The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DIANE NEWTON, Personal Representative of the UNPUBLISHED
ESTATE OF PAUL NEWTON, December 22, 2025
9:28 AM
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 373235
St. Clair Circuit Court
MCLAREN PORT HURON, DOROTHY DUDAS, LC No. 23-002367-NH
R.N., and KURT BRINKER, P.T.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and BORRELLO and CAMERON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this wrongful-death action, plaintiff, Diane Newton, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Paul Newton, appeals by right the order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants, McLaren Port Huron (McLaren), Dorothy Dudas, R.N., and Kurt Brinker, P.T. on the
ground that defendants were immune from liability pursuant to the Pandemic Health Care
Immunity Act (PHCIA), MCL 691.1471 et seq. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse
and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from an incident during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic
where the decedent, Paul Newton (Newton), fell and sustained injuries during the course of
receiving medical treatment at McLaren. On April 14, 2020, Newton presented to McLaren for
respiratory issues and shortness of breath. He had a medical history that included chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease and pneumonia, and a chest x-ray revealed a “suggestion of
multifocal pneumonia.” Newton took an initial COVID-19 test, which returned a negative result.
However, medical notes indicated that Newton “may still in fact have a coronavirus.” Despite
this, medical records did not indicate that he was treated for COVID-19 and summarized the
reasons for Newton’s visit as pulmonary edema and congestive heart failure.
Newton was placed on the intensive care unit (ICU) stepdown telemetry floor for cardiac
monitoring. Upon his admission, Newton was assessed as a high fall risk, and defendants
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implemented several fall-mitigation techniques, including the use of a call light and chair alarm in
Newton’s room.
The hospital was actively treating COVID-19 patients on Newton’s floor, and the doors to
patient rooms were kept shut in order to reduce the spread of COVID-19. On April 16, 2020,
physical therapist Kurt Brinker conducted a physical-therapy evaluation with Newton at about
10:00 a.m. The evaluation took place inside of Newton’s room because during that time, COVID-
19 prevented Brinker from conducting treatment outside of patient rooms.
The same day, at about noon, nurse Dudas performed an assessment of Newton and gave
him his medications before going on her lunch break. Dudas left Newton sitting in his bedside
chair with a chair-alarm clip attached to his hospital gown. The chair alarm was designed to go
off if Newton stood up from his chair. Dudas was not concerned that Newton would attempt to
get out of his chair unassisted because Newton was aware that he needed to use a call light for
nursing assistance, and Newton could reach the call light from his chair. At about 1:45 p.m., when
Dudas returned from her break, she noticed that Newton’s chair alarm was going off and she found
him lying on the floor. Dudas attempted to call a rapid-response team for assistance and also called
out into the hallway for help, but the only staff that responded were security officers and her
manager. Dudas speculated that the failure to timely attend to Newton’s chair alarm, and the lack
of response to her requests for help, were a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Newton passed
away on April 24, 2020.
Plaintiff initiated this wrongful-death action against defendants, asserting claims for
medical negligence against McLaren, Dudas, and Brinker. The complaint alleged that Newton
suffered a foreseeable and preventable fall as a result of the negligent medical care provided by
defendants, which in turn caused a significant head injury that ultimately caused Newton’s death.
Plaintiff further alleged that defendants left Newton unsupervised and failed to properly, timely,
and continuously implement appropriate fall-mitigation strategies for a patient such as Newton
who had been designated a high fall risk.
Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10),
arguing that they were immune from liability under the PHCIA. The trial court granted defendants’
motion. This appeal ensued.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court reviews issues of law de novo, including the interpretation and application of a
statute. Whitman v Burton, 493 Mich 303, 311; 831 NW2d 223 (2013). This Court also reviews
a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Chisholm v State Police,
347 Mich App 646, 651-652; 16 NW3d 563 (2023).
“A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is warranted when immunity
is granted by law.” Id. at 652. On appellate review, this Court “consider[s] the documentary
evidence submitted by the parties and accept[s] the contents of the complaint as true unless
contradicted by documentation submitted by the nonmoving party.” Id.
“A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency
of the claim and is properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when
the record leaves open an issue on which reasonable minds might disagree.” Id. On review, this
Court “consider[s] the documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants on the basis of PHCIA immunity because there was no evidence of a sufficient
connection between the medical services defendants provided to Newton and services provided by
defendants in support of the state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Section 5 of the Pandemic Health Care Immunity Act, MCL 691.1471 et seq., provides as
follows:
A health care provider or health care facility that provides health care
services in support of this state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic is not liable
for an injury, including death, sustained by an individual by reason of those
services, regardless of how, under what circumstances, or by what cause those
injuries are sustained, unless it is established that the provision of the services
constituted willful misconduct, gross negligence, intentional and willful criminal
misconduct, or intentional infliction of harm by the health care provider or health
care facility. [MCL 691.1475.]
This Court has held that the Legislature’s “clearly-communicated intent” in this statute was
to “limit this immunization to services stemming from the pandemic.” Skipper-Baines v Bd of
Hosp Managers for Flint, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 365137);
slip op at 3. This certainly does not mean that the Legislature intended to provide the statutorily
described level of immunization for all medical services of whatever nature performed during the
pandemic. Id. at ___; slip op at 3-4. For the immunity provided by MCL 691.1475 to apply, there
must be a “connection” between the nature of the malpractice alleged and the COVID-19
pandemic. Id. at ___; slip op at 4. Accordingly, this Court explained its holding in Skipper-Baines
as follows:
We do not hold that immunity only applies when a patient is being treated
for COVID-19, but it is clear that there must be some connection. For example, if
an unrelated emergency was not timely dealt with because hospital staff were
overwhelmed with COVID-19 patients, there might be immunity. If a hospital ran
out of ventilators, there might be immunity for cases involving patients who needed
ventilators for unrelated ailments. [Id. (emphasis added).]
Here, although Dudas in her deposition attempted to blame the failure to timely respond to
the decedent’s fall on the circumstances of the pandemic, her statements were nothing more than
unsupported speculation that there could not have been any such failure unless it was caused by
the pandemic. Moreover, the factual evidence that Dudas provided actually demonstrates a
complete lack of connection between the nature of the malpractice alleged and the circumstances
of the pandemic.
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The alleged malpractice in this case involved leaving Newton unsupervised and failing to
properly, timely, and continuously implement appropriate fall-mitigation strategies for a patient
such as Newton who had been designated a high fall risk. These failures also apparently extend
to a failure to timely and appropriately respond to a patient who had fallen after being designated
as a high fall risk. Dudas testified that the standard general precautions for a high-fall-risk patient
included “activating alarms, chair alarms, bed alarms, [and] answering the call light promptly.”
The decedent had a chair alarm that would sound an alert if he got out of his chair. Dudas testified
that she believed that the chair alarm was going off when she found the decedent lying on the floor
of his room and that she did not know how long the alarm had been going off. Dudas also testified
that the chair alarm “may have been attached to the call light,” in which case the alarm would also
have been heard in the nurse’s station. When Dudas went on her lunch break, she had asked other
nurses to be aware of her patients. Dudas explained the lack of response to the decedent’s chair
alarm as follows:
I think that people weren’t able to answer it. I think that there was so much
going on with the COVID, that there wasn’t anybody that was available to answer
it right away. So many people in rooms with the door closed doing things for people
in isolation. Because I didn’t get a response to my rapid response, you know, I just
got the security guard, I didn’t get anybody, the rapid response team, no -- I couldn’t
find any help so I --
You know, then there were people on the unit so I think that was the case, I
think that COVID patients made our staffing requirements low.
This is nothing more than an unsupported assertion that because nobody responded right
away to the fall alarm, it somehow “must” have been a result of the concurrent COVID-19
pandemic. There is simply no record evidence of an actual connection between the decedent’s fall
and services related to providing COVID-19 treatment beyond such entirely speculative assertions.
Had there been evidence that the medical staff was actually so consumed with other
COVID-related patient services that nobody was available to respond to the decedent’s chair
alarm, then the requisite connection could have potentially been established. Skipper-Baines, ___
Mich App at ___; slip op at 4. Here, Dudas actually testified that the number of patients that had
been assigned to her on that day was within the typical normal range. Without any evidence that
these patients, or other patients assigned to other staff, were somehow consuming more of the
staffing resources than normal, there is no basis on which to conclude that there was any
connection between COVID-19 and the injuries that led to the decedent’s death in this case. There
was also no evidence that defendants were somehow prevented from providing appropriate fall-
mitigation strategies because of the pandemic.
Accordingly, the trial court erred by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff having prevailed may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A).
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
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