“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 20 responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 21 caused a constitutional deprivation.”
How later courts described this case
- “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 20 responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 21 caused a constitutional deprivation.”
- “[T]he 10 ‘state officer having custody’ may be ‘either the warden of the institution in which the 11 petitioner is incarcerated . . . or the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions.’”
- “The actual person who is [the] custodian [of the petitioner] must be the 9 respondent.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 JOE ROBERT COLLIER, Case No.: 25-cv-3487-AJB-MMP
12 Petitioner,
ORDER DISMISSING CASE
13 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND
DENYING MOTIONS FOR IFP
14 JAMES HILL, Warden, et al.,
WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT
15 Respondents.
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17 On October 20, 2025, Petitioner Joe Robert Collier, a state prisoner proceeding pro
18 se, filed a complaint on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights form in the Northern District of
19 California, which was docketed as a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus filed under 28 U.S.C.
20 § 1651. (Doc. No. 1; see also docket in N.D. Cal. Case No. 3:25-cv-08946-LB.)1 On
21 October 20, 2025, Collier also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
22 (“IFP”). (Doc. No. 2.) After the Clerk provided notice to Collier of both the filing fee for a
23 civil action and that he had not submitted his IFP motion on the proper form (Doc. No. 3),
24 on November 7, 2025, Collier filed a second IFP motion (Doc. No. 6). On November 19,
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1 A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal
27 judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508
F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n. 2 (9th Cir.
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1 2025, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) submitted a
2 copy of his certified trust account statement. (Doc. No. 8.)
3 On December 8, 2025, the Northern District ordered the instant case transferred,
4 noting Collier “filed this pro se civil rights action seeking parole” and “[w]here an action
5 ‘is directed to the manner in which a sentence is being executed, e.g., if it involves parole
6 or time credit claims, the district of confinement is the preferable forum.’ Brown v. Court
7 of Appeals – Third Dist., 2012 WL 368376, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2012).” (Doc. No. 9 at
8 1) (additional citations omitted). Noting that Collier is currently confined at the Richard J.
9 Donovan Correctional Facility, which “lies within the venue of the Southern District of
10 California,” the Northern District transferred the case to this district.2 (Id. at 1–2.) On
11 December 9, 2025, the case was opened in this district and was again docketed as a Petition
12 for a Writ of Mandamus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1651. (See generally docket.)
13 I. DISCUSSION
14 Upon review and for the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that this case must
15 be dismissed because it contains contentions pertaining to both federal habeas and civil
16 rights and appears to primarily seek relief only available in habeas corpus, but Collier
17 cannot maintain both types of contentions in a civil suit and his case does not appear
18 amenable to conversion.
19 A. Basis for Filing
20 Challenges to the fact or duration of confinement brought by state prisoners in
21 federal court are brought by petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
22 § 2254; challenges to conditions of confinement are brought pursuant to the Civil Rights
23 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488–500 (1973). “[W]hen
24 a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and
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27 2 In ordering the case transferred, the Northern District also specifically indicated that: “The Court
takes no position on whether this action should be maintained as a civil rights lawsuit or as a habeas
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1 the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier
2 release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at
3 500. On the other hand, “a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is
4 making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or
5 length of his custody.” Id. at 499.
6 While Collier has captioned his filing as a complaint under the civil rights act,
7 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and appears to contend he is eligible and should be considered for parole
8 under Proposition 57 (see, e.g. Doc. No. 1 at 5, 9–10), Collier indicates in his “prayer for
9 relief” that he seeks “release” from confinement and notably does not indicate he seeks
10 either a parole hearing or parole consideration. (See id. at 7.) Additionally, Collier appears
11 to separately allege that CDCR improperly calculated and/or failed to apply his pre-
12 sentence credits and that he is also currently eligible for parole due to already having served
13 his base term. (See id. at 14–22.) Collier also appears to contend his current punishment
14 has “become grossly disproportionate” in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
15 Amendments and asserts “[c]ourts are to consider whether the punishment is so
16 disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions
17 of human dignity.” (Id. at 9) (citation omitted).
18 To the extent Collier seeks immediate “release” from imprisonment (see id. at 7),
19 Collier’s “sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.
20 However, to the extent Collier instead only seeks injunctive type relief compelling CDCR
21 to either consider or reconsider Collier’s eligibility for parole under Proposition 57, such
22 claims would not fall within the “core of habeas corpus” and must instead be brought under
23 1983, if at all. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[W]e
24 hold that if a state prisoner’s claim does not lie at ‘the core of habeas corpus,’ it may not
25 be brought in habeas corpus but must be brought, ‘if at all,’ under § 1983.”) (quoting first
26 Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487; then Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n.13 (2011)); see, e.g.
27 Blanco v. Asuncion, 2019 WL 2144452, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 16, 2019) (Report and
28 Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending dismissal of § 2254 habeas petition seeking in
1 relevant part parole consideration under Proposition 57, reasoning that “Proposition 57
2 does not necessarily make petitioner eligible for an earlier release from prison” because the
3 parole board would still need to determine parole suitability and could deny parole and
4 “[t]herefore, petitioner’s claim falls ‘outside the core of habeas corpus.’”) (quoting and
5 citing Nettles, 830 F.3d at 934); see also Blanco v. Diaz, 2019 WL 3562215 (S.D. Cal.
6 Aug. 6, 2019) (Order adopting R&R, granting motion to dismiss, and denying certificate
7 of appealability).
8 B. Conversion
9 The Court further finds Collier’s complaint is not amenable to conversion to either
10 a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or to a habeas petition pursuant to 28
11 U.S.C. § 2254. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 936 (“‘If the complaint is amenable to conversion
12 on its face, meaning that it names the correct defendants and seeks the correct relief, the
13 court may recharacterize the petition so long as it warns the pro se litigant of the
14 consequences of the conversion and provides an opportunity for the litigant to withdraw or
15 amend his or her complaint.’”) (quoting Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 388 (7th Cir.
16 2005)).
17 First, it is at a minimum unclear whether Collier may instead simply seek a parole
18 eligibility hearing under Proposition 57 rather than immediate release, and because his
19 contentions do not solely lie in either habeas corpus or solely outside the “core of habeas
20 corpus,” id. at 931, the instant complaint does not appear to readily lend itself to conversion
21 to either type of action. Second, the Court notes that the two actions involve different
22 requisite filing fees. All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district
23 court of the United States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a
24 filing fee of $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee
25 of $55, although the administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed
26 IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc.
27 Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). Meanwhile, “on application for a writ of habeas
28 corpus the filing fee shall be $5.” Id. While Collier has filed two motions for IFP (see Doc.
1 Nos. 2; 6), because Collier’s complaint does not appear amenable to conversion, it is
2 unclear which filing fee is appropriate and thus unclear how to properly consider Collier’s
3 IFP motions.
4 Third and finally, a federal habeas case and a civil rights action involve different
5 state actors as defendant or respondent. As currently pled, Collier names the Warden and
6 the Secretary of the Department of Corrections (see Doc. No. 1 at 1), either of which are a
7 proper Respondent to a habeas action. See e.g. Ashley v. Washington, 394 F.2d 125, 126
8 (9th Cir. 1968) (“The actual person who is [the] custodian [of the petitioner] must be the
9 respondent.”); see also Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he
10 ‘state officer having custody’ may be ‘either the warden of the institution in which the
11 petitioner is incarcerated . . . or the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions.’”)
12 (quoting R. 2(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (2019), advisory committee’s note).
13 However, were this complaint construed as a civil rights action, Collier not only fails to
14 identify any action or inaction of the Warden or of the Secretary he seeks to challenge,
15 Collier also does not name any individual or individuals he alleges were involved in other
16 actions of which he complains, such as those responsible for his current classification and
17 denial of eligibility for parole and it is unclear whether he seeks to hold other state officials
18 responsible for any such alleged wrongs. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.
19 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and
20 responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have
21 caused a constitutional deprivation.”) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370–71
22 (1976)). For these reasons, the Court finds that judicial economy does not counsel in favor
23 of conversion.
24 II. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
25 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DISMISSES Collier’s case without
26 prejudice to refiling his action. To the extent Collier seeks to challenge the fact or length
27 of his custody, he must file a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which will be
28 given a new case number. If Collier instead wishes to challenge the conditions of his
1 || confinement and not the fact or length of his custody, he must file a new civil rights action
2 || pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which will be given a new case number. The Court DENIES
3 |}as MOOT Collicr’s motions for leave to proceed IFP (Doc. Nos. 2; 6) without prejudice
4 ||to reraising a motion for IFP in a new action.
5 The Clerk of Court is directed to send Petitioner a blank In Forma Pauperis
6 || Application, a blank 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Habeas Petition form and a blank 42 U.S.C.
7 || § 1983 Civil Rights Complaint form and in forma pauperis application together with a
8 || copy of this Order.
9 IT IS SO ORDERED.
10 || Dated: December 18, 2025 © ¢
Hon. Anthony J. attaglia
12 United States District Judge
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