The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JEFFREY E. HERRERA,
Plaintiff : CIV. ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-1530
V. : (JUDGE MANNION)
AGENTS OF PENNSYLVANIA :
BOARD OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE, et al., :
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
This is a prisoner civil rights case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
For the reasons set forth below, the case will be dismissed with prejudice for
plaintiff's failure to prosecute.
l. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Jeffrey E. Herrera, filed this case on September 30, 2022,
asserting that defendants violated his civil rights by holding him in prison
beyond his maximum release date. (Doc. 1). On November 9, 2022, the court
dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that it barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Docs. 12-13). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated this judgment and remanded the case,
concluding that the case was not barred by Heck, but that Herrera’s
complaint may nonetheless be subject to dismissal because it may be
untimely. (Doc. 37-1). The court accordingly directed this court to grant
Herrera leave to amend his complaint to determine whether equitable tolling
of the statute of limitations is warranted. (/d.)
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed a “petition to equitably toll’ the
limitations period. (Doc. 40). The court, liberally construing this document as
a request to litigate the timeliness and equitable tolling issues through
motions practice rather than through an amended complaint, granted the
request, reopened the case, and gave plaintiff a deadline to file a legal brief
presenting his arguments. (Doc. 41). Plaintiff then filed sixteen nnotions in the
ensuing months complaining about the court’s handling of tnis and various
other procedural issues. The court resolved these motions in an omnibus
order on December 8, 2025, denying or deeming withdrawn the motions
except to the extent they sought leave to amend plain:iff’s timeliness
arguments. (Doc. 74). The court accordingly required plaintiff to file a single
brief presenting his arguments within thirty days. (/d.)
On December 17, 2025, the court’s order was returned) as
undeliverable, with a notation indicating that plaintiff had been released from
the county prison in which he was previously detained. (Doc. 74).
Subsequent searches by the court on the online inmate locators of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and the United States Bureau of
Prisons indicate that he is also not in state or federal custody. In light of
Herrera’s failure to keep the court informed of his current mailing address
despite his obligation to do so, (see Doc. 4), the court will analyze whether
dismissal of the case for Herrera’s failure to prosecute is appropriate.
ll. | DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) allows for the dismissal of an
action for “failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or comply with these rules or
order of court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). When determining whether to dismiss
a case for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), the court must balance the
factors set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863
(3d Cir. 1984). These factors include:
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the
prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet
scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of
dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney
was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other
than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions;
and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
Id. at 868. Not all of the Poulis factors must be satisfied in order for a court
to dismiss a complaint. Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992).
The first three Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissing this case.
First, because Herrera is proceeding pro se, he is personally responsible for
his failure to comply with the court’s orders. Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d
184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002). Second, his failure to update his address prejudices
to defendants by delaying resolution of the case. Manuel v. Harry, No. 1:20-
CV-2309, 2021 WL 602723, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2021). Third, Herrera
has shown a history of dilatoriness by failing to update his address. /d.
The court finds that the fourth and fifth Poulis factors—whether
plaintiff's conduct was willful or in bad faith and the effectiveness of sanctions
other than dismissal—also weigh in favor of dismissal. First, his failure to
abide by court orders demonstrates a willful disregard for procedural rules
and court directives. Second, because the court does not have a current
mailing address for him and thus cannot meaningfully enforce any other
sanctions against him at this time, the court is without any viable alternative
to dismissal. The sixth and final factor, the meritoriousness of plaintiff's claim,
also weighs in favor of dismissal. As noted above, the Third Circuit has
concluded that plaintiffs complaint is facially untimely and has remanded for
further proceedings to determine whether equitable tolling is necessary.
(Doc. 37-1). Herrera has not presented any equitable tolling arguments since
the case was remanded. Thus, on the current record, it appears that
dismissing the complaint as untimely would likely be appropriate.
Upon balancing the Poulis factors, the court finds that they weigh
heavily in favor of dismissal. In light of plaintiff's failures to comply with court
orders, we will dismiss this action with prejudice. See Hamer v. LivaNova
Deutschland GmbH, 994 F.3d 173, 177 n.3 (3d Cir. 2021) (“District courts
have authority under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
dismiss claims with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order.”).
However, because the court has not previously given Herrera notice that the
case may be dismissed for his failure to prosecute, the court will
automatically reopen the case without Herrera having to file a formal notice
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 or 60 if he updates his
address within thirty days of this decision.
Ill. . CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will dismiss this case with
prejudice for plaintiff's failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b). An appropriate order shall issue.
wh Mannion
United States District Judge
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