Weldeyohannes v. State of Washington

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MUSSIE E. WELDEYOHANNES, No. 24-3821

D.C. No.

Plaintiff - Appellant,

3:23-cv-05526-

JCC-BAT

v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON; JOHN

LEE, Sergeant, Washington OPINION

Corrections Center; OLSON-WARD,

Nurse, Washington Corrections

Center; STEPHEN VERES, AKA

Veres; UNKNOWN OFFICERS,

Correctional Officer, Washington

Corrections Center; KYLE

GONTHIER, WCC - Sgt; KEITH

MALONE, WCC - C/O; JEFFREY

HOWARD, WCC - C/O; JORDAN

BALETO, WCC - C/O; ADAM LEE,

WCC - C/O; WASHINGTON

CORRECTIONS CENTER,

Department of Corrections Agency,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

2 WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WA

Argued and Submitted September 17, 2025

Seattle, Washington

Filed December 19, 2025

Before: William A. Fletcher, Ronald M. Gould, and Ana de

Alba, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould

SUMMARY *

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s summary

judgment for prison officials based on qualified immunity,

and remanded, in an action brought by a Washington state

prisoner regarding a use of force incident that occurred

during a scheduled transport between prison facilities.

Plaintiff has a documented history of medical

accommodation, including the use of a wheelchair as a result

of his mobility problems. During the transport, he was not

provided with a wheelchair van or special transport vehicle

that would accommodate his wheelchair. Instead,

defendants used physical force to move him and allegedly

dropped him and dragged him onto the floor of a regular bus,

resulting in injuries. Plaintiff alleged violations of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WA 3

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”) and brought claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to a substantial

risk of serious harm and the use of excessive force in

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

The panel held that the district court erred in granting

summary judgment in favor of the State on plaintiff’s ADA

and RA claims. There was conflicting evidence in the record

regarding (1) whether plaintiff told prison officials that he

could not walk up the steps of the normal transport bus and

instead needed a wheelchair-accessible vehicle; (2) whether

prison officials checked his transportation code; and

(3) what officials saw on the day in question. These disputes

over the extent of the prison officials’ notice and

investigation were sufficient for plaintiff’s ADA and RA

claims to survive a motion for summary judgment.

The panel held that material disputes of fact similarly

precluded summary judgment in favor of prison officials on

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate

indifference and excessive force. Because the district

court’s grant of qualified immunity was premised on a

finding that the prison officials had not violated plaintiff’s

rights, and because factual disputes remained about the

officials’ conduct that could impact whether the

unlawfulness was clearly established at the time, the panel

reversed the district court’s determinations of qualified

immunity and remanded for further proceedings.

COUNSEL

Athul K. Acharya (argued) and Sara K. Rosenburg, Public

Accountability, Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

4 WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WA

Sarah C. Brisbin (argued), Assistant Attorney General,

Corrections Division; Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney

General; Office of the Washington Attorney General,

Olympia, Washington; Candie M. Dibble, Senior Counsel,

Corrections Division, Office of the Washington Attorney

General, Spokane, Washington; for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Mussie Weldeyohannes (“Weldeyohannes”), an inmate

in the custody of the Washington State Department of

Corrections, brought a pro se civil rights action against the

State of Washington and several prison officials regarding a

use of force incident that occurred during a scheduled

transport between prison facilities. Weldeyohannes alleged

violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)

and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”) and brought claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to a

substantial risk of serious harm and the use of excessive

force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation

(“R&R”) recommending that the district court deny the State

and individual prison officials’ request for summary

judgment on all claims because of genuine disputes of

material facts. The magistrate judge recommended denying

qualified immunity for the individual prison officials for the

same reasons. The district court declined to adopt these

recommendations and instead granted summary judgment

for the State and the prison officials, and concluded that

WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WA 5

qualified immunity should be given to the individual

officials.

Weldeyohannes appeals, contending that the district

court erred when it resolved factual disputes in favor of the

moving party on summary judgment. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because we conclude that genuine

disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment in

favor of the State and prison officials, we reverse and

remand the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A

Weldeyohannes has a documented history of medical

accommodations from the prison system as a result of his

mobility problems. Dating back to at least 2017,

Weldeyohannes has received Health Status Reports

(“HSRs”) from the prison that document his

accommodations. At the time of the transfer,

Weldeyohannes had active HSRs for “lower tier” housing

and specialized gloves when using a walker or wheelchair

without a pusher. His past HSRs reflected his need for lower

tier or “no upper bunk” housing, a wheelchair and

wheelchair pusher, specialized compression stockings, a

cane, and a walker, and his requirement for taking the

“shortest route” when moving him. Similarly, his HSRs

issued after the transfer reflect his need for a wheelchair and

wheelchair pusher, specialized shoes and socks, gloves for

using a walker or wheelchair without a pusher, and an ADA-

compliant cell.

In addition to HSRs, prison medical providers also

assign inmates transportation codes (“T-codes”) that reflect

the accommodations needed for the transport of an inmate.

6 WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WA

T-codes range from “1,” which indicates that a medical

provider believes an inmate can get themselves onto the

regular transport bus without assistance, to “5,” which

indicates that an inmate requires a wheelchair van or other

special transport vehicle. Only a medical provider can

change the code for an inmate’s transport. The prison here

had issued Weldeyohannes a T-code of 5, meaning that he

requires a wheelchair van or other special transport vehicle

for all transports.

On February 15, 2023, Weldeyohannes was transferred

from the Washington Corrections Center in Shelton,

Washington, to the Washington State Penitentiary in Walla

Walla, Washington. Weldeyohannes arrived at the loading

area for the transport bus in his wheelchair. Upon his arrival,

Weldeyohannes was not provided with a wheelchair van or

special transport vehicle that would accommodate his

wheelchair. Although many underlying facts of this incident

are disputed by the parties, it is not disputed that on February

15, 2023, Weldeyohannes told at least one prison official

involved in his transport that he was unable to board the

regular transport bus and needed special transportation to

accommodate his wheelchair. Weldeyohannes contends that

he told many prison officials that he needed this

accommodation. Surprisingly, in light of his presence in a

wheelchair, the prison officials treated the incident as a

refusal of transport, called in a crisis negotiator, and after

negotiations failed, received authorization from a supervisor

to use physical force to move Weldeyohannes onto the

normal transport bus.

Again, the parties dispute the extent of force used and

resulting injuries, but Weldeyohannes contends that he was

dropped and dragged onto the floor of the bus and that, as a

WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WA 7

result, he suffered an injured shoulder and post-traumatic

stress, among other injuries.

An internal prison investigation after the incident

revealed that Weldeyohannes in fact had a T-code of 5 on

the day of the incident, but that this code was incorrectly

entered into the prison records as a T-code of 1.

B

On May 1, 2024, a magistrate judge issued an R&R

recommending denying the State’s and prison officials’

motion for summary judgment on all claims because the

record was either unclear or conflicting on what T-code was

in fact in place on February 15, 2023, what T-code was

reflected in the prison’s records and viewable to the prison

officials at the time of the transfer, which officials checked

the T-code, what steps they took to check it, whether any

officials were aware that Weldeyohannes had a T-code of 5,

and whether Weldeyohannes had voiced a request for

specialized transport. The R&R further found that the record

was unclear and that there was conflicting evidence on the

extent of any injury and the need for physical force. 1

The district court declined to adopt the magistrate

judge’s recommendations, concluding that the R&R was

fundamentally flawed because it failed “to engage with the

source of the alleged violation — [the State’s] erroneous

coding of [Weldeyohannes’s] transportation status (T-5 vs.

T-1), which the individual defendants then relied on.” The

1

The R&R recommended finding qualified immunity for one official,

Sergeant John Lee, who provided evidence that he spoke with medical

personnel and relied on their statement that Weldeyohannes would have

no issues with transport in a regular bus. Thus, the R&R recommended

granting summary judgment only as to John Lee on the claim of

deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment.

8 WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WA

district court concluded that although Weldeyohannes

presented in a wheelchair, that did not mean Weldeyohannes

was unable to self-ambulate for a short distance and the

individual prison officials’ conclusions to this effect did not

amount to deliberate indifference. For this reason, the

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State

on the ADA/RA claims, and in favor of the individual

officials on the Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate

indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. As for the

excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, the

district court found that qualified immunity applied to the

individual officials and granted summary judgment.

Weldeyohannes appeals, and we reverse and remand.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment and its determinations of qualified immunity.

Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013). In

doing so, we construe Weldeyohannes’s pro se filings

liberally. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir.

2010) (“We have . . . held consistently that courts should

construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro

se inmates and should avoid applying summary judgment

rules strictly.”). We also construe all evidence in

Weldeyohannes’s favor. Id. at 1149.

III. DISCUSSION

A. THE ADA AND RA CLAIMS

The district court erred in granting summary judgment in

favor of the State on Weldeyohannes’s ADA and RA claims

because the erroneous coding of Weldeyohannes’s

transportation status did not preclude a finding of deliberate

indifference.

WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WA 9

Under the ADA and RA, the “failure to provide

reasonable accommodation can constitute discrimination.” 2

Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002). We

have recognized that the need for reasonable

accommodation applies to inmate transportation. See Bell v.

Williams, 108 F.4th 809, 826 (9th Cir. 2024). After

receiving a request for an accommodation, a public entity

must “undertake a fact-specific investigation to determine

what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.” Duvall v.

Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001). To

receive money damages, Weldeyohannes must show that the

officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to his need for

accommodation. Id. at 1138.

Numerous genuine disputes of material fact preclude the

district court’s grant of summary judgment to the State.

There is conflicting evidence in the record regarding whether

Weldeyohannes told prison officials that he could not walk

up the steps of the normal transport bus and instead needed

a wheelchair-accessible vehicle, whether prison officials

checked his transportation code, and what officials saw on

the day in question. Ninth Circuit precedent supports our

holding that these disputes over the extent of the prison

officials’ notice and investigation are sufficient for

Weldeyohannes’s ADA and RA claims to survive a motion

for summary judgment. See Updike v. Multnomah Cnty.,

870 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A denial of a request

without investigation is sufficient to survive summary

judgment on the question of deliberate indifference.”); see

2

We analyze Weldeyohannes’s ADA and RA claims together because

they do not differ in any relevant way for this appeal, and because Title

II of the ADA was modeled after § 504 of the RA. See Duvall v. Cnty.

of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2001).

10 WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WA

also Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1140 (“[Plaintiff] provided

sufficient evidence to create a triable issue as to whether

[Defendants] . . . had notice of his need for the

accommodation involved and that they failed despite

repeated requests to take the necessary action.”). In Updike,

we reversed summary judgment on some of the plaintiff’s

ADA and RA claims because factual disputes existed as to

the extent of Multnomah County’s investigation into a

needed accommodation. We held that a reasonable jury

could find that the County’s actions were more than mere

“bureaucratic slippage.” Updike, 870 F.3d at 954–57.

Similarly, in Duvall we reversed summary judgment in favor

of Kitsap County when, viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, we determined that genuine issues

of material fact existed about the County’s investigation into

an accommodation. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139 (“When the

plaintiff has alerted the public entity to his need for

accommodation (or where the need for accommodation is

obvious . . .), the public entity is on notice that an

accommodation is required, and the plaintiff has satisfied the

first element of the deliberate indifference test.”). Here, too,

as in Duvall, questions of fact exist about what records the

prison officials checked, what those records showed, and any

other steps the prison officials took to investigate

Weldeyohannes’s need for a special transport van to

accommodate his wheelchair.

B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS

Material disputes of fact similarly preclude summary

judgment in favor of the prison officials on

Weldeyohannes’s Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate

WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WA 11

indifference and excessive force. 3 To prove liability for

deliberate indifference in this context, a plaintiff must meet

an objective standard — that the plaintiff was subject to a

“substantial risk of serious harm,” — and a subjective

standard — that a prison official subjectively knew of this

substantial risk and yet failed to take “reasonable measures

to abate it.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 845–

47 (1994); see also Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.,

726 F.3d 1062, 1074–76 (9th Cir. 2013) (an Eighth

Amendment claim requires an objective showing of a serious

deprivation and a subjective showing of deliberate

3

Weldeyohannes’s pro se amended complaint and his response to the

State’s motion for summary judgment frames his Eighth Amendment

claims as based on both excessive force and “deliberate indifference to

his serious medical needs.” The magistrate judge also framed one of his

Eighth Amendment claims as “deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need,” though the district court frames it only as a “deliberate

indifference” claim. We recognize that Weldeyohannes is not arguing

on appeal that the prison officials failed to provide him adequate medical

care, as is typical in an Eighth Amendment claim based on disregard for

an inmate’s medical needs. See, e.g., Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d

1164, 1185–90 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (bringing Eighth Amendment claim

based on denial of medical care for gender dysphoria). Instead,

Weldeyohannes is asserting a theory of deliberate indifference to his

safety or well-being because he alleges the prison officials knew of a

substantial risk of serious harm, yet disregarded that risk and ultimately

caused him harm. See, e.g., Wilk v. Neven, 956 F.3d 1143, 1147–48 (9th

Cir. 2020); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994).

Because it is clear from the framing of the claim throughout the pleadings

that Weldeyohannes was not alleging inadequate medical treatment, we

do not hold Weldeyohannes’s framing of his “serious medical need” to

his detriment on appeal. See, e.g., Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757

(9th Cir. 2003) (when construing pleadings, we provide a pro se plaintiff

the “benefit of any doubt”) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

12 WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WA

indifference); Wilk v. Neven, 956 F.3d 1143, 1147–48 (9th

Cir. 2020).

At summary judgment, the following factual disputes

must be resolved in Weldeyohannes’s favor: First, that

Weldeyohannes was sitting in a prison-issued wheelchair

was plain and obvious to the prison officials involved in the

transport. What was plain and obvious to their eyes and

reinforced by Weldeyohannes’s protests asking for special

transport raises at least a factual question. Second,

Weldeyohannes’s presence in a prison-issued wheelchair

also raised an issue of fact as to whether it was reasonable

for the prison officials to believe that he could walk a few

feet up the stairs of the regular transport bus. Third,

Weldeyohannes’s documented history of wheelchair use and

his official medical accommodations at the prison similarly

provide a triable issue of fact as to whether the prison

officials knew of and ignored an obvious risk to

Weldeyohannes when they used force to transport him, a

wheel-chair bound individual, up the stairs to a regular

transport bus. 4 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (“[A] factfinder

may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk

from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”).

Whether this use of force was justified under the

circumstances similarly turns on disputed facts that preclude

summary judgment. See Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d

4

We note that obtaining an accommodation for a prison-issued

wheelchair or other medical equipment requires a showing of a disability

and proving a need for an accommodation. See Wash. State Dep’t of

Corr., DOC 690.400, Individuals with Disabilities § IV (2022) (outlining

the accommodation process). Therefore, we are not persuaded by the

prison officials’ mistaken belief that Weldeyohannes could “self-

ambulate up a few steps,” even though he arrived in a wheelchair and do

not give that mistaken belief weight at summary judgment.

WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WA 13

1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020) (listing factors for an Eighth

Amendment excessive force claim). Here, we have sharply

conflicting evidence in the record. Weldeyohannes, on the

one hand, alleges that he was dragged and dropped onto the

floor of the regular transport bus, while by contrast the

prison officials say his body went limp, and the officials then

employed de minimis force to lift him into the bus. Only a

trier of fact can determine which of these characterizations

is closest to the truth; that cannot be determined conclusively

on a summary judgment motion. 5

C. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Qualified immunity protects government officials from

liability for civil damages unless their conduct objectively

violates clearly established rights. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 815–18 (1982). In our Circuit, “[q]ualified

immunity protects government officials from liability under

5

The parties acknowledge that a video of the incident exists, as is

required by the State’s policies for pre-planned uses of force.

Weldeyohannes requested the video recording in his complaint and again

noted in his response to the State’s motion for summary judgment that

“no photos [of the incident] have been provided.” Interpreting

Weldeyohannes’s pro se pleadings liberally, we construe these

statements as a request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) for

further discovery prior to judgment. See Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150

(declining to apply strict summary judgment rules to pro se inmates).

The magistrate judge recognized the existence of this video, and said that

it “could, potentially, be dispositive” to Weldeyohannes’s excessive

force claims. But the district court did not mention the video recording

in its grant of summary judgment in favor of the State and prison

officials. It was error for the district court to grant summary judgment

without first addressing this implicit request for discovery concerning

the video recording. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 930 (9th Cir.

2004) (“[S]ummary judgment in the face of requests for additional

discovery is appropriate only where such discovery would be ‘fruitless’

with respect to the proof of a viable claim.”).

14 WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WA

§ 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or

constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their

conduct was clearly established at the time.” Cuevas v. City

of Tulare, 107 F.4th 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2024) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the district

court’s grant of qualified immunity was premised on a

finding that the prison officials had not violated

Weldeyohannes’s rights, and because factual disputes

remain about the officials’ conduct that may impact whether

the “unlawfulness . . . was clearly established at the time,”

we reverse and remand the determinations of qualified

immunity. 6 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State and

the prison officials and its determination of qualified

immunity and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

6

We recognize that not all prison officials in this lawsuit had the same

level of involvement in the use of force incident. We decline to decide

in the first instance whether some individual officials may be entitled to

qualified immunity based on the scope of their individual actions when

the parties have not directly made this argument and the district court has

not first decided this specific question.