Armstrong

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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NORREL ARMSTRONG,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

25-CV-6983 (NRM) (PK)

-against-

781 METROPOLITAN JV LLC and THE

HONORABLE JOANNE D. QUIÑONES,

Defendants.

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NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Norrel Armstrong, proceeding pro se, filed the above-captioned civil

action against a property manager and an appellate judge, seeking to stay an order

of eviction. ECF No 1. At the time he filed the complaint, on December 19, 2025,

Plaintiff also submitted a proposed Order to Show Cause seeking the same relief.

ECF No. 3. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915, ECF No. 2, is granted for the limited purpose of this Order. For the reasons

that follow, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed and the proposed Order to Show

Cause for immediate injunctive relief is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff states that he is the father and representative of L.A., a disabled

minor child, who, Plaintiff alleges, has succession rights in a subsidized apartment

previously occupied by the child’s mother, who is now deceased. ECF No. 1 at 5.

Plaintiff claims that the New York City Housing Authority approved “Section 8

succession,” which he claims confers “a federal property interest.” Id. He states:

“An eviction is scheduled for 12/31/2025, which will cause irreparable harm by

terminating a federal subsidy and making a disabled person homeless without due

process.” Id. Plaintiff claims that “the state court has twice refused to sign a stay

of eviction or hold a hearing.” Id. Plaintiff requests an immediate temporary

restraining order and a preliminary injunction to stay the eviction and “order the

state court to hold a meaningful hearing on the federal succession rights of the

disabled tenant.” Id. at 6.

Plaintiff also filed a separate motion for an order to show cause for a

preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. ECF No. 3. In this

motion, he also asserts claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging

that “the court and landlord must provide reasonable accommodations to a qualified

individual with a disability . . . to prevent discriminatory forfeiture of housing.” Id.

at 1. Plaintiff does not explain how Defendants discriminated against his daughter

or identify reasonable accommodations.

Plaintiff attaches to the motion a copy of an unsigned stipulation of

settlement in 781 Metropolitan JV, LLC v. Norell Armstrong, et al., Index No. L&T

323866-24KI, that would have required Plaintiff to pay more than $15,000 in back

rent plus the November rent in exchange for his signature on a lease to commence

November 1, 2025. ECF No. 3 at 5–6. He also attaches a partial copy of an order

seeking a stay in the New York Appellate Division, Second Department of

unspecified proceedings; the partial copy is marked “Refused” by the Honorable

Joanne D. Quiñones. Id. at 19. Both Judge Quiñones and 781 Metropolitan JV,

LLC are named as Defendants.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Courts are required to give special consideration to pro se litigants, those

individuals who represent themselves in court. This means that pro se litigants are

not expected to meet the same standards required for formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Where a liberal reading of the

pleading “gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated,” the court must

grant leave to amend it at least once. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.

2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)).

A federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), allows indigent plaintiffs to file

lawsuits without paying the usual filing fee. This statute requires a district court to

dismiss a case if the complaint “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To avoid dismissal, a

complaint must include facts that show that the defendants may be responsible for

the harm to the plaintiff. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007);

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although “detailed factual allegations”

are not required, a complaint must include more than only “labels and conclusions”

or a list of the elements of a cause of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A

complaint fails to state a claim if it includes only bare assertions with no factual

details. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Moreover, a federal district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case,

sua sponte, if it determines that the action is frivolous or the court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over the matter. An action is frivolous as a matter of law when,

inter alia, it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” — that is, when it

“lacks an arguable basis in law or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of

the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir.

1998) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir.

1990) (per curiam)). For example, “[a] complaint will be dismissed as ‘frivolous’

when ‘it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit.’” Montero v. Travis, 171

F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

327 (1989)).

Additionally, if the court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see

Chestnut v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-5369 (JS) (ARL), 2012 WL 1657362,

at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2012) (“Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard

afforded pro se litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may

not preside over cases if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.”).

A plaintiff seeking to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction must also establish that

he has standing, which requires him to demonstrate that he has suffered a

“concrete and particularized injury.” See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S.

413, 423 (2021). If “the plaintiff does not claim to have suffered an injury that the

defendant caused and the court can remedy, there is no case or controversy for the

federal court to resolve.” Id. (quoting Casillas v. Madison Avenue Assocs., Inc., 926

F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2019). A litigant proceeding pro se may represent her own

interests but, in most cases, may not bring claims on behalf of anyone else unless

the litigant is an attorney admitted to practice in this Court. See Iannaccone v.

Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause pro se means to appear for one’s

self, a person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause.”). In

order for a parent or guardian to bring a lawsuit on behalf of a minor child, the

parent or guardian must be represented by counsel. See Tindall v. Poultney High

Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 2005) (“It is . . . a well-established general rule

in this Circuit that a parent not admitted to the bar cannot bring an action pro se in

federal court on behalf of his or her child.”); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of

Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[A] non-attorney parent must be

represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of his or her child.”).

II. The Anti-Injunction Act

Under the Anti-Injunction Act, “[a] court of the United States may not grant

an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by

Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or

effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Where, as here, none of the

enumerated exceptions apply, the Anti-Injunction Act functions as “an absolute

prohibition against any injunction of any state-court proceedings.” Vendo Co. v.

Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630 (1977); see Allen v. New York City Hous. Auth.,

No. 10-CV-168 (CM)(DCF), 2010 WL 1644956, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2010)

(“Courts in this Circuit have repeatedly held that the Anti-Injunction Act bars a

federal court from enjoining state-court eviction proceedings.”); see also Watkins v.

Ceasar, 88 F. App’x 458, 459 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming a district court's denial of a

request to “enjoin summary eviction proceedings” as barred by the Anti-Injunction

Act).

In this case, Plaintiff is asking this Court to intervene in a landlord-tenant

proceeding in state court where it appears an order of eviction has already been

entered and an appellate judge has declined to intervene. The Anti-Injunction Act

prohibits this Court from interfering in these state court proceedings. Accordingly,

the Court is unable to grant Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.

III. Representing the Minor Child

Plaintiff has claimed that his daughter has a due process right to a federal

housing subsidy and eviction protections and a right under New York City or State

law to succession tenancy. He has also alleged that his daughter is entitled to

reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiff

has not established standing to bring these claims on his own behalf. He does not

allege that he is himself a qualified individual with a disability or that he is entitled

to any of these protections. Unless Plaintiff is an attorney admitted to practice in

this Court, he may not represent his child in this action. Accordingly, any possible

claims brought on behalf of the child are dismissed without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the action is dismissed under the Anti-

Injunction Act and for lack of standing. Any claims brought on behalf of a minor

child are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s request for immediate injunctive

relief by Order to Show Cause is denied. Should Plaintiff find counsel to proceed on

behalf of his daughter, counsel may move to reopen this action and file an amended

complaint within 30 days of the date of this Order.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from

this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is

denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-

45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is requested to enter Judgment and mail a copy of this

Order and the Judgment to Plaintiff and note the mailing on the docket.

Finally, if Plaintiff requires legal assistance in his state-court proceedings, he

is encouraged to visit http://nyc.gov/site/hra/help/legal-services-for-tenants.page for

more information on free legal help for tenants.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Nina R. Morrison

NINA R. MORRISON

United States District Judge

Dated: December 19, 2025

Brooklyn, New York