Gunn

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

STEVEN GUNN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) No. 4:25-cv-00212-SEP

)

MRS. BUBLITZ, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court are self-represented Plaintiff Steven Gunn’s motions: (1) Motion to

Proceed in forma pauperis, (2) Motion to Appoint Counsel, (3) Motion for an Evidentiary

Hearing, (4) and Motion for Leave to Permit Discovery Inspection and Production. Docs. [6],

[7], [8], and [9]. Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his

constitutional rights. On initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court denies his

motions as moot.

LEGAL STANDARD ON INITIAL REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court must dismiss a complaint against the government

if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b). To state a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is

more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at

679. The Court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton

v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820

F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (court not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation”).

benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court

should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered

within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004)). But even pro se complaints must

“allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d

1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15 (federal courts not required to

“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have

formed a stronger complaint”). And “procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” need not be

“interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” McNeil v. United

States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff brings this action under § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his

constitutional rights when they found him guilty of possessing a contraband cell phone at

Missouri Eastern Correctional Center (MECC). Plaintiff named the following MECC employees

as Defendants: Mrs. Bublitz (Functional Unit Manager), Stephanie Easter (Case Manager), and

Patricia Wickey (Warden). Plaintiff sues Defendants only in their individual capacities.

Plaintiff states that after searching the housing unit, CO Harris found a cell phone taped

to the underside of a desk drawer in Plaintiff’s cell. Doc. [1-4] at 4. Plaintiff alleges he was not

aware of the cell phone. Plaintiff’s cellmate accepted all responsibility for the phone, admitting

that it was his alone. See Doc. [1-4] at 5. Despite this, on April 16, 2024, Plaintiff participated

in a classification hearing presided over by COs Link, Brown, and Jones. See Doc. [1-4] at 7.

Following the hearing, the officers found Plaintiff guilty because the cellphone was in a shared

common area, indicating possession and ownership of all objects within that space. As

discipline, officers placed Plaintiff in administrative segregation for two months. Doc. [1-4] at 4,

7, 8.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his rights to due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment because he was not given a fair and impartial hearing. He argues the criminal

standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” should have applied in the hearing. Doc. [1] at 4.

He also alleges his due process rights were violated because he was not given “assistance in

crafting a defense and in preparing for his disciplinary hearing before or prior to his hearing.”

findings with fingerprints or other physical evidence. Id. at 5.

For relief, Plaintiff asks for his conduct violation to be dismissed and expunged from his

record. He also seeks compensatory damages of between $25 and $2,500.

DISCUSSION

Determining whether prison officials denied an inmate due process requires a two-step

inquiry. See Williams v. Hobbs, 662 F.3d 994, 1000 (8th Cir. 2011). First, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that he or she was deprived of life, liberty, or property by government action. See

Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d

1017, 1047 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that a court “need reach the question of what process is due

only if the inmates establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest”); Singleton v. Cecil, 155

F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir. 1998) (explaining that to claim a due process violation, plaintiff has to be

deprived of either life, liberty, or property, otherwise “it does not matter whether one has

received due process or not”). Once it has been established that a life, liberty, or property

interest exists, the process necessary to protect that interest must be determined. Williams, 662

F.3d at 1000.

As neither life nor property is at issue here, Plaintiff must identify a liberty interest to

state a due process claim. See Phillips, 320 F.3d at 847. Prisoners do have a protected liberty

interest in avoiding conditions of confinement that impose an “atypical and significant hardship

on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 484-87 (1995). But due to the prevalence of administrative segregation in prisons for non-

punitive purposes, plaintiffs face a high bar in demonstrating that it imposes an ‘atypical and

significant hardship’ in relation to ordinary prison life. Id. at 486 (“Conner’s confinement [in

disciplinary segregation] did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary, confinement [such as

in administrative segregation] in either duration or degree of restriction.”). Thus, even where

segregation was “concededly punitive,” the Supreme Court could not find that it “present[ed] a

dramatic departure from the basic conditions of Conner’s indeterminate sentence.” Id. at 485.

Moreover, as the Court further explained, such disciplinary actions do not necessarily impact an

individual’s release date. Id. at 487 (“The decision to release a prisoner rests on a myriad of

considerations. And, the prisoner is afforded procedural protection at his parole hearing in order

to explain the circumstances behind his misconduct record.”) (citation omitted).

Applying Supreme Court precedent, the Eighth Circuit has held that “an inmate has no

protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population absent a showing of

discipline in segregated confinement which amounts to atypical, significant deprivation.” Wycoff

v. Nichols, 94 F.3d 1187, 1190 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485). Under that

precedent, absent a showing of “atypical, significant deprivation,” Plaintiff's assignment to

administrative segregation does not amount to a deprivation of liberty that could give rise to a

due process claim. See, e.g., Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-86 (no atypical and significant hardship

where inmate spent 30 days in solitary confinement); Hemphill v. Delo, 124 F.3d 208 (8th Cir.

1997) (unpublished) (same conclusion for 30 days in disciplinary segregation and 290 days in

administrative segregation); Wycoff, 94 F.3d at 1190 (same conclusion for 10 days disciplinary

detention and 100 days in maximum security cell). Because Plaintiffs placement in

administrative segregation did not violate a protected liberty interest, due process protections are

not applicable to the classification hearing. The Complaint thus fails to state a due process claim

relating to Plaintiff's placement in administrative segregation. !

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma

pauperis, Doc. [6], is DENIED as moot as Plaintiff has paid the filing fee.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED without prejudice

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs (1) Motion to Appoint Counsel, (2)

Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing, and (3) Motion for Leave to Permit Discovery, Docs. [7],

[8], and [9], are DENIED as moot.

An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 19" day of December, 2025.

SARAH E. PITLYK ~

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

'To the extent Plaintiff objects to the use of a standard other than guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, he also

fails to state a claim. Because Plaintiffs administrative classification hearing was not a criminal

prosecution, he was not entitled to the full array of constitutional rights afforded to criminal defendants in

that context. See Hrbek v. Nix, 12 F.3d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1993).

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