The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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Case No.: 25CV1119-AJB (BLM)
11 MARK WATKINS, et al.,
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL
13 v. FURTHER DISCOVERY RESPONSES
14 AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC., et al.,
ECF No. 29
15 Defendants.
[REDACTED]
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Currently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ November 3, 2025 Motion to Compel Further
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Discovery Responses (“MTC”) [ECF No. 29], Defendant’s November 20, 2025 revised opposition
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to the motion (“Oppo”) [ECF No. 40], and Plaintiffs’ December 1, 2025 reply (“Reply”) [ECF No.
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44]. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED in part.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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This putative class action challenges Defendant AvalonBay’s (“Defendant”) security
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deposit practices. Plaintiffs allege Defendant retains residential security deposits from former
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tenants in violation of California law. MTC at 1 (citing Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1.)
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Plaintiffs claim Defendant centrally administers security deposit policies and procedures
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uniformly across its California properties. Id. at 1; Compl. at ¶ 108. Plaintiffs identify three
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“centralized deposit practices” which they claim result in “uniform statutory violations.” MTC at
1 1-2. These three challenged practices are: (1) the fixed-fee “Clean Sweep Program”; (2) use of
2 self-generated Itemized Apartment Receipts (“IARS”) in place of vendor-provided invoices; and
3 (3) deductions for work performed by Defendant’s employees without statements “describing
4 the work performed, the time spent, and the cost of labor.” MTC at 2-3 (citing Compl. at ¶¶ 13-
5 15, 120, 150, 153, 122-125, 141-145, 152-158.)
6 The originally named Plaintiffs1 are former residents of Defendant’s property known as
7 “AVA Pacific Beach” from approximately July 2023 to August 2024, and they seek to represent
8 all “residents of Defendant’s property [throughout California] whose leaseholds terminated
9 within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of final judgment” who
10 had at least $125 of their security deposit retained for cleaning, repairs, and/or replacements
11 combined. Compl. at ¶ 179.
12 DISCOVERY BACKGROUND
13 On August 27, 2025, Plaintiffs served their First Set of Special Interrogatories and
14 Requests for Production of Documents (“RFP”) on Defendant. Decl. of Jimmie Davis Parker in
15 Supp. of MTC (“Parker Decl.”) at 29-1 at 33, Ex. A. Defendant served its responses and
16 objections to the RFPs on September 26, 2025 and acknowledged that Plaintiffs had agreed to
17 an extension to respond to the interrogatories. Id. at 32-33. After the parties agreed to an
18 extension, Defendant served its responses and objections to Plaintiffs’ RFPs on October 10,
19 2025. Id. at 31-32. The parties met and conferred “in multiple written, telephonic
20 videoconference meet and confers in an effort to resolve the discovery disputes without court
21 intervention” but could not reach a resolution. Id. at ¶ 2.
22 On October 23, 2025, the parties jointly contacted the Court regarding Defendant’s
23 responses. ECF No. 28. In regard to the dispute, the Court set a briefing schedule. Id. The
24 parties timely filed their pleadings.2 See MTC, Oppo, and Reply. In addition, Plaintiffs and
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1 Mark Watkins, William Crosier and Alex Tharappel are the originally named Plaintiffs.
27 2 Defendant’s initial opposition was timely filed on November 17, 2025 but they later discovered
a typographical mistake in their opposition and sought leave to file a revised opposition which
1 Defendant sought leave of Court to file their pleadings under seal. ECF Nos. 35, 39, 45, and 47.
2 The Court granted the parties leave to file the motion, revised opposition, and reply under seal.
3 ECF Nos. 32, 37, 47.
4 LEGAL STANDARD
5 The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is defined as follows:
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Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
7 to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case,
8 considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’
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resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether
10 the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
11 Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to
be discoverable.
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13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
14 District courts have broad discretion to determine relevancy for discovery purposes. See
15 Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). District courts also have broad discretion
16 to limit discovery to prevent its abuse. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (instructing that courts must
17 limit discovery where the party seeking the discovery “has had ample opportunity to obtain the
18 information by discovery in the action” or where the proposed discovery is “unreasonably
19 cumulative or duplicative,” “obtain[able] from some other source that is more convenient, less
20 burdensome, or less expensive,” or where it “is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1)”).
21 The scope of pre-class certification discovery lies within the sound discretion of the trial
22 court. Coleman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 2013 WL 2896884, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2013) (citing
23 Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205 (9th Cir.1975)). In seeking discovery before class
24 certification, Plaintiffs bear the burden of making a showing that the Fed. R. Civ. P.
25 23 requirements are satisfied or that discovery is likely to substantiate the class allegations
26 (Mantolete Burden). Salgado v. O'Lakes, 2014 WL 7272784, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014);
27 see also Coleman, 2013 WL 2896884, at *4 (citing Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424
1 determination of whether a class action is maintainable, the plaintiff bears the burden of
2 advancing a prima facie showing that the class action requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 are
3 satisfied or that discovery is likely to produce substantiation of the class allegations. Absent
4 such a showing, a trial court's refusal to allow class discovery is not an abuse of discretion.”)).
5 Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a) permits a class action to proceed where
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(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there
7 are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
8 representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
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class.
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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
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Plaintiffs seek an order from the Court compelling Defendant to supplement its responses
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to include information for their deposit-handling policies, procedures, and practices statewide
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rather than just for the single property, AVA Pacific Beach. MTC at 5. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek
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to compel further responses to RFP Nos. 1-8, 17-19, 28, 31, 33-34, 36, 40-45 and interrogatories
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Nos. 1-10, 15-19. Id. at 15. The parties’ central dispute is Defendant’s decision to limit its
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responses to the single apartment complex and to not include all of its statewide properties. Id.
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at 3.
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Plaintiffs propounded discovery seeking “(a) the identification of class members and data
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relevant to the amount in controversy, (b) production of Defendant’s statewide policies and
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procedures relating to deposit accounting and retention; and (c) a representative sampling of
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tenant “move-out packets”. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs argue that there is “substantial evidence” of
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uniform statewide security deposit policies and procedures, as well as uniform implementation
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of these policies and procedures. Id. at 3-4.
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION
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Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not met the Mantolete standard to justify the pre-
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certification statewide discovery Plaintiffs are seeking. Oppo at 3. Defendant argues that the
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Court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion for three reasons. First, Plaintiffs have failed to make the
1 requisite showing to permit this type of discovery or that this discovery will substantiate their
2 class allegations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and Mantolete. Id. at 4. Second, precedent supports
3 “limiting pre-certification discovery to the property where Plaintiffs reside.” Id. (citing Munguia-
4 Brown v. Equity Res., 2017 WL 2645500, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2017)). Third, the discovery
5 requests are irrelevant, disproportionate, and unduly burdensome in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P.
6 26(a)(1). Id.
7 PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY
8 Plaintiffs reply that they have provided more evidence than what is required under the
9 Mantolete standard. Reply at 2-3. Specifically, Plaintiffs have submitted evidence
10 demonstrating that there is a statewide centralized and uniform practice regarding how
11 Defendant implements both the security deposit and move-out policies and procedures and the
12 “Clean Sweep” program. Id. at 3.
13 Plaintiffs argue that the “move-out” packets are relevant because the information they
14 contain are essential to substantiate the class allegations. Id. at 7. In addition, Defendant’s
15 argument that the requested discovery will create an undue burden is without merit because
16 the retrieval efforts for a company of Defendant’s size is not overly burdensome and the burden
17 argument is undermined by the declarations of Defendant’s own employees. Id. 8-9. Finally,
18 Plaintiffs argue that any privacy concerns with the requested discovery are alleviated by the
19 protective order that has been entered in this case and can also be adequately addressed by
20 the proposed Belaire-West procedure. Id. at 9-10.
21 DISCUSSION
22 Plaintiffs are seeking an order from the Court compelling Defendant to supplement its
23 responses to RFP Nos. 1-8, 17-19, 31, 36, 40-45. MTC at 1. These RFPs seek production of
24 “vendor procurement and invoice requests,” “standardized forms and dispute handling,” “Clean
25 Sweep Program Data and Participation,” “Aggregate Class Data,” “Corporate Oversight,
26 Compliance, and Employee Discipline,” and “Software, Databases and ESI Systems.” Decl. of
27 Parker, Ex. A at 14-17. Defendant agreed to produce discovery in response to these RFPs but
1 a statewide level. MTC, Appendix I, ECF No. 29 at 21-40. However, Defendant acknowledged
2 that “many of the documents AvalonBay has produced (or will produce) apply to AVA Pacific
3 Beach AvalonBay’s other California properties” and are responsive to Plaintiffs’ RFPs
4 requesting “corporate policies, employee training and compliance materials.” Oppo at 1
5 (emphasis in original.) Unfortunately, Defendant’s discovery responses do not identify which
6 documents that they have produced are applicable only to AVA Pacific Beach and which are
7 applicable to all of their California properties.
8 Plaintiffs also are seeking an order from the Court compelling Defendant to supplement
9 its responses to Special Interrogatories 1-10 and 17-19. MTC at 1. These interrogatories seek
10 information identifying the class members, numerical and statistical data, information related to
11 operational knowledge and implementation of policies, identification of third party vendors, and
12 identify of individuals involved in the creation of Defendant’s statewide policies. MTC, Appendix
13 I, ECF No. 39 at 40-50. Once again, Defendant restricted its responses to this discovery to AVA
14 Pacific Beach rather than all the properties it owns statewide.
15 The dispute over whether Defendant must supplement its responses by providing
16 statewide discovery, instead of limiting discovery to the one property where the currently named
17 Plaintiffs resided, is the “single overarching dispute [] that affects nearly every category.” MTC
18 at 7. The Court will therefore address this dispute first.
19 1. Pre-Certification Class Discovery
20 The initial inquiry is whether Plaintiff has made a showing in accordance with
21 Mantolete that Rule 23 commonality is likely to be satisfied and/or that the requested discovery
22 is likely to substantiate class allegations. The Mantolete standard places the burden on Plaintiffs
23 who are seeking statewide pre-certification discovery to make a showing. Mantolete,
24 767 F.2d at 1424-25.
25 Plaintiffs provide five types of evidence to make their showing: (1)
26 Defendant’s 2024 Form 10-K filing; (2) declarations from former tenants who resided at multiple
27 properties in California; (3) Defendant’s verified interrogatory responses and document
1 Stipulation of Dismissal. Defendant challenges the meaning and value of each type of evidence.
2 A. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
3 Before discussing the evidence, the Court notes that the pleadings have changed in a
4 way that dramatically impacts the pending motion. On December 5, 2025, while this motion was
5 pending, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to add new Plaintiffs to the action who did not reside
6 at AVA Pacific Beach. See ECF No. 49. On December 15, 2025, Defendant filed a “Statement of
7 Non-Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint.” ECF No. 51.
8 On the same day, District Judge Anthony Battaglia granted Plaintiffs’ motion and authorized
9 Plaintiffs to file their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). See ECF Nos. 52, 53. District Judge
10 Battaglia also ordered Defendant to respond to the FAC on or before January 6, 2026. ECF No.
11 52 at 2.
12 In the FAC, Plaintiffs add three new plaintiffs who did not reside at AVA Pacific Beach.
13 Id. at 3. The three new proposed plaintiffs are: (1) Janelle Dixon who resided at Avalon at Cahill
14 Park in San Jose; (2) Rachel Oboyle who resided at Avalon La Jolla Colony in San Diego; and
15 (3) Derek Chipman who resided at eaves Huntington Beach in Huntington Beach and AVA Little
16 Tokyo in Los Angeles. Id. Each of these new plaintiffs are alleging materially similar allegations
17 regarding the security deposit practices and the Clean Sweep program implemented by
18 Defendant at four different properties.
19 In Defendant’s discovery responses to a majority of the RFPs, Defendant agreed to
20 produce responsive discovery “if any, concerning AVA Pacific Beach (the property at which the
21 Named Plaintiffs resided) only.” See ECF No. 29 at 23-40. The addition of these new Plaintiffs
22 and properties directly refute the Defendant’s attempt to limit discovery to a single property. At
23 a minimum, the new Plaintiffs require Defendant to supplement its response to include
24 information relevant to the new properties. More importantly, the allegations of the new Plaintiffs
25 are consistent with the allegations of the original Plaintiffs regarding Defendant’s centralized and
26 uniform security deposit practices and therefore provide significant support for Plaintiffs’ motion.
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1 B. Defendant’s SEC Filing
2 Defendant’s 2024 Form 10-K filing3 describes a centralized shared services center that
3 conducts administrative functions including billing, collections, and responses to resident
4 inquiries. MTC at 14 citing Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. 4, AvalonBay 2024 Form 10-K at 4.
5 Plaintiffs argue that this description establishes that Defendant’s “operating model” is one that
6 relies on the “capabilities of [Defendant’s] centralized shared services center” assisted by onsite
7 associates. Id. They note that it does not reflect any ability on the part of the onsite associates
8 to implement policies or procedures specific to an individual property. Plaintiffs emphasize that
9 the Form 10-K states that AvalonBay relies on “centralization of lease renewal activity, as well
10 as many community administration and support tasks at our shared service center.” Id. at 5.
11 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs mischaracterize the Form 10-K and asserts that the Form
12 10-K emphasizes the role of onsite associates in evaluating the units after the tenant has moved
13 out and providing those evaluations to the AvalonBay Customer Care Center (“CCC”). Oppo at
14 5. Defendant notes that the CCC must contact the individual “community” to confirm and resolve
15 any dispute. Id.
16 The Form 10-K reveals a business model that is built around centralization and uniform
17 processes related to the security deposits rather than decentralized, property-specific policies
18 and procedures. While Defendant demonstrates some level of involvement by onsite
19 management, the language in the Form 10-K clearly indicates that billing, collections, and
20 resident-response functions from all of the California properties are conducted through a
21 centralized service center. The role of the onsite management appears to be limited to initial
22 data gathering and submitting this data to the CCC, and then the actual decisions regarding the
23 handling of the security deposits are made by the CCC.
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3 Plaintiffs seek judicial notice of Defendant’s Form 10-K filings with the Security and Exchange
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Commission (SEC) as a publicly traded company. See Req. for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 29-2 at
27 3. Plaintiffs note that this form is available on the SEC’s website. Id. Defendant has not
opposed this request and therefore, Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED.
1 The Court finds that Defendant’s Form 10-K supports a finding that a significant portion
2 of the policies and procedures at issue in this discovery dispute and in the instant case are
3 centralized and applicable to all of Defendant’s California properties. The Court further finds that
4 the role of the onsite associates does not negate the evidentiary value of the Form 10-K, which
5 supports Plaintiffs’ showing.
6 C. Former Tenants’ Declarations
7 Plaintiffs present declarations from some of the current plaintiffs, as well as other former
8 tenants who resided at properties owned and operated by Defendant in California. All of these
9 declarations attach documents referred to as “Statement of Deposit Accounting” or “SODA” and
10 an “Itemized Apartment Receipt” or “IAR.” See Decl. of Alex Tharappel, ECF No. 29-3, Exhs. A,
11 B; Decl. of Mark Watkins, ECF No. 29-4, Exhs. A, D; Decl. of Rachel O’Boyle, ECF No. 29-5, Exhs.
12 C, E; Decl. of Janelle Dixon, ECF No. 29-7, Exhs. A, B; Decl. of Bryan Dewey, ECF No. 29-8,
13 Exhs. A, B; Decl. of Satej Bhogill, ECF No. 29-9, Exhs. H, 1. The Court has reviewed these
14 documents and finds that they demonstrate a uniformity across different properties as these
15 forms are all generated by the “AvalonBay Customer Care Center” (“CCC”) rather than by an
16 individual property management group and appear to have substantially identical formatting and
17 content.
18 Each SODA attached as an exhibit to these declarations is a standard corporate form
19 template that has the same letterhead, corporate identification, summary table of deposit,
20 itemized charges, dates, and a payment deadline. See id. The explanatory footnotes in each
21 SODA, specifically with regard to their debt collection practices, are the same. See id. The only
22 differences are the names of the individual tenants, the unit address, and the amount they were
23 charged. Id. Likewise, the IARs attached to the declarations as exhibits follow an identical
24 corporate form template that shows the same corporate identification, a row for each charge
25 category such as cleaning, carpeting, and painting, the assigned vendor, amount for repair or
26 replace, and the name of the former tenant and unit they resided in. See id.
27 Five of the seven former tenants who submitted declarations also provided email
1 “priorresident@avalonbay.com” and “residentrecovery@avalonbay.com.” Four of the former
2 tenants received emails from “priorresident@avalonbay.com” with identical language informing
3 them that a SODA had been “processed for this account,” notifying them that an “unpaid balance
4 remains and is currently due,” and instructing them to mail the payment to “AvalonBay
5 Communities, Inc.” located in Virginia Beach, Virginia. See Tharappel Decl., Exh. A; Watkins
6 Decl., Exh. A; Dixon Decl., Ex. A; and Dewey Decl., Exh. A. Former tenants Watkins and Bhogill
7 both received emails containing nearly identical language from priorresident@avalonbay.com
8 informing them that the AvalonBay CCC had reviewed their accounts, along with their “resident
9 file,” and “determined that all damage charges are valid.” See Watkins Decl., Exh. C; Bhogill
10 Decl., Exh. E. These emails, along with the SODAs and IARs, demonstrate that the paperwork
11 associated with the handling of security deposits and move-outs are uniform and generated
12 from corporate templates as opposed to by individual properties management.
13 Defendant does not dispute that corporate templates were used or that a large amount
14 of the emails came from a corporate domain but instead argues that there is no uniformity
15 because some of the email inquiries attached to these declarations between the former tenants
16 and Defendant were handled by “onsite associates at the relevant AvalonBay community” and
17 not always through the CCC. Oppo at 12. A review of the declarations show that when a tenant
18 did engage with an onsite associate, they were directed to contact the CCC. Former tenant
19 Bhogill corresponded via email with Austin Grisham, the ”AvalonBay Manager” at eaves Mission
20 Ridge, regarding his dispute over move out charges billed by AvalonBay. See Bhogill Decl. at ¶
21 10, Exh. C. In response to his request for documentation for the charges, Grisham responded
22 “[m]y apologies, in these kinds of situations you would need to go through the central office
23 because they are in charge of billing.” Id. Former tenant Janelle Dixon corresponded via email
24 with the AvalonBay “Community Manager,” Jessica Hernandez, for Avalon at Cahill Park. See
25 Dixon Decl. at ¶ 12, Ex. C. Dixon also was disputing the charges billed by AvalonBay after she
26 moved out of the unit. Id. Hernandez emailed Dixon informing her “typically damage disputes
27 are handled by the billing center and note (sic) the onsite team.” Id. These declarations
1 discretion as to how they handle the security deposits which is a core allegation in this matter.
2 In fact, these declarations show that onsite associates consistently direct former tenants to the
3 CCC.
4 The Court finds that the tenant declarations and attached documentation provide
5 significant support to Plaintiff’s assertion that the security deposit policies and procedures are
6 uniform across multiple AvalonBay properties and are handled by a centralized corporate entity.
7 The minimal involvement of communication with the individual properties does not negate the
8 evidentiary value of the documents and communications.
9 D. Defendant’s Verified Discovery Responses
10 Plaintiffs argue that in its verified interrogatory responses, Defendant “expressly
11 confirmed that its security deposit policies are developed and maintained at the corporate level
12 and disseminated company-wide through centralized systems.” MTC at 12. Defendant
13 maintains an “internal intranet” that provides access to all employees of security deposit policies
14 and when a new policy is issued, the changes are “announced through AvalonBay’s monthly
15 communication update (“MCU”) distribution.” Parker Decl. at ¶ 6. Defendant also admitted that
16 the “generation and distribution of tenant move-out disclosures is also handled through its
17 central corporate operations.” MTC at 12 citing Parker Decl. at ¶ 6. Defendant’s only argument
18 in response to this showing by Plaintiffs is to state, without citation, “a common method of
19 disseminating information does not translate into a common toward residents
20 across over 100 unique communities.” Oppo at 6-7. While Defendant’s statement may be
21 technically accurate, Defendant’s discovery responses support the argument that there are
22 common policies and procedures applicable to all of Defendant’s California properties that are
23 implemented and controlled by a central corporate group.
24 Plaintiffs also rely on Defendant’s production of documents related to the “Clean Sweep”
25 program to demonstrate that the “Clean Sweep” program is centrally created and administered
26 at the corporate statewide level. See MTC at 15; 23-26. Defendant acknowledges that “an
27 AvalonBay policy document states that the Clean Sweep program ‘must be consistently offered
1 the fee imposed for the program and the supporting documentation “may be ‘community or
2 regionally specific’ subject to approval by community management.” Id. at 6 (citing Declaration
3 of Mathilda S. McGee-Tubb in Supp. of Oppo (“McGee-Tubb Decl.”), ECF No. 34-1, Exh. C.) A
4 review of the Clean Sweep policy indicates that while the fee charged for the program may vary
5 by individual property, the program itself is determined by Defendant and any adjustments to
6 the fee, as well as any “community or regionally specific forms or flyers,” must be approved by
7 Defendant’s “Portfolio Maintenance Directors” or “Portfolio Operations Directors.” McGee-Tub
8 Decl., Ex. C. The variations in the amount charged for the Clean Sweep program does not
9 amount to a showing that there are substantive differences in how the Clean Sweep program
10 operates across individual properties. For these reasons, the Court finds that the documents
11 produced by Defendants regarding the Clean Sweep program also support a showing
12 that the program is a common corporate policy and procedure applicable to all of Defendant’s
13 California properties.
14 E. Pending Central District Action
15 Plaintiffs argue that an “overlapping class action in the Central District” is further evidence
16 that Defendant’s practices are implemented statewide. MTC at 15. Currently pending in the
17 Central District of California is Renault, et al. v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc., C.D. Cal. Civil
18 Case No. 8:25-cv-00729-FWS-DFM (“Renault”) See https://pacer.uscourts.gov (website last
19 visited Dec. 9, 2025). This is a putative class action that does appear to be related to some of
20 the claims in this matter and involves the same Defendant. However, the pleadings in Renault
21 are not settled due to a pending motion to dismiss and the defendants have not filed an answer
22 to date. Id. The Court is not persuaded that this Central District action, in its current stage of
23 the proceedings, is evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claims.
24 F. Joint Stipulation
25 Finally, Plaintiffs rely on a joint stipulation that was entered in this matter dismissing the
26 individual property level Defendants. MTC at 9 (citing Jnt. Stip., ECF No. 12.) In this stipulation,
27 the parties stipulate that Defendant, AvalonBay, managed security deposits for California
1 move-out policies and procedures statewide, and has possession, custody, or control of
2 statewide records. See ECF No. 12. Plaintiffs argue this is a concession by Defendant that they
3 engage in statewide uniform policies and practices which constitutes the requisite
4 showing. MTC at 13-14. Defendant argues Plaintiffs cannot rely on this joint stipulation because
5 the parties agreed it would “not [be] admissible for any purpose” and that “[a]ll representations
6 [t]herein by AvalonBay shall not be construed as an admission of liability or concession to any
7 of Plaintiffs’ theories of liability.” Oppo at 9 (citing ECF No. 12 at 5.) In their reply, Plaintiffs
8 argue that this language prevents the “use as a liability admission and bars use in other litigation
9 – not consideration within this action for discovery scope.” Reply at 4, fn. 1. The stipulations
10 made in this joint stipulation support a finding that statewide discovery is relevant based on the
11 statements that Defendant engages in centralized, uniform practices relating to the core issues
12 in this matter. While the stipulation provides that it is not admissible for any purpose, such as
13 an admission of liability or concession to a theory of liability, it does not expressly bar
14 consideration of the stipulation for purposes of defining the scope of discovery consistent with
15 Rule 26(b)(1). The Court finds this stipulation supports a finding that the scope of discovery
16 should include statewide discovery reasonably related to security deposit administration and
17 move-out policies and procedures for all California properties, including records, data, and
18 communications within Defendant’s possession, custody, or control concerning those topics.
19 The Court finds that the addition of the new Plaintiffs as well as the evidence provided
20 by Plaintiffs and discussed above establishes that Defendant has uniform policies and procedures
21 governing security deposits that are applicable to all of its California properties and are
22 implemented and enforced by a central corporate entity. While Defendant has articulated the
23 possibility of limited local variation of practices, it has not undercut the relevance of the evidence
24 and conclusion. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs met their Mantolete burden by
25 providing evidence that the requested statewide discovery is likely to substantiate the class
26 allegations and by making a showing that the Rule 23 class requirements are
27 satisfied. The Court also finds that the requested statewide discovery is directly relevant to the
1 class certification discovery and Defendant is required to supplement its responses beyond the
2 single property.
3 2. Undue Burden and Proportionality
4 The next issue is the scope of the authorized statewide discovery and Defendant’s undue
5 burden and related proportionality objections. Initially, the Court notes that Defendant admits
6 that as to corporate policies, “many of the documents AvalonBay has produced (or will produce)
7 apply to AVA Pacific Beach AvalonBay’s other California properties.” Oppo at 1 (emphasis in
8 original.) Unfortunately, Defendant does not clarify which produced documents apply to all
9 California properties and which apply only to AVA Pacific Beach. Defendant also does not clarify
10 whether there are responsive documents that do not apply to AVA Pacific Beach but do apply to
11 other properties. To clarify Defendant’s discovery responses, Defendant must supplement its
12 responses to the discovery at issue in the pending motion to produce all responsive policies and
13 procedures that are applicable to any of Defendant’s California properties.
14 Defendant argues that the “only dispute is whether AvalonBay must go to extraordinary
15 lengths to collect, review, and provide documents and information unique to 100+ California
16 properties” by producing “thousands of individual tenants ‘move-out packets.’” Id. Specifically,
17 Defendant explains that AvalonBay manages “approximately 30,000 units” in California, and
18 assuming an average two year tenancy, that would require Defendant to produce individual
19 “move-out packets” for “60,000 former tenancies” for the four-year class period. Oppo at 12-
20 13. Defendant contends that there is “no known mechanism for bulk collecting or downloading
21 documents from AvalonBay’s electronic or outside vendor storage systems” and would require
22 the documents to be manually retrieved. Id. at 13.
23 In response, in order to “mitigate any burden and ensure proportionality,” Plaintiffs
24 propose a statewide sampling protocol of approximately 1-5% of tenant files across all of
25 Defendant’s California properties. MTC at 13-14. Plaintiffs argue that this data can be drawn
26 from Defendant’s “off-site and centralized apparatus for issuing security deposit accountings to
27 former tenants,” also known as “move-out packets.” MTC at 13-14; Reply at 9, fn. 4. Defendant
1 former tenancies during the class period would mean compiling “move-out packets” for
2 approximately 600 tenancies.” Oppo at 18.
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21 Relying on these numbers provided by Defendant, a two percent sampling of former
22 tenancies during the class period across all of Defendant’s properties would require
23 approximately eighty-four hours to search for, manually download and compile move-out
24 packets including information from both and Defendant argues that
25 “compelling AvalonBay to undertake such a manual, time consuming, and labor-intensive
26 documents collection before class certification would be premature and unduly burdensome.”
27 Oppo at 17 (citing Munguia-Brown v. Equity Res., 2017 WL 2645500, *6 (N.D. Cal. June 20,
1 brought a putative class action against defendants who were allegedly charging tenants late
2 fees that violated California Civil Code § 1671. 2017 WL 2645500, *1. Plaintiffs sought to
3 compel defendants to produce draft budgets for approximately 144 properties that were at issue
4 in the case. Id. at *3. The court denied this motion finding that while the information about
5 late fees was relevant, the request was not proportional because of the 220 rows of financial
6 data in the draft budgets, only one row related to late fees. Id. In contrast to Munguia-Brown,
7 the entirety of the requested “move-out packets,” which include the SODAs, IARs, and electronic
8 communications, are relevant to Plaintiffs’ core allegations in this litigation. The tenant records
9 are relevant to Plaintiffs’ class allegations and substantive claims that Defendant has
10 standardized and unlawful practices regarding the administration of security deposits.
11 The Court denies Defendant’s request to limit sampling to AVA Pacific Beach. The Court
12 orders a statewide sampling of “move-out packets” limited to two percent of former tenancies
13 during the four-year class period across all of Defendant’s California properties. The two percent
14 sampling shall be randomly selected using a mutually agreed-upon randomization protocol and
15 drawn proportionally across properties statewide.
16 3. Privacy Concerns and Notice
17 Plaintiffs seek an order directing the issuance of a Belaire-West notice for a statewide
18 class list to facilitate the production of putative class member contact information. MTC at 14-
19 15. Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2 request that Defendant provide a “class list”
20 by identifying former tenants who had $126 or more withheld from their security deposits during
21 the class period and participated in the Clean Sweep program. Id. Defendant opposes4 and
22 argues that the imposition on former residents’ privacy is substantial, that Belaire-West notice
23 is inadequate and burdensome, and requests that Plaintiffs bear any associated costs if notice
24 is ordered by this Court. Oppo at 14-15.
25
26
4 Plaintiffs indicate in their moving papers that the parties have agreed to a Belaire-West notice
27 procedure for a class list and the only dispute is whether to apply it AVA Pacific Beach or all
California properties. MTC at 14-15. However, Defendant’s opposition does not mention any
1 Defendant argues that the “imposition on former residents’ privacy is substantial” because
2 the move-out packets “may host private, personal information about former residents (including
3 minors), such as photos of their homes or belongings; disability-disability related and fair
4 housing accommodations or modifications; roommate and familial relationships; evidence of
5 domestic violence or other highly sensitive or legal issues.” Oppo at 14. Plaintiffs argue in
6 response that Defendant’s “asserted concern is speculative and illogical” because move-out
7 packets are related to the “security deposit and finances” and it is “unclear why they would ever
8 include private photographs of tenant’s belongings or evidence concerning domestic violence.”
9 Reply at 10.
10 The Belaire-West procedure originated in Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court,
11 which approved sending notice to putative class members in a wage and hour class action to
12 allow them to opt out of disclosure of their contact information. Belaire-West, 149 Cal. App. 4th
13 554, 561, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 (2007). The California Supreme Court later affirmed this approach
14 in Williams v. Superior Court, holding that an opt-out notice sufficiently protected their privacy
15 interests. 3 Cal. 5th 531, 555, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 472, 398 P.3d 69 (2017).
16 “Generally, federal courts in this circuit have held that a protective order, in lieu of a
17 Belaire-West notice, sufficiently protects putative class members [] privacy interests in the
18 confidentiality of their contact information.” Amaraut v. Spring/United Management Company,
19 2020 WL 8024170, *7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2020); see e.g. Goro v. Flower Foods, Inc, 334 F.R.D.
20 275, 288 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2018) (finding federal courts in this circuit generally hold that
21 protective orders are adequate to safeguard privacy interests with regard to confidentiality of
22 contact information). There is no federal requirement that parties use a Belaire-West notice and
23 in general, federal courts in this circuit have generally “required Belaire-West notices only when
24 there are special privacy concerns, such as the disclosure of medical or financial information,
25 and/or when the parties have agreed to such notice.” Austin v. Foodliner, Inc., 2018 WL
26 1168694, at *2, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018).
27 Here, the parties have entered into a joint protective order governing the handling of
1 || protective order protects any confidential or sensitive information that may be contained in the
2 ||move-out packets and that a Belaire-West notice is not required. See Holland-Hewitt v. Allstate
3 || Life Insurance Co., 343 F.R.D. 154, 179 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Austin, 2018 WL 118694, at *2)
4 || The predominant practice among courts in the Northern District of California is to allow pre-
5 || certification discovery of putative class members’ confidential contact information subject to a
6 || protective order, without requiring a Belaire-West notice.”); see also Trullijo._v. Chef's Warehouse
7 Coast LLC, 2020 WL 7315346, at *24 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020) (Declining to direct issuance
8 || of Belaire-West notice finding protective order negotiated by the parties “sufficient to protect
9 || the privacy interests at stake.”)
10 Accordingly, the Court DENIES the request to direct a Belaire-West notice be issued.
11 CONCLUSION
12 For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART as
13 || follows:
14 1. Defendant is ORDERED to provide further responses to RFP Nos. 1-8, 17-19, 28,
15 ||31, 33-34, 36, 40-45 and interrogatories Nos. 3-10, 15-19. On or before January 9, 2026,
16 || Defendants shall supplement their responses to include all properties owned in California
17 2. Parties are ORDERED to meet and confer on or before December 30, 2025 to
18 || develop a randomization protocol for a two percent statistical sampling of “move-out packets.”
19 3. On or before January 23, 2026 Defendant is ORDERED to produce a two
20 percent statistical sampling of the move-out packets for the relevant class period across all
21 || properties owned by Defendant in California.
22 4. Plaintiffs’ motion for order compelling further responses to Interrogatories 1-2 and
23 || request for issuance of a Belaire-West notice is DENIED.
24 IT IS SO ORDERED.
25 ~
||Dated: 12/18/2025 lobe Mager
Hon. Barbara L. Major
27 United States Maqistrate Judde
28
12