Thomas

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

TIFFANY THOMAS, CASE NO. 1:25-cv-2167

individually and as parent of other C.A.,

a minor, DISTRICT JUDGE

DONALD C. NUGENT

Plaintiff,

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

vs. JAMES E. GRIMES JR.

BEACHWOOD CITY SCHOOL

DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, REPORT A ND

RECOMMENDATION

Defendants.

In October 2025, pro se Plaintiff Tiffany Thomas filed a motion for

preliminary injunction. Doc. 3. In December 2025, the District Court referred

this matter to a Magistrate Judge for pretrial supervision, including for

completion of a report and recommendation for case-dispositive motions. Doc.

16, at 1. This report and recommendation generally concerns Thomas’s motion

for preliminary injunction. The parties have also filed several additional and

related motions, which are also addressed below. For all the reasons stated, I

recommend that Thomas’s motion for preliminary injunction, Doc. 3, be denied.

Additionally, Thomas’s motion for an evidentiary hearing, Doc. 10, is denied,

and Defendant’s motion to file supplemental documents in opposition to the

motion for preliminary injunction, Doc. 13, is granted.

Background

In October 2025, Thomas, filed a Complaint seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief. Doc. 1. The Complaint stated four counts against Defendant,

Beachwood City School District Board of Education. Doc. 1, at 1, 3. Thomas

contemporaneously filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking an

injunction ordering Defendant to:

1. Immediately restore Plaintiff’s ability to

communicate directly by email and in person

with her child’s teachers, therapists, and

service providers; and

2. Refrain from further retaliation or

interference with Plaintiff’s statutory and

constitutional rights pending resolution of

this case.

Doc. 3, at 1.

The circumstances underlying Thomas’s Complaint and motion for

preliminary injunction concern her child, C.A., and interactions beginning

before C.A.’s 2025–26 school year.1 In early 2025, Thomas filed a state

complaint alleging denial of inclusive extracurricular and mental-health

programing.2 See Doc. 1, at 2; Doc. 12-8. In August 2025, Thomas filed

1 The following factual summary relies on facts alleged in the pleadings

and verified documents provided in relation to Thomas’s motion for

preliminary injunction.

2 Although Thomas included this allegation in the Complaint, it does not

appear to be related to the claims in the Complaint.

complaints with Defendant’s human resources department alleging retaliation

and harassment by school district administrators. Doc. 1, at 2.

From July 2025 to, at least, September 2025, Thomas engaged in

consistent email and in-person contact with various teachers and support staff

that allegedly violated the Defendant’s communication standards. See e.g.,

Doc. 3-8; 8-1, at 5–6; Doc. 8-2, at 8–10; Doc. 12-2; Doc. 12-4. In September 2025,

Defendant instituted a communication protocol, which established that email

communications from Thomas to C.A.’s teachers must be directed to only the

Superintendent, the Principal, and the Director of Pupil Services. Doc. 1, at 2.

Additionally, the communication protocol blocked all emails from Thomas’s

email address if sent directly to staff or teachers. Id. Thomas was informed

that this communication protocol was implemented based on her violations of

the district’s communication standards. See Doc. 3-8. On September 12, 2025,

following implementation of the communication protocol, Thomas asserted

that she “cannot meaningfully participate in [C.A.’s] IEP3 process” and

“cancel[ed] all pre-meetings with staff that had been scheduled in person” so

that she could “devote the coming week to [her] resolution meeting, to

3 The initialism “IEP” stands for individualized education program. See

Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). The Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (“IDEA”), reauthorized in 2004 as the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Improvement Act (“IDEIA”), see Pub. L. 108-446, 118

Stat 2647 (Dec. 3, 2004), and previously named the Education of the

Handicapped Act (EHA), mandates that an IEP be developed and reviewed,

through specific processes established by statute, for every disabled child to

ensure that each child receives the statutorily required free appropriate public

education (“FAPE”). Id.

cooperation with the outside investigator working with the district and to

completing the filing of additional complaints with appropriate state agencies

in regard to Beachwood Staff.” See Doc. 8-1, at 50–54. A September 15, 2025,

letter from Thomas says that the Director of Pupil Services, Speech

Pathologist, and Occupational Therapist, conducted a meeting, as previously

requested by Thomas, but that Thomas did not appear at that meeting. Doc. 8-

1, at 55. Thomas’s letter asserts that she:

explicitly stated to you that I would not be

participating in meetings this week, including the

IEP meeting, because I am focusing my time and

energy on the state complaints and resolution

sessions currently pending. You yourself

acknowledged the cancellation of the IEP meeting

but failed to mention the cancellation of this related

provider meeting.

Id.

On September 17, 2025, Thomas filed a state complaint alleging

violations of IDEA and Ohio law arising out of the communication protocol and

other alleged conduct by Defendant. See Doc. 13-1. In October 2025, Thomas

filed an addendum to the state complaint alleging “procedural and ethical

violations” arising out of the allegedly “improper conduct” that was the

September 15 meeting. Doc. 8-1, at 58. On November 16, 2025, the Ohio

Department of Education and Workforce, issued findings on Thomas’s

September 17 complaint and found that the Defendant did not violate

Thomas’s parent-participation rights or the statutory provisions requiring

prior written notice. See Doc. 13-1, at 3–4.

In October 2025, Thomas filed this action alleging that since the

Defendant employed the communication protocol banning certain email

communications, C.A. has “lost instructional time, missed services, and

regressed behaviorally.” Doc. 1, at 2. Based on the communication protocol and

alleged repercussions that the communication protocol has had on Thomas’s

ability to engage with school teachers and staff, she alleges: denial of C.A.’s

right to a FAPE under IDEA; disability discrimination on behalf of C.A. under

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”); retaliation for her protected activity under Section 504, the ADA, and

the First Amendment; and a First Amendment claim that the communication

protocol unlawfully restricted her ability communicate with public officials. See

Doc. 1, at 3.

Legal Standard

When considering a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65, courts consider the same factors considered in determining

whether to issue a temporary restraining order. Northeast Ohio Coalition for

Homeless and Service Employees Int’l Union, Local 1199 v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d

999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Summit Cnty. Democratic Central and

Executive Committee v. Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2004)). The

moving party has the burden of establishing the following four factors: whether

(1) the moving party has a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the

merits; (2) the moving party will suffer irreparable harm unless injunctive

relief is granted; (3) the requested relief will cause substantial harm to others;

and (4) injunctive relief is in the public interest. Id.; see also Jones v. Caruso,

569 F.3d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 2009). “These factors are not prerequisites but are

factors that are to be balanced against each other.” Overstreet v. Lexington-

Fayette Urb. County Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002).

Discussion

Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Thomas makes two requests in her motion for preliminary injunction:

(1) immediately restore her ability to communicate directly by email and in

person with her child’s teachers, therapists, and service providers; and (2)

refrain from further retaliation or interference with her statutory and

constitutional rights pending resolution of the case. Doc. 3, at 1. Thomas

references and provides brief arguments for each of the four factors to be

considered on a motion for preliminary injunction. See Doc. 3, at 2. Each factor

and Thomas’s related arguments are discussed in turn.

1. Likelihood of success on the merits

To demonstrate the first factor, Thomas must show that she is likely to

succeed on the claims raised in her Complaint. Whether a movant is likely to

succeed on the merits is a question of law. See Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399

F.3d 754, 760 (6th Cir. 2005).

Thomas raises four claims in her Complaint: Count I – Denial of FAPE

(IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.); Count II – Disability Discrimination (Section

504 and ADA); Count III – Retaliation (Section 504, ADA, and First

Amendment); and Count IV – First Amendment Violations. See Doc. 1, at 3.

As to Count I, Thomas alleges the following: “By preventing Plaintiff’s

meaningful participation in her child’s IEP and withholding service

information, Defendant violated IDEA procedural safeguards and deprived

C.A. of a Free Appropriate Public Education.” Doc. 1, at 3. In her motion for

preliminary injunction, Thomas does not make any specific argument as to how

she will prove her Count I claim. See Doc. 3, at 2. Instead, she generally claims

that “[t]he communication block violates 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (parental

participation). 29 U.S.C. § 794, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the First Amendment.

Defendant offers no lawful justification for banning a parent from

communication about her child’s education.” Doc. 3, at 2. As Defendant’s note,

however, a prerequisite to relief under IDEA is administrative exhaustion. See

20 C.F.R. § 1415(f), (g), (l).

Thomas makes no allegation, either in the Complaint, the motion for

preliminary injunction, or her reply to show that she has exhausted her

administrative remedies. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schools, 580 U.S. 154,

165–68 (2017) (explaining the IDEA exhaustion requirement and holding that

even claims brought under a statute other than IDEA require exhaustion

where the claim seeks relief for denial of FAPE based on application of 20

U.S.C. § 1415). Instead, in her reply, Thomas asserts that her filings with the

state satisfy the exhaustion requirement and that, regardless, she is excused

from the exhaustion requirement because the Defendant’s conduct interfered

with her participation in the due process hearing. See Doc. 12, at 4.

In support of her assertion that she has satisfied the exhaustion

requirement, however, Thomas only asserts that she has filed certain state

agency complaints and that she filed, but then withdrew, a due process

complaint. Id. These assertions do not show that she has completed the

administrative processes required to exhaust her claims under IDEA.

Likewise, the allegation that the Defendant obstructed her due process hearing

is unsubstantiated and thus unpersuasive. See Bishop v. Oakstone Acad., 477

F. Supp. 2d 876, 883 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (recognizing that “the burden of

establishing the futility or inadequacy of the administrative remedies rests on

the party seeking to bypass them. Mere speculation at the futility or procedural

deficiencies of a proposed administrative proceeding is not enough to satisfy

this burden.”) (citations omitted). Based on the above, Thomas’s Count I claim

does not have a strong likelihood of success on the merits.

As to Count II, Thomas alleges the following: “Defendant discriminated

against C.A. on the basis of disability by restricting parental participation,

failing to provide equal access to extracurricular programs, and ignoring

accommodation needs.” Doc. 1, at 3. Thomas does not make any specific

argument as to the likelihood of success on the merits for Count II in her

motion for preliminary injunction. See Doc. 3, at 2. In response, the Defendant

again asserts that to the extent that Count II raises a Section 504 claim, that

claim requires a showing of administrative exhaustion before initiating a court

action. See Doc. 8, at 13. As with Count I, Thomas’s complaint makes no

allegations regarding administrative exhaustion of her Count II claim. See

generally Doc. 1. And Thomas’s argument in reply, that exhaustion does not

apply to her Section 504 or ADA claims, fails because her claims specifically

concern allegations that C.A. was deprived of his right to a FAPE. See Doc. 12,

at 4 (citing Fry, 580 U.S. 154 in arguing that exhaustion does not apply). And

Fry, which Thomas cites to support her attempt to avoid the exhaustion

requirement, illustrates why the exhaustion requirement applies for her claim.

As the Court in Fry explained:

exhaustion rule hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks

relief for the denial of a FAPE. If a lawsuit charges

such denial, the plaintiff cannot escape § 1415(l)

merely by bringing her suit under a statute other

than the IDEA–as when, for example, the plaintiffs

in Smith claimed that a school’s failure to provide a

FAPE also violated the Rehabilitation Act. Rather,

that plaintiff must first submit her case to an IDEA

hearing officer, experienced in addressing exactly

the issues she raises.

Fry, 580 U.S. at 168.

More detrimental, however, to Thomas’s Count II claim––and generally

to all claims she purports to raise on behalf of C.A.––is that, as the Defendant

points out, Thomas is unable to represent C.A.’s interests. See Doc. 8, at 13.

Taking as fact the allegations in the Complaint, Thomas does not appear to be

an attorney. A non-attorney parent has no standing to represent her child’s

interests without assistance of counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(1)(A)

(permitting a “general guardian” to “sue … on behalf of a minor”), (2) (“A minor

or an incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative

may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem.”); Sheperd v. Wellman, 313

F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[P]arents cannot appear pro se on behalf of their

minor child because a minor’s personal cause of action is her own and does not

belong to her parent, or representative.”) (citing Cheung v. Youth Orchestra

Found. Of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990)).

So, as to Count II, Thomas has not shown a likelihood of success on the

merits.

As to Count III, Thomas alleges retaliation under Section 504, the ADA,

and the First Amendment based on the following actions by Defendant: “After

Plaintiff filed protected complaints and founded a special education parent

teacher association chamber, Defendant retaliated by imposing a

communication block, mischaracterizing her advocacy as harassment, and

discouraging staff interaction.” Doc. 1, at 3. Again, Thomas makes no specific

argument as to the merits of Count III in her motion for preliminary injunction.

See Doc. 3, at 2.

As Count III’s likelihood of success, the first problem is that there is no

private cause of action for retaliation under Section 504. See Smith v. Michigan

Dep’t of Corr., 159 F.4th 1067, 1074–82 (6th Cir. 2025). As to retaliation under

the ADA, Thomas:

must show: (1) [that she] engaged in protected

activity; (2) the Board knew of the protected activity;

(3) the Board took an adverse action against [her];

and (4) there was a causal connection between the

protected activity and the adverse action.

M.L. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 772 F. App’x 287, 291 (6th Cir. 2019).

In her motion for preliminary injunction, Thomas simply presents the

nature of her claims by citing the statutes she invoked in the Complaint and

the First Amendment and asserting that Defendant and its representatives

haven’t provided a lawful justification for their actions. Doc. 3, at 2. But

Thomas’s own evidence shows that’s not true. In an email to Thomas, the

District’s superintendent told her that her emails to staff members—who had

themselves filed a complaint against Thomas, see Doc.8-1, at 35–38—violated

the District’s “Communication Standards,’” see Doc. 8-1, at 4–6, and were

“received” by staff “as harassing, threatening and attempts to intimidate.” Doc.

3-8, at 2.

Further, although Defendant argued in opposition that Thomas could

not show that she suffered an adverse action as would be needed to sustain an

ADA retaliation claim, Doc. 8, at 17–18, Thomas merely restates the facts

without confronting whether the communication protocol amounts to an

adverse action, see Doc. 12, at 1–2. In other words, Thomas not only makes no

effort to show how she has met any of the prima facie elements of the ADA

retaliation claim asserted in Count III, but she ignores her own evidence which

belies the only basis that she asserts to support the claim. Consequently,

Thomas has not shown a likelihood of success on her ADA retaliation claim.

Insofar as Thomas’s Count III raises a First Amendment Retaliation

claim, she must establish:

(1) that the plaintiff was engaged in a

constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the

defendant’s adverse action caused the plaintiff to

suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of

ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that

activity; and (3) that the adverse action was

motivated at least in part as a response to the

exercise of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 2010). As with the ADA retaliation

claim raised in Count III, Thomas makes no argument in her motion for

preliminary injunction that she has pleaded a prima facie First Amendment

retaliation claim.

Thomas also cites no case in which a court has held that a

communication protocol similar the one at issue here violated a parent’s First

Amendment rights. To the contrary, courts that have confronted this

circumstance have rejected First Amendment claims. See L. F. v. Lake

Washington Sch. Dist. #414, 947 F.3d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 2020); Boone v. Lowell

Area Schs., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193862, *9 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2025); see

also Searle v. Red Creek Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 21-cv-6086, 2021 WL 5086405, at

*4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2021); cf. McElhaney v. Williams, 81 F.4th 550, 559 (6th

Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 696 (2024) (“a school may impose reasonable,

viewpoint neutral, time, place, and manner restrictions on parental

interactions with the school”).

In short, Thomas has not shown that her Count III claim is likely to

succeed on the merits.

As to Count IV, Thomas alleges that the Defendant violated her First

Amendment rights because: “The communication protocol unlawfully restricts

[her] right to petition and communicate with public officials about her child’s

education.” Doc. 1, at 3. Thomas makes no specific argument regarding the

likelihood of success on Ground IV in her motion for preliminary injunction.

See Doc. 3, at 2.

By contrast, and as noted above, courts have rejected similar First

Amendment claims. See Doc. 8, at 14–15 (citing Boone, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

193862, at *9–12); see also L. F., 947 F.3d at 626. And, as Defendant also

highlights, the Sixth Circuit holds that a school “may impose reasonable,

viewpoint neutral, time, place and manner restrictions on parental

interactions with the school.” See Doc. 8,at 15 (citing McElhaney, 81 F.4th at

559). Based on both the filings to date and the absence of any developed

argument from Thomas regarding the likely success on the merits, the

described communication protocol constitutes a permissible time, place, and

manner restrictions, rather than a content-based or retaliatory action in

violation of the First Amendment.

The first factor––likelihood of success on the merits––thus, does not

weigh in favor of granting Thomas’s requested preliminary injunction.

2. Irreparable harm

Next, the Court considers whether Thomas has shown that she will

suffer irreparable harm unless injunctive relief is granted. See Blackwell, 467

F.3d at 1009. While the Court weighs all four factors, the Sixth Circuit has

held that when evaluating a motion for preliminary injunction “the extent of

an injury may be balanced against other factors, the existence of an irreparable

injury is mandatory.” D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324, 327 (6th Cir.

2019) (explaining that the irreparable harm requirement “is indispensable: If

the plaintiff isn’t facing imminent and irreparable injury, there’s no need to

grant relief now as opposed to at the end of the lawsuit.”) (emphasis in

original). Notably, “[t]o merit a preliminary injunction, an injury ‘must be both

certain and immediate,’ not ‘speculative or theoretical.’” Id. (citing Mich. Coal.

Of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 154 (6th Cir.

1991)).

Here, Thomas makes two claims in an effort to demonstrate irreparable

harm. First, she claims “[e]ach school day lost without parental participation

causes irreversible educational regression for a non-verbal child.” Doc. 3, at 2.

Second, she asserts that “[l]oss of meaningful IDEA participation is, by law, an

irreparable injury.” Id. To support his second assertion, Thomas cites the

Supreme Court decision Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). See id.

As to her first argument, Thomas provides no support for her assertion

that the communication protocol employed by the Defendant deprives her of a

statutorily defined right to parental participation. In the body of her motion

Thomas cites the following statutory provisions in support of her position that

she was deprived meaningful parental participation:

• 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1), which provides that

the school district must establish a procedure

affording “[a]n opportunity for the parents of

a child with a disability to examine all records

relating to such child and to participate in

meetings with respect to the identification,

evaluation, and educational placement of the

child, and the provision of a free appropriate

public education to such child, and to obtain

an independent educational evaluation of the

child.”

• 29 U.S.C. § 794 and 42 U.S.C. § 12132, which

generally prohibit disability discrimination,

including by exclusion or denial of benefits,

against qualified individuals on the basis of a

disability by any federally funded program or

public agency.

See Doc. 3, at 2. Based on what the parties have presented, the communication

protocol employed by the Defendant does not affect Thomas’s ability to

examine records or participate in meetings relevant to C.A.’s FAPE. Instead,

the communication protocol establishes three points of contact for Thomas

about any questions she may have related to C.A.’s FAPE. And Thomas

provides no support for the assertion that the Defendant’s implementation of

the communication protocol amounted to disability discrimination.

Additionally, the exhibits attached to Thomas’s motion indicate that she

is relying on several regulatory provisions, which establish the right to

meaningful parental participation. See Doc. 3-7, at 1 (citing 34 C.F.R. §§

300.501, 300.503, 300.613). The sections Thomas cites do not provide the

support she appears to believe they do.

Section 300.501 establishes parental rights to inspect and review all

education records, participate in meetings, and be involved in placement

decisions. Thomas claims she has not been able to meaningfully participate

due to the communication protocol, Doc. 3, at 2, but that protocol only blocks

Thomas from directly communicating with certain teachers and support staff.

None of the provisions that Thomas cites entitle her to direct communication

with each teacher or staff member who interacts with her child. Nor does she

argue that those regulations impose such a requirement. And the record shows

that Thomas continues to communicate with, for instance, the Director of Pupil

Services regarding IEP meeting scheduling and that the only meeting that the

record shows that was missed appears to have been missed due to Thomas’s

refusal to participate. See Docs. 8-1, at 50–54; 13-1. So nothing in the

Complaint or the motion show that Thomas has been excluded meaningfully

participating in IEP meetings or placement decisions. See Docs. 1, 3.

As to Thomas’s right to inspect and review education records, see 34

C.F.R. § 300.501(a), nothing in the Complaint or motion show that Defendant

or its officers failed to comply with an inspection request within the required

timeframe. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.613(a) (providing 45 days for an educational

agency to respond to reasonable requests). Additionally, to the extent that

Thomas is arguing that she was not provided the prior written notice required

by Section 300.503, that notice is only required before C.A.’s school either

proposes or refuses “to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or

educational placement of [C.A.] or the provision of FAPE to [C.A].” 34 C.F.R §

300.503(a)(1)–(2). Neither in Thomas’s motion, nor in her Complaint, does she

argue that such proposal or refusal have occurred without her participation or

the requisite notice.

Moreover, Thomas has not provided any evidence that C.A. experienced

any regression as a result of the communication protocol. In her reply, Thomas

lists for the first time “documented regression” that C.A. has allegedly suffered.

Doc. 12, at 3. To this end, Thomas asserts that the Defendant has not rebutted

certain alleged regressions that C.A. has experienced. Id. But because these

alleged “educational injuries” were not provided in Thomas’s motion for

injunctive relief, it is unsurprising that the Defendant did not rebut those

allegations. Indeed, a reply is not an appropriate vehicle for presenting new

evidence. See Lewis v. Gotham Ins. Co., No. 09-cv-52, 2009 WL 3698028, at *1

(S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009) (“‘It is improper for a moving party to introduce new

facts ... in the reply brief than those presented in the moving papers’ when

those facts could have been presented in the opening brief.”) (citation omitted);

Springs Indus., Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 137 F.R.D. 238, 239–40 (N.D.

Tex. 1991); cf. Island Creek Coal Co. v. Wilkerson, 910 F.3d 254, 256 (6th Cir.

2018) (explaining that arguments not raised in an opening brief are forfeited).

And, as discussed earlier, Thomas’s apparent status as a non-attorney means

that she cannot represent C.A.’s interests. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2).

As to her second argument, the Supreme Court’s decision in Honig does

not support Thomas’s broad assertion that she experienced a “loss of

meaningful IDEA participation” simply by having her email communications

directed to school administrators rather than directly to teachers or staff. See

Doc. 3, at 2. Indeed, beyond generally explaining the importance of parental

participation, see 484 U.S. at 309, Honig is inapposite to Thomas’s case. The

dispute in Honig arose when two students in different school systems were

expelled based on behavior attributed to conditions accounted for in their IEPs

while administrative proceedings pertaining to those IEPs remained pending.

See 484 U.S. at 312–17. The Supreme Court held that the expulsion violated

the students’ and parents’ rights under the EHA’s “stay put” provision.4 484

U.S. at 309, 325. Specifically, the Court found that by expelling the students

4 The EHA’s stay-put provision cited in Honig is substantially the same

as the provision found in the now applicable IDEA, which provides in relevant

part:

[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted

pursuant to this section, unless the State or local

educational agency and the parents or guardian

otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-

current educational placement of the child, or, if

applying for initial admission to a public school,

shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in

the public school program until all such proceedings

have been completed.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).

while the administrative process was ongoing, the school violated the parents’

rights to meaningfully participate in the administrative process without

detriment to the students’ education. 484 U.S. at 328 (affirming an injunction

stopping the students’ indefinite suspension pending resolution of the required

statutory procedures). By contrast, Thomas doesn’t assert that C.A. was

expelled. See Doc. 1, at 3; Doc. 3, at 2. The Complaint is also devoid of any

allegation that Defendant impeded Thomas’s participation in any

administrative proceedings related to C.A.’s IEP or that Defendant made any

change to C.A’s IEP without Thomas’s involvement. See Doc. 1, at 3.

Based on the above, Thomas has not shown that she is likely to face

imminent and irreparable harm based on Defendant’s alleged conduct. So this

factor weighs against granting the requested injunctive relief.

3. Balance of Equities and Public Policy

Because the two most important factors discussed above weigh against

granting Thomas’s requested preliminary injunction, the final two factors are

only discussed briefly together.

As to the balance of equities, Thomas asserts that “[r]estoring

communication imposes no burden on the District; continued restrictions

severely harm the student a parent.” Doc. 3, at 2. This general assertion

provides nothing to substantiate Thomas’s assertion that the Defendant would

be unburdened if it is enjoined from implementing the communication protocol.

By contrast, the Defendant asserts that if the communication protocol is lifted

“District staff will be unnecessarily subjected to communications found to be

in violation of the District’s Communication Standards.” Doc. 8, at 25. And, as

discussed above, Thomas has not shown that the harms alleged are the sort

that require immediate injunctive relief or a likelihood of success on the merits

of her claims. So the balance of equities factor weighs against the requested

injunctive relief.

As to the public policy factor, Thomas asserts that “[e]nsuring

transparency and parental participation in special education furthers the

purposes of IDEA and protects constitutional rights.” Doc. 3, at 2. No one

disputes the importance of transparency and parental participation in special

education. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 325 (explaining the importance of

meaningful parental participation and how the stay-put provision protects the

interests of the student to allow for meaningful parental participation). As

discussed above, however, Thomas’s allegations and the arguments she raises

do not show that the Defendant’s alleged conduct—implementing a

communication protocol that requires that Thomas contact school officials

other than C.A.’s direct instructors interfered with this interest. So the public

policy factor does not support the requested injunctive relief.

Motion for evidentiary hearing

Separately, Thomas moves the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing

regarding the motion for preliminary injunction. See Doc. 10. This motion

asserts that “live evidence” is necessary to the resolution of her motion for

preliminary injunction because the motion “raises substantial and material

disputes of fact that cannot be resolved on the written record alone.” Doc. 10,

at 1. Thomas thus claims that a hearing is needed “to assess credibility,

evaluate omitted or distorted documents, examine the timeline of events, and

protect minor student C.A. from further irreparable harm.” Id.

Thomas presents nothing to show that the documents provided omitted

or distorted facts and, in any event, as discussed above, she has not shown that

she or C.A. have experienced irreparable harm. Indeed, for the reasons

explained above, it is apparent that she cannot represent C.A.’s interest. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2).

Thomas’s motion for an evidentiary hearing is thus DENIED.

Motion for leave to file instanter supplemental exhibit

The Defendant also filed a motion for leave to file instanter

supplemental authority in support of its opposition to Thomas’s motion for

preliminary injunction. See Doc. 13. This document is pertinent to the

Defendant’s opposition and Thomas has not opposed the inclusion of this

supplemental exhibit. Defendant’s motion is thus GRANTED.

Conclusion

For all the reasons stated, I recommend that the District Court deny

Thomas’s motion for preliminary injunction, Doc. 3. Additionally, Thomas’s

motion for evidentiary hearing, Doc. 10, is denied and Defendant’s motion, Doc.

13, is granted.

Dated: December 19, 2025

/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.

James E. Grimes Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

OBJECTIONS

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with

the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served

with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure

to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–531 (6th

Cir. 2019).