The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Cash Wright, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 1108 C.D. 2022
:
City of Philadelphia : Submitted: November 6, 2025
BEFORE: HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE WOLF FILED: December 19, 2025
Cash Wright, an unrepresented litigant, appeals to this Court from the July 1,
2022 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court)
sustaining the Preliminary Objections of the City of Philadelphia (City) to a
Complaint filed by Mr. Wright and dismissing said Complaint. Mr. Wright
maintains that an auctioneer failed to preside over an auction of City real estate in a
fair manner. Because Mr. Wright fails to provide any reason why the trial court’s
decision was in error, we affirm.
I. Background
In his Amended Complaint, filed on April 29, 2022,1 Mr. Wright averred that
an auctioneer employed by the City engaged in bid-rigging, bid-fixing, and bid
1
Mr. Wright’s initial Complaint, filed on February 18, 2022, contained factual averments and
legal arguments that are missing from the Amended Complaint. See Original Record (O.R.), Item
(Footnote continued on next page…)
manipulation at a February 19, 2020 real estate auction. Original Record (O.R.),
Item No. 5, Am. Compl. ¶ 1. In so doing, Mr. Wright explained, the auctioneer
“clearly and openly violated” the prohibition of unfair trade practices and deceptive
actions in the Federal Trade Commission Act,2 the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution,3 and Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a)(2).4 Mr.
Wright did not identify the relief that he sought in the Amended Complaint. The
City filed its Preliminary Objections on May 19, 2022, in which the City asserted
that Mr. Wright’s claims were both legally insufficient and insufficiently specific.
See O.R., Item No. 8. Mr. Wright filed no response to the Preliminary Objections
to his Amended Complaint.
In a June 27, 2022 order, the trial court sustained the Preliminary Objections
and dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice. See O.R., Item No. 10. Mr.
Wright appealed to the Superior Court, which issued an order to show cause as to
why the appeal should not be transferred to this Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §
762(a)(4)(i) (granting the Commonwealth Court exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
No. 1. It is well settled that an amended complaint has the effect of eliminating the original
complaint. Hionis v. Concord Twp., 973 A.2d 1030, 1036 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); Avery v. Cercone,
225 A.3d 873, 882 (Pa. Super. 2019). Thus, the trial court’s references to the original Complaint
are omitted from discussion here.
In evaluating Mr. Wright’s pleadings and appeal arguments, we are mindful of the principle
that “allegations of a pro se complainant are held to a less stringent standard than that applied to
pleadings filed by attorneys.” Rosario v. Beard, 920 A.2d 931, 934 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). It is
nonetheless true, however, that “pro se litigants are subject to the same rules of procedure as are
represented litigants.” Kozicki v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 299 A.3d 1055, 1063 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2023) (cleaned up).
2
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58.
3
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4
Rule 1.7(a)(2) provides that a lawyer “shall not represent a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest,” which occurs if “there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.” Pa.R.P.C.
1.7.
2
from trial court orders involving any municipality). O.R., Item No 12. Without a
response from Mr. Wright, our sister court transferred the matter to this Court’s
Prothonotary.
In an opinion in support of its order, the trial court explains its view that Mr.
Wright’s Federal Trade Commission Act claim is legally insufficient because “an
individual does not have the right to file an action against another party” pursuant to
that legislation. Trial Ct. Op. at 4 (citing Gilliam v. Nat’l Comm’n for Certification
of Physician Assistants, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 1512, 1514 (E.D. Pa. 1989)). Regarding
Mr. Wright’s Commerce Clause claim, the trial court explains that the Amended
Complaint “fails to assert what specific conduct or action” by the City is in violation
of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 5. Finally, the trial court observes that Mr. Wright
has failed to establish how the City violated Pa.R.P.C. 1.7(a)(2)’s prohibition of
concurrent representation, or how the Rules of Professional Conduct are at all
relevant. Id. at 5-6. Thus, the trial court maintains that the Preliminary Objections
were properly sustained and the Amended Complaint was properly dismissed.
II. Discussion
Our review of a trial court’s ruling on preliminary objections is limited to a
determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error
of law. Leahy v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 551 A.2d 1153, 1156 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988).
Preliminary objections are to be sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly
failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d
1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Where a preliminary objection presents a question
of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Firearm
Owners Against Crime v. City of Harrisburg, 218 A.3d 497, 505 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).
3
In his Brief to this Court, Mr. Wright argues that he had an “absolute right to
file suit against the City” due to its “negligence, bad faith actions, collusion[-]based
activities, gross misconduct,” and other alleged bad acts, given that Mr. Wright “was
of the opinion his [s]tate [r]ights and [f]ederal [c]onstitutional [r]ights were grossly
and extremely violated[.]” Wright’s Br. at 16-17. Mr. Wright further contends that
the trial court erred as a matter of law by finding that the City was shielded from suit
by sovereign immunity. Id. at 17. Next, Mr. Wright argues that the City violated
the provisions of the “FTCA,” by which Mr. Wright no longer refers to the Federal
Trade Commission Act, as he had in his pleadings, but to the Federal Tort Claims
Act.5 See id. at 12. Finally, Mr. Wright devotes the remainder of his Brief to a
discussion of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), in support of his contention that the City
violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
We are not persuaded by Mr. Wright’s arguments. First, the Trial Court never
addressed the issue of Mr. Wright’s “absolute right to file suit against the City” based
on his “opinion” that the City had violated his rights; rather, the trial court focused
on the legal insufficiency of his claims. Next, Mr. Wright’s contention that the trial
court erred by applying sovereign immunity doctrine is lacking in foundation, given
that the trial court never addressed that topic. Similarly, Mr. Wright does not explain
why we should reverse the trial court on the basis of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
given that he never raised an issue involving that legislation before the trial court.
Lastly, Mr. Wright’s discussion of the Commerce Clause omits any valid basis to
overturn the trial court’s conclusion that the Commerce Clause has no relevance to
this case.
5
See 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
4
Mr. Wright also makes new factual averments in his Brief. See Wright’s Br.
at 11 (averring that 80% of properties sold at auction require “some renovation” and
therefore “many trips” to home improvement retailers such as Home Depot or
Lowe’s); id. at 20 (averring that a parking lot near the location of the February 19,
2020 real estate auction contained many vehicles bearing New York and New Jersey
license plates). Setting aside the question of the relevance of these new claims, we
simply note that the proper place for such averments was in Mr. Wright’s pleadings,
not, for the first time, in an appellate brief. See Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Bureau
of Workers’ Comp. Fee Rev. Hearing Off. (Insight Pharm.), 245 A.3d 1158, 1165
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (explaining that “factual averments in a brief that have no basis
in the certified record cannot be considered by an appellate court”).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.
_____________________________________
MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
5
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Cash Wright, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 1108 C.D. 2022
:
City of Philadelphia :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 19th day of December 2025, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned matter, dated July 1,
2022, is hereby AFFIRMED.
_____________________________________
MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge