The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
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JORDAN SLACH, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05760-DGE
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Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
12 v. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
(DKT. NO. 18)
13 CITY OF BATTLE GROUND et al.,
14 Defendants.
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16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. No.
17 18.) For the reasons articulated herein, Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel is DENIED.
18 I BACKGROUND
19 This matter arises from Plaintiff’s termination from the City of Battle Ground Parks and
20 Recreation Department and its aftermath. Plaintiff has filed three complaints (Dkt. Nos. 3, 11,
21 15); the first two were dismissed by this Court pursuant to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
22 review (Dkt Nos. 10, 14) but the Court permitted Plaintiff to direct service for his second
23 amended complaint without further analysis of the merits of his claims. (Dkt. No. 16.) Plaintiff
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1 brings seven causes of actions: (1) a claim under the Fourth Amendment for a “unreasonable
2 search and seizure/privacy violation,” (2) claims under the First Amendment for retaliation and
3 interference with right to petition, (3) a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for procedural
4 due process violations, (4) a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for a violation of his
5 “Liberty Interest – Stigma-Plus,” (5) a claim for Monell liability against the City of Battle
6 Ground, (6) a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and (7) claims for state law torts
7 including intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision and retention,
8 defamation per se, fraud/misrepresentation, and wrongful termination in violation of public
9 policy. (Dkt. No. 15.)
10 Plaintiff previously sought counsel (Dkt. No. 6); the Court denied the motion as moot
11 after denying his initial complaint. (Dkt. No. 10.) Plaintiff now brings a renewed motion for
12 counsel noting the “fundamental change[]” to the case. (Dkt. No. 18 at 1.) Plaintiff asserts there
13 are “exceptional circumstances” because of the number of defendants and claims; the issues of
14 public concern at stake; and the questions of “extraordinary legal complexity that exceed[] the
15 capacity of any pro se litigant,” including qualified immunity, database access regulations,
16 Monell liability, Fair Credit Reporting Act statutory interpretation, and digital forensics. (Id. at
17 2–3, 7.) Finally, Plaintiff notes he is “financially unable to retain counsel” and none of the
18 attempts he has made to obtain counsel—including communicating with over 20 attorneys and
19 law firms, the Clark County Bar Association Referral Program, the Northwest Justice Project,
20 and multiple nonprofit legal aid organizations—have been successful. (Id. at 5.)
21 II DISCUSSION
22 A. Legal Standard
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1 There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d
2 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a court may exercise
3 discretion and request an attorney to represent “any person unable to afford counsel.” Such
4 discretion should only be exercised under “exceptional circumstances.” Agyeman v. Corrections
5 Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). In determining whether exceptional
6 circumstances exist, a court must consider: (1) a plaintiff’s “likelihood of success on the merits”
7 and (2) whether he “is unable to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the issues
8 involved.” Harrington v. Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299, 1309 (9th Cir. 2015). Neither of these
9 considerations is dispositive and instead must be viewed together. Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970.
10 B. Analysis
11 Here, Plaintiff’s motion is not supported by exceptional circumstances. At present,
12 Plaintiff has not established a likelihood of success on the merits. The fact the Court has now
13 directed service on Defendants is not indicative of the likelihood of success on the merits. See
14 Waliezer v. Fortney, No. 2:21-cv-01100-RAJ-JRC, 2021 WL 4169174, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept.
15 14, 2021) (“Moreover, although the Court has found that solely for screening purposes, his
16 complaint is adequate to merit an order directing service on defendants, the Court is unable to
17 determine that there is a likelihood of success on the merits, at this early stage in the
18 proceedings.”) (denying motion to appoint to counsel). And the nature of Plaintiff’s claims is
19 also insufficient to grant this motion. An individual bringing a constitutional claim is not
20 necessarily entitled to counsel, see Betts v. Terronez, No. 25-cv-1296-JES-DDL, 2025 WL
21 2099202, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 25, 2025) (prisoner bringing constitutional claims did not show
22 exceptional circumstances), and bringing more claims does not change that analysis. See Ellis v.
23 Corizon Incorporated, CV-17-0536-PHX-SPL (JFM), 2017 WL 11454403, at *1 (D. Ariz. May
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1 16, 2017) (“That there a variety of claims and defendants may make litigating more time
2 intensive, but it does not alter the nature of the claims themselves.”). Finally, “Plaintiff’s
3 indigency and his lack of formal legal training are not exceptional circumstances sufficient to
4 warrant the appointment of counsel.” Jackson v. Goodwin, C22-5959-JCC-SKV, 2024 WL
5 381147, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 1, 2024). Plaintiff thus far has been able to identify and
6 advance his claims. The current motion is organized and well-presented, evidencing Plaintiff’s
7 ability to articulate and assert his factual and legal position. Accordingly, the Court finds the
8 absence of exceptional circumstances that would justifying appointment of counsel at this stage.
9 III ORDER
10 Plaintiff’s motion for counsel (Dkt. No. 18) is DENIED without prejudice.
11 Dated this 17th day of December, 2025.
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David G. Estudillo
14 United States District Judge
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