SANDERS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIE

ORGUNA SANDERS, )

)

Plaintiff ) 1:22-CV-00355-RAL

)

vs. ) RICHARD A. LANZILLO

) Chief United States Magistrate Judge

K.M. MULLANEY, ERIE POLICE DEPT )

PTLM, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ON CROSS-

) MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants )

RE: ECE Nos. 135, 141

Plaintiff Orguna Sanders (“Sanders”), an inmate at the Pennsylvania State Correctional

Institution at Pine Grove, initiated this pro se action against several judicial officers, municipal

government officials, and members of law enforcement. Sanders’ false arrest, false imprisonment,

and malicious prosecution claims against Defendant K.M. Mullaney (“Mullaney”) are the only

claims to have survived prior motions to dismiss.! Discovery is concluded, and Mullaney and

Sanders have cross moved for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed herein, Sanders’

motion will be DENIED and Mullaney’s motion will be GRANTED.”

I. Material Facts?

At 9:26 a.m. on October 8, 2021, the Northern Tier Regional Computer Aided Dispatch

(CAD) received a call reporting that Sanders was present outside East Middle School in Erie,

' The Court previously dismissed the claims against Defendants Magisterial District Judge Suzanne C. Mack, the City

of Erie, Mayor Joseph Schember, Police Chief Daniel Spizarny, Assistant District Attorney Jeremy C. Lightner, and

Assistant District Attorney Nicholas A. Maskery.

2 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 636.

3 The material facts are taken from the parties’ concise statements of materials facts, see ECF No. 137 (Sanders); ECF

No. 140 (Mullaney), the exhibits submitted by each, and state court dockets and records concerning which the Court

takes judicial notice. Disputed facts are noted.

Pennsylvania, and had threatened to kill 13-year-old SC because she had testified against him in a

prior case.* Mullaney, a patrolman employed by the City of Erie Police Department, responded to

the call. Upon arrival at East Middle School, Mullaney spoke with SC and her mother. SC

reported that she had been walking to school in the 600 block of Pennsylvania Avenue when

Sanders, who SC knew from prior incidents and family relationships, threatened her by saying,

“when I see you alone, you are dead.”* This reported threat prompted Mullaney to file a Criminal

Complaint against Sanders on October 8, 2021, charging him with one count of Misdemeanor |

Terroristic Threats under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1) and one count of Misdemeanor 3 Disorderly

Conduct under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(4). ECF 140, 3. In the criminal complaint, Officer Mullaney

attested that, “on 10/8/2021 at approx. 0830 hours in the area of the 600 block of Pennsylvania

Avenue [Sanders] did knowingly threaten the victim with bodily harm. [Sanders] knows the victim

from previous criminal case(s) with EPD.” ECF Nos. 140, § 5; 140-4. Mullaney did not arrest

Sanders or seek a warrant for his immediate arrest. Instead, he issued a criminal summons/notice

to appear before a magisterial district judge for a preliminary hearing on the criminal charges. ECF

140, 4.

The magisterial district judge conducted a preliminary hearing on the charges on

December 13, 2021. SC was the only witness to testify at the preliminary hearing. /d., {| 6-8;

ECF No. 140-5. She testified that Sanders was parked in a driveway of a house next to Wayne

Park by the middle school, made eye contact with her, and then threatened to kill her. At the

conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the judge found that the Commonwealth had met its burden

+ Although Sanders disputes that SC personally called the police to report the incident, see ECF No. 148, § 1, he does

not dispute that someone reported the incident to the dispatch center.

5 Sanders also denies these factual assertions by Mullaney see ECF No. 148, § 2; however, he cites no evidentiary

materials in support of his denial. More importantly, Sanders’ denial is to the accuracy of the information SC reported

to Mullaney, not to the fact of the report itself.

prima facie case as to each charge, and she bound over both charges for trial. ECF Nos. 140, § 8;

140-5, p. 12. The case proceeded to trial on April 11, 2023, and a jury acquitted Sanders on both

charges. ECF No. 43-2, pp. 12-14.

II. Standard of Review

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the district court to enter

summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under this

standard “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no

genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A

disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome under

applicable substantive law. /d. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d

Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Brenner v. Loc. 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters

and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).

When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must

view the record in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682,

685 (3d Cir. 1993). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on

the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden

of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the

nonmoving party must go beyond its pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a

genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). On a motion for summary

judgment, “a pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under [Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure] 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's

motion ....”. Dawson v. Cook, 238 F. Supp. 3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted).

Hl. Discussion

Sanders’ false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims fail

because Mullaney had probable cause to initiate the charges against him.

“To bring a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must establish ‘(1) that there was an arrest;

and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.’”© Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190,

199 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012)).

Similarly, to state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that he was

detained; and (2) that the detention was unlawful. James, 700 F.3d at 682 (citing Wallace v. Kato,

549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007)). “[W]here the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee

has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.”

Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). Conversely, “[fJalse arrest

and false imprisonment claims will ‘necessarily fail if probable cause existed for any one of the

crimes charged against the arrestee.’” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 199 (quoting Dempsey v. Bucknell

Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 477 (3d Cir. 2016)). “To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff

must demonstrate that: ‘(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal

proceeding ended in [the] plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause;

(4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice;

and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a

6 Mullaney did not arrest Sanders or seek a warrant for his arrest when he swore out the Criminal Complaint against

him. Instead, he issued a summons for Sanders’ appearance before a judicial officer to determine whether probable

cause supported the charges. Sanders’ false arrest claim therefore fails based on the absence of factual support for

this threshold element of the claim.

consequence of a legal proceeding.’” J/d., 973 F.3d at 206 (quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco,

318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)). Thus, the absence of probable cause is an essential element of

each of the foregoing claims. Pinkney v. Meadville, Pennsylvania, 648 F. Supp. 3d 615, 633-34

(W.D. Pa. 2023), aff'd, 95 F.4th 743 (3d Cir. 2024). But, in contrast to false arrest and false

imprisonment claims, the existence of probable cause to support one charge, does not

automatically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim alleging the lack of

probable cause for another charge. See Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, (2024); see

also Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 83 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a finding of “probable cause

for the arrest of the plaintiff on any one charge” will not necessarily “insulate” a law enforcement

officer from liability for malicious prosecution).

“(P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting

officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an

offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 467

(citation omitted). Probable cause is assessed based upon the “totality-of-the-circumstances”

available to the arresting officer. Harvard, 973 F.3d at 200 (citing Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 467-68).

Because the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry is “necessarily fact-intensive,” whether probable

cause existed is typically a question for the jury. /d. (citing Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 468; Merkle v.

Upper Dublin School Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3rd Cir. 2000)) (“Generally, the question of

probable cause in a section 1983 damage suit is one for the jury.”) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). “Nevertheless, summary judgment may be granted on the question of probable

cause if a court concludes that ‘the evidence, viewed most favorably to [the nonmoving party],

reasonably would not support a contrary factual finding.” Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 468 (quoting

Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997)).

The record before the Court establishes that Mullaney had probable cause to initiate

criminal proceedings on both charges against Sanders. See Harvard, 973 F.3d at 200 (noting that

the analysis of probable cause is to be undertaken on a crime-by-crime basis). Under Pennsylvania

law, a person commits the offense of “terroristic threats with the intent to terrorize another ... if

the person communicates either directly or indirectly, the threat to (a) commit any crime of

violence with the intent to terrorize another ...” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2706(a)(1). “A person

is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm,

or recklessly created a risk thereof, he: (1) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or

tumultuous behavior; (2) makes unreasonable noise; (3) uses obscene language, or makes an

obscene gesture; or (4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which

serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5503.

The initial complaint to police dispatch on the morning of October 8, 2021, specifically

identified Sanders as having threatened to kill SC while she was outside her school. After being

assigned to investigate the incident, Mullaney spoke directly with SC and her mother, who

confirmed the substance of the report, including SC’s specific identification of Sanders as the

person who threatened her. Mullaney memorialized SC’s statements in the narrative section of his

police report. See ECF No. 140-3, p. 3 (“[SC] was walking to school in the 600 block of

Pennsylvania Avenue when the actor, known to her from prior EPD incidents and prior family

relationships threatened her with physical harm. [SC] knows the actor by name and identified him

as Orguna Sanders.”). An eyewitness’s positive identification of a suspect is generally sufficient

to establish probable cause. See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 793, 795 (3d Cir. 2000) (where

victim “positively and without hesitation” identified person “as her assailant” the identification

alone supported probable cause to arrest); Sutton v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty.,

700 F.3d 865, 874 (6th Cir. 2012); Hargroves v. City of New York, 411 Fed. Appx. 378, 383 (2d

Cir. 2011) (“Ordinarily, the identification, by an eyewitness, of a suspect will likely be sufficient

to establish probable cause for an arrest.”). Police officers can “generally assume that victims are

credible, because their motive is ostensibly concern for their or others’ safety” and because

“victims are presumed to have sufficient knowledge, given that the crime happened to them.”

Collick vy. William Paterson Univ., 2021 WL 2374388, at *7 (D. N.J. June 10, 2021) (citing Easton

v. City of Boulder, 776F.2d 1441, 1449-50 (10th Cir. 1985)). Because the standard for probable

cause is relatively low, and the evaluation of a victim’s statement is typically addressed in

proceedings following an arrest, the reliability and foundational basis of a victim’s statement are

usually adequate to establish probable cause. See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 793- 95 (Garth, J.,

concurring). At the preliminary hearing before the magisterial district judge, SC related the same

information she had communicated to Mullaney, and the magisterial district judge independently

found that the Commonwealth had established probable cause to support both charges against

Sanders. See ECF No. 140-5, pp. 2-14.

The threat SC attributed to Sanders—to kill her—was a threat to commit a crime of

violence and supported an inference that he intended to terrorize her within the meaning of 18 Pa.

Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2706(a)(1). As such the information related by SC to Mullaney supported

probable cause to charge Sanders with terroristic threats under that criminal statute. Similarly,

Sanders’ conduct, as related by SC, represented “threatening” conduct within the meaning of 42

Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5503. As such, it supported probable cause to charge Sanders with

disorderly conduct.

Sanders contends that Mullaney’s Criminal Complaint against him was “illegal” because

it did not include an affidavit of probable cause. See ECF No. 136, generally. Rule 504 of the

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure outlines the requirements for a criminal complaint.’

Rule 504 does not require an affidavit of probable cause for a valid criminal complaint. Rather, it

requires “a verification by the affiant that the facts set forth in the complaint are true and correct

to the affiant’s personal knowledge, or information and belief, and that any false statements therein

are made subject to the penalties of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904, relating to unsworn

falsification to authorities” and “the signature of the affiant and the date of the execution of the

complaint.” 234 Pa. Code Rule 504 (11), (13). Mullaney’s criminal complaint against Sanders

satisfied both requirements as well as the other requirements of Rule 504. See ECF No. 140-4.

An affidavit of probable cause is required only when the charging officer also requests an arrest

warrant. See 234 Pa. Code Rule 513; ECF No. 140-4, p. 4. Mullaney elected not to request a

warrant for Sanders’ immediate arrest. Instead, he issued a summons for Sanders to appear for a

preliminary hearing on the charges, at which the magisterial district judge determined that probable

cause supported the charges.®

7 Every complaint shall contain: (1) the name of the affiant; (2) the name and address of the defendant, or if unknown,

a description of the defendant as nearly as may be; (3) a direct accusation to the best of the affiant's knowledge, or

information and belief, that the defendant violated the penal laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; (4) the date

when the offense is alleged to have been committed, with provisions for unknown or continuing offenses; (5) the place

where the offense is alleged to have been committed; (6) in a court case, a summary of the facts sufficient to advise

the defendant of the nature of the offense charged, or, in a summary case, a citation of the specific statute allegedly

violated along with a summary of the facts; (7) a statement that the acts of the defendant were against the peace and

dignity of the Commonwealth or in violation of an ordinance; (8) a notation if criminal laboratory services are

requested; (9) a notation that the defendant has or has not been fingerprinted; (10) a request for the issuance of a

warrant or summons, unless an arrest has already been made; (11) a verification by the affiant that the facts are true

to their personal knowledge or belief, subject to penalties for unsworn falsification (18 Pa.C.S. § 4904); (12) a

certification that the complaint complies with the Case Records Public Access Policy regarding confidential

information; and (13) the signature of the affiant and the date of execution. Pa. R. Crim. P. 504.

8 Even if Mullaney had failed to comply with a procedural requirement of state law, this would not have negated the

existence of probable cause for the charges against him because a deviation from state law alone is not a constitutional

violation. See Tramaglini v. Martin, 2019 WL 4254467, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2019) (noting that courts should not

conflate “‘a state law violation with a federal constitutional violation’).

No genuine issue exists regarding the facts demonstrating that probable cause supported

Mullaney’s filing of charges of terroristic threats and disorderly conduct against Sanders.

Mullaney is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Sanders’ claims against him.?

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Mullaney’s motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED,

and Sanders’ motion for summary judgment will be DENIED. An Order of judgment will issue

separately.

DATED this 22nd day of December 2025.

BY THE COURT:

RICHARD A. A fp: :

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

° Qualified immunity also entitles Mullaney to judgment as a matter of law in this case. Qualified immunity shields

government officials performing discretionary acts from civil liability so long as their conduct “does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Here, the undisputed facts do not support that Mullaney violated Sanders’ constitutional

rights. Therefore, the Court need not assess the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity analysis. See

Ely. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 336 n.5 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Having concluded there was no constitutional violation,

we do not assess the other step of the qualified immunity analysis: ‘whether the right was clearly established.’”)

(citation omitted). Furthermore, “a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity unless it would have been clear to

a reasonable officer there was no probable cause to arrest.” Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing

Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 437 (3d Cir.2000); Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir.2004) (“whether

there was any reasonable basis to suppose there was probable cause ... is the test for qualified immunity’”)). The

undisputed facts of this case fully support the reasonableness of Mullaney’s conclusion that probable cause existed

for charging Sanders.