ROBINSON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ALVIN D. ROBINSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:23-cv-87

)

GUILFORD COUNTY SHERIFF’S )

OFFICE, and DANNY H. ROGERS, )

individually and in his )

capacity as Sheriff of Guilford )

County, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge

Before this court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (Doc.

16), treated as a motion summary judgment following the

Magistrate Judge’s order, (Doc. 21). Defendants have filed a

brief in support of their motion to dismiss, (Doc. 17), and a

supplemental brief responding to the order, (Doc. 25). Plaintiff

has responded to the motion and order, (Doc. 29), and Defendants

have replied, (Doc. 30). For the reasons stated herein,

Defendants’ motion will be granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are construed in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff and are uncontested unless otherwise

noted. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).

Pro se Plaintiff Alvin D. Robinson was employed by

Defendant Guilford County Sheriff’s Office (“GCSO”) as a part-

time Deputy Sheriff when GCSO announced a COVID-19 Testing

Disciplinary Policy and Procedure (“Testing Policy”), (Defs.’

Pol’y (Doc. 17-1)), effective October 28, 2021. (Compl. (Doc. 2)

at ¶¶ 4–5.) The Testing Policy stated that “the Sheriff’s Office

is not mandating vaccinations for its employees.” (Defs.’ Pol’y

(Doc. 17-1) at 4 (emphasis in original).) 1 Instead, it

established that “employees who choose not to be vaccinated,

however, are required to be tested for COVID-19 on a weekly

basis.” (Id. (emphasis in original).) The Testing Policy also

announced that “[r]eligious and medical exemptions are generally

not applicable to the mandatory testing requirement.” (Id.)

Plaintiff objected to the Testing Policy “based upon his

sincerely held religious beliefs” and informed GCSO that “[i]t

is a sin against my God-given conscience to allow unwanted

intrusions into, extractions from, and restrictions to my body

which is the temple of the Holy Spirit.” (Compl. (Doc. 2) ¶ 6.)

Corresponding with GCSO, Plaintiff stated “I am requesting that

the reasonable accommodations be that I be allowed to continue

1 All citations in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to

documents filed with this court refer to the page numbers

located at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they

appear on CM/ECF.

to report to work at Guilford County Sheriff’s Office . . .

without any disciplinary actions related to the Guilford County

COVID-19 testing policy.” (Pl.’s Correspondence Nov. 17, 2021

(Doc. 17-2).)2

Responding to Plaintiff’s request, GCSO Legal Advisor James

Secor informed Plaintiff that “[w]e do not accept your logic on

this issue. Hence, the masking requirement will stand.” (Defs.’

Correspondence Nov. 18, 2021 (Doc. 17-2).) Further, Secor stated

that “[y]our refusal to comply with the much less intrusive

requirements for weekly testing and mask wearing put other

employees, and the public we serve, at a greater health risk.

That increased risk is, without doubt, ‘an undue burden’.” (Id.)

Thus, Plaintiff was instructed to “comply with the Sheriff’s

requirements for weekly testing and masking.” (Id.)

On the same day, Plaintiff received a “Non-disciplinary

Letter of Performance Counseling” signed by GCSO Captain D. R.

Pruitt. (Defs.’ Letter Nov. 18, 2021 (Doc. 17-3).) This letter

2 In his complaint, Plaintiff similarly stated that he

“requested therein that defendant GCSO accommodate his religious

beliefs by allowing him to continue to work as he had been prior

to implementation of the Policy on grounds that allowing him to

do so would not pose an undue hardship to defendant.” (Compl.

(Doc. 2) ¶ 6). Therefore, while Plaintiff later stated that he

“included a list of reasonable accommodations for my exempt

status,” (Pl. Correspondence Nov. 30, 2021 (Doc. 17-4)), this

court finds that until November 30, 2021, Plaintiff had only

requested that he be permitted to work without being subject to

the testing requirement.

stated that Plaintiff had not been in compliance with the

Testing Policy and further noncompliance “will result in the

next step in the disciplinary process.” (Id.) Later that month,

Plaintiff met with Defendant GCSO Sheriff Danny Rogers. (Compl.

(Doc. 2) ¶ 9.) During this meeting, “Sheriff Rogers told

[P]laintiff that he did not want to have to let [P]laintiff go

because [P]laintiff was a good employee,” but “later that day”

Plaintiff was “suspended from duty without pay . . . for

violating the Policy.” (Id.)

Plaintiff then “attempted to appeal his suspension through

an email” to Secor. (Id. ¶ 10.) In this email, Plaintiff stated

that his previously correspondence had “included a list of

reasonable accommodations for my exempt status.” (Pl.’s

Correspondence Nov. 30, 2021 (Doc. 17-4) at 1.) After restating

his religious objections, Plaintiff then explained that “if I

were to exhibit COVID-19 symptoms, I am not opposed to getting

tested to confirm illness at that time.” (Id. at 3.) Moreover,

Plaintiff indicated that he was “not opposed to wearing a mask

when I am acting as a medical first responder in my law

enforcement capacity.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff maintained that

“mask wearing outside of the aforementioned emergency

circumstances and weekly COVID-19 testing is the government

imposing a different religious practice (daily and weekly

rituals) on me which goes against my sincerely held religious

beliefs.” (Id.)

On December 3, 2021, Secor responded to Plaintiff’s email

stating that “there is no legal or factual basis for reversing

[GCSO’s] position on the COVID-related testing and mask-wearing

mandates.” (Defs.’ Correspondence Dec. 3, 2021 (Doc. 17-5) at

1.) The letter agreed that religious beliefs must be interpreted

“broadly,” but also maintained that religious freedom objections

are not “limitless.” (Id.) The letter identified “evidence that

you, in the past, have behaved in manners inconsistent with your

stated belief.” (Id. at 2.) The letter also explained that “the

business necessity of the GCSO’s mandatory testing and mask

wearing requirement is manifest” because employees “engage in

close, personal contact with the public and other agency

employees.” (Id.) As such, Plaintiff “cannot perform those

specific duties remotely from a laptop at home nor can [he]

perform those duties safely if the GCSO capitulates to [his]

request to reject weekly COVID testing and daily mask wearing.”

(Id.) (emphasis in original).

After Plaintiff “continued to refuse to submit to weekly

testing,” (Compl. (Doc. 2) ¶ 12) GCSO First Lieutenant E.M. Cox

sent Plaintiff a “Statement of Charges and Recommended

Discipline” that recommended termination. (Id.) Plaintiff

appealed this recommendation and articulated “that the

scriptural authority upon which he relied was Romans 14:23b:

‘For whatever does not proceed from faith is sin.’” (Id. ¶ 13.)

Sheriff Rogers denied the appeal on December 13, 2021, and

“upheld the termination of [P]laintiff’s employment for failure

to abide by the mandatory testing requirement.” (Id. ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants GCSO and

Sheriff Danny H. Rogers in his individual capacity and official

capacity as Sheriff of Guilford County. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff

asserts Title VII claims for religious discrimination in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., (id. ¶¶ 25–33), and 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claims for violations of the Free Exercise Clause,

(id. ¶¶ 34–40).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on December 31, 2021.

(EEOC Charge (Doc. 2-1) at 1–4.) Plaintiff received his right to

sue letter on October 22, 2022. (EEOC Right to Sue (Doc. 2-1) at

6–9.) Plaintiff then filed his complaint on January 30, 2023.3

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Mot. to Dismiss (Doc.

16).) On January 11, 2024, Plaintiff had not responded to

Defendants’ motion, and the Magistrate Judge ordered Plaintiff

to file a Notice of Intent to Proceed. (Order (Doc. 21) at 1.)

The order also recognized that Defendants “attached various

documents, some of which may be outside the pleadings.” (Id.)

Therefore, the Magistrate Judge determined that under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), Defendants’ motion will be

treated as one for summary judgment. (Id. at 1–2.) Plaintiff

then timely informed this court of his intent to proceed. (Pl.’s

Notice of Intent to Proceed (Doc. 22).) Because the order

3 Plaintiff attached both his EEOC charge and right to sue

letter to his complaint. (See Doc. 2-1.) While it appears that

Plaintiff may have filed his complaint more than 90 days after

receiving the letter, see Davis v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 180

F.3d 626 (4th Cir. 1999), Plaintiff did not identify whether he

received his letter by mail or email and this court cannot

determine the form of Plaintiff’s correspondence. Using the

established Fourth Circuit presumption that Plaintiff received

the mailed notice within three days of the letter’s issuance,

see Crabill v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 423 F. App’x

314, 321 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished table decision), Plaintiff

has timely filed his complaint. Moreover, Defendants do not

challenge Plaintiff’s timeliness and agree that the complaint

was timely filed because the deadline to file was a Saturday,

thus permitting Plaintiff to file by January 30th. (Defs.’ Br.

in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 17) at 1 n.1.) Therefore, this

court determines that Plaintiff has timely filed his complaint.

treating the motion as one for summary judgment permitted the

parties to “present any additional material,” (Order (Doc. 21)

at 1–2), Defendants filed supplemental briefing to support the

motion, (Defs.’ Suppl. Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Compl.

and/or Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Suppl. Br.”) (Doc. 25)).

Plaintiff then responded to Defendants’ motion, (Pl.’s

Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Resp.”) (Doc. 29)). In

this response, Plaintiff addressed three statements from

Defendants. (See Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 29) at 1–6; Br. in Supp. of

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. (“Defs.’ Br.”) (Doc. 17).)

Plaintiff also stated that “pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” Plaintiff “moves for the

Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice of this action against all

defendants under the condition that the Court would grant me one

(1) year from the date of the entry of the Court’s order to

refile my action against all defendants.” (Pl’s Resp. (Doc. 29)

at 7. (emphasis in original).) Defendants replied to Plaintiff’s

response. (Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Compl.

(“Defs.’ Reply”) (Doc. 30).) Defendants “strenuously oppose[d]”

Plaintiff’s request, arguing that it was both procedurally

defective and lacking substantive basis to dismiss without

prejudice. (Id. at 6–7.)

Defendants’ motion is ripe and ready for ruling. A hearing

is not necessary to resolve the motion.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), courts

have discretion to convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for

summary judgment. Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v.

Norfolk S. Corp., 109 F.3d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1997). A motion to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is not converted into a motion

for summary judgment by the mere submission or service of

extraneous materials. Id. (considering issue in context of

voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(a)). However, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, if “matters outside

the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,

the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under

Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). If the court opts to convert

the motion, “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable

opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the

motion.” Id.; see Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985)

(holding that the non-moving party has the right to file counter

affidavits or pursue reasonable discovery). Generally, parties

are on notice of a potential Rule 12(d) conversion if they are

aware that materials outside the pleadings are before the court.

Gay, 761 F.2d at 177.

Here, all parties were notified of the potential

conversion. The Magistrate Judge’s order gave notice to all

parties of the intent to convert the motion and then provided

the opportunity to present additional information pertinent to

the motion. (Order (Doc. 21) at 2.) Both Plaintiff and

Defendants filed responsive pleadings after receiving this

order, (see Defs.’ Suppl. Br. (Doc. 25); Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 29);

Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 30)). Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants

objected to converting the motion. As a result, this court finds

that conversion is appropriate and that the issues before the

court may be decided based upon the pleadings and evidence

submitted. See Bullock v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 3d 517,

522–23 (M.D.N.C. 2016).

Summary judgment is appropriate where an examination of the

pleadings, affidavits, and other proper discovery materials

before the court demonstrates that no genuine issue of material

fact exists, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The moving party bears the burden

of initially demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

If the moving party has met that burden, then the nonmoving

party must persuade the court that a genuine issue remains for

trial. This requires “more than simply show[ing] that there is

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”; the

“nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986)

(citations omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). In

considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is not to

weigh the evidence, but rather must determine whether there is a

genuine dispute as to a material issue. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

Nonetheless, the court must ensure that the facts it

considers can be “presented in a form that would be admissible

in evidence” and that any affidavits or evidence used to support

or oppose a motion are “made on personal knowledge, set out

facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the

affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters

stated.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2), (4).

The court must view the facts in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, drawing inferences favorable to that

party if such inferences are reasonable. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255. However, there must be more than a factual dispute, the

fact in question must be material, and the dispute must be

genuine. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A

dispute is only “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

When a party is proceeding pro se, his filings are “to be

liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

However, the principles calling for “special judicial

solicitude” in viewing pro se filings “do[] not transform the

court into an advocate.” United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789,

797 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); see also Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274,

1278 (4th Cir. 1985). If the non-movant fails to meet his

burden, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322.

IV. ANALYSIS

In his complaint, Plaintiff names as defendants the

Guilford County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Rogers in both his

individual and official capacities. (Compl. (Doc. 2).) As an

initial matter, this court agrees with Defendants that GSCO

lacks the capacity to be sued as an entity. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc.

17) at 6–7.) As a governmental agency, state law determines a

sheriff’s office capacity to be sued. Efird v. Riley, 342 F.

Supp. 2d 413, 419–20 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (citing Avery v. Burke

Cnty., 660 F.2d 111, 113–14 (4th Cir. 1981)). The Fourth Circuit

has held that “[u]nder North Carolina law, police departments

cannot be sued as entities.” Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 256–

57 (4th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion as to

Plaintiff’s claims against GCSO as an entity will be granted,

and GCSO will be dismissed as a Defendant.

This court next addresses Sheriff Rogers as a Defendant in

his individual and official capacities. (Compl. (Doc. 2).)

Because Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, this court

liberally construes Plaintiff’s pleadings to assert the

following: (1) a Title VII claim against Sheriff Rogers, in his

official capacity as Plaintiff’s employer, for failing to grant

Plaintiff’s religious accommodation,4 (2) a § 1983 claim against

Sheriff Rogers in his individual capacity for violating

Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights established by the Free

Exercise Clause,5 and (3) a municipal liability claim against

4 Title VII does not permit suits against supervisors in

their individual capacities. See Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc.,

159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998). However, “in North Carolina,

each county’s sheriff is an ‘employer’ within the meaning of

Title VII and must be named as a defendant in a Title VII suit.”

Efird v. Riley, 342 F. Supp. 2d 413, 420 (M.D.N.C. 2004); see

also Parker v. Bladen Cnty., 583 F. Supp. 2d 736, 739 (E.D.N.C.

2008) (“[U]nder North Carolina law, a sheriff’s deputy ‘is an

employee of the sheriff, not the county.’” (quoting Clark v.

Burke Cnty., 117 N.C. App. 85, 89, 450 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1994))).

As Defendants identify, it is “well-established” that “a cause

of action may exist as to a local Sheriff in his official

capacity,” (Defs.’ Rep. (Doc. 30) at 1–2). This court agrees.

See, e.g., King v. McMillan, 594 F.3d 301, 308–09 (4th Cir.

2010) (“In sum, state law demarcations of particular offices

cannot be used to cut off the (federal) Title VII rights of

state and local employees.”). Because Plaintiff, proceeding pro

se, named Sheriff Rogers in his official capacity as a

Defendant, (Compl. (Doc. 2), this court finds that Plaintiff’s

Title VII claim may proceed against Sheriff Rogers in his

official capacity as Plaintiff’s employer.

5 Despite Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s “allegations

do not mention an individual capacity claim,” (Defs.’ Br. (Doc.

17) at 19) (citation omitted), this court finds that Plaintiff

stated his second cause of action when he contended that “the

actions of the defendants GCSO, by and through Sheriff Rogers

and its employees, were under color of law.” (Compl. (Doc. 2)

¶ 36.) Construed liberally, this court finds that Plaintiff has

stated a claim against Sheriff Rogers in his individual capacity

under § 1983 by arguing that Sheriff Rogers acted under color of

law. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (“On the

merits, to establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it

is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state

law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.” (emphasis in

original) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961))).

Sheriff Rogers in his official capacity for implementing and

executing the Testing Policy which violated Plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights.6 This court will grant Defendants’ motion

because Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law,

and it will deny Plaintiff’s request for voluntary dismissal

without prejudice.

A. Title VII

Under Title VII, an employer cannot “discharge any

individual, or otherwise . . . discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,

6 Where individual capacity suits consider an officer’s

deprivation of federal rights while acting under color of state

law, see Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, official capacity suits are

“treated as suits against the municipality.” Davison v. Randall,

912 F.3d 666, 688 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (Jan. 9, 2019)

(quoting Santos v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451,

469 (4th Cir. 2013)). Municipalities are liable “when its

‘policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

policy, inflicts the [plaintiff’s] injury.’” Santos, 725 F.3d at

470 (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978)).

Plaintiff contends that the Testing Policy “forced

[P]laintiff to choose between violating his sincerely held

religious beliefs or being fired.” (Compl. (Doc. 2) ¶ 39.)

Plaintiff cited Monell in his response and argued that “local

governments and individual local government officials indeed can

be sued for federal constitutional violations resulting from

their official policies.” (Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 29) at 2–3 (citing

Monell, 436 U.S. at 659).) Because Plaintiff has named Sheriff

Rogers in his official capacity as a Defendant, argued that the

Testing Policy caused his alleged injury, and cited to the

appropriate authority for municipal liability, this court

determines that Plaintiff has stated a claim for Monell

liability. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 692–94.

or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . .

religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII defines religion

as “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as

belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to

reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective

employee’s religious observance or practice without undue

hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Id.

§ 2000e(j).

Courts in the Fourth Circuit “employ a burden shifting

scheme” where a plaintiff must “first establish a prima facie

claim.” E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d

307, 312 (4th Cir. 2008). To establish a prima facie claim, a

plaintiff must show that “(1) he or she has a bona fide

religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement;

(2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; and (3) he

or she was disciplined for failure to comply with the

conflicting employment requirement.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). If established, the burden then shifts

to the employer, who must “demonstrate either (1) that it

provided the plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation for his

or her religious observances or (2) that such accommodation was

not provided because it would have caused an undue hardship.”7

Id. (emphasis in original). This court finds that Defendants

could not have accommodated Plaintiff without suffering an undue

7 Title VII has different legal standards for failure to

accommodate and disparate treatment claims. See Hall v. Sheppard

Pratt Health Sys., Inc., 155 F.4th 747, 751 (4th Cir. 2025)

(explaining that “[e]mployees may sue under Title VII using

either a ‘disparate treatment’ or ‘failure to accommodate’

theory”); see also Barnett v. Inova Health Care Servs., 125

F.4th 465, 471 (describing the disparate treatment standard).

Plaintiff alleges a “failure to provide religious

accommodation.” While Plaintiff does not allege a theory of

disparate treatment, (see Compl. (Doc. 2) at 9–11), his

response stated that “[t]here was another part-time deputy at

the time who, because he was not absolutely needed to work, was

advised to not work during that same time period.” (Pl.’s Resp.

(Doc. 29) at 5.) Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff alleges

disparate treatment through a comparator, this court finds that

Plaintiff failed to establish that the comparator was similarly

situated.

To state a claim for disparate treatment, Plaintiff must

“produce evidence of particular comparators who were similarly

situated,” which can include individuals who “dealt with the

same supervisor, were subject to the same standards and . . .

engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or

mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or

the employer’s treatment of them for it.” Hall v. Sheppard Pratt

Health Sys., Inc., 749 F. Supp. 3d 532, 549 (D. Md. 2024) aff’d,

155 F.4th 747 (4th Cir. 2025) (alteration omitted) (quoting

Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223–24 (4th

Cir. 2019)). Plaintiff does not identify any similarities in job

duties, tenure, responsibilities, or qualifications. Plaintiff

does not state this deputy’s religion or explain why “he was not

absolutely needed to work.” (See Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 29) at 5.)

Plaintiff also does not articulate Defendants’ stated reason for

advising this individual not to work. (See id.) Therefore, to

the extent Plaintiff intended to state a disparate treatment

claim, this court finds that summary judgment is appropriate.

hardship and will therefore grant summary judgment to Defendants

on Plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

i. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Claim

When evaluating the “bona fide religious belief” element of

a prima facie claim, courts must consider whether the “belief is

(1) sincerely held and (2) religious in nature.” Barnett v.

Inova Health Care Servs., 125 F.4th 465, 470 (4th Cir. 2025)

(citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)). The

“first prong” of sincerity evaluates “an adherent’s good faith

in the expression of [his] religious belief.” Id. (quoting

Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984)). This

good-faith inquiry examines whether beliefs “are held as a

matter of conscience” or “are animated by motives of deception

and fraud.” Id. (quoting Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157). The “second

prong” of religious in nature “limits” a court’s inquiry to

whether “the beliefs professed are, in the claimant’s own scheme

of things, religious.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Patrick, 745

F.2d at 157–58). It is not an employer’s duty, “nor ours as a

court, to questions the correctness or even the plausibility of

[a plaintiff’s] religious understandings.” E.E.O.C. v. Consol

Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 131, 142 (4th Cir. 2017). Courts cannot

evaluate whether a plaintiff, “in seeking to protect his

religious conscience, has drawn the line in the right place.”

Id.

This court finds that genuine disputes of material fact

preclude summary judgment on the first prong of sincerity. As

recognized by the Fourth Circuit, “the inquiry into sincerity is

‘almost exclusively a credibility assessment’ and ‘can rarely be

determined on summary judgment.’” Barnett, 125 F.4th at 470

(quoting Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007)).

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged his sincere belief in the

Christian faith. As “an ordained, Christian minister,” who

worked with both GCSO and the Greensboro Fire Department,

(Compl. (Doc. 2) ¶ 4), Plaintiff asserted “that the Holy Spirit

convicted him to refuse to comply with the Policy,” (id. ¶ 13).

Plaintiff also provided “the scriptural authority upon which he

relied” to voice his objections. (Id.) At this stage, Plaintiff

has provided “sufficient evidence” to support that his “beliefs

are sincerely held” and in good faith. Consol Energy, 860 F.3d

at 142.

Beyond credibility, this court also finds that material

facts remain in dispute. Specifically, this court finds material

whether Plaintiff’s requested accommodation on November 30,

2021, differed from Plaintiff’s request on November 17, 2021,

and whether either request deviated from pre-Testing Policy

practices. Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s opposition to the

testing/mask-wearing mandates is not religious but rather

personal, secular, and based on his own perceived opinion of the

weight of the medical evidence supporting those protective

practices.” (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 17) at 10.) Additionally, the

difference between the two requests “substantially undermines

the sincerity of his religious opposition to the testing/masking

requirements. Why? Because if he believed these measures were so

wholly offensive to his beliefs, he would not have offered this

concession.” (Id. at 15–16.)

Defendants’ objections implicate the consistency of

Plaintiff’s requests. Courts have previously maintained that

certain inconsistent statements or actions “dilute” the

sincerity of one’s religious-based objections. See Schmidt v.

Tchrs. Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am., No. 3:23-CV-00881-FDW-DCK,

2024 WL 3380152, at *3 (W.D.N.C. July 11, 2024) (determining

that a plaintiff failed to “plausibly allege any evidence of

adherence to a religious tenant” after the evidence revealed

“that he was able to receive a vaccine for the flu a mere

fourteen months prior to his objection to a vaccine for Covid-

19”); see also DeVore v. Univ. of Kentucky Bd. of Trs., 118

F.4th 839, 846–47 (6th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1903

(2025) (explaining that a plaintiff failed to establish a

“conflict between the Policy and any religious objections” after

first stating that “repeated testing can damage the first line

of defense God created,” then stating there “was no invasiveness

regarding the saliva test”).

While Plaintiff first objected to the Testing Policy by

requesting to “be allowed to continue to report to work . . . as

I have since December 2013 without any disciplinary actions,”

(Pl.’s Correspondence Nov. 17, 2021 (Doc. 17-2) at 2), and then

later stated that “I am not opposed to wearing a mask when I am

acting as a medical first responder in my law enforcement

capacity,” (Pl.’s Correspondence Nov. 30, 2021 (Doc. 17-3) at

3), such statements are not inherently contradictory. Plaintiff

explained on November 30, 2021, that he believed wearing a mask

“outside of the aforementioned emergency circumstances” amounted

to “daily and weekly rituals” that he viewed as a “different

religious practice” imposed by GCSO. (Id.) According to his

complaint, Plaintiff sought permission on November 30, 2021, “to

continue to work as he had prior to the Policy, self-monitoring

for symptoms.” (Compl. (Doc. 2) ¶ 10). Plaintiff also argues

that he made a similar request on November 17, 2021, when he

asked “to continue to work as he had been prior to the

implementation of the Policy.” (Id.) Moreover, Defendants

responded to Plaintiff’s November 30, 2021, request by stating

that Plaintiff previously “willingly and regularly abided by

certain grooming standards and requirements to wear protective

equipment” including “protective breathing apparatus.” (Defs.’

Correspondence Dec. 3, 2021 (Doc. 17-5) at 2.)

Therefore, this court is unable to determine whether

Plaintiff’s request to only wear a mask in emergency

circumstances and only test when he became symptomatic deviated

from the pre-COVID requirements of GCSO policy. Without a clear

baseline for practices prior to the Testing Policy, this court

cannot evaluate the consistency of Plaintiff’s requests. As

such, this court cannot grant summary judgment on the first

prong of sincerity.

Defendants also challenge the sincerity of Plaintiff’s

beliefs by contending that “Plaintiff fails to explain how

testing or masking violate those Biblical references” that form

Plaintiff’s objections. (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 17) at 10). As a

matter of religious conviction, this court cannot analyze

whether Plaintiff’s stated beliefs justify his objections. As

the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he validity of what [a

plaintiff] believes cannot be questioned. Some theologians, and

indeed some examiners, might be tempted to question . . . the

truth of [a plaintiff’s] concepts. But these are inquiries

foreclosed to Government.” Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184.

Notwithstanding that beliefs may change, certain “convictions

which some might find ‘incomprehensible’ or ‘incorrect’ come

within the meaning of ‘religious belief.’” Welsh v. United

States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970) (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at

184–85).

This court is limited to evaluating whether Plaintiff has

articulated a religious belief or secular preference. See

Dachman v. Shalala, 9 F. App’x 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2001). To do

so, this court can consider whether Plaintiff’s objections

changed over time. While the parties do not dispute that

Plaintiff consistently objected to wearing a mask “on a routine

basis,” (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 17) at 10; Pl.’s Correspondence Nov.

30, 2021 (Doc. 17-3) at 3), the parties dispute whether

Plaintiff’s second request amounted to a “concession,” (Defs.’

Br. (Doc. 17) at 16), and whether either the first or second

request deviated from pre-Policy practices. This court is

therefore precluded from granting summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s prima facie claim.

ii. Defendants’ Undue Hardship

Even accepting that Plaintiff stated his prima facie claim,

this court will grant summary judgment to Defendants because

Defendants could not have accommodated Plaintiff without

suffering undue hardship. In Groff v. DeJoy, the Supreme Court

determined that undue hardship “is shown when a burden is

substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business.”

600 U.S. 447, 468 (2023). Rejecting the notion that undue

hardship means “more than a de minimis cost,” the Supreme Court

explained that “an employer must show that that the burden of

granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased

costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business.”

Id. at 470 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432

U.S. 63, 83 n.14 (1977)). Further, “courts must apply the test

in a manner that takes into account all relevant factors in the

case at hand, including the particular accommodations at issue

and their practical impact in light of the nature, size and

operating cost of an employer.” Id. at 470–71 (internal

quotations and alterations omitted). An employer’s burden is not

limited to economic factors, see Hall v. Sheppard Pratt Health

Sys., Inc., 155 F.4th 747, 752–53 (4th Cir. 2025), and courts

can consider the impact on coworkers so long as the asserted

hardship is not “attributable to employee animosity to a

particular religion, to religion in general, or to the very

notion of accommodating religious practice.” Groff, 600 U.S. at

472.

Defendants have shown that Plaintiff’s requests would have

imposed undue hardship. Corresponding with Plaintiff on December

3, 2021, GCSO Legal Advisor Secor explained that Plaintiff’s

“duties as Deputy Sheriff require close, personal contact with

the public and other agency employees.” (Defs.’ Correspondence

Dec. 3, 2021 (Doc. 17–5) at 2.) Further, Secor stated that

Plaintiff “cannot perform those specific duties remotely from a

laptop at home” and that “the negative impact of accommodating

[Plaintiff’s] request would be substantial — i.e., unnecessarily

exposing our customers and your fellow GCSO employees to the

risk of COVID infection.” (Id.)

Recently, the Fourth Circuit determined that a medical

employer articulated undue hardship in the vaccination context

after denying a request to mask and test weekly when it

presented evidence of detriment to patients, increased risk to

coworkers, and an inability to perform job duties remotely. See

Hall, 155 F.4th at 753–55. Other courts have consistently found

that “the possibility of an unvaccinated individual getting

others sick [is] a non-speculative risk that a court may

consider when performing an undue hardship analysis.” Dodson v.

Lutheran Vill. at Millers Grant, Inc., No. CV EA-23-169, 2025 WL

1474319, at *7 (D. Md. May 22, 2025) (collecting cases). Such

cases “are indeed legion” with respect to organizations that

provide medical or first response services. Lumley v. Town of

Knightdale, No. 5:23-CV-663-FL, 2024 WL 3678348, at *5 (E.D.N.C.

Aug. 6, 2024). The “through-line” in each case is that the

“increased risks of getting others sick, even vaccinated

individuals, can be considered in deciding an undue hardship

under Title VII.” Bordeaux v. Lions Gate Ent., Inc., 703 F.

Supp. 3d 1117, 1136 (C.D. Cal. 2023), aff’d, No. 23-4340, 2025

WL 655065 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2025). Courts adopt this through-

line because public entities cannot function safely without

adequate staffing, see Gantt v. City of N. Charleston, No. 2:22-

CV-04224-DCN-MHC, 2024 WL 4486184, at *11 (D.S.C. July 25,

2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-CV-04224-DCN,

2024 WL 4343708 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2024), first responders

interact closely with coworkers and the public, see Marucci v.

Greater Baltimore Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 23-CV-0510-ABA, 2025 WL

860137, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 18, 2025), and the appearance of not

prioritizing safety could cause reputational harm and “erode[]

public trust.” Hall v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc., 749 F.

Supp. 3d 532, 546 (D. Md. 2024), aff’d, 155 F.4th 747 (4th Cir.

2025).

The distinct facts of this case reinforce the legal

principles discussed above and demonstrate Defendants’ undue

hardship. Critically, the Testing Policy did not mandate COVID

vaccination. (Defs.’ Pol’y (Doc. 17-1) at 4.) Rather, GCSO

permitted employees to refuse vaccination and instead test

weekly and wear a mask. (Id.) These practices often are the

accommodation requests rejected by other employers. See Hall,

155 F.4th at 754; Gantt, 2024 WL 4486184, at *11–12; Marucci,

2025 WL 860137, at *5–7; Antredu v. Mass. Dep’t of Youth Servs.,

729 F. Supp. 3d 76, 81 (D. Mass. 2024). By permitting testing

and masking in lieu of vaccination, Defendants did not promote a

“vaccination culture,” see Caudill v. N. Carolina Symphony

Soc'y, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 3d 531, 561 (E.D.N.C. 2024), nor did

they “rely upon the services of first responders from

neighboring local government units, including of individuals who

were in fact unvaccinated,” while simultaneously requiring its

own employees to vaccinate. Lumley, 2024 WL 3678348, at *5.

Instead, Defendants gave its employees the choice to either

vaccinate or test weekly and wear a mask, and this universal

policy provided “no alternative employment option inside the

GCSO to offer Plaintiff as an accommodation.” (Defs.’ Suppl. Br.

(Doc. 25) at 14).

In light of the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Hall,

this court finds that the “specific circumstances” of

Plaintiff’s job prohibited remote work, (Defs.’ Correspondence

Dec. 3, 2021 (Doc. 17-5) at 2), and an exemption from testing

would have placed both the workplace and the public at risk. “It

is beyond cavil” that the health and safety of a workplace “is

of absolute importance.” Beickert v. New York City Dep’t of

Educ., No. 22-CV-5265(DLI)(VMS), 2023 WL 6214236, at *5

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2023). This concern is elevated in a setting

where the job duties include “close personal (and sometimes

physical) interaction with members of the public, detainees, and

arrestees.” (Defs.’ Suppl. Br. (Doc. 25) at 14). This concern

reaches its apex when the public trust is shaped by safe

interactions. Because Defendants’ undue hardship implicates “the

potential loss of human life,” (id.), this court will grant

summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s Title VII claim.8

B. Section 1983

This court also finds that Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s Free Exercise claims.

8 Plaintiff states in his response that Defendants “never

held the required interactive process to gain further

information of how they could accommodate my religious

exemption.” (Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 29) at 5.) Plaintiff does not

cite any authority which states that Defendants are “required”

to engage in an interactive process. While required in other

accommodation contexts, an interactive process is not mandatory

in the context of religious discrimination. See Marucci, 2025 WL

860137, at *6 n.9. To the extent that “bilateral cooperation” is

required, see Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69

(1986), this requirement only exists “in defining the employer’s

accommodation obligation.” Id. This “obligation” is met when an

employer “demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable

accommodation to the employee.” Id. However, an employer is not

required to offer a reasonable accommodation, so long as it

demonstrates that it would suffer an undue hardship. Groff, 600

U.S. at 457. Here, because Defendants would have suffered an

undue hardship, this court finds that Defendants were not

required to have engaged in an interactive process.

Plaintiff asserts a claim against Defendants pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, and qualified immunity shields government

officials “unless the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of

the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664

(2012). This immunity provides officials with “breathing room to

make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”

Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013). Courts analyze qualified

immunity through a two-step process. Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100

F.4th 498, 504 (4th Cir. 2024). First, a plaintiff must prove

that a constitutional violation occurred. See id. Second, a

defendant must articulate whether the asserted constitutional

right was clearly established at time of the asserted violation.

See id. Either of the two prongs may be addressed first “in

light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

This court finds that Defendants did not violate a clearly

established right. “A clearly established right is one that is

‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have

understood that what he [or she] is doing violates that right.’”

Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). This right cannot be

defined “at a high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). The right instead must be “infringed

at a ‘high level of particularity,’” Atkinson, 100 F.4th at 505

(quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250–51 (4th

Cir. 1999)), considering “the specific context of the case, not

as a broad general proposition,” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12

(quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)).

Read in the specific context of this case, Plaintiff

asserts that Defendants violated his right to work in a law

enforcement capacity exempt from a weekly testing and mask

wearing policy because of his religious beliefs. (See Compl.

(Doc. 2) at 1.) To determine whether the law clearly established

that Defendants’ conduct was unconstitutional, this court must

consider decisions from the United States Supreme Court, the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the North Carolina Supreme

Court. Atkinson, 100 F.4th at 506 (citing Edwards, 178 F.3d at

251)). Absent such authority, this court may also consider “a

consensus of cases” from other jurisdictions. Id. (quoting Owens

ex rel. Owens v. Lott, 372 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2004)). This

court finds that Plaintiff’s asserted right was not clearly

established at the time Defendants terminated Plaintiff.

The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he right to

practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the

community . . . to communicable disease or . . . to ill health

or death.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944).

Applying Prince, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a state

statute “requiring vaccinations as a condition of admission to

school does not unconstitutionally infringe [plaintiff’s] right

to free exercise.” Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F.

App’x 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2011). More recently, in the context of

COVID-19, the Supreme Court identified that “[s]temming the

spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a compelling interest.”

Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 18

(2020). The North Carolina Supreme Court, citing earlier

decisions from “the start of the twentieth century,” noted that

“public welfare may sometimes justify vaccination mandates”

while “purely individualized medical decisions, on the other

hand, do not implicate such concerns.” Happel v. Guilford Cnty.

Bd. of Educ., 387 N.C. 186, 198, 913 S.E.2d 174, 187 (2025)

(citing State v. Hay, 126 N.C. 999, 1001, 35 S.E. 459, 460

(1900); Hutchins v. School Committee, 137 N.C. 68, 71, 49 S.E.

46, 47 (1904)). While each case presents unique facts and

variations on the legal issues between religion and vaccines,

none of the decisions from the Supreme Court, the Fourth

Circuit, or the North Carolina Supreme Court provide “fair

warning,” see Atkinson, 100 F.4th at 508, that a governmental

entity’s vaccination requirement, much less a testing and

masking requirement, violates the Free Exercise Clause.

Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

C. Municipal Liability

This court will also grant summary judgment to Defendants

for Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Sheriff Rogers in his

official capacity. Under Monell v. Department of Social

Services, a municipality “can be sued directly under § 1983 for

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the

action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or

executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”9 436

U.S. 658, 690 (1978). The Fourth Circuit has explained that, to

state a claim for Monell liability, a plaintiff “must show both

that he has suffered a constitutional harm and that the harm was

the result of the Department’s unconstitutional policy or

9 While “it may be less likely that a municipality may be

found liable when the constitutional terrain was as murky” in

the context of qualified immunity, Atkinson, 100 F.4th at 509,

this court finds it necessary to analyze Plaintiff’s official

capacity claim. Construed liberally, Plaintiff has alleged that

Sheriff Rogers acted under color of law, (see Compl. (Doc. 2) ¶

36), and has cited to Monell in support of his claims, (see

Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 29) at 1–3). Mindful that “it is not

immediately apparent why the municipal fisc should be burdened

in the absence of any ascertainable federal standards by which

municipal policies can be gauged,” Atkinson, 100 F.4th at 510

(Wilkson, J., concurring), this court finds it necessary to

analyze the merits of Plaintiff’s claim. See id. at 509 n.8.

custom.” English v. Clarke, 90 F.4th 636, 649 (4th Cir. 2024);

see also Johnson v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 500 F. Supp. 3d 454,

459 (D. Md. 2020) (“It is axiomatic that a Monell claim cannot

lie ‘where there is no underlying constitutional violation by

the employee.’” (quoting Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d

567, 579 (4th Cir. 2001))). While Plaintiff has identified an

official policy, see Howard v. City of Durham, 68 F.4th 934, 952

(4th Cir. 2023), Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that this

policy caused a constitutional harm. Therefore, this court will

grant summary judgment to Defendants.

Plaintiff contends that the Testing Policy “forced [him] to

choose between violating his sincerely held religious beliefs or

being fired, imposing a substantial burden on [him] as well as

interfering with, and depriving him of, the enjoyment of the

religious liberties guaranteed him by the First Amendment of the

U.S. Constitution.” (Compl. (Doc. 2) at 12–13.) Defendants argue

that Plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim “fail[s] under both

rational basis review and strict scrutiny.” (Defs.’ Br. (Doc.

17) at 21.) Defendants assert that “the rational basis test

applies” because the Testing Policy “was completely content

neutral and applied to all full and part-time employees.” (Id.

at 21–22.) Additionally, “even if the more rigorous strict

scrutiny test applie[s],” Defendants argue that preventing

COVID-19 “exposure was an abundantly compelling justification”

and the decision to permit “simple testing and masking versus

mandatory vaccination demonstrates the narrowly-tailored nature”

of the Testing Policy. (Id. at 22–23.)

This court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim. “To implicate the

Free Exercise Clause, state action must burden religious

exercise.” Kim v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard Cnty., 93 F.4th 733,

747 (4th Cir. 2024). State action can burden religion “in

various ways, including by showing that a government entity has

burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy

that is not ‘neutral’ or ‘generally applicable.’” Kennedy v.

Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 525 (2022) (quoting Emp.

Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–

81 (1990)). Conversely, actions that incidentally burden

religion “are ordinarily not subject to strict scrutiny under

the Free Exercise Clause so long as they are neutral and

generally applicable.” Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S.

522, 533 (2021).

This court preliminarily finds that Plaintiff has suffered

a burden on his religious exercise. After objecting to the

Testing Policy and refusing to test weekly and wear a mask,

Plaintiff was terminated from his position at GCSO. Plaintiff

believes that the “Holy Spirit convicted him to refuse to comply

with the Policy,” (Compl. (Doc. 2) ¶ 13), and Defendants

maintain that that “there was no alternative employment option”

left to offer Plaintiff, (Defs.’ Suppl. Br. (Doc. 25) at 14). As

a result, the “employment relationship remains severed.” Polk v.

Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., No. CV DLB-24-1487, 2025 WL 240996,

at *6 (D. Md. Jan. 17, 2025). This separation is sufficient to

demonstrate a burden on religious exercise.

However, Defendants have demonstrated that the Testing

Policy is both neutral and generally applicable. Government

action is not neutral “when it proceeds in a manner intolerant

of religious beliefs or restricts practices because of their

religious nature.” Fulton, 593 U.S. at 533 (citing Masterpiece

Cakeshop v. Colorado C.R. Comm’n, 584 U.S. 617, 636–40 (2018);

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533

(1993)). Alternatively, government action is neutral “if it ‘has

no object that infringes upon or restricts practices because of

their religious motivation.’” Kim, 93 F.4th at 748 (cleaned up

in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Alive Church of the

Nazarene, Inc. v. Prince William County, 59 F.4th 92, 108 (4th

Cir. 2023)) (citing Hines v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 148 F.3d 353,

357 (4th Cir. 1998) (“A law is considered neutral if it

proscribes conduct without regard to whether that conduct is

religiously motivated or not.”)).

This court finds that Defendants have not “transgressed

this neutrality standard.” Fulton, 593 U.S. at 533. From the

text of the Testing Policy, the “object” was not to “infringe

upon or restrict practices.” Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.

Indeed, the Testing Policy clarified that both medical and

religious exemptions were not applicable to the testing

requirement, (see Defs.’ Pol’y (Doc. 17-1) at 4), and therefore

“did not single out religion alone.” Does 1-6 v. Mills, 16 F.4th

20, 30 (1st Cir. 2021). While Defendants may have been able to

“deny a religious accommodation request even if the employer

ha[d] a history of granting that same request as a medical

accommodation,” see Hall, 155 F.4th at 754 (comparing Title VII

to the ADA), the Testing Policy made both religious and secular

exemptions “generally not applicable,” (Defs.’ Pol’y (Doc. 17-1)

at 4). Therefore, this court finds that Defendants did not treat

a “comparable secular activity more favorably than religious

exercise,” Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61, 62 (2021), and the

text of the policy is facially neutral.

Facial neutrality, however, is not determinative. See

Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534. If government action “affects

religious practice, even if indirectly, a court must look behind

the law’s text to determine if it was enacted ‘because of’ and

not ‘in spite of’ its effect on religion.” Alive Church of the

Nazarene, 59 F.4th at 108 (quoting Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at

540). Courts may consider contextual statements “surrounding the

law’s passage, and any deviations from standard decisionmaking

procedures.” Id. (citing Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. 541–42).

Here, Defendants state that that the Testing Policy “applied

equally to all full and part-time employees.” (Defs.’ Suppl. Br.

(Doc. 25) at 21). Defendants explain that Testing Policy was

universal because “GCSO depends on a stable and dependable work

force, and it is unreasonable . . . [to] hand out temporary

furloughs to every employee with a gripe about COVID

preventative measures.” (Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 30) at 5). Thus, the

Testing Policy was not motivated by religious animus because

“[a]nyone who disagrees with them — for religious, secular, or

other reasons — must nevertheless abide by them.” Polk, 2025 WL

240996, at *8. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to provide any

contemporaneous statements or actions by Defendants indicating

that Defendants targeted religion when creating the Testing

Policy. Therefore, this court finds that the Testing Policy is

neutral.

The Testing Policy is also generally applicable. Government

action is not generally applicable when it “prohibits religious

conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the

government’s asserted interests in a similar way” or by creating

a “mechanism for individualized exemptions,” Fulton, 593 U.S. at

533–34 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884). To the extent Plaintiff

attempts to prove that the Testing Policy was not generally

applicable through evidence of “another part-time deputy,”

(Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 29) at 5), this court finds that comparison

insufficient. Plaintiff failed to articulate whether this deputy

was “advised to not work” for religious, medical, or other

reasons. (Id.) Plaintiff did not establish whether this deputy

sought an exemption, or whether he was “away from work” because

he was placed on leave, resigned, or was terminated from

employment. (Id.) Plaintiff additionally does not state

Defendants’ reason for advising the deputy not to work, and

whether the deputy being “not absolutely needed to work” was due

to staffing, medical, or other reasons. (Id.)

Therefore, this court determines that by prohibiting

exemptions to the Testing Policy, Defendants “ma[de] no

distinction between religious and secular.” Kim, 93 F.4th at

748. The Testing Policy neither vested, see id., nor invited,

see Fulton, 593 U.S. at 533, Defendants to exempt certain

conduct. Without practices to the contrary, this court finds

that the Testing Policy was generally applicable.10

When government action is neutral and generally applicable,

courts subject the action to rational basis review. See Jesus

Christ is the Answer Ministries, Inc. v. Baltimore City, 915

F.3d 256, 265 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (Feb. 25, 2019). This

standard of review “is quite differential” and “simply requires

courts to determine whether the classification in question is,

at a minimum, rationally related to legitimate governmental

goals.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 734 F.3d 344, 347–48 (4th Cir. 2013).

10 Even if Plaintiff had established that strict scrutiny

applies, Defendants have demonstrated that the Testing Policy

was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.

Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546. The Supreme Court has stated

that “[s]temming the spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a

compelling interest.” Diocese of Brooklyn, 592 U.S. at 18.

Moreover, in the context of vaccination policies for

governmental entities, “narrow tailoring requires the town to

show that measures less restrictive of religion could not

address its interest in reducing the spread of COVID.” Lumley,

2024 WL 3678348, at *8. The Testing Policy permitted employees

to refuse vaccination. Those who refused vaccination were

required to wear a mask and test weekly. Unlike cases where

governmental entities defended a vaccination requirement by

“citing various cases holding that testing, PPE, and other

precautions did not adequately serve a government actor’s

interest in preserving public health against COVID,” see id.

(collecting cases), Defendants have already incorporated an

accommodation into the policy itself. Therefore, the Testing

Policy both served a compelling interest and was narrowly

tailored.

This court finds that the Testing Policy is rationally

related to the legitimate government interest of preventing the

transmission of COVID-19 to both the workplace and the public.

Defendants identified this purpose in its Testing Policy,

stating that GCSO is “committed to promoting and providing a

safe workplace to all employees.” (Defs.’ Pol’y (Doc. 17-1) at

1.) Additionally, the Testing Policy “largely adopt[s] the

guidelines previously promulgated by Guilford County Human

Resources” and “shall apply to all full and part-time

employees.” (Id.) Courts considering employer vaccination

requirements have “easily conclude[d] that such a rational

relationship exists” because “vaccines are a safe and effective

way to prevent the spread of COVID-19.” Smith v. Biden, No.

1:21-CV-19457, 2021 WL 5195688, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2021),

appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. President United

States, No. 21-3091, 2023 WL 5120321 (3d Cir. Aug. 10, 2023).

This court agrees that “preventing the spread of COVID-19 is a

legitimate government interest,” Menk v. MITRE Corp., 713 F.

Supp. 3d 113, 176 (D. Md. 2024), and requiring either

vaccinations or weekly testing and masking in lieu of

vaccination is rationally related to such interest. Therefore,

this court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s claim against Sheriff Rogers in his

official capacity because Plaintiff has failed to show that he

has suffered a constitutional harm. English, 90 F.4th at 649.

D. Voluntary Withdrawal

This court will consider and ultimately deny Plaintiff’s

request for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, (see Pl.’s

Resp. (Doc. 29) at 7). Responding to Defendants’ motion,

Plaintiff concluded by stating that he “moves for Voluntary

Dismissal without Prejudice of this action against all

defendants under the condition that the Court would grant me one

(1) year from the date of the entry of the Court’s order to

refile my action against all defendants.” (Id. (emphasis in

original).) Plaintiff “assert[s] that the time and circumstances

for proceeding with my action may not be entirely ripe,”

contending that “the availability of greater information as well

as the clarity provided by rulings in existing cases over the

coming year may make it efficacious for me to pursue this action

at a later date.” (Id.)

Defendants “strenuously oppose” Plaintiff’s motion on

procedural and substantive grounds. (Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 30) at

6.) Procedurally, Defendants argue that the motion is “wholly

defective as it violates Local Rule 7.3” because the motion was

not filed as a separate document and instead was “tucked, almost

as an afterthought, into this Response.” (Id.) Substantively,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to articulate a

legitimate basis for leave and dismissal without prejudice

“would prejudice Defendants who have invested significant time

in briefing this matter.” (Id. at 6–7.)

This court agrees with Defendants as a matter of procedure

that Plaintiff failed to follow the requirements of Local Rule

7.3. This rule requires that “[a]ll motions . . . shall be in

writing and shall be accompanied by a brief . . . . Each motion

shall be set out in a separate document.” LR 7.3(a). Plaintiff

did not include a separate motion with his response. While

Plaintiff’s failure to follow the rules is apparent, this court

will consider Plaintiff’s request given that he is proceeding

without counsel and is not held to the same standards as an

attorney. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 n.7 (1980).

Considering the merits, this court will deny Plaintiff’s

motion and grant summary judgment to Defendants. Pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), “an action may be

dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on

terms that the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

41(a)(2). Motions to dismiss under Rule 41(a) are “a matter for

the discretion of the district court.” Davis v. USX Corp., 819

F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1987). Such motions “should not be

denied absent plain legal prejudice to the defendant.” Gross v.

Spies, 133 F.3d 914 (4th Cir. 1998). When applying this plain

legal prejudice standard, courts must consider:

(1) the opposing party’s effort and expense in preparing

for trial; (2) excessive delay or lack of diligence on

the part of the movant; (3) insufficient explanation of

the need for a dismissal; and (4) the present stage of

the litigation, i.e., whether a motion for summary

judgment is pending.

Id. This court will deny Plaintiff’s motion because all four

factors support plain legal prejudice.

First, this court agrees that Defendants “have invested

significant time in briefing this matter for dismissal under

both Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.” (Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 30) at 7.) Defendants have filed

an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint, (see Defs.’ Answer (Doc.

19)), a motion to dismiss and brief in support, (see Defs.’ Mot.

to Dismiss (Doc. 16); Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 17)), and an objection to

Plaintiff’s Notice of Intent to Proceed, (Pl.’s Notice of Intent

to Proceed (Doc. 22); Defs.’ Obj. to Pl’s Req. for an Extension

of Time (“Defs.’ Obj.”) (Doc. 23)). Defendants cite Local Rule

7.3 as a basis for the objection, (Defs.’ Obj. (Doc. 23) at 3),

thus informing Plaintiff of the requirements for filing with

this court. Following the Magistrate Judge’s order stating the

intent to treat the motion to dismiss as one for summary

judgment, (Order (Doc. 24)), Defendants filed supplemental

briefing supporting summary judgment and provided affidavits

from Sheriff Rogers, Captain Pruitt, and Legal Advisor Secor,

(see Doc. 26; 27; 28). Following Plaintiff’s response, (Pl.’s

Resp. (Doc. 29)), Defendants replied with additional briefing,

(Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 30)). The facts and circumstances of this

case reveal that Defendants not only spent significant time

briefing but also expended effort holding litigants accountable.

Therefore, the first factor weighs in favor of Defendants.

The second factor also weighs in favor of Defendants. While

Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, this case was

previously stayed for failure to pay a filing fee. (Order (Doc.

4).) The Magistrate Judge had to remind Plaintiff of his service

obligations, (Order (Doc. 8)), and response requirements, (Order

(Doc. 21)). Then, after Plaintiff stated that he “was not

‘warned’ of [his] need to respond to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss,” (Pl.’s Notice of Intent to Proceed (Doc. 22) at 1)

(quoting Order (Doc. 21) at 1), the Magistrate Judge extended

the response deadline, (Order (Doc. 24) at 2). Plaintiff’s

response was then filed after the extended deadline. (See Pl.’s

Resp. (Doc. 29).) This court finds that Plaintiff has caused

delays throughout this case.

This court also finds that Plaintiff acted without

diligence in filing his response. As stated above, Defendants

cited Local Rule 7.3 when objecting to Plaintiff’s Notice of

Intent to Proceed. (Defs.’ Obj. (Doc. 23) at 3.) While this

court recognizes that the challenges of proceeding without

counsel, “pro se litigants are not entitled to a general

dispensation from the rules of procedure or court imposed

deadlines.” Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1994).

Having previously been made aware of the rule by the opposing

party, Plaintiff’s failure to abide by the rules of this court

reveals at minimum a lack of diligence by Plaintiff.

The third factor supports denying Plaintiff’s motion.

Plaintiff contends that “the availability of greater information

as well as clarify provided by rulings in existing cases over

the coming year may make it efficacious for me to pursue this

action at a later date.” (Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 29) at 7.) This

court recognizes that it is “well established that, for the

purposes of Rule 41(a)(2), prejudice to the defendant does not

result from the prospect of a second lawsuit” and “the

possibility that the plaintiff will gain a tactical advantage

over the defendant in future litigation will not serve to bar a

second suit.” Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1274–75 (4th

Cir. 1987). However, it is also “settled that a plaintiff may

not obtain a non-prejudicial voluntary dismissal simply to

circumvent adverse rulings.” Teck Gen. P’ship v. Crown Cent.

Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 2d 989, 992 (E.D. Va. 1998) (citing

Paturzo v. Home Life Ins. Co., 503 F.2d 333, 336 (4th Cir.

1974)). Given Plaintiff’s admission that the “circumstances for

proceeding with my action may not be entirely ripe,” (Pl.’s

Resp. (Doc. 29) at 7), this court finds that Plaintiff’s request

more closely resembles an attempt to avoid an adverse ruling

than to gain an advantage in litigation. Plaintiff made this

request after Defendants had filed a brief in support of

dismissal with ten exhibits, (Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 17)), which had

been converted into one for summary judgment, (Order (Doc. 21)),

and an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint, (Defs.’ Answer (Doc.

19)). Plaintiff is not, as in Davis, attempting to transfer

litigation to state court “to resolve a difficult question of

state law.” Davis, 819 F.2d at 1275. Rather, it appears that

Plaintiff recognized the need for “greater information as well

as . . . clarity” to support his claims. (Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 29)

at 7.) By receiving Defendants’ briefs, the Magistrate Judge’s

orders, and permission to refile within a year, Plaintiff would

gain the benefits of tested theories and identified shortcomings

at the expense of Defendants’ resources. Therefore, the third

factor weighs in favor of denying Plaintiff’s motion.

The final factor also weighs in favor of denying

Plaintiff’s motion. Given the Magistrate Judge’s order, (Order

(Doc. 24)), and the responses by the parties, this court is

treating Defendants’ motion as one for summary judgment.

Plaintiff did not object to this order in his intent to proceed,

(see Pl.’s Notice of Intent to Proceed (Doc. 22)), and he did

not request a voluntary dismissal until his response, (see Pl.’s

Resp. (Doc. 29) at 7). Because Plaintiff’s request concluded his

last opportunity to be heard before summary judgment, the fourth

factor weighs in favor of Defendants. Therefore, based on the

totality of the circumstances, this court will deny Plaintiff’s

motion for voluntary dismissal and grant summary judgment to

Defendants.

Vv. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 16), 1s converted into a

Motion for Summary Judgment and is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Voluntary

Dismissal Without Prejudice, (Doc. 29), is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

A judgment dismissing this action will be filed

contemporaneously herewith.

This the 19th day of December, 2025.

United nip ts Bike, Me

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