Abdullah

United States District Court

Middle District of Florida

Jacksonville Division

HAKIM ABDULLAH,

Plaintiff,

v. NO. 3:25-cv-617-MMH-PDB

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

& DIRECTOR JULIANNA BOOR,

Defendants.

Report and Recommendation

The plaintiff, proceeding without a lawyer and without the prepayment

of fees (i.e., in forma pauperis), Doc. 4, sues the Department of Veterans Affairs

(VA) and its director for alleged violations of his Fifth Amendment right to due

process and his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Doc. 1.

I. Complaint

The plaintiff alleges these facts:

On or about May 29, 2025, I the Plaintiff, Hakim Abdullah was

Unconstitutionally denied and did not receive my monthly VA

Pension Check as scheduled. VA Case No.: 24 542 296. See financial

Statement Exhibits [A]

Plaintiff, Hakim Abdullah a totally disabled Veteran did not receive

any NOTICE from the VA stating that my Pension Benefit would not

get posted prior to the interruption of my monthly deposit. See

Exhibit B.

On or about May 30, 2025, the plaintiff logged into the Veterans

Administration to obtain letter contained under Exhibit B and was

Never Granted Adequate Notice to respond or object in the form of a

letter or appeal. The letter addresses entitlement to the plaintiff’s

Veterans Pension benefits and specifically advised about a

communication from October 11, 2024 for a request for information

related to the plaintiff’s Social Security Retirement showing the

amount received since May 1, 2010. After they carefully reviewed

Information from the Social Security Administration and Evidence

within their files made a determination to discontinue the plaintiff’s

VA pension effective October 1, 2014.

Doc. 1 at 2 (capitalization in original; emphases and numbering omitted).

The plaintiff contends that the defendants violated his Fifth Amendment

right to due process and his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial by failing

to provide him notice before discontinuing his benefits.1 Doc. 1 at 2. He states,

“When Veterans request … a hearing[,] procedures grant[] individuals to

appeal, object, and or answer to said notice.” Doc. 1 at 2–3 (capitalization and

emphasis omitted).

The plaintiff asserts that the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331,2 28 U.S.C. § 2201,3 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4 Doc. 1 at 1.

In the caption and his description of the parties, the plaintiff states that

the director is sued in her “Individual Personal Capacity.” Doc. 1 at 1, 2. He

later states, “There is no qualified immunity available to the defendants sued

in their individual capacities; Federal Employer may be found personally liable

1“It has long been settled that the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury does

not apply in actions against the Federal Government.” Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S.

156, 160 (1981).

2Section 1331 permits a federal district court to exercise jurisdiction over a civil

action “arising under” federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

3Section 2201 is part of the Declaratory Judgment Act and permits a federal

district court to issue declaratory relief in certain cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

4Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against any person who, acting

under color of state law, deprives another of a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

that the action taken violated clearly established Federal Constitutional

Laws.” Doc. 1 at 3 (emphasis omitted).

The plaintiff includes with the complaint correspondence from the VA,

Doc. 1-2 at 2–3; a financial account statement, Doc. 1-2 at 4; law on the Fifth

Amendment, Doc. 1-2 at 5; and an appellate brief and appendix that he filed in

2004 with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Doc. 1-3 at 1–17.

The plaintiff demands $1 billion in damages for “emotional pain, mental

anguish, inconveniences, humiliation, loss of time, pride, [and] security”; $1

billion in punitive damages; and a permanent injunction “prohibiting the

defendants from reducing [his] Veteran Pension Benefits without a hearing.”

Doc. 1 at 3 (capitalization omitted).

II. Law and Analysis

A. Liberal Construction

A court must construe a pleading drafted by an unrepresented litigant

liberally and hold the pleading to a less stringent standard than one drafted

by a lawyer. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.

1998). Liberal construction means that a court must “look beyond the labels

used in a[n unrepresented] party’s complaint and focus on the content and

substance of the allegations” to determine if a cognizable remedy is available.

Torres v. Mia.-Dade Cnty., 734 F. App’x 688, 691 (11th Cir. 2018).

B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Article III of the Constitution provides that the judicial power “shall

extend” to certain “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

“As a result, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that possess only

that power authorized by the Constitution and statute” and “have an

independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their

jurisdiction and to raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties

either overlook or elect not to press.” Johnson v. United States Cong., 151 F.4th

1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2025) (alteration, internal quotation marks, and quoted

authority omitted). “Because jurisdiction is power to declare the law, when it

ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing

the fact and dismissing the cause.” Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks,

and quoted authority omitted).

A dismissal for want of jurisdiction is without prejudice. Stalley ex rel.

U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir.

2008).

C. In Forma Pauperis

Under the in forma pauperis statute, “the court shall dismiss the case at

any time if the court determines that … the action … fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

D. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act

“Every claimant has the right to written notice of the decision made on

his … claim, the right to a hearing, and the right of representation.” 38 C.F.R.

§ 3.103(a). “Proceedings before [the] VA are ex parte in nature, and it is the

obligation of [the] VA to assist a claimant in developing the facts pertinent to

the claim and to render a decision which grants every benefit that can be

supported in law while protecting the interests of the Government.” Id.

Federal law, under what is known as “§ 511” or “§ 511(a),” provides that

the VA Secretary “shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary to a

decision by the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of benefits by

the Secretary to veterans[.]” 38 U.S.C. § 511(a). A “benefit” is defined as

including “any payment, service, commodity, function, or status, entitlement

to which is determined under laws administered by [the] VA[.]” 38 C.F.R.

§ 14.627(e). Unless an exception applies, see 38 U.S.C. § 511(b), “the decision

of the Secretary as to any such question shall be final and conclusive and may

not be reviewed by any other official or by any court, whether by an action in

the nature of mandamus or otherwise,” id. at § 511(a).

For the exceptions, the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act creates “an

exclusive scheme of judicial review for all questions arising from veterans’

benefits decisions.” Johnson, 151 F.4th at 1292 (emphasis added). Under the

Act, a veteran may appeal a benefits decision by the Secretary to the Board of

Veterans’ Appeals, and the Board’s decision becomes the Secretary’s final

decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a); Johnson, 151 F.4th at 1292.

From there, a veteran may appeal the Board’s decision to the Court of

Appeals for Veterans Claims. 38 U.S.C. § 7252. The Court of Appeals for

Veterans Claims has “exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the

Board” and has the “power to affirm, modify, or reverse a decision of the Board

or to remand the matter.” Id. § 7252(a) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals

for Veterans Claims must “decide all relevant questions of law, interpret

constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions” and “hold unlawful and

set aside decisions” found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or otherwise not in accordance with law”; “contrary to constitutional right,

power, privilege, or immunity”; “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,

or limitations, or in violation of a statutory right”; or “without observance of

procedure required by law.” Id. § 7261(a)(1), (3).

From there, a party may appeal a decision by the Court of Appeals for

Veterans Claims to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit “with respect

to the validity of a decision of the Court[ of Appeals for Veterans Claims] on a

rule of law or of any statute or regulation … or any interpretation

thereof … that was relied on by the Court[ of Appeals for Veterans Claims] in

making the decision.” Id. § 7292(a). “[T]he Federal Circuit [has] exclusive

jurisdiction … to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the

extent presented and necessary to a decision.” Id. § 7292(c) (emphasis added).

The Federal Circuit may review factual findings or applications of law to fact

only to the extent that the appeal presents a constitutional issue. Id.

§ 7292(d)(2). Judgments by the Federal Circuit are final, subject to review by

the United States Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. Id. § 7292(c).

“[I]n addition to precluding judicial review of any substantive benefits

determination by the Secretary, the [Veterans’ Judicial Review Act] also

precludes judicial review of any decision made by the Secretary in the course

of making a benefits determination.” Smith v. United States, 7 F.4th 963, 985

(11th Cir. 2021) (alterations, emphasis, internal quotation marks, and quoted

authority omitted). The Act “thus serves to prevent judicial second-guessing of

decisions made by the Secretary in the course of making a benefits

determination.” Id.

“To decide whether the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act bars [a] complaint

from being filed in the district court,” a court asks “only whether Congress’[s]

intent to preclude district court jurisdiction is fairly discernible in the statutory

scheme.” Johnson, 151 F.4th at 1293 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and

quoted authority omitted). “[T]he Supreme Court has cautioned that where

Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent

to do so must be clear so as to avoid the serious constitutional question that

would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a

colorable constitutional claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and quoted

authority omitted). That “heightened standard applies only when a statute

purports to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.” Id.

(emphasis, internal quotation marks, and quoted authority omitted). “No

heightened standard applies where Congress simply channels judicial review

of a constitutional claim to a particular court.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and quoted authority omitted).

The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act “does not eliminate judicial review; it

instead channels review exclusively to the Court of Appeals for Veterans

Claims and then to the Federal Circuit.” Id.; see also id. at 1296 (same).

“Congress’s intent to exclude district-court jurisdiction is fairly discernible

from the Act.” Id. at 1293 (internal quotation marks and quoted authority

omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit recently observed, “[E]ach of our sister circuits that

has considered the question agrees that a veteran cannot circumvent the

statutory scheme by recasting his benefit decision in constitutional terms.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit provided these cases as examples:

See, e.g., Sugrue v. Derwinski, 26 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[C]ourts

do not acquire jurisdiction to hear challenges to benefits

determinations merely because those challenges are cloaked in

constitutional terms.”); Zuspann v. Brown, 60 F.3d 1156, 1159 (5th

Cir. 1995) (“Since the enactment of the [Act], federal courts have

refused to entertain constitutional claims if they are based on the

[Administration’s] actions in a particular case.”); Hicks v. Veterans

Admin., 961 F.2d 1367, 1370 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that

veteran’s “claim that unconstitutional retaliatory conduct was the

cause of the reduction of his disability rating and benefits is

essentially a challenge to the reduction of benefits on a constitutional

basis” and that “[a]s a challenge to a decision affecting benefits, it is

encompassed by [section] 511 and is not reviewable”); Veterans for

Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1025 (9th Cir. 2012) (en

banc) (concluding that the jurisdictional limitation in section 511(a)

“extends not only to cases where adjudicating veterans’ claims

requires the district court to determine whether the [Administration]

acted properly in handling a veteran’s request for benefits, but also

to those decisions that may affect such cases”); see also Weaver v.

United States, 98 F.3d 518, 520 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a

district court lacked jurisdiction to consider a litigant’s allegations

against Administration officials because he sought “review of actions

taken in connection with the denial of [his] administrative claim for

benefits” and presented “nothing more than a challenge to the

underlying benefits decision”); Blue Water Navy Viet. Veterans Ass’n

v. McDonald, 830 F.3d 570, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that

section 511 bars district court review of a claim “when ‘underlying

the claim is an allegation that the [Administration] unjustifiably

denied ... a veterans’ benefit’” (citation omitted)).

Id. at 129394 (alterations in original); see also Simpson v. U.S. Veterans

Admin., No. 22-10636, 2022 WL 17247565, at *2 (11th Cir. Nov. 28, 2022)

(“[The plaintiff]’s framing of his claims as constitutional challenges cannot

circumvent § 511(a)’s limits on jurisdiction.”).5

A plaintiff, therefore, must assert any due process or other constitutional

claim that arises from a veterans’ benefit decision through the judicial review

procedures provided in the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act. See Addington v.

United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 779, 783 (2010) (“The exclusive remedy for claims of

due process violations lies in the [Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims].”); see,

5Some circuit courts distinguish between as-applied and facial constitutional

challenges, concluding that district courts retain jurisdiction over the latter. Johnson,

151 F.4th at 1294. The Eleventh Circuit disagrees with that approach and does not draw

that distinction. Id.

e.g., Wiker v. McDonough, 36 Vet. App. 119, 126–27 (2023) (ruling that the VA

failed to provide the plaintiff proper notice of its decision denying his benefits

claim, and, therefore, the decision was not final); Williams v. Wilkie, 32 Vet.

App. 46, 58–59 (2019) (ruling that actions by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals

did not violate the plaintiff’s due process rights); Mathis v. Shinseki, 494 F.

App’x 78, 81 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“While the Seventh Amendment provides the

right to a jury trial in civil suits at common law, it is not ‘implicated in the VA

adjudication process.’” (quoting Paswell v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 102 (2006)).6

To the extent that the plaintiff challenges a finding or conclusion about

his benefits or any decision by the Secretary in the course of making a benefits

determination, the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act precludes this court from

exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. That the plaintiff couches

his claim in constitutional terms matters naught. See, e.g., Bracken v. United

States, No. 3:19-cv-982-MMH-PDB, 2020 WL 3610810, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 2,

2020) (dismissing for want of subject-matter jurisdiction a claim for the alleged

wrongful recoupment of education benefits from a veteran’s spouse; explaining

that “the statutory bar to judicial review may not be circumvented by

characterizing what are in essence challenges to VA benefits determinations

in constitutional terms” and that a plaintiff may not “hide his true cause of

action in order to avoid the prohibitions of [§ 511]” (quoted authority omitted));

6The plaintiff appears to understand the process for judicial review. He previously

followed the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act by asserting in an appeal a procedural due

process challenge based on the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ failure to provide him notice

and a hearing before discontinuing his special monthly pension. See Doc. 1-3; Abdullah

v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 510, 2005 WL 1073889, *3 (2005) (vacating and remanding the

Board’s decision where the record was unclear why the plaintiff was not provided a

hearing before terminating his special monthly pension; declining to determine whether

he was deprived of procedural due process because the determination encompassed

factual findings for the Board to make in the first instance).

Cheves v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 124546 (M.D. Fla.

2002) (dismissing for want of subject-matter jurisdiction a claim that the VA

violated due process rights by failing to provide notice and the opportunity to

be heard before denying benefits; explaining that “the statutory bar to judicial

review may not be circumvented by characterizing what are in essence

challenges to VA benefits determinations in constitutional terms”); Jelks v.

McDonald, No. 2:16-cv-01639-JHE, 2017 WL 4050314, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Sept.

13, 2017) (“Although [the plaintiff] does not directly seek an award of

benefits … and alleges his cause of action is for violation of his civil rights, he

cannot evade the conclusion that he essentially seeks review of the

determination by the [VA Secretary] that he was not entitled to benefits.

Regardless of how [the plaintiff] frames his claims, a district court simply lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a claim challenging a denial of

individual benefits.”); Williamson v. Sec’y of Veteran Affs., 139 F. Supp. 3d

1282, 1286–87 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (“Here, [the plaintiff] has alleged various

administrative and due process claims concerning the VA’s processing of his

disability claims. … [A]lthough he couches his claims in constitutional

language, it is clear that [he] is simply seeking the receipt of

benefits. … [B]ecause the essence of [his] demands is clearly for the court to

review and reverse determinations of benefits made by the VA, his case is

outside of this court’s jurisdiction.”).

E. Bivens

Section 1983, on which the plaintiff relies, see Doc. 1 at 1, provides a

cause of action against a person acting under the color of law of a “State” or

“Territory,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not under the law of the United States.

Accordingly, that statute is inapplicable. Under a liberal construction of the

complaint, the plaintiff is attempting to sue the director in her personal

capacity based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

In Bivens, the Supreme Court “recognized an implied cause of action for

damages against federal officers for certain alleged violations of the Fourth

Amendment.” Goldey v. Fields, 606 U.S. 942, 942 (2025). “The Court

subsequently recognized two additional contexts where implied Bivens causes

of action were permitted,” id., “first, for a former congressional staffer’s Fifth

Amendment sex-discrimination claim, and second, for a federal prisoner’s

inadequate-care claim under the Eighth Amendment,” Egbert v. Boule, 596

U.S. 482, 49091 (2022) (internal citation omitted). “Since these cases, the

Court has not implied additional causes of action under the Constitution.” Id.

at 491. Rather, since 1980, the Supreme Court has “declined more than 10

times to extend Bivens to cover other constitutional violations.” Goldey, 606

U.S. at 942.

“Now long past the heady days in which [the Supreme] Court assumed

common-law powers to create causes of action, [the Court has] come to

appreciate more fully the tension between judicially created causes of action

and the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial power[.]” Egbert,

596 U.S. at 491 (internal citation, quotation marks, and quoted authority

omitted). “At bottom, creating a cause of action is a legislative endeavor.” Id.

“Courts engaged in that unenviable task must evaluate a range of policy

considerations at least as broad as the range a legislature would consider.” Id.

(alterations, internal quotation marks, and quoted authority omitted). “Those

factors include economic and governmental concerns, administrative costs, and

the impact on governmental operations systemwide.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and quoted authority omitted). “Unsurprisingly, Congress is far more

competent than the Judiciary to weigh such policy considerations.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). “And the Judiciary’s

authority to do so at all is, at best, uncertain.” Id.

“Nonetheless, rather than dispense with Bivens altogether, [the

Supreme Court has] emphasized that recognizing a cause of action under

Bivens is a disfavored judicial activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

quoted authority omitted). “When asked to imply a Bivens action, [the]

watchword is caution.” Id. (internal quotation marks and quoted authority

omitted). “If there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the

efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy, the courts must refrain from

creating it.” Id. (alterations and quoted authority omitted). “Even a single

sound reason to defer to Congress is enough to require a court to refrain from

creating such a remedy.” Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and quoted

authority omitted). “Put another way, the most important question is who

should decide whether to provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the

courts?” Id. at 49192 (internal quotation marks and quoted authority

omitted). “If there is a rational reason to think that the answer is ‘Congress’—

as it will be in most every case—no Bivens action may lie.” Id. at 492 (internal

citation omitted).

The Supreme Court has “framed” the analysis of a proposed Bivens claim

“as proceeding in two steps.” Id. “First, [the Court] ask[s] whether the case

presents a new Bivens context—i.e., is it meaningfully different from the three

cases in which the Court has implied a damages action.” Id. (alteration,

internal quotation marks, and quoted authority omitted). “Second, if a claim

arises in a new context, a Bivens remedy is unavailable if there are special

factors indicating that the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than

Congress to weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to

proceed.” Id. (internal quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). “If there

is even a single reason to pause before applying Bivens in a new context, a

court may not recognize a Bivens remedy.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

quoted authority omitted). “While [the] cases describe two steps, those steps

often resolve to a single question: whether there is any reason to think that

Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.” Id.

“[A] court may not fashion a Bivens remedy if Congress already has

provided, or has authorized the Executive to provide, an alternative remedial

structure.” Id. at 493 (internal quotation marks and quoted authority omitted).

“If there are alternative remedial structures in place, that alone, like any

special factor, is reason enough to limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a

new Bivens cause of action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and quoted

authority omitted). “[T]he relevant question is not whether a Bivens action

would disrupt a remedial scheme, or whether the court should provide for a

wrong that would otherwise go unredressed.” Id. (alteration, internal

quotation marks, and quoted authority omitted). “Nor does it matter that

existing remedies do not provide complete relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and quoted authority omitted). “Rather, the court must ask only whether it,

rather than the political branches, is better equipped to decide whether

existing remedies should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial

remedy.” Id. (internal quotation marks and quoted authority omitted).

Courts of appeals that have considered whether a plaintiff may sue a VA

employee under Bivens for damages caused by the VA employee’s alleged

unconstitutional actions or inactions in the context of a benefits claim have

held that the plaintiff may not. See Mehrkens v. Blank, 556 F.3d 865, 870 (8th

Cir. 2009); Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 975–76 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hicks v.

Small, 69 F.3d 967, 969 (9th Cir. 1995); Zuspann, 60 F.3d at 1161; Sugrue, 26

F.3d at 12–13; Waksmundski v. Williams, 727 F. App’x 818, 820–21 (6th Cir.

2018). The Fifth Circuit provided this rationale:

[N]o Bivens remedy exists against VA employees. Special factors

counsel hesitation to create a Bivens remedy[.] This is a situation in

which Congress has set up an elaborate remedial structure; the

administrative process created by Congress provides for a

comprehensive review of veterans’ benefits disputes. Further,

Congress has explicitly precluded judicial review of veterans’

benefits disputes, which suggests that Congress’[s] failure to create

a remedy against individual VA employees was not an oversight.

Zuspann, 60 F.3d at 1161 (internal footnote, quotation marks, and quoted

authority omitted); see also Cheves, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1247 (“This Court agrees

with the circuit courts that have held that the comprehensive remedial

structure of the [Veterans’ Judicial Review Act] precludes Bivens actions

against VA officials.”); Hutchison v. United States, No. 3:15-cv-890-MMH-

MCR, 2016 WL 7173886, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2016) (“[T]he comprehensive

remedial structure of the [Veterans’ Judicial Review Act] precludes Bivens

actions against VA officials.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:15-

cv-890-MMH-MCR, 2016 WL 7157561 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2016); Abdullah v.

Gibbard, No. 3:06-cv-275-VMC-MCR, 2007 WL 2412896, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug.

21, 2007) (“[The plaintiff]’s complaint brings only a Bivens claim against the

[VA] employees in their individual capacities. No such Bivens claim exists, and

the Court declines to create one.”).7

7The plaintiff here was the plaintiff in Abdullah, No. 3:06-cv-275-VMC-MCR, and

therefore should be familiar with this law.

Under that persuasive rationale, no Bivens claim is available to the

plaintiff against the director in her personal capacity.

III. Amendment

If “a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim,” a court must

give a plaintiff proceeding without a lawyer “at least one chance to amend the

complaint before … dismiss[ing] the action with prejudice.” Silberman v. Mia.

Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1133 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks

and quoted authority omitted). But dismissal with prejudice is appropriate if

granting leave to amend would be futile. Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307,

1310 (11th Cir. 2007). Leave to amend would be futile if “the complaint as

amended would still be properly dismissed.” Id.

Leave to amend is unwarranted, and dismissal with prejudice of any

Bivens claim is appropriate, because any amendment would be futile.

IV. Recommendation

The undersigned recommends (1) dismissing without prejudice, for

want of subject-matter jurisdiction, any claim challenging a finding or

conclusion about VA benefits or any decision in the course of making a VA

benefits determination; (2) dismissing with prejudice any Bivens claim

against the director in her personal capacity; and (3) directing the clerk to

close the file.

V. Objections and Responses

“Within 14 days after being served with a copy of [a] recommended

disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the

proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). An objection

must not exceed 10 pages. Local Rule 3.01(b). “A party may respond to another

party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(2). A response must not exceed 10 pages. Local Rule 3.01(c). “The

district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s

disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(8); see also

28 U.S.C. § 6386(b)(1)(C) (“A [district judge] shall make a de novo determination

of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.”). “A party failing to object

to ... findings or recommendations ... in a report and

recommendation ... waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s

order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions[.]” 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

Any objection to this report and recommendation must be served and

filed by December 5, 2025.

Entered in Jacksonville, Florida, on November 21, 2025.

LOY, Patricia D. Barksdale

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies to:

The Honorable Marcia Morales Howard

Hakim Abdullah

P.O. Box 364

Jacksonville, FL 32201

16