Edwards

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

ERIC EDWARDS, individually and

as personal representative of

the Estate of Romelo Barnes,

deceased, and TAMETHIA BROWN,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 8:21-cv-2874-VMC-AEP

CHAD CHRONISTER, in his

official capacity as Sheriff

of the County of Hillsborough,

MATTHEW MOYER, JOHN DOE 1,

and JOHN DOE 2

Defendants.

/

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on consideration of

Plaintiff Eric Edwards’s pro se “Motion for Reconsideration

of Dismissal” (Doc. # 40), filed on December 15, 2025. For

the reasons that follow, the Motion is denied.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiffs, Eric Edwards, individually and as personal

representative of the estate of Romelo Barnes, and Tamethia

Brown, commenced this action in December 2021, alleging that

Sheriff’s Deputies Matthew Moyer, Miguel Guerra, and Jamar

Colon “unlawfully caused through the use of excessive and

deadly force, the death of [their son, Romelo Barnes], in

violation of his Federal Constitutional rights, the Americans

with Disabilities Act, and the laws of the State of Florida.”

(Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 3, 9-10).

The complaint asserted six claims: excessive force in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Deputies Moyer, Guerra,

and Colon (Count I); wrongful death (battery) under Florida

law against Deputies Moyer, Guerra, and Colon (Count II);

wrongful death (battery) under Florida law against Sheriff

Chad Chronister (Count III); wrongful death (negligence)

under Florida law against Deputies Moyer, Guerra, and Colon

(Count IV); wrongful death (negligence) under Florida law

against Sheriff Chronister (Count V); and violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 28

C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7), against all Defendants (Count VI).

(Id. at ¶¶ 16-51).

In February 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss the

complaint with prejudice on the grounds that: “Plaintiffs’

Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading; (2)

Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the mandatory

provisions of Florida Statute § 768.28; (3) Plaintiffs have

failed to establish standing to bring a wrongful death claim;

(4) Plaintiffs have incorrectly identified certain potential

Defendants; (5) Plaintiffs have failed to overcome the

Deputies’ qualified immunity; and (6) Plaintiffs have failed

to state a claim for an ADA violation.” (Doc. # 13 at 2).

Plaintiffs responded in opposition. (Doc. # 18). The motion

to dismiss was referred to Magistrate Judge Anthony E.

Porcelli. (Doc. # 22). After a hearing on the motion,

Magistrate Judge Porcelli granted Plaintiffs’ oral motion for

leave to file an amended complaint to address the deficiencies

raised by Defendants and denied as moot Defendants’ motion to

dismiss. (Doc. # 35).

In May 2022, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint

against Sheriff Chronister, Deputy Moyer, and two unnamed

deputies, John Does 1 and 2. (Doc. # 36). The amended

complaint asserted the same claims as set forth in Counts I

through V of the original complaint, except Defendants John

Doe 1 and 2 replaced Deputies Guerra and Colon in Counts I,

II, and IV. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-44, 60-68). The amended complaint

did not assert an ADA claim. (Id.).

On June 6, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss the amended

complaint, arguing as follows: “Count One should be dismissed

because Plaintiffs have failed to overcome the Deputies’

Qualified Immunity; Counts Two through Five should be

dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed to establish

standing to bring a wrongful death claim” and “because

Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Florida Statute §

768.28”; “Claims against ‘Deputy Doe 1’ and ‘Deputy Doe 2’ .

. . should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed to

file an appropriate fictitious party pleading; Counts Four

and Five should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed

to state a cause of action for wrongful death due to

negligence; Counts Two and Three inappropriately reference

claims brought under the Fourth Amendment and request

punitive damages and such references should be struck”;

“Counts Two and Four should be dismissed for failing to

overcome the Deputies’ immunity found in Florida Statute §

768.28”; and “Counts Three and Five should be dismissed for

failing to state a cause of action against the Sheriff

pursuant to Florida Statute § 768.28.” (Doc. # 37 at 2-3).

Defendants also argued that Mr. Edwards, in his individual

capacity, and Ms. Brown were inappropriate parties to the

action. (Id. at 3). On the same day, Plaintiffs, through

counsel, filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without

prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(a)(1)(A)(i). (Doc. # 38). On June 7, 2022, the Court

entered an order confirming the dismissal of the action and

directing the Clerk to close the case. (Doc. # 39).

More than three and a half years later, Mr. Edwards, pro

se, moves for reconsideration of the dismissal pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and seeks to reinstate

the action. (Doc. # 40).

II. Legal Standard

“[U]pon a plaintiff’s notice of a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i)

voluntary dismissal, the action is no longer pending, and the

district court is immediately deprived of jurisdiction over

the merits of the case.” Absolute Activist Value Master Fund

Ltd. v. Devine, 998 F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the district

retains jurisdiction to consider collateral issues after the

action is voluntarily dismissed, such as “(1) the imposition

of costs, (2) the imposition of attorney’s fees, (3) the

imposition of contempt sanctions, and (4) the imposition

of Rule 11 sanctions.” Id.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a

party may file a motion to alter or amend a judgment no later

than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(e). “The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59] motion are

newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.”

Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a party may

move for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding

for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable

diligence, could not have been discovered in time

to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an

opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or

discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that

has been reversed or vacated; or applying it

prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “A motion under Rule 60(b) must be

made within a reasonable time – and for reasons (1), (2), and

(3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or

order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(c)(1). “Rule 60(b) is the appropriate avenue for relief”

from a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Waetzig v.

Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 604 U.S. 305, 313 (2025).

III. Analysis

Mr. Edwards argues that the Court should reconsider the

dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 59(e). (Doc # 40 at

1-2). Mr. Edwards asserts that “[n]ew evidence, clarification

of misapplied standards, and overlooked legal arguments

compel reconsideration and reinstatement of the matter to

address substantial due process and civil rights violations

regarding the death of Romelo Barnes.” (Id.). The Court

disagrees.

As an initial matter, the Motion is purportedly brought

on behalf of Plaintiffs. However, because Mr. Edwards is pro

se, he can only seek relief in his individual capacity.

Next, Rule 59(e) is not applicable here as there has

been no entry of judgment. See Anderson v. Counts, No. 1:07-

cv-0192-WSD, 2008 WL 268988, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2008)

(“[Rule 59(e)] does not apply because no judgment of any kind

has been entered it this case.”).

Finally, even construing the Motion as seeking relief

under Rule 60(b), Mr. Edwards is not eligible for relief from

the notice of voluntary dismissal filed by his own attorney.

Contrary to his assertion, Mr. Edwards has not offered any

“new evidence” in support of the Motion. (Doc. # 40 at 1). In

any event, even if he did, this would not be grounds for

relief because the Motion was filed more than three years

after the action was dismissed and thus beyond the one-year

deadline for Rule 60(b)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Even if

he had asserted reasons covered by Rule 60(b)(4)-(6), the

Court determines that the Motion was not filed within a

“reasonable time.” Id.

Regardless, rather than asserting any of the grounds for

which a party may seek relief under Rule 60(b), Mr. Edwards

merely attempts to rebut several points made in Defendants’

second motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 40 at 2-3). Mr. Edwards has

not articulated any basis that would warrant granting relief

from the notice of dismissal filed by his own counsel.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

Plaintiff Eric Edwards’s pro se “Motion for

Reconsideration of Dismissal” (Doc. # 40) is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

17th day of December, 2025.

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE