month term of post-release supervision and that Defendant Herman violated his

Fourteenth Amendment rights by administering the no-contact condition.5 North Carolina’s

Justice Reinvestment Act (“JRA”), effective December 1, 2011, “mandates terms of post-release

supervision for all convicted felons except those serving sentences of life without parole.” United

States v. Barlow, 811 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). In North Carolina, post-

5 In this regard, the Court does not read Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to assert a procedural due process

claim against Defendant Herman. That is, the Plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to due process before

the condition was imposed. [Doc. 1 at 20]. Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Herman only touch

on the administration of the already imposed no-contact condition.

release supervision is defined as “[t]he time for which a sentenced prisoner is released from prison

before the termination of his maximum prison term.” Id. at 138 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-

1368(a)(1)). Under this scheme, the “‘sentence or sentences’” imposed do not terminate until ‘a

supervisee completes the period of post-release supervision.’” Id. (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-

1368.2(f)). “State law accordingly places time spent on post-release supervision within, not

outside of or in addition to, the maximum term of imprisonment.” Id. As such, the Fourth Circuit

has held that a term of post-release supervision in North Carolina is unambiguously part of a

convicted felon’s sentence. Id. at 138-40. Thus, Plaintiff remained a prisoner of the State of North

Carolina during his term of supervised release.

“Prisoners … may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citations omitted). However, “the fact that

prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause in no way implies that these rights are not

subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully

committed.” Id. “While a prisoner retains basic constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has found

that an inmate’s liberty interests derived from the Fourteenth Amendment are limited, given the

nature of incarceration.” Jones v. Keller, 698 S.E.2d 49, 55 (N.C. 2010) (citing Hewitt v. Helms,

459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983)) (internal citation omitted).

The Supreme Court “has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of

marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the [substantive component of the] Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S.

494, 499 (1977) (collecting cases). There is, however, no question that an incarcerated criminal

defendant necessarily has no liberty interest in residing with his spouse during such incarceration.

See, e.g., Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (observing that

an inmate “has no constitutional right to physical contact with his family”). Moreover, special

conditions of supervised release barring co-defendants from associating with one another have also

been upheld. See United States v. Hendricks, 69 Fed. App’x 592, 597 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished

decision).

There are no precedential decisions issuing from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit, or

the North Carolina Supreme Court recognizing the right of co-defendant spouses to reside together

during terms of PRS that are necessarily part of their criminal sentence. As far as the Court can

tell, no other jurisdiction has considered this issue and very few jurisdictions have considered the

more general right of a parolee, which is distinct from a North Carolina post-release supervisee, to

cohabitate with his spouse. See Brown v. Maher, 597 F.Supp.3d 541, 546 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2022)

(“[A] parolee’s right to live with his spouse is a fundamental right, and any parole condition

impeding that right must withstand strict scrutiny.”); Marquez v. Annucci, 2020 WL 3871362, at

*6 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2020) (applying strict scrutiny to a parole condition that would have prevented

the plaintiffs, independently convicted sex offenders, from associating with each other and getting

married). Moreover, while the condition here certainly touches on the marital relationship by

prohibiting Plaintiff from having contact with his co-defendant wife during his 12-month term of

post-release supervision, it does not prohibit him and his wife from being married and is hardly

different from the circumstances of Plaintiff’s physical incarceration.

Without any precedential law clearly establishing the right at issue, Defendant Herman was

not on notice that administering the no-contact condition violated established law, Hope, 536 U.S.

at 741, particularly where she was acting in obedience to an order of the Commission, McCray,

456 F.2d at 5. Because Plaintiff did not allege facts showing that the alleged right was clearly

established at the time of the challenged conduct, Defendant Herman was entitled to qualified

immunity even if not protected by absolute immunity.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs individual capacity damages

claims against Defendants Commission Members and Herman based on alleged procedural and

substantive due process violations fail initial review.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiffs individual capacity procedural and

substantive due process claims against Defendants Herman, Moss, Jr., Atkinson, Phillips, and

Jackson fail initial review and are DISMISSED in accordance with the terms of this Order.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to transmit this Order to the Clerk of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: December 22, 2025

Kenneth D. Bell

United States District Judge woe

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