Urrutia-Diaz

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

MARLON GEOVANNY URRUTIA-DIAZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

) No. 2:25-cv-03098-TLP-atc

v. )

)

SCOTT LADWIG, )

)

Respondent. )

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Marlon Geovanny Urrutia-Diaz, an alien detained in the West Tennessee

Detention Facility in Mason, Tennessee, petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2241. (ECF No. 1.) On December 4, 2025, the Court entered an Order directing Respondent to

show cause why the Writ should not be granted. (ECF No. 6.) Respondent responded. (ECF

No. 7.) But Petitioner did not reply.1 For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN

PART the Petition.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner, a Honduran citizen, first entered the United States unlawfully in December

2023. (ECF No. 7 at PageID 23.) But authorities “encountered [him] at the border” and

“returned [him] to Mexico via expedited removal.” (Id.) Petitioner reentered the United States

without lawful status around January 10, 2025. (Id.) Authorities detained him again. (See ECF

1 The Parties consented to the Court ruling without a hearing. See emails from Chelsea P.

Sparkman, Petitioner’s Counsel, and Stuart Canale, Respondent’s Counsel, to the Court. (Dec.

9–10, 2025) (on file with the Court).

No. 7-2.) And on February 14, 2025, the United States Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”) provided Petitioner a Notice to Appear. (Id.) They allege that he entered the country

as an immigrant without “a valid unexpired [] visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other

valid entry document” in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I).2 (ECF No. 7-1 at PageID

46.)

Authorities released Petitioner afterward and reset his hearing until June 22, 2026, for

Petitioner to return with an attorney. (ECF No. 7 at PageID 23.) In October 2025, Petitioner

applied to the Memphis Immigration Court for Asylum and Withholding of Removal. (ECF No.

1-3 at PageID 13.) And on November 20, 2025, authorities detained Petitioner near Memphis,

Tennessee, for violating the Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”) program. (ECF No. 7 at PageID

24.) Petitioner remains in United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody

at the West Tennessee Detention Facility in Macon, Tennessee. (Id.)

DHS and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) have not held a bond

hearing for Petitioner. (See ECF No. 1-3 at PageID 14.) They determined that he is subject to

mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), a change from a decades-long practice of

affording aliens in Petitioner’s position with bond hearings. (See id. at PageID 16.) The change

came in July 2025, when DHS, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and ICE issued a new

policy.3 See, e.g., Monge-Nunez v. Ladwig, No. 25-3043, 2025 WL 3565348, at *1 (W.D. Tenn.

Dec. 12, 2025). This new policy subjects aliens who have resided in the United States and who

2 The United States Code here codifies the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) §

212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Petitioner’s Notice to Appear cites the INA section.

3 American Immigration Lawyers Association, ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding

Detention Authority for Applications for Admission, AILA (July 8, 2025),

https://www.aila.org/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-

for-admission (“For custody purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same manner that

‘arriving aliens’ have historically been treated.”) (last visited Dec. 15, 2025).

are apprehended in the interior of the country to mandatory detention. Id. In the past, those

same persons were detained and afforded bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id.; Godinez-

Lopez v. Ladwig v., No. 25-2962, 2025 WL 3047889, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2025). (ECF

No. 1-3 at PageID 13–17.) The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) later upheld this new

policy in the case of In re Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). So now,

immigration judges are bound by precedent which denies aliens like Petitioner bond hearings

under § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Petitioner asserts that Respondent’s failure to provide him a bond hearing amounts to

“indefinite detention without a meaningful custody review.” (ECF No. 1-3 at PageID 13.) And

he alleges that his detention violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States

Constitution and “deviates from established circuit court precedent, valuable Supreme [C]ourt

dictum, and the clear intent of Congress.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6.) He asks for the Court to

grant his Petition and “Order Respondent[] to release Petitioner on reasonable bond or parole, or,

alternatively, to provide a meaningful bond hearing before an impartial adjudicator within a

reasonable time.” (Id. at PageID 7.) Petitioner also seeks attorney’s fees and costs under the

Equal Access to Justice Act. (Id.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A petition for habeas corpus enables a person to challenge the legality of their custody.

See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,

484 (1973)). And “the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 484; see 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(3) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend

to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States[.]”). Petitioner here asserts that his custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is

unlawful.

Detention of noncitizens during removal proceedings is typically governed by

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) §§ 1225 and 1226. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226.

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) governs the mandatory detention of “applicant[s] for admission” after an

immigration officer has determined that an applicant is not entitled to admission in the United

States.

(b) Inspection of applicants for admission

. . .

(2) Inspection of other aliens

(A) In general

Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an

alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining

immigration officer determines that an alien seeking

admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be

admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under

section 1229a of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). An “applicant for admission” is an alien “present in the United States

who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).

“[A]dmission” and “admitted” are defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States

after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). And

again, detention is mandatory under this section. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

On the other hand, § 1226(a) provides for discretionary detention:

(a) Arrest, detention, and release

On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and

detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the

United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such

decision, the Attorney General—

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on—

(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and

containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General .

. . .

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Known as the Laken Riley Act, subsection (c) of § 1226 provides for the

mandatory detention of aliens found inadmissible or deportable under specific provisions and

who have been “charged with,” “arrested for,” “convicted of,” or admit to “having committed”

certain listed crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Aliens arrested and detained under this section “have

a right to request a custody redetermination (i.e., bond hearing) before an Immigration Judge.”

Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 777 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. §

1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)). That immigration judge “evaluates whether there is a risk of

nonappearance or danger to the community.” Id. (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37,

40 (BIA 2006)). With that in mind, the Court now turns to the Parties’ arguments.

ANALYSIS

The Court must determine whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s

detention. This is not an issue of first impression before this Court. And Respondent detaining

Petitioner under § 1225(b) instead of § 1226(a) is not an isolated event. Indeed, the Court

recently considered this same question and held that Ҥ 1226 governs the arrest and detention of

an alien without a criminal history who has been residing in the United States.” See, e.g.,

Monge-Nunez, 2025 WL 3565348, at *6; Padilla-Ugsha v. Ladwig, No. 25-3045, 2025 WL

3638007 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 2025). Because of the increasing frequency of these habeas

petitions, other district courts in this circuit have also been asked to consider which statutory

provision governs. For the most part, they too have determined that § 1226(a) fits in this

scenario. See, e.g., Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL 3047889. Other district courts across the country

have concluded the same. As one court just observed:

By a recent count, the central issue in this case – the administration's new position

that all noncitizens who came into the United States illegally, but since have been

living in the United States, must be detained until their removal proceedings are

completed – has been challenged in at least 362 cases in federal district courts.

The challengers have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 of

those cases decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different

courts spread across the United States. Thus, the overwhelming, lopsided

majority have held that the law still means what it always has meant.

Barco Mercado v. Francis, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025)

(footnotes omitted) (collecting cases). But the Sixth Circuit has yet to decide whether § 1225(b)

or § 1226(a) applies under these circumstances.

With that in mind, the Court’s analysis here comes in three parts.4 The Court first

considers whether it should require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before

hearing this claim. It then uses statutory interpretation to determine which section applies. And

finally, the Court addresses procedural due process.

I. Administrative Exhaustion

Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (See ECF No. 11 at PageID

48.) To do so, he would need to request a bond hearing before an immigration judge, have an

immigration judge deny his request, and then appeal that denial to the Board of Immigration

Appeals. Respondent argues that the Court should require Petitioner to go through that process

before considering his Petition. The Court disagrees with Respondent for the reasons below.

Exhaustion is required when mandated by Congress. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503

U.S. at 140, 144 (1992). No statute requires administrative exhaustion in this context. (See ECF

No. 7 at PageID 25.) When Congress has not explicitly mandated exhaustion, the decision

whether to require a petitioner to exhaust their administrative remedies lies within “sound

judicial discretion.” McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). In exercising that

4 Because the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to the discretionary bond process under §

1226 as a matter of statutory interpretation and procedural due process, it need not consider

Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 9; ECF No. 10 at PageID 37.)

discretion, the Supreme Court has explained that “federal courts must balance the interest of the

individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum against countervailing

institutional interests favoring exhaustion.” Id. at 146. Those institutional interests are

“protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.” Id. at 145.

The Supreme Court also identified situations in which the interest of the individual

weighs heavily against the institutional interests. See id. at 146–49. Relevant here, “an

administrative remedy may be inadequate where the administrative body . . . has otherwise

predetermined the issue before it.” Id. at 148 (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575, n.

14 (1973); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968) (in view of Attorney General's

submission that the challenged rules of the prison were “validly and correctly applied to

petitioner,” requiring administrative review through a process culminating with the Attorney

General “would be to demand a futile act”); Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC,

627 F.2d 1151, 1156–1157 (1979) (bias of Federal Trade Commission chairman), cert. denied,

447 U.S. 921 (1980); Patsy v. Florida International University, 634 F.2d 900, 912–913 (5th Cir.

1981) (en banc) (administrative procedures must “not be used to harass or otherwise discourage

those with legitimate claims”), rev’d on other grounds, sub nom. Patsy v. Board of Regents of

Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982)); See also Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 822–23 (6th Cir.

2015) (“If administrative review would come to naught, if any efforts before the agency would

be pointless, the courts do not insist that litigants go through the motions of exhausting the claim

anyway.”) (internal quotations omitted).

Petitioner explains that he did not request a bond hearing because of the BIA’s decision

in Matter of Yajujure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (2025), which “renders it a certainty that the

hearing will not be conducted, let alone that a bond determination will be heard on the merits.”

(ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) See Matter of Yajujure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 228 (holding that

aliens “who surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for admission until and

unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted by an immigration officer” because “[r]emaining

in the United States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by itself,

does not constitute an ‘admission”’). Respondent acknowledges “Petitioner may be unlikely to

obtain the relief he seeks through the administrative process based on Matter of Yajure Hurtado,

which binds the agency and the immigration courts and rejects Petitioner’s statutory arguments

in this case.” (ECF No. 7 at PageID 26.) But Respondent nonetheless argues that the Court

should exercise its discretion and require Petitioner to exhaust his remedies. (Id.)

The Court agrees with Petitioner that Matter of Yajure Hurtado—which is binding on

immigration judges—makes exhausting administrative remedies futile here. To exhaust his

remedies, Petitioner would need to appeal to the same BIA that just decided Matter of Yajure

Hurtado. So the decision on whether to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing has been

predetermined. See Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 778 (reasoning that “administrative

review is not likely to change Respondents’ position that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies in this

context”). What is more, the BIA has no authority to review constitutional challenges. See

Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). This means that Petitioner can only

bring his due process claim in federal court.

It follows that requiring exhaustion in this case would not further the ends of judicial

efficiency and protecting administrative authority because it would simply delay the resolution of

Petitioner’s legal questions. Petitioner’s individual interest in having prompt access to this

forum outweighs any institutional interests at stake. Another practical reason supports this

conclusion. “Bond appeals before the BIA, on average, take six months to complete.” Lopez-

Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 779 (citing Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D.

Wash. 2025)).

Requiring Petitioner to wait six months—or any length of time for that matter—so that

the BIA can address an issue it has already decided creates hardship for hardship’s sake. The

Court declines to impose such a result here.5

II. Statutory Interpretation

The Parties disagree over whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) should govern

Petitioner’s detention. And the Parties take conflicting views on how to interpret these sections.

Petitioner argues that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to applicants for admission “at the time of

arriving or being stopped at entry” into the United States. (ECF No. 1-3 at PageID 14.) And §

1226(a) “governs aliens present in the U.S. awaiting a final removal decision.” (Id.) Petitioner

also contends that Respondent’s § 1225(b)(2)(A) interpretation renders § 1226’s mandatory

detention provision superfluous. (Id.) See 8 U.S.C. §1226(c)(1)(E).

Respondent counters that “under § 1225’s plain terms, all unadmitted aliens in the United

States are “applicants for admission,” regardless of their proximity to the border, the length of

time they have been present here, or whether they ever had the subjective intent to properly

apply for admission.” (ECF No. 7 at PageID 27.) In other words, Respondent asserts that the

plain text of § 1225 applies to Petitioner because “he is an alien, he was not admitted, and he was

5 Respondent points to a line of cases out of the Northern District of Ohio that require

immigration habeas petitioners to exhaust their bond-related administrative remedies before

considering their habeas claims. (ECF No. 7 at PageID 25 (citing Monroy Vaillalta v. Greene, --

- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-1594, 2025 WL 2472886, at *2– 3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2025);

Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8–

12 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025); see also Laguna Espinoza v. Dir. of Detroit Field Off., U.S.

Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 25-2107, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Oct.

9, 2025)). The Court has reviewed those cases. And it is unpersuaded for the reasons discussed

above.

present in the United States when ICE detained him.” (Id.) And Respondent points out that the

INA recognizes two classes of applicants for admission—those who are “(1) arriving aliens

determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documents . . .

and (2) certain other aliens designated by the Attorney General who have not been admitted or

paroled into the United States and who have been present for less than two years.” (Id. at

PageID 31 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii).)

When interpreting statutes, courts should construe the text “so that effect is given to all its

provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Corley v.

United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)); see

Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012)

(“If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect.”). To apply this approach,

courts give each word “‘its ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ while keeping in mind

that ‘statutory language has meaning only in context.’” See, e.g., Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th

585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation modified) (citing Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.,

137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010, (2017). And courts “presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what

it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.

249, 253–54 (1992).

For the reasons below, these principles resolve the dispute in Petitioner’s favor.

Although certain legal principles overlap, the Court first addresses the plain language before

considering the statutory framework. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638 (2016).

A. Plain Language

Detention under 1225(b)(2)(A) applies “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for

admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is

not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). This means

the alien must be an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” and “not clearly and

beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”

Section 1225(a)’s definition of “applicants for admission” does not match Petitioner. The

statute defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has

not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). And the statute

defines “admission” and “admitted” as “with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into

the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). So read together, “applicants for admission” means “aliens

who have unlawfully entered into the United States after inspection and authorization by an

immigration officer.” This definition applies to applicants for admission who have undergone

inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. It does not fit with Respondent’s

definition of “applicants for admission,” which would include aliens like Petitioner who have

been residing in the interior of the country for a while without inspection or authorization by an

immigration officer.

Section 1225(a)’s “seeking admission” language also does not apply to Petitioner under

these facts. “Seeking,” of course, implies “some sort of present-tense action.” Barco Mercado, -

- F. Supp. 3d. --, 2025 WL 3295903, at *5. And “seeking” suggests action. So the Court finds

that to fall under § 1225(b)(2)(A), the alien must be actively seeking admission, not simply

residing in the country after entering it unlawfully like Petitioner here.6

The plain meaning of § 1226 better captures Petitioner’s situation. For example, it

applies to the “apprehension and detention of aliens,” providing that, upon “a warrant issued by

the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested or detained pending a decision on whether the

alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Petitioner was apprehended

in the interior of the country after residing here for almost a year. Thus the Attorney General has

the discretion under this section to “continue to detain [him]” or she “may release [him] on

bond.” Id. She may not, though, deny him the bond hearing to which he is entitled. See 8

C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1).

B. Statutory Framework

The titles of statutory provisions also suggest that Petitioner’s interpretation of them is

correct. See Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL 3047889, at *4. “[T]he title of a statute in the heading of

a section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt” about a statute’s meaning. Dubin v.

United States, 599 U.S. 110, 121 (2023). Section 1225’s title is “Inspection by immigration

officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C.

§1225 (emphasis added). Section 1225’s title then envisions arriving aliens placed in expedited

removal. But again, Petitioner was detained over 1,000 miles from the border years after he had

crossed it. Meanwhile, § 1226’s title is “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” Id. at § 1226.

6 To be sure, the INA recognizes two classes of aliens who are not seeking admission—those that

are arriving yet found to be inadmissible because of fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid

documents, and those that are designated by the Attorney General who have not been admitted or

paroled and have not been present in the United States for two years. See 8 U.S.C. §§

1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). But that does not preclude the existence of other alien

classes that do not fall under § 1225. See, e.g., Padilla-Ugsha, 2025 WL 3638007.

That title fits the situation here. Petitioner was apprehended, not while arriving in the United

States, but nearly a year later in the interior of the country. And he is now detained.

Section 1225’s title therefore seems inapplicable to aliens in Petitioner’s shoes, but § 1226’s title

seems spot on.

A look at § 1225’s subject matter further undercuts Respondent’s interpretation of the

statutory framework. Section 1225 describes the process of inspecting and removing immigrants

who are actively crossing the border or entering at a port of entry. See Jennings v. Rodriguez,

583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (“That process of decision [described in § 1225] generally begins at

the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien

seeking to enter the country is admissible.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). It explicitly applies to

“an alien who . . . has not affirmatively shown . . . that the alien has been physically present in

the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the

determination of inadmissibility . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). Although Petitioner

has resided in the United States for almost a year, it makes little sense, without more, to apply §

1225 to someone who is not actively crossing the border. Cf. Padilla-Ugsha v. Ladwig, 2025

WL 3638007, at *6 (“It makes little sense to apply § 1225 to Petitioner who has resided in the

United States for over a year and is not actively entering the country.”).

That is not all. The existence of § 1226(c) also cuts against Respondent’s position here

because Respondent’s interpretation of § 1225(b) makes § 1226(c)’s mandatory detention

provision superfluous. To be sure, subsections 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii) provide for mandatory

detention of certain aliens. But it applies only to those aliens who both entered the country

without inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), (C), and (7) who are also “charged with, . . .

arrested for, . . . convicted of . . .” certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). And so to

interpret § 1225(b)(2)(A) as Respondent argues would subject mandatory detention to every

alien who did not lawfully enter the country. This reading would strip 1226(c) of meaning.

What is more, Congress only recently added subsection 1226(c)(1)(E) when it passed the Laken

Riley Act. Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). Respondent’s interpretation asks this Court to

presume Congress pointlessly amended the statute with a redundant provision when it most

recently considered it. The Court declines to do so. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08

(2019) (“This would violate the cannon against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner

that would render another provision superfluous.”).

The Court addresses one final point. Respondent acknowledges that another court in the

Western District of Tennessee considered these same statutory provisions and held that § 1226(a)

applied to the petitioner there. (Id. at PageID 29 (citing Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL 3047889).)

And Respondent seeks to distinguish that case from the facts here. In short, he argues that the

petitioner in Godinez-Lopez had been in the United States for over three years and had been

granted status as a Special-Immigrant Juvenile through 2027. (Id. at PageID 30.) But here,

Petitioner has only been present in the United States for 11 months and is subject to removal.

(Id.) But Respondent overlooks that this Court has considered facts like these and still concluded

that § 1226(a) governed.

In Padilla-Ugsha v. Ladwig, this Court concluded that § 1226(a) applied to a detained

alien who resided in the United States for over a year. 2025 WL 3638007, at *6. That is because

the plain text and statutory framework indicate that §§ 1225 and 1226 are different statutory

provisions that apply in different contexts. As the Supreme Court explained in Jennings, the

government may “detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country” under § 1225(b)

while § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending

the outcome of removal proceedings.” 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). So even though

Petitioner here has resided in the United States for less than a year, § 1226 governs because he is

not seeking admission but is already in this country. Petitioner is therefore subject to the

discretionary bond process under § 1226.

III. Due Process

Because the Court has found that § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention, he is owed

the process given to him under the statute. See, e.g. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,

591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (“[A]n alien in [Petitioner’s] position has only the rights . . . that

Congress has provided by statute.”). Petitioner alleges that Respondent violates his due process

rights by continuing to detain him without a bond hearing. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6.)

Respondent counters that because Petitioner complains that he is detained under the wrong

statute, even if his detention is unlawful, it is not unconstitutional. Respondent notes that

Petitioner “has been given notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may attend

hearings with an immigration judge, can request bond at that time, and has the right to appeal the

denial of any request for bond.” (ECF No. 7 at PageID 39 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1362).) Put simply,

Respondent asserts that § 1225(b)(2)(A) has already afforded Petitioner the due process that

Congress chose to provide him. (Id.)

The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects every person from being

“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The

Sixth Circuit generally “applies the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319

(1976), to evaluate the level of process owed to a noncitizen.” Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL

3047889, at *6 (citing United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020)).

And under Matthews, the Court must consider (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the

official action.” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest,” and (3) “the

Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens

that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335.

All three factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor. He has a strong liberty interest in being free

from physical detention. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The risk of erroneous deprivation is high here considering that

Respondent and the BIA’s current position is to afford him no bond hearing whatsoever. And

bond hearings are a significant procedural safeguard to balance the Government’s interest in

immigration enforcement against individual liberties. So the Court finds that the Government’s

interest in detaining Petitioner without that procedural safeguard does not outweigh Petitioner’s

liberty interest or the risk of erroneous deprivation. This is all the more true because Petitioner

has no meaningful opportunity for an immigration judge to consider whether he is a danger to

society or a flight risk. This all makes clear that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing before an

immigration judge. And not only that, but his continued detention without that bond hearing

violates his due process rights. The Court therefore GRANTS the Petition.

IV. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Petitioner seeks attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2412. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 9.) Section 2412(b) allows a court to award “reasonable

fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to

subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). The Federal Rules require that claims for attorney’s fees and related

expenses be made by motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A). So Petitioner must timely file a

motion that complies with Local Rule 54.1(b) to seek attorney’s fees and costs. See L.R. 54.1(b).

CONCLUSION

Immigration policies have long been subject to the changing tides of government. But

those changing tides cannot usurp statutory authorization. For the reasons above, the Court

GRANTS IN PART the Petition and ORDERS Respondent to provide Petitioner with a bond

hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1) within 14 days of the entry

of this Order.7 And the Court further ENJOINS Respondent from pursuing Petitioner’s

detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

SO ORDERED, this 19th day of December, 2025.

s/Thomas L. Parker

THOMAS L. PARKER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7Given the facts here, the Court declines to Order that Respondent release Petitioner pending the

bond hearing.