Michael Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tenn.

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 25a0351p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐

MICHAEL HESTER,

│

Plaintiff-Appellant, │

> No. 24-5800

│

v. │

│

CHESTER COUNTY, TENNESSEE; BLAIR WEAVER; MARK │

GRIFFIN; BRIAN STOUT, │

Defendants-Appellees. │

┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Jackson.

No. 1:24-cv-01034—S. Thomas Anderson, District Judge.

Argued: May 7, 2025

Decided and Filed: December 19, 2025

Before: CLAY, READLER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Charles H. Barnett, IV, SPRAGINS, BARNETT & COBB, PLC, Jackson,

Tennessee, for Appellant. Nathan D. Tilly, PENTECOST, GLENN & TILLY, PLLC, Jackson,

Tennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Charles H. Barnett, IV, Sara E. Barnett, SPRAGINS,

BARNETT & COBB, PLC, Jackson, Tennessee, for Appellant. Nathan D. Tilly, PENTECOST,

GLENN & TILLY, PLLC, Jackson, Tennessee, for Appellees.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Michael Hester was granted parole after serving less than the

aggregate term of his sentences on multiple convictions. He remained in prison, however, for

four months beyond his parole release date because of a detainer lodged by Chester County,

No. 24-5800 Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tenn. Page 2

Tennessee, law enforcement officials. Based on this delayed release, he sued Chester County;

county officials including the sheriff, a deputy sheriff, and the jail administrator; several state

officials; and ten John Doe defendants, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hester alleged that the Chester

County defendants knowingly or recklessly used an invalid detainer warrant to prevent his

release on parole, and in doing so violated his right to due process under the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments and violated the Tennessee constitution and state law. The district

court granted the county defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Hester timely

appealed. We AFFIRM.

I.

A. Factual Background

According to the complaint, Hester pleaded guilty to criminal charges in Madison

County, Tennessee, in 2016 and received a ten-year prison sentence. He was later released on

probation. But in 2019, he was arrested on new charges in Chester County, Tennessee, which

resulted in the revocation of his Madison County probation. The Chester County arrest led to

Hester’s indictment on three misdemeanor charges for driving while his license was revoked and

two felony charges for possession with intent to sell and possession with intent to deliver

schedule II drugs. He pleaded guilty to all five charges and received a sentence of 11 months

and 29 days for the three merged misdemeanor counts and 6 years for the two felony drug

counts. The Chester County Circuit Court ordered the sentences on all five counts to run

concurrently but consecutively to the Madison County probation-revocation sentence. This

resulted in a combined total sentence of sixteen years with a sentence expiration date of January

27, 2033. Hester was remanded to the custody of the Tennessee Department of Corrections

(“TDOC”) to serve his time at the Morgan County Correctional Complex (“MCCX”). Hester

became eligible for parole in due course.

Following a parole hearing on January 10, 2023, the Tennessee Board of Parole granted

Hester parole and issued him a Certificate of Parole (alternately “Certificate” or “COP”). The

Certificate “ordered that [Hester] be, and hereby is paroled . . . effective [February 15, 2023].”

(COP, R. 1-3, PageID 27).

No. 24-5800 Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tenn. Page 3

Shortly before Hester’s parole release date, Chester County Jail Administrator Brian

Stout called Hester and informed him that Stout and Deputy Sheriff Mark Griffin “took it upon

themselves” to lodge a detainer warrant that would prevent Hester’s release from MCCX.

(Compl., R. 1, PageID 5). On February 14, 2023, Stout filed the detainer warrant. As a result,

Hester’s parole release date came and went with no release. Hester alleges that Stout, Griffin,

and Sheriff Blair Weaver “falsely asserted” that Hester had not completed his sentence and that

he was required to serve another 11 months and 29 days at Chester County Jail. (Id. at PageID

9).

Hester and his family fruitlessly worked to bring about his release. And at one point,

Stout said that he was “working on it.” (Id. at PageID 6). But, according to Hester, none of the

county defendants intervened to clarify or resolve the matter. They allegedly “refused to

consider Mr. Hester’s complaints.” (Id. at PageID 9). Hester ultimately retained counsel to

assist with obtaining his release. Once Hester’s counsel intervened, the detainer was lifted on

May 10, 2023—84 days after Hester’s effective parole release date. Further unknown delays

resulted in another 43 days after that. Hester was ultimately released on parole on June 22,

2023—127 days after his effective release date of February 15, 2023.

B. Procedural Background

In February 2024, Hester sued Chester County and county officials: Weaver, Griffin, and

Stout; state officials: Mike Parris, Jim Purviance, and Frank Strada; and ten John Doe defendants

who were allegedly involved in his “over detention,” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at PageID 3–

4). His complaint alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments by incarcerating him without legal authority. It also asserts that Defendants

violated the Tennessee constitution and state tort laws. Chester County, Weaver, Griffin, and

Stout (“county defendants”) moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Weaver, Griffin, and Stout claimed they were entitled to

qualified immunity. Parris, Purviance, and Strada (“state defendants”) filed a separate motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Hester voluntarily dismissed his claims against the state

defendants. And the district court later granted the county defendants’ motion to dismiss. The

district court decided that because Hester did not have a liberty interest in release on parole,

No. 24-5800 Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tenn. Page 4

Weaver, Griffin, and Stout were entitled to qualified immunity, and it concluded that Hester did

not plausibly plead a Monell claim against Chester County. After dismissing all of Hester’s

federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law

claims. Hester timely appealed.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Smith v. Kentucky, 36 F.4th 671, 674 (6th Cir. 2022). We also

review de novo a district court’s grant of qualified immunity. See Libertarian Nat’l Comm., Inc.

v. Holiday, 907 F.3d 941, 945 (6th Cir. 2018). We “must construe the allegations of the

complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiffs [and] accept all well-pled factual allegations as

true.” U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, 705 F.3d 588, 597 (6th Cir. 2013). “To survive a motion

to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation

modified). “This plausibility standard requires the plaintiff to plead factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Lindke v. Tomlinson, 31 F.4th 487, 496 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). Our

review is generally limited to the four corners of the complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), but we

may consider documents attached to the complaint or incorporated by reference that are central

to the claim, see Berry v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 832 F.3d 627, 637 (6th Cir. 2016). Here, Hester

attached to his complaint the sentencing orders from the county court and his COP, which we

consider below.

III.

Hester claims that the county defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process when they knowingly or recklessly issued an invalid detainer warrant that prevented his

release on his parole effective date.1 “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

1

Hester also briefly attempts to reprise his claim under the Fourth Amendment, without developing any

argument to support its application to his circumstances. Instead, he merely points out that Fourth Amendment

protections apply “beyond initial seizure” and thereby encompass instances of “continued detention without

probable cause.” (Appellant Br., ECF 9, 48). But Hester fails to illuminate how these concepts help him. Indeed,

No. 24-5800 Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tenn. Page 5

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States[] and must show

that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause prohibits state actors from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To establish a violation of the due process

clause, Hester must show that (1) he had a protected interest, (2) he was deprived of that interest,

and (3) the state did not afford him adequate process before the deprivation. See EJS Props.,

LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 2012).

1. Qualified Immunity

Weaver, Griffin, and Stout assert qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects

“government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

To overcome a claim of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that “(1) [Defendants]

violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of [Defendants’]

conduct was clearly established at the time.” Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 760 (6th Cir.

2021) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018)). We may consider

these requirements in the order of our choosing. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236

(2009). “If one is lacking, we need not address the other.” Crawford, 15 F.4th at 760.

A right is clearly established when every reasonable official would understand that his

conduct violates that right. Id. at 763. “Though a plaintiff need not point to a case on all fours

with the instant fact pattern to form the basis of a clearly established right, there must be a

sufficiently analogous case (or cases) from which a reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing violates that right.” Pleasant View Baptist Church v. Beshear, 78 F.4th 286,

295 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation modified).

the cases he cites discuss pretrial detentions without probable cause and malicious prosecution—claims that he does

not assert on appeal. (Id. (citing Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2010); Gregory v. City of

Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 747–51 (6th Cir. 2006))). As he has not otherwise developed any Fourth Amendment

claim, any such argument is forfeited. See Buetenmiller v. Macomb Cnty. Jail, 53 F.4th 939, 946 (6th Cir. 2022).

No. 24-5800 Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tenn. Page 6

Here, Hester has not provided legal authority supporting his allegation that he possessed a

plausible liberty interest in release on parole. So we need not consider whether he was deprived

of any such interest or the adequacy of any process he may have received. And even if he had

made out a plausible violation, Hester has failed to point to any binding caselaw clearly

establishing the existence of the right he claims. Therefore, the individual county defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity.

a. Liberty Interest in Parole Release

Hester frames his claim as one seeking redress for a violation of a liberty interest in

release following a grant of parole rather than a liberty interest in obtaining a grant of parole.2 In

so doing, he apparently seeks to shed the constraints of our prior holdings that there is no liberty

interest in parole under Tennessee law. See Wright v. Trammell, 810 F.2d 589, 591 (6th Cir.

1987) (per curiam); Seagroves v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 86 F. App’x 45, 48 (6th Cir.

2003) (citing TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-28-117(a) and 40-35-503(b) (1999)). Indeed, we recently

reiterated in Thomas v. Montgomery that “inmates in Tennessee do not have a constitutionally

recognized expectation of receiving parole because the statutory scheme does not sufficiently

constrain the Board’s discretion to deny parole.” 140 F.4th 335, 342 (6th Cir. 2025). And, as

discussed in Subsection b. below, his effort to cast his claim as one analogous to over-detention

is unavailing.

The Supreme Court has stated unequivocally, “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent

right of a convicted person to be conditionally released [on parole] before the expiration of a

valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). A

“mere unilateral hope or expectation of release on parole” does not create a protected liberty

interest; the person “must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Inmates of

Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7). Rather, “[a] liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by

2

Hester emphasizes his allegations supporting his assertions that the county defendants issued the detainer

knowingly or recklessly. However, while we credit Hester’s well-pleaded factual allegations concerning the county

defendants’ conduct and all reasonable inferences therefrom to Hester, ultimately the validity of a detainer does not

drive our determination about whether the liberty interest requirement of a procedural due process claim is satisfied.

See EJS Props., 698 F.3d at 855.

No. 24-5800 Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tenn. Page 7

reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’ or it may arise from an expectation or interest

created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (internal

citations omitted). Greenholtz provides an apt example of how this can occur. There, a

Nebraska statute provided that the parole board “shall” release parole-eligible inmates unless

certain exclusionary factors applied. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11. The mandatory nature of the

scheme led the Supreme Court to conclude that the statute created a liberty interest in parole. Id.

at 11–13; see also Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 372 (1987) (same under Montana

parole statute); Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219–20 (2011) (per curiam) (same under

California law). Such an interest arose because the language of the statute produced an

“expectancy of release” that was “entitled to some measure of constitutional protection.”

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12. In fact, the structure of the Nebraska law created a default position

that inmates would be released unless certain conditions existed. Id. at 11–12. Because of this

design, the Supreme Court observed that Nebraska’s “statute ha[d] unique structure and language

and thus whether any other state statute provides a protectible entitlement must be decided on a

case-by-case basis.” Id. at 12. Nonetheless, if “state law entitles an inmate to release on

parole . . . that entitlement is a liberty interest which is not to be taken away without due

process.” Inmates of Orient, 929 F.2d at 235. Determining whether state law creates such an

interest requires examination of the state’s “statutory scheme as a whole.” Thomas, 140 F.4th at

342 n.1.

Hester acknowledges that an inmate can claim a constitutional right to the grant of parole

only if state law creates a specific entitlement to it. And he rightly recognizes that the Tennessee

parole scheme creates no such entitlement. Yet he argues antithetically that once the Tennessee

Board of Parole grants parole, so long as it does not revoke that grant, an inmate has a legitimate

claim of entitlement—i.e., a liberty interest in being released on parole. We see no principled

way to distinguish Hester’s case from others in which courts have rejected inmates’ claims to a

liberty interest in parole release absent state law creating such an interest.

No. 24-5800 Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tenn. Page 8

Because Tennessee’s statutory scheme creates no expectancy of release, Hester does not

rely on the structure of the statute to establish his liberty interest.3 Instead, he argues that his

signed COP, which was issued pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-01-01-.09(1)(a), gave

him “‘a legitimate claim of entitlement’ to parole.” (Appellant Br., ECF 9, 33). Notably, he

points to no language in that regulation which might establish such a protected interest. Rather,

Hester directs us to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), to argue that when parole is

granted—in his case via the COP—an inmate has a “liberty interest in remaining free.”

(Appellant Br., ECF 9, 27). But this unremarkable proposition does not help Hester. Morrissey

addressed a different scenario and articulated a specific interest not relevant here; it recognized

that a parolee already freed from custody has a protectable interest in retaining that freedom.

408 U.S. at 481–82. Therefore, a person in those circumstances has a right to due process before

having their independence taken away again. Id. at 482 (“[T]he liberty of a parolee, although

indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts

a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.”). This is not difficult to understand;

someone who has been living outside the strictures of custody faces an acute impingement on

their freedom when revocation occurs. Hester contends Morrissey’s rationale should extend to

inmates awaiting parole release. This would mean that the liberty interest would vest when

parole is granted, rather than when a parolee is physically released from custody. According to

Hester, his COP established a liberty interest in his release because his parole was “deemed

effective” on a date certain—regardless of his custodial status. (Appellant Br., ECF 9, 29).

We find it difficult to square Hester’s argument with Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14

(1981), and Inmates of Orient. Both cases involved inmates who had been granted parole. In

Jago, the plaintiff inmate alleged a due process violation based on the recission of his parole

without a hearing. 454 U.S. at 16. The Supreme Court held that the inmate was not entitled to a

hearing before his parole was rescinded because Ohio law created no liberty interest in parole.

Id. at 21 (applying Greenholtz, 422 U.S. 1). Similarly, in Inmates of Orient, inmates who had

3

True, Tennessee law provides that “the prisoner . . . if paroled shall be allowed to go upon parole outside

of prison walls.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-28-117(a)(1) (2024) (emphasis added). But that portion of the statute

stands for the straightforward premise that a grant of parole means that the inmate will be released. In other words,

it merely defines parole. Regardless, Hester does not rely on this language, and neither party has provided briefing

on it. So we do not consider it.

No. 24-5800 Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tenn. Page 9

received favorable parole decisions after having a full hearing argued that their due process

rights were violated when their “on or after dates” for release were later rescinded without a

hearing. 929 F.2d at 234–35. In ruling on the inmates’ appeal of the district court’s denial of a

preliminary injunction to bar the recissions, we concluded that the inmates had “no

constitutionally protected liberty interest in being released at a time related to [their] on or after

date[s]” under Ohio law. Id. at 235. This conclusion was based on our reasoning that since Ohio

law establishes “no legitimate claim of ‘entitlement’ to parole before the expiration of a valid

sentence of imprisonment,” the recission of an “on or after date” for parole release is not a

protected liberty interest. Id. at 235–36. We relied on the rationale contained in Greenholtz and

Jago that where granting parole is “purely discretionary” under state law, an inmate enjoys no

liberty interest in release “before the expiration of a valid sentence of imprisonment.” Id.

(citation omitted).

Hester attempts to distinguish Jago and Inmates of Orient from his circumstances

because his parole was not revoked, and the inmates’ parole release in each of those cases

depended on a contingency. For example, in Jago, because Ohio law allowed for the recission of

parole, says Hester, the inmate’s release was contingent on the board not rescinding parole. And

in Inmates of Orient, Hester suggests that the parole order was “under review by the circuit court

as part of contemplated parole procedures.” (Appellant Br., ECF 9, 35). True, the parole

authority did not revoke Hester’s parole; rather, his release was delayed due to an invalid

detainer warrant. But this is a distinction without difference for purposes of evaluating the

existence of a liberty interest. Under Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-01-01-.09(1)(d), Hester’s

release date—like those in Jago and Inmates of Orient—also was contingent. The Board could,

among other things, “delay a parole date” if it received significant new information. See TENN.

COMP. R. & REGS. 1100-01-01-.09 (2022). And, at bottom, those decisions denied the existence

of a liberty interest simply because Ohio law does not create a liberty interest in parole. Jago,

454 U.S. at 21; Inmates of Orient, 929 F.2d at 235–36. The same is true here. So the fact that

Hester challenges the actions of county actors rather than the Parole Board is neither here nor

there. Tennessee’s statutory framework does not establish a liberty interest in parole release, so

Hester enjoyed no particular due process right under these circumstances.

No. 24-5800 Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tenn. Page 10

Resisting this conclusion, Hester turns our attention to Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480

(1980), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)—to no avail. Both cases are consistent

with the teachings of Greenholtz and its progeny that a liberty interest exists where a state creates

a legitimate claim of entitlement. In Vitek, the Supreme Court determined that a state statute

created for inmates a protectable interest in not being involuntarily transferred to mental health

facilities without a prior finding that they were suffering from mental illness. 445 U.S. at 490–

91. And in Wolff, the Court held that a statutory framework establishing procedures for granting

and taking away inmates’ “good-time credits”—which could affect parole eligibility—created a

liberty interest in the credits subject to due process requirements. 418 U.S. at 557–58. Neither

case helps Hester overcome the fact that Tennessee law does not create a protected liberty

interest in parole. Nor do they support his theory that the COP establishes such an interest.

Hester also relies on out-of-circuit and state court cases to argue that he had a legitimate

entitlement to release pursuant to his COP. See Kelch v. Dir., Nev. Dep’t of Prisons, 10 F.3d 684

(9th Cir. 1993); Patuxent Inst. Bd. of Rev. v. Hancock, 620 A.2d 917 (Md. 1993); Monohan v.

Burdman, 530 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1975) (en banc). However, not only are these cases non-binding,

they also are unpersuasive for the proposition that Hester advances. See, e.g., Phillips v. United

States, 734 F.3d 573, 583 (6th Cir. 2013) (“We, of course, are not bound by a decision from

another circuit.” (citation omitted)).

In sum, Hester has not adequately explained why a delay in release, before the expiration

of his sentence, would garner procedural safeguards that revocation of parole or rescission of a

release date does not. Thus, we agree with the district court that he has not shown a plausible

liberty interest in his release from parole.

b. Over-Detention/Clearly Established Law

Even if Hester somehow had a liberty interest, he points to no caselaw that would have

placed county officials on notice that their actions in causing a delay in release after the issuance

of a COP would violate that interest. Indeed, Hester acknowledges that he “has not found a case

directly on point” clearly establishing a statutorily created liberty interest based on the issuance

of his COP. (Appellant Br., ECF 9, 23). He instead argues that over-detention cases are more

No. 24-5800 Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tenn. Page 11

analogous to his situation than parole cases are. And he urges us to recognize his liberty interest

based on over-detention caselaw as well. Specifically, he says that just as an inmate has a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in being released at the end of his term of

imprisonment, an inmate, likewise, has a liberty interest in not being over-detained past his

parole-release date. But over-detention cases offer him no more relief than parole cases do.

When an inmate’s sentence expires, the state loses its power to hold him, and continued

detention can violate his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See McNeil v.

Dir., Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 246 (1972). Hester points us to Shorts v. Bartholomew for the

principle that “an incarcerated inmate has a liberty interest in being released at the end of his

term of imprisonment.” 255 F. App’x 46, 51 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation modified). But Shorts is

both nonbinding and inapt. In Shorts, the respondent inmate had received a split sentence that

included one year of incarceration to be followed by seven years of probation, with a

predetermined probation-release date. Id. at 47–48. Yet the county and its officials kept Shorts

in prison over 200 days beyond his one-year prison term. Id. at 48–49. Finding that the county

sheriff, in his official capacity, had over-detained Shorts and violated his constitutional rights, we

reversed the grant of summary judgment to the county. Id. at 60. Cf. Jones v. Bottom, 85 F.4th

805, 810–11 (6th Cir. 2023) (calling into question Shorts’s conclusion of a well-established right

under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). Hester argues that county authorities over-

detained him, like Shorts, when he should have been conditionally released.

Parole, however, confers different rights and expectations than does probation because it

is “more akin to imprisonment.” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006). Indeed,

“parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals.” Morrissey, 408

U.S. at 477. The Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he essence of parole is release from

prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain

rules during the balance of the sentence.” Id. Probation, conversely, is “in lieu of[]

incarceration.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (citation omitted). Thus, Shorts, as a probationer

serving the second phase of his split sentence, had completed his full prison term. In contrast,

Hester has not completed his prison term; his term does not expire until 2033. So the similarities

between the circumstances are somewhat superficial. Moreover, even if Shorts were sufficiently

No. 24-5800 Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tenn. Page 12

analogous to Hester’s case, as an unpublished case, it could not place officials on notice that their

actions violated a constitutional right. Bell v. City of Southfield, 37 F.4th 362, 367–68 (6th Cir.

2022).

Hester also points us to out-of-circuit over-detention cases, arguing that once a detainee is

ordered released, there is little tolerance for administrative delay. See Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d

703, 713 (8th Cir. 2004) (discussing Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730, 732–33 (8th Cir.

2001)); Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 771–72 (9th Cir. 2004); Brass v. County of Los Angeles,

328 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003). But in each case, the detainees who were over-detained

had reached the end of any valid period of detention or term of imprisonment. And unlike

Hester, they had no additional form of community supervision. Young, 249 F.3d at 732–33;

Berry, 379 F.3d at 766–67; Brass, 328 F.3d at 1194. What’s more, out-of-circuit cases can only

clearly establish the law when they “‘both point unmistakably to’ a holding and are ‘so clearly

foreshadowed by applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt’ regarding that holding.”

Ashford v. Raby, 951 F.3d 798, 804 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Ass’n v.

Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 1988)). That is not the case here, where none of these

cases address the rights of inmates like Hester who have been granted parole but have not

reached the end of their term of imprisonment.

Because Hester has failed to show that he had a protected liberty interest that was clearly

established at the time of his delayed release, his claim fails, and we need not consider the two

remaining elements of a procedural due process claim. See EJS Props., 698 F.3d at 855.

2. Monell Claim against Chester County

On appeal, Hester contends that Chester County is liable under two Monell theories: a

single decision by a policymaker (by Weaver) and a policymaker’s ratification of illegal action

(Weaver ratifying Griffin and Stout’s filing of the detainer). As an initial matter, however, a

“county cannot be liable under § 1983 absent an underlying constitutional violation by its

officers.” See Roell v. Hamilton County, 870 F.3d 471, 487 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Blackmore

v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 900 (6th Cir. 2004)). Because Hester fails to establish a

No. 24-5800 Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tenn. Page 13

constitutional violation, his Monell claim against Chester County fails as well. See Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

3. State-law Claims

Hester maintains that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims after dismissing his federal claims. He argues

that his state-law claims are closely tied to his federal claims and that separate adjudication

would waste judicial resources and risk inconsistent results.

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Osborn v. Haley, 549

U.S. 225, 245 (2007). We review a lower court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction

for abuse of discretion. See Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010).

When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts consider and weigh the

“values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Id. at 951–52 (quoting

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). When a district court has dismissed

all federal claims, the balance of considerations usually points to dismissing any remaining state-

law claims. Id. The district court here dismissed the state-law claims because it had dismissed

all federal claims, and Hester’s case was neither old nor voluminous, nor had the district court

involved itself extensively in the case already. The district court did not abuse its discretion

when it balanced the relevant factors and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

IV.

We AFFIRM.